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Preface
Conference papers normally emerge as the product of an idea and are usually fo¬
cussed around a theme. The papers included in this volume were submitted for a
meeting held at the Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung of Bielefeld University.
That meeting was designed as a preparatory Conference for a group of European eco¬
nomic historians who have informally engaged in discussions to write a new eco¬
nomic history of Western Europe.
Their plans have been stimulated by a shared dissatisfaction with the way eco¬
nomic history of Europe is now taught and written at universities throughout the
continent and North America. They believe that the subject lacks a comparative per¬
spective and a common method of approach which could supply coherence to the
continued accumulation of data and historical narratives on a country by country ba¬
sis. In brief they all feel it is time to break away from national history and the study
of Europe's past economic development in terms of compartmentalized country stud¬
ies and suggest that "European" economic history needs to be focussed on the meas¬
urement and explanation of differences in the levels of income and productivity at¬
tained by national economies for bench mark periods between the late eighteenth
and the mid twentieth centuries.
Until such a Statistical framework is established, many scholars who now research
and teach in the expanding field of European economic history find it difficult to
identify a central set of problems for their articles, books and lectures. Standard texts
in the subject refer to "Europe", but they assemble together country studies which
describe and analyse the process of economic development within a purely national
context. They are cases which summarize and synthesize ongoing historical research
State by state. Explicit comparisons across national frontiers constitute a rather lim¬
ited part of the book and are often relegated to conclusions. For method, economic
histories of Europe tend to rely upon preliminary chapters which guide students to¬
wards an understanding of the historical mechanisms through which such major in¬
puts as capital, labour, technology, land, the widening of markets, demand and entre¬
preneurs, generated the observed growth of output for particular countries. And they
depend for coherence upon a diffusion model which for the period before 1914
pushes enquiry towards an explanation for the British lead and Continental lags in
high rates of capital formation and the adoption of advanced industrial and agrarian
technology. Objections to and dissatisfaction with recent attempts to write European
economic history as technological diffusion or in terms of accelerated rates of invest¬
ment are already well known. Nevertheless, typologies of development propounded
by Rostow, Gerschenkron and Landes in the 1950s continue to dominate and to pro¬
vide heuristic devices for the Organization of runs of data and the plethora of scho¬
larly country studies now available.
Many scholars in this field now expect that the elements of a new approach could
emerge simply by bringing together the considerable but separated bodies of statis¬
tics we now possess for individual countries into a multinational frame of reference.
Perhaps the most obvious and urgent task of the discipline is to restructure and to re-
constitute the economic data available into a form that will permit ready compari¬
sons across the countries and across the regions of Europe. To advance further, Eu¬
ropean economic history should be firmly established on the basis of statistics which
will command the respect of scholars throughout the continent. Such statistics would
hopefully inciude the conventional kind of numbers readily accessible to economists
and historians who are concemed with the development of Europe in the second half
ofthe 20th Century; for example, those familiär calculations of per capita incomes
expressed in a common currency and numerous indicators of partial productivity for
agriculture and industry which form the indispensable basis for analysis into con¬
trasts in living Standards and economic efficiency among the economies of Europe at
the present time.
Certainly the amount of information available for earlier periods will be more lim¬
ited. While the task of collating and structuring local and national statistics into a
form which will allow historians to compare levels of welfare and productivity across
national boundaries will require a sustained effort of research and co-operation from
scholars in several European universities. There are, moreover, problems of method
and definition to be solved before the search for data can begin. But the concepts
connected with international comparisons of income and productivity have been ex¬
tensively discussed by economists. And the voluminous research over the past three
decades on the quantitative economic history of European countries indicates that a
considerable volume of statistics are available to be collated into countrywide or re¬
gional averages and presented in form which would facilitate international compari¬
sons.
When an acceptable body of data has been gamered (largely from published
sources) and presented as sets of tables, the gaps in living Standards among Euro¬
pean populations can be located and quantified. Historians will be able to distin¬
guish the share of the differential attributable to differences in the allocation of la¬
bour between industry and agriculture from the share attributable to national differ¬
ences in the productivity of labour employed in industry and agriculture. Differen¬
tials in labour productivities can then be broken down between industries and sectors
of agriculture. The productivity and role of the service sector can be fitted into the
picture. Finally scholars could then proceed to analyse such differences in terms of
capital-labour ratios, natural endowments, the diffusion of technology, variations in
pattems of demand, the size of the market, etc. in different parts of Europe. At this
stage (when salient differences between nations are clear and quantified) they can
then begin to utilize, to modify and to construct modeis of economic growth to ac¬
count for differences in their patterns and rates of growth over the long run.
All the scholars who met at Bielefeld believe that the Statistical building blocks for
an economic history of Europe must take the form of measures of the productivities
of labour employed in producing the manifold commodities and Services which make
up the output of a given country. They recognized they could not hope to make pro¬
ductivity estimates for more than a selection of the principal commodities produced
in the 19th and 20th centuries. But if the Utility of the ideas is appreciated the exam¬
ple should stimulate further research by others along similar lines.
Meanwhile the production of estimates related to such obvious and major com¬
modities as grain, meat, wine, coal, textiles, iron and steel, bricks, ships and railways
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(just to take some obvious examples) should enable historians to begin to base Eu-
rope's economic history upon a valid body of statistics and focus it firmly upon an
attempt to account for measured differences in levels of productivity over fairly long
periods of time.
Statistics are only a preface to historical enquiry. But once they are collated into
the required form, the analysis of contrasts and changes over the long run in labour
productivity can begin and at that stage the relative significance of agriculture, food
supplies, capital, the diffusion of advanced technology and other elements, which are
the preoccupations of economic historians, can be appreciated and a European per¬
spective brought to bear upon the national histories of its constituent states. At that
point not only should a "real" economic history of Europe become possible but the
finished study could exercise a real influence upon the teaching and writing of na¬
tional economic history because the collection and proper arrangement of data on
differences in productivity among European economies is probably indispensable for
a deeper understanding of the long term economic evolution of individual states.
For its preparatory meeting at Bielefeld the group concentrated on three themes re¬
lated to these broad ideas and objectives: first, the recent development and present
state of European economic history (discussion was organized around the opening
paper presented by Herman Van der Wee and Jos Delbeke and an address by Peter
Mathias); secondly, a lively and protracted debate took place in several sessions con¬
cemed with the conceptual problems involved in the measurement and comparisons
of income and productivity across countries (papers by Richard Tilly, Patrick
O'Brien and Gianni Toniolo raised most ofthe theoretical issues which could arise);
thirdly, our deliberations became more concrete when the Conference turned to con¬
sider papers by Maurice Levy-Leboyer, Angus Maddison, Juan Guispado and Rainer
Metz designed to measure growth and fluctuations in productivity over time and
even more specific when we considered two exercises in econometrics comparing the
relative efficiency of European iron and steel industries, 1820-1914 by Rainer
Fremdling and Robert Allen.
Interchanges between historians and economists from several national and intel¬
lectual traditions generated lively and constructive argument. Despite reservations
expressed by many scholars about the conceptual and empirical difficulties of com¬
paring trends in income and productivity across Western Europe, they remained con¬
vinced that a new economic history of the region could only be based on carefully
collected and properly calibrated sets of statistics.
All those who attended the Bielefeld meeting on European Productivity, 1789-
1950, from 25th-26th April, 1981, wished to extend their warm thanks to their aca¬
demic host, Sidney Pollard, to the Directorial Board ofthe Zentrum für Interdiszipli¬
näre Forschung (including its helpful executive staff) for financing and managing a
Conference on this important topic. They would also like to express their gratitude to
the editors of Quantum for help in Publishing most of the papers submitted or soli-
cited for the Bielefeld, Conference.
Autumn 1981 Rainer Fremdling
Patrick K. O'Brien

Part 1: Concepts
Jos Delbeke, Herman Van der Wee
Quantitative Research in Economic History
in Europe after 1945*
The study of quantitative economic history, building on the substantial base that was
laid by economic historians such as Simiand and Labrousse in the 1930*s, greatly ex¬
panded after 1945. The most important contributory factor for this phenomenon was
undoubtedly the increasing interest of economists for the empirical testing of their
theories, which, since the methodological conflicts of the 1880's, had been largely
based on an ahistorical, deductive method. Then, too, more tools became available
for the conduct of such research: more and more Statistical techniques were devel¬
oped that could be applied directly to economic research, and the evolution of Com¬
puter sciences made their application practicable. Finally, the general expansion of
the science of economy began to attract attention from other disciplines. Among
those who feit this attraction were historians.
Our purpose here is to present the major trends of this intensified European re¬
search in economic history. We will concentrate on the fields of research that have
occupied the attentions ofthe majority ofthe economic historians in specific periods.
However, since complete bibliographies are readily available, we will make no at¬
tempt to provide an exhaustive list of the relevant publications.
The interest of economic historians has closely paralleled the contemporary prob¬
lems confronting the science of economics. Between the two World Wars and shortly
after World War II, economic movements attracted a great deal of attention. The
great economic crises of the thirties end their aftermath were decisive. Historians set
out to determine whether economic fluctuations had occurred in the past and, if so,
in what manner. In so doing, they laid the foundations for the present quantitative
economic history.
In the 1950's and 1960's, interest shifted more and more toward sectoral and ma-
cro-economic growth and toward the institutional factors associated with this
growth. This was a period of decolonization, and the problem of development
loomed large for the new nations though not less for the "old" nations. And with the
ongoing crisis of the 1970's, the problem of discordant and unbalanced economic
growth again came to the fore.
We want to express our sincere thanks to Drs. E. Aerts for his valuable remarks.
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Thus, our concem here is with the major trends in quantitative economic history as
manifested in the work of European economic historians from 1945-1980. In addi¬
tion, we will only treat the 1945-1980 period insofar as it is part of a larger whole.
One final restriction: we will be interpreting this historical work in the strict eco¬
nomic sense: studies dealing primarily with demographical, social, political, and
other analogous variables will not be taken into consideration. For them, we would
refer the reader to more broadly conceived works.1
I. The Study of Economic Movements
The world depression of the 1930*s stimulated economists and historians to take up
the study of the fluctuations in economic development and of business cycies. This
interest led to the establishment of the "International Scientifical Committee on
Price History" in 1931 under the chairmanship of Lord Beveridge. This association
provided the first significant impulse to quantitative economic historical research in
Europe. The interest was primarily on fluctuations in prices and wages, and numer¬
ous studies appeared in France,2 Germany,3 Austria,4 the United Kingdom,5 Italy,6
Poland,7 and Spain.8
1. Baudet, H., Van Der Meulen, H., (eds.), Kernproblemen der economische geschiedenis, Gro¬
ningen 1978.
Bläsing, J. F. E., Inleiding tot de elementaire economische geschiedenis, Groningen 1980.
Kula, W., Problemi e metodi di storia economica, Milano 1972.
Geurts, P. A. M., Messing, F. A, M., Theoretische en methodologische aspecten van de eco¬
nomische en sociale geschiedenis, in: Geschiedenis in veelvoud 7/8, Den Haag 1979.
Marczewski, J., Introduction ä Vhistoire quantitative, Geneve 1965.
Slicher van Bath, B. H., Theorie en Praktijk in de economische en sociale geschiedenis, in:
A. A. G. Bijdragen, nr. 14, Wageningen 1967, pp. 105-228.
Van der Wee, H., Kiep, P. M. M., Quantitative economic history in Europe since the Second
World War: Survey, Evaluation and Prospects, in: Recherches Economiques de Louvain, 41
(1975), pp. 195-218.
2. Hauser, H., Recherches et documents sur Vhistoire des prix en France de 1500 ä 1800, Paris
1933.
Labrousse, C. E., Esquisse du mouvement des prix et des revenus en France au XVIIIe siecle,
Paris 1933.
3. Elsas, M. J., Umriss einer geschichte der Preise und Löhne in Deutschland, Leiden 1936-49.
Jacobs, A., Richter, H., Die Großhandelspreise in Deutschland von 1792 bis 1934, Berlin
1935.
4. Pribram, A. F., Materialen zur Geschichte der Preise und Löhne in Oesterreich, XV-XVIII
Jahrhundert, Vienna 1938.
5. Beveridge, W., Prices and Wagesfrom the Twelfth to the Nineteenth Century. Vol. 1. Price Ta¬
bles: Mercantile Era, London 1939.
Gilboy, E. W., Wages in Eighteenth Century England, London 1934.
6. Parenti, G., Prime richerche sulla Rivoluzione dei prezzi in Firenze, Florence 1939.
Fanfani, A., Indagini sulla "Rivoluzione dei prezzi", Milano 1940.
Parenti, G., Prezzi e mercato del grano a Siena, 1546-1756, Florence 1942.
1. Several price publications appeared in the series "Badania z Dziejow Spoznyck i Gospo-
darczyck" pod redahcja Prof. Fr. Bujak. The editors were Adamczyck, A., Furtak, T., Gor-
kiewicz, M., Hoszowski, S., Mika, M., Pelc, J., Siegel, S., Tomaszewski, E.
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This trend continued after World War II, and new research projects were set up in
various countries. Under the impetus provided by E. Labrousse and J. Meuvret in
France, an enormous project was begun with the objective of editing and Publishing
official French price lists from the 16th Century on.9 Similar work was commenced in
almost every European country: Italy,10 the Netherlands,11 Belgium (where the "In-
teruniversity Centre for the History of Prices and Wages" was established in 1953),12
8. Hamilton, E. J., American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1501-1650, Cambridge,
Mass. 1934.
Hamilton, E. J., Money, Prices and Wages in Valencia, Aragon and Navarra, 1351-1500,
Cambridge, Mass. 1936.
Hamilton, E. J., War and Prices in Spain, 1651-1800, Cambridge, Mass. 1947.
9. Baulant, M., Meuvret, J., Prix des cereales extraits de la mercuriale de Paris, 1520-1698, Paris
1960.
Baulant, M., Le prix du bie ä Paris, 1450-1789, in: Annales E. S. C, 23(1968), pp. 520-540.
Baulant, M., Le salaire des ouvriers du bätiment ä Paris de 1400 ä 1726, in: Annales E. S. C,
26(1971), pp. 436-483.
Romano, R., Commerce et prix du bie ä Marseille au XVIIIe siecle, Paris 1956.
Freche, G. & G., Les prix des grains, des vins et des legumes ä Toulouse, 1486-1868, Paris
1967.
Labrousse, E., Romano, R., Dreyfus, F. G., Le prix dufroment en France au temps de la mon¬
naie stable, 1726-1913, Paris 1930.
Dupaquier, J., Lachiver, M., Meuvret, J., Mercuriales du pays de France et du Vexin francais,
1640-1792, Paris 1968.
10. De Maddalena, A., Prezzi e aspetti di mercato in Milano durante il secolo XVII, Milano 1950.
Romano, R., Prezzi, salari e servizi a Napoli nel secolo XVIII, 1734-1806, Milano 1965.
De Maddalena, A., Prezzi e mercedi a Milano dal 1701 al 1860, Milano, 1974.
Also several publications in: Cipolla, C. M., (ed.), Archivio Economico delV Unificazione Ital¬
iana, 1956.
Sella, D., Salari e lavoro nell edifizia lombarda durante il secolo XVII, Pavia 1968.
Basini, G. L., L'uomo e il pane. Ricorse, consumi e carenze della populazione modenese nel
Cinque e Seicento, Milano 1970.
Vigo, G., Real Wages ofthe Working Class in Italy: Building Workers' Wages, fourteenth to
eighteenth Century, in: The Journal of European Economic History, 3(1974), pp. 378-399.
11. Posthumus, N. W., Nederlandsche Prijsgeschiedenis, Leiden 1943.
Posthumus, N. W., Ketner, F., Nederlandsche Prijsgeschiedenis, Leiden 1964.
12. Verlinden, C, a.o., Dokumenten voor de geschiedenis van prijzen en Ionen in Viaanderen en
Brabant, Bruges 1959-73.
Van der Wee, H., The Growth ofthe Antwerp Market and the European Economy, fourteenth-
sixteenth centuries, vol. 1: Statistics, The Hague 1963.
Ruwet, J., Heiin, E., Ladrier, F., Van Buyten, L., Marche des cereales ä Ruremonde, Luxem¬
bourg, Namur et Diest aux 17e et 18e siecles, Louvain 1966.
Genicot, L., Bouchat-Dupont, M. S., Delvaux, B., La crise agricole du Bas Moyen Age dans le
Namurois, Louvain 1970.
Fanchamps, M. L., Recherches statistiques sur le probleme annonaire dans la principaute de
Liege de 1475 ä lafin du 16e siecle, Liege 1970.
Tits-Dieuaide, M. J., La formation des prix cerealiers: t'exempleflamand et brabancon au 15e
siecle, Brüssels 1975.
Several articles are published in the "Bijdragen tot de Prijsgeschiedenis/Contributions a
l'histoire des prix".
In the 1970s, a series "Lonen en Prijzen", is being published under the direction of E. Schol-
liers (Brüssels).
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Denmark,13 the United Kingdom,14 Portugal,15 Sweden,16 the USSR,17 Poland,18
Spain,19 West Germany,20 and Turkey and the Middle East.21
These price and wage studies primarily constituted the first phase of quantitative
economic historical research: the constmction of a data bank. The data were very
13. Friis, A., Glamann, Kr., A History of Prices and Wages in Denmark, 1660-1800, London
1958.
14. Postan, M. M., Titow, J., Heriots and Prices on Winchester Manors, in: The Economic His¬
tory Review, ll(1958-'59), pp. 392-417.
Farmer, D. L., Some Grain Price Movements in Thirteenth-Century England, in: The Eco¬
nomic History Review, 10(1957-'58), pp. 207-220.
Farmer, D. L., Some Livestock Price Movements in Thirteenth Century England, in: The Eco¬
nomic History Review, 22(1969-'70), pp. 1-16.
Brenner, Y. S., The Inflation ofPrices in Early Sixteenth Century England, in: The Economic
History Review, 14(1960-'61), pp. 225-239.
Brenner, Y. S., The Inflation ofPrices in England, 1551-1650, in: The Economic History Re¬
view, 15(1962-^63), pp. 266-284.
Bowden, P., Agricultural Prices, Farm Profits and Rents, in: J. Thirsk (ed.), The Agrarian His¬
tory of England and Wales, vol. IV: 1500-1640, Cambridge 1967, pp. 593-695.
Hoskins, W. G., Harvest Fluctuations and English Economic History, 1480-1619, in: Agricul¬
tural History Review, 12(1964), pp. 18-46.
Hoskins, W. G., Harvest Fluctuations and English Economic History, 1620-1759, in: Agricul¬
tural History Review, 16(1968), pp. 15-31.
Chapman, A., Knight, R., Wages and Salaries in the United Kingdom, 1920-1938, London
1953.
15. Magelhaes Godinho, V., Prix et Monnaies au Portugal, 1750-1850, Paris 1955.
16. Hammarström, I., The Price Revolution ofthe Sixteenth Century: Some Swedish Evidence, in:
The Scandinavian Economic History Review, 5(1957), pp. 118-154.
Jörberg, L., The Development of Real Wages for Agricultural Workers in Sweden During the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, in: Economy and Theory, 15(1972), pp. 41-57.
17. Mankov, A. G., Le mouvement des prix dans l'etat russe du 16e siecle, Paris 1957.
18. Hoszowski, St., Les prix ä Lwow, 16e-17e siecles, Paris 1954.
19. Eiras Roel, A., Uzero Gonzales, R, Los Precios de los granes de Santiago de Compostella: si¬
glo 18, in: Jornadas de Metodologia aplicada de las Ciencas Historicas, 24-27 Abril 1973,
Ponencias y Communicaciones, vol. 2, pp. 20.
Garcia Lombardero, J., Analisis estadistico de los precios de los productos agricolas en la Gali¬
cia del siglo 18, in: Jornadas de metodologia aplicada de las Ciencas Historicas, 24-27 Abril
1973, Ponencias y Communicaciones, vol. 2, pp. 12.
20. Abel, W., Agrarkrisen und Agrarkonjunktur. Eine Geschichte der Land- und Ernährungswirt¬
schaft Mitteleuropas seit dem hohen Mittelalter, Hamburg, Berlin 1935.
Abel, W., Massenarmut und Hungerkrisen im vorindustriellen Europa, Hamburg, Berlin
1974.
Achilles, W., Getreidepreise und Getreidehandelsbeziehungen europäischer Räume im 16. und
17. Jahrhundert, in: Zeitschrift für Agrargeschichte und Agrarsoziologie, 7(1959), pp. 32-
55.
Schmidt, H. J., Faktoren der Preisbildung für Getreide und Wein in der Zeit von 800 bis 1350,
Stuttgart 1968.
21. Barkan, O., XV. asrin sonunda bazi büyük schirierde esya ve yiyecik fiyatlari, Istanbul 1942.
Barkan, O., Les mouvements des prix en Turquie entre 1490 et 1655, in: Melanges en Phon-
neur de F. Braudel, Vol I.: Histoire economique du monde mediterraneen, 1450-1650, Tou¬
louse 1973, pp. 65-79.
Ashtor, E., Histoire des prix et des salaires dans VOrient Medieval, Paris 1969.
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precisely classified and made homogeneous, but very few Statistical analyses were
earned out The publication of primary sources continues unabated today, which is
necessary for further research Now, however, most publications inciude more exten¬
sive Statistical analyses
Also during the 1930's, some economists became fascinated by the successive pen¬
ods of growth and decline that seemed to occur in the various economic sectors, and
they began to subject these phenomena to detailed histoncal and Statistical analysis,
which the increasing availabihty of numencal matenal made possible
The Russian economist, N D Kondratieff, was the first to test and integrate
the existing speculative theories on the long waves scientifically
22
The influen¬
ce of his work was great, and, together with the outbreak of the Great Depression,
it inspired a number of important studies that often extended into the pre-indu-
stnal penod in France by F Simiand and E Labrousse,23 in Belgium by L H
Dupnez and his colleagues,24 and in the Netherlands by S De Wolff25 In Ger¬
many, numerous interesting studies were published
26
After World War II, the study
22 The idea of long waves was first suggested in 1913 by the Dutch economist Van Gelderen,
who wrote under the name of J Fedder In the twenties, Kondratieff developed the notion
of long waves systematicaUy
Kondratieff, N D , Die langen Wellen der Konjunktur in Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und
Sozialpolitik, 56(1926), pp 573-609
Kondratieff, N D, Die Preisdynamik der industriellen und landwirtschaftlichen Waren in
Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 60(1929), pp 1-85
23 Simiand, Fr, Le salaire l evolution sociale et la monnaie Essai de theone expenmentale du
salaire Paris 1932
Simiand, Fr , Recherches anciennes et nouvelles sur le mouvement general des prix du 16e au
19e siecle Paris 1932
Simiand, Fr, Inflations et stabilizations alternees le developpement economique des Etats-
Ums Paris 1934
Labrousse, C E , Esquisse du mouvement des prix et des revenus en France au 18e siecle Pans
1932
Labrousse, C E , La crise de l economiefrancaise a lafin de l Ancien Regime et au debut de la
Revolution Paris 1944
24 Dupnez, L H , Einwirkungen der langen Wellen auf die Entwicklung der Wirtschaft seit 1800
in Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 37(1935), pp 1-12
Dupnez, L H , Des mouvements economiques generaux Louvain 1947
Dupnez, L H , Philosophie des conjonetures economiques Louvain 1959 The very interesting
sectoral research of Dupnez and his colleagues was published in Recherches Economiques
de Louvain, formerly Bulletin de l'Institut des Sciences Economiques, founded in 1929
25 de Wolff, S , Prospentats- und Depressionsperioden in Der lebendige Marxismus Festgabe
zum 70 Geburtstag von K Kautsky, Jena 1924
de Wolff, S , Het Economisch Getij Amsterdam 1929
As noticed in footnote 22, Van Gelderen (pen named J Fedder) first suggested the idea of
the long wave, already before the first world war
Van Gelderen, J , Spnngvloed beschouwingen over mdustriele ontwikkehng en prijsbeweging
in De Nieuwe Tijd, 1913, pp 253-277, 369-384, 445-464
26 Abel, W , Agrarkrisen und Agrarkonjunktur Eine Geschichte der Land- und Ernährungswirt-
schaft Mitteleuropas seit dem hohen Mittelalter Hamburg, Berlin 1935
Cassel, G , Theoretische Sozialokonomie Leipzig 1932
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of the long waves was enriched by the integration of the study of short-term fluc¬
tuations.27
The most influential of the authors who dealt with long wave theories was un¬
doubtedly J. A. Schumpeter.28 His works are milestones in economic historiography,
and they continue to exercise much influence on economic thought. The dating of his
analytical schema was carried out by Simon Kuznets.29
Notwithstanding the interest in the long waves, research conceming short-term
fluctuations continued to be very active. In France, these studies were dominated by
Labrousse's concept of "crise d'ancien type" or "crise de subsistance".30 The interest
in England was focused more on the business cycies in the 18th and 19th centuries.
Some of these studies were the result of broad and fruitful Anglo-American Coopera¬
tion,31 and others were published as shorter monographs32 or as articles.33
//. The Study of Economic Growth
In the postwar period, the successes achieved in the reconstruction of wage and price
data were rapidly extended to the areas of agrarian, industrial, commercial, and mon¬
etary statistics. Indeed, the economic movement theories had shown how usefully
diverse quantitative information could be combined in such a way that more pro¬
found analyses could be carried out than were possible using traditional qualitative
historiography.
von Ciriacy-Wantrup, S., Agrarkrisen und Stockungsspannen zur Frage der langen Wellen in
der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Berlin 1936.
Däbritz, W., Die typischen Bewegungen im Konjunkturverlauf, Leipzig 1929.
Wagemann, E., Struktur und Rhythmus der Weltwirtschaft, Berlin 1931.
Wagemann, E., Menschenzahl und Völkerschicksal, Berlin 1948.
Woytinski-Lorenz, W., Das Rätsel der langen Wellen, in: Schmoller's Jahrbuch (1931), pp. 1-42.
27. Akerman, J., Structures et Cycies Economiques, Paris 1957.
Imbert, G., Des mouvements de lonque duree Kondratieff, Aix-en-Provence 1959.
Parry Lewis, J., Building Cycies and Economic Growth, London 1965.
Thomas, B., Migration and Economic Growth, Combridge 1954.
Weinstock, U., Das Problem der Kondratieffzyklen, Berlin, München 1964.
For the pre-industrial period can also be mentioned:
Braudel, F., Spooner, F. C, Prices in Europe from 1450 to 1750, in: The Cambridge Eco¬
nomic History of Europe, vol. IV, Cambridge 1957, pp. 374-486.
Van der Wee, H., Typologie des crises et changements de structures au Pays-Bas, 15e-16e sie¬
cles, in: Annales E.S.C, 18(1963), pp. 209-225.
28. Schumpeter, J. A., Business-Cycles. A theoretical, historical and Statistical analysis ofthe capi¬
talist process, New York 1939.
29. Kuznets, S., Schumpeter's Business Cycies, in: Economic Change, New York 1953.
30. Meuvret, L, Etudes d'histoire economique. Recueil d*articles, Paris 1971.
Chabert, A, Essai sur le mouvement des revenus et de Vactivite economique en France de 1798
ä 1820, Paris 1945-'49.
31. Gayer, A., Rostow, W. W., Schwartz, A. J., The Growth and Fluctuations ofthe British Econo¬
my, 1790-1850, Oxford 1953.
32. Ashton, T. S., Economic Fluctuations in England, 1700-1800, Oxford 1958.
33. Phelps-Brown, E. H., Handfield-Jones, S. J., The Climacteric ofthe 1890's: A study in the Ex¬
panding Economy, in: Oxford Economic Papers, 4 (1952) pp. 266-307.
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Initially, the major effort was devoted to the construction of reliable data bases,
and Statistical analyses were limited. The researchers evidently hoped that more inte¬
grated analyses could be performed afterwards, and as time went by they tried more
and more to test the existing theories for their truth value.
The most significant analyses, nevertheless, were those that provided fundamental
contributions to the formulation of new economic theories on the basis of history.
The long-wave theoreticians and historians had been the pioneers in this regard be¬
cause they had illustrated how fmitful a laboratory history could be for the human
sciences, to which economics continues to belong in spite of its use of methods de¬
rived from the positive sciences.
And in the 1950's and 1960's, there was a great need for new theory formation.
Many economists, confronted with the problems of the developing countries and the
questions conceming further progress in a world that had recovered from the war,
feit the limitations of the ahistorical marginalist approach. Therefore, they took up
the study of history from their own scientific points of view in order to analyze the
variables of economic development, which had been considered externally up tili
then. The pioneers of this evolution were Kuznets, Gerschenkron, and Rostow in the
United States, Lewis in the United Kingdom, and Perroux in France.34 More and
more historians joined this evolution and schooled themselves in economic theories
and quantitative analysis, instruments that had matured in the science of economics.
These historians fruitfully emphasized the social changes that economic growth
seemed to imply.
Interest in commercial statistics had long been keen, doubtless because ofthe em¬
phasis that classic economic theory had placed on commercial Hberalization for the
development of the capitalist world economy. Several important publications were
devoted to maritime statistics. N. Ellinger Bang published the Sont registers, that is,
Statistical material on the Baltic and North Sea trade. These data were computerized
by Johansson.35 P. Chaunu and H. Chaunu compiled the first statistics conceming
the trade between Europe and the West Indies.36 For England, global statistics on the
overseas trade were assembled with a high degree of reliability and "cover", that is,
for the Middle Ages,37 the 17th Century,38 and for the later period.39 For the other
34. Kuznets, S., Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread, New Haven, Conn. 1966.
Gerschenkron, A., Continuity in History and other Essays, Cambridge, Mass. 1968.
Rostow, W. W., The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge, Mass. 1966.
Lewis, W. A., Economic Development with unlimited Supplies of Labour, in: Manchester
School of Economic and Social Studies, 12(1954).
Perroux, F., La coexistence pacifique, Paris 1958.
35. Ellinger Bang, N., Korst, Kn., Tabeller over Skibsfart og Varetransport gennen 0resund,
1497-1660, Copenhagen 1906-1923.
Ellinger Bang, N., Korst, Kn., Tabeller over Skibsfart og Varetransport gennen 0resund,
1661-1783 og gennem Storebaelt, 1701-1748, Copenhagen 1930-1953.
36. Chaunu, P. & H., Seville et VAtlantique, 1504-1650. Statistique du traffic entre VEspagne et le
Nouveau Monde, Paris 1953-1960.
37. Carus-Wilson, E. M., Coleman, O., Englands Export Trade, 1275-1547, Oxford 1963.
38. Davis, R, English Overseas Trade, 1500-1700, London 1973.
39. Schumpeter, E. B., English Overseas Trade Statistics, 1697-1808, Oxford 1960.
Schlote, W., British Overseas Tradefrom 1700 to the 1930's, Oxford 1952.
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European countries, analogous global or national Statistical information conceming
the Ancien Regime was not available, although several studies appeared with more
specific commercial statistics conceming particular harbors, forms of trade, or toll
revenues.
The innovational works began increasingly to apply the international trade theo¬
ries to the historical data that had become available: F. Mauro developed a model
for the European colonial expansion ofthe Modern Period;40 H. Van der Wee pro¬
posed a dual development model as the explanation of the trend in European trade
in the late Middle Ages and in the Modem Period;41 K. Veraghtert applied advanced
Statistical techniques to new sources conceming the Port of Antwerp in the 19th Cen¬
tury;42 and other European economic historians studied the role of international
trade in industrial development (see below). Thus, C. Wilson investigated the rela¬
tionship between the growth of British overseas trade and the development of Euro¬
pean industry,43 and P. Bairoch contributed to the comparison of foreign trade and
economic development in Europe during the 19th and 20th centuries.44
Most economic historians seem to have been fascinated primarily by the study of
macro-economic growth, and major works were published on this subject, though
many of them were still descriptive in nature. Regional studies, mainly on the Ancien
Regime, were very populär on the continent. The general influence of the French
"Annales" school and the specific influence of F. Braudel's geo-history and his
"Longue Duree" are obvious.45 For France, it is possible to point to an entire series
of important regional studies for the period from the Late Middle Ages to the 19th
Century.46 Outside of France, the influence of the "Annales" school was strongly feit
in Italy, Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands.47
40. Mauro, F., Towards an Intercontinental Model: European Overseas Expansion between 1500
and 1800, in: The Economic History Review, 15(1961), pp. 1-17.
41. Van der Wee, H., Peeters, Th., Un modele dynamique de croissance interseculaire du commerce
mondiale, 12e-18e siecles, in: Annales E.S.C, 25(1970), pp. 100-126.
42. Veraghtert, K., De havenbeweging te Antwerpen tijdens de 19e eeuw. Een kwantitatieve benad-
ering, Leuven 1977.
43. Wilson, Ch., The Growth of Overseas Commerce and European Manufacture, in: New Cam¬
bridge Modern History, 1957.
44. Bairoch, P., Commerce internationale et genese de la revolution industrielle anglaise, in: An¬
nales E.S.C., 28(1973), pp. 541-571.
Bairoch, P., European Foreign Trade in the XIXth Century. The Development ofthe Value and
Volume of Exports, in: The Journal of European Economic History, 2(1973), pp. 3-56.
Bairoch, P., Geographical Structure and Trade Balance ofEuropean Foreign Tradefrom 1800
to 1970, in: The Journal of European Economic History, 3(1974), pp. 557-608.
45. Braudel, F., La Mediterranee et le monde mediterraneen ä l'epoque de Philippe II, Paris
1949.
46. Le Roy Ladurie, E., Les Paysans de Languedoc, Paris 1966.
Goubert, P., Beauvais et le Beauvaisis de 1600 ä 1730, Paris 1960.
Leon, P., La naissance de la gründe Industrie en Dauphine, fin du 17e siecle-1869, Paris
1954.
Baehrel, R, Une croissance: la Basse-Provence rurale.fin du 16e siecle-1789, Paris 1961.
*
Neveux, H., Les grains du Cambresis.fin du 14e-debut du 17e siecles. Vie et declin d'une struc¬
ture economique, Lille 1974.
47. Vilar, R, La Catalogne dans VEspagne moderne, Paris 1962.
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In Great Britain, numerous major studies were published on the industrial revolu¬
tion by such scholars as T. S. Ashton, P. Deane, R. M. Hartwell, P. Mathias, and
P. Mantoux.48 This research was soon followed on the continent by P. Lebmn and
H. Van der Wee in Belgium, W. G. Hoffmann in Germany, J. A. De Jonghe and R. T.
Griffiths in the Netherlands, and F. Crouzet, P. Leon, M. Levy-Leboyer, and J. Mar-
czewski in France.49 The Take-Off and Great Spurt Hypotheses of W. W. Rostow
and A. Gerschenkron, respectively, attracted a great deal of interest. Later on, how¬
ever, more and more studies were devoted to the long-term development of industrial
capitalism in Western Europe50 for which extensive Statistical material was assem¬
bled and made homogeneous.51
Van der Wee, H., The Growth ofthe Antwerp Market and the European Economy, fourteenth-
sixteenth centuries, The Hague 1963.
Slicher van Bath, B. H , Een samenleving onder spanmng Geschiedenis van het platteland in
Overijssel, Assen 1957.
Van der Woude, A. M., Het Noorderkwartier Een regionaal historisch onderzoek in de demo¬
grafische en economische geschiedenis van westehjk Nederland van de late middeleeuwen tot
het begin van de 19e eeuw, in: A.AG.-Bijdragen, nr. 16, Wagemngen 1972
Faber, J. A, Drie eeuwen Friesland. Economische en sociale ontwikkehngen van 1500 tot 1800,
in: A.A.G.-Bijdragen, nr. 17, Wageningen 1972.
48. Ashton, T. S., The Industrial Revolution, 1760-1830, London 1948.
Deane, Ph., The First Industrial Revolution, Cambridge 1965.
Hartwell, R M. (ed.), The Causes ofthe Industrial Revolution in England, London 1967
Mathias, P, The First Industrial Nation, London 1969
Mantoux, P, La revolution industrielle au 18e siecle, London 1960.
49. Lebrun, P., La Revoluzione Industriale in Belgio Strutturazwne e destrutturazione delte eco¬
nomic regionale, in. Studi Storici, 2(1961), pp. 448-558
Lebrun, P., Bruwier, M., Dhondt, J , Hansotte, G., Essai sur la revolution industrielle en Belgi-
que, 1770-1847, Brüssel 1979.
Van der Wee, H., De Belgische Industnele Revolutie, in: Histonsche aspecten van de eco¬
nomische groei, Antwerpen 1972
Hoffmann, W. G., Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft seit der Mitte des 19 Jahrhun¬
derts, Berlin 1965
De Jonghe, J. A., De industnahsatie in Nederland tussen 1850 en 1914, Amsterdam 1968
Griffiths, R. T, Industrial Retardatwn in the Netherlands, 1830-1850, Den Haag 1979
Crouzet, F., Angleterre et France au 18e siecle Essai d'analyse comparee de deux croissances
economiques, in: Annales E.S.C, 21(1966), pp. 254-291.
Leon, P., Crouzet, F., Gascon, R., L'industnalisation en Europe au 19e siecle Cartographie et
Typologie, Lyon 7-10 Octobre 1970, Pans 1972.
Levy-Leboyer, M., Les banques europeennes et Vindustriahsation internationale dans la pre-
miere mottle du 19e siecle, Paris 1964.
Marczewski, J., The take-off hypothesis and French experience, in- Rostow, W W, The eco¬
nomics of take-off into sustained Growth, London 1963, pp 119-139.
50. Deane, P., Cole, W. A, British Economic Growth, 1688-1959 Trends and Structure, Cam¬
bridge 1962.
Landes, D. S., The Unbound Prometheus. Technological Change and Industrial Development
from 1750 to the present, Cambridge 1969.
Milward, A. S., Saul, S. B., The Economic Development of Continental Europe, 1780-1870,
London 1973.
Milward, A. S., Saul, S. B., The Development ofthe Economies of Continental Europe, 1850-
1914, London 1977.
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In the analysis of the determinants of economic growth, capital formation in Great
Britain received considerable attention, particularly since the pioneering study of
A. K. Cairncross.52 On the continent, too, research in this area increased: in France
under the direction of F. Crouzet and in the Scandanavian countries.53
Inspired by the New Economic History in the United States, the effect on eco¬
nomic growth of investment in the railroad sector attracted the attention of a number
of scholars such as F. Caron in France, G. R. Hawke in England, and R. Fremdling
in Germany.54 Others studied more explicitly the role of technological innovations
Pollard, S., Peaceful Conquest: The Industrialisation of Europe, 1760-1970, Oxford 1981.
Hoffmann, W. G, British Industry, 1700-1950, Oxford 1955.
Hoffmann, W. G., Ein Index der industriellen Produktion für Grossbritannien seit dem 18.
Jahrhundert, in: Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 36(1934), p. 383.
Gadisseur, J., Le produit physique de Veconomie beige, 1831-1913. Presentation critique des
donnees statistiques, Liege 1980.
Perroux, Fr., Prises de vue sur la croissance de Veconomiefrancaise, 1780-1950, in: Kuznets,
S. (ed.), Income and Wealth, Series V, London 1955.
Hodne, F., Growth in a Dual Economy: The Norwegian Experience, 1814-1914, in: Economy
and History, 16(1973), pp. 81-110.
Hausen, S. A, Okonomisk Vaekst i Danmark, 1720-1970, Copenhagen 1972.
Berend, I. T., Ranki, G, Hungary. A Century of Economic Development, New York 1974.
Nadal, J., El Fracaso de la Revolucion industrial en Espana, 1814-1913, Barcelona 1975.
51. Mitchell, B. R, Deane, R, Abstract of British Historical Statistics, Cambridge 1962.
Mitchell, B. R, European Historical Statistics, 1750-1970, London 1975.
52. Cairncross, A. K, Home and Foreign Investment, 1870-1913, Cambridge 1953.
Chapman, S. D., Fixed Capital Formation in the British Cotton Industry, 1770-1815, in: The
Economic History Review, 23(1970), pp. 235-266.
Deane, Ph., Capital Formation in Britain before the Railway Age, in: Economic Development
and Cultural Change, 11(1961), pp. 352-368.
Feinstein, C. H., Home and Foreign Investment: Some Aspects of Capital Formation and Fi¬
nance in the United Kingdom, 1870-1913, Cambridge 1959.
Feinstein, C. H., Capital Formation in the United Kingdom, 1920-1938, Cambridge 1965.
Hawke, G. R., Reed, M. C, Railway Capital in the United Kingdom in the Nineteenth Cen¬
tury, in: The Economic History Review, 22(1969), pp. 269-286.
Higgens, J. P. P., Pollard, S., (eds.), Aspects of Capital Investment in Great Britain, 1750-1850.
A Preliminary Survey, 1971.
Lenfant, J. H., Great Britain's Capital Formation, 1865-1914, in: Economica, 18(1951), pp.
151-168.
Pollard, S., The Growth and Distribution of Capital in Great Britain, 1770-1870, in: Third In¬
ternational Conference of Economic History, München 1965, vol. 1, 1968.
53. Crouzet, Fr. (ed.), Capital Formation in the Industrial Revolution, London 1972.
Lundberg, L., Kapitalbildningen i Sverige, 1861-1965, Upsala 1969.
Martinus, S., Agrar Kapitalbildnung och finansiering, 1833-1892, Göthenborg 1970.
Krust, O. A, Bjerke, J., Real Capital and Economic Growth in Norway, 1900-1956, in: In¬
come and Wealth, Series 8, London, 1959.
54. Caron, Fr., Histoire de Vexploitation d'un grand reseau: la Compagnie du Chemie de Fer du
Nord, 1846-1937, Paris 1973.
Hawke, G. R, Railways and Economic Growth in England and Wales, 1840-1870, Oxford
1970.
Mitchell, B. R, The Coming ofthe Railway Age and United Kingdom Economic Growth, in:
Journal of Economic History, 24(1964), pp. 315-336.
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and their diffusion. The research of H. J. Habakkuk was very significant in this
area.55 In Britain, several studies were undertaken in order to measure labor and cap¬
ital productivity on the national, regional, and sectoral levels. A. Maddison,
P. O'Brien, and others compared the evolution of labor productivity international¬
ly.56 In this connection, the brilliant study of E. H. Phelps-Brown and M. H. Browne,
"A Century of Pay", must also be mentioned here.57
In France, Germany, and Belgium, particular attention was devoted to the in¬
fluence of financial intermediation on economic development.58 A more recent de-
Vamplew, W., Railways and the Transformation in the Scottish Economy, in: The Economic
History Review, 24(1971), pp. 37-54.
Vamplew, W., Railways and the Iron Industry in Scotiand, in: Reed, M. C. (ed.), Railways in
the Victorian Economy, Newton Abbot 1969.
Fremdling, R, Eisenbahnen und deutsches Wirtschaftswachstum, 1840-1879, Ein Beitrag zur
Entwicklungstheorie und zur Theorie des Infrastruktur, Dortmund 1975.
Fenoaltea, S., Raüroads and Italian Industrial Growth, 1861-1913, in: Explorations in Eco¬
nomic History, 9(1972), pp. 325-352.
55. Habakkuk, H. J., American and British Technology in the 19th Century: the Searchfor Labour-
Saving Inventions, Cambridge 1962.
56. Maddison, A., Economic Growth in the West: Comparative Experience in Europe and North
America, New York 1964.
O'Brien, P. K., Keyder, C, Economic Growth in Britain and France, 1780-1914: Two Paths to
the 20th Century, London 1978.
Blaug, M., The Productivity of Capital in the Lancashire Cotton Industry during the Nineteenth
Century, in: The Economic History Review, 13(1960-1961), pp. 358-381.
Floud, R, Changes in the Productivity of Labour in the British Machine Tool Industry, 1856-
1900, in: McCIoskey, D. N. (ed.), Essays on a Mature Economy, Princeton 1971, pp. 313-
337.
Hunt, E. H, Labour Productivity in English Agriculture, 1850-1914, in: The Economic His¬
tory Review, 20(1967), pp. 281-292.
Kennedy, W. R, Foreign Investment, Trade and Growth in the United Kingdom, 1870-1913,
in: Explorations in Economic History, 9(1973-1974), pp. 415-444.
Lomax, K. S., Production and Productivity Movements in the United Kingdom since 1900, in:
Journal ofthe Royal Statistical Society (1959).
Rostas, L., Comparative Productivity in British and American Industry, Cambridge 1948.
Saul, S. B. (ed.), Technological Change: the United States and Britain in the Nineteenth Cen¬
tury, London 1970.
Tann, J., Fuel Savings in the Process Industries during the Industrial Revolution: A Study in
Technological Diffusion, in: Business History, 15(1973), pp. 149-159.
Taylor, A. J., Labour Productivity and Technological Innovation in the British Coal Industry,
1850-1914, in: The Economic History Review, 16(1961-1962), pp. 48-70.
Walters, R, Labour Productivity in the South Wales Steam-Coal Industry, 1870-1914, in: The
Economic History Review, 28(1975), pp. 280-303.
57. Phelps Brown, E. H., Browne, M. H., A Century of Pay. The Course of Pay and Production in
France, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States ofAmerica, 1860-1960,
London, New York 1968.
58. Bouvier, J., Le Credit Lyonnais de 1863 ä 1882. Les annees de la formation d'une banque de
depöts, Paris 1961.
Bouvier, J., Les Rothschild, Paris 1967.
Levy-Leboyer, M., Les banques europeennes et l'industrialisation internationale dans la pre-
miere moitie du 19e siecle, Paris 1964.
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velopment in Europe is the application of quantitative methods in business history.
In 1970, during the first Anglo-American MSSB Conference at Harvard, K. Trace and
P. H. Lindert used cost-benefit analysis in order to estimate the effect of entrepreneu-
rial decision making in the chemical industry on the Victorian economy.59 Both J.
Kocka and R. Tilly have conducted quantitative studies on the relation between in¬
dustrialization, bureaucratization, and the capital markets in Germany during the
second half ofthe 19th Century.60 Both of these German studies, however, were more
Statistical than econometrical history. More econometrical was H. Deams' research
on the strategy ofthe large Belgian holding companies. This study developed a math¬
ematical theory of corporate control, measured the impact of the financial institution
on Belgian economic growth, and estimated the financial Performance.61
A true macro-economic approach was applied in the massive effort to reconstruct
the national accounts. The greatest influence in this regard came undoubtedly from
Simon Kuznets and from the International Association for Research in Income and
Wealth, which not only renovated the research in the field but also supported it fi¬
nanciaUy.62 In England, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research and
the Department of Applied Economics of Cambridge University were very active; in
France the Institut des Sciences Economiques Appliquees (ISEA); and in Germany
the Institut für Weltwirtschaft in Kiel and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.
The first useable results became available in the 1960's published under the direction
of P. Deane and W. A. Cole in Great Britain, J. Marczewski in France, and W. Hoff¬
man in Germany.63
Eistert, E., Die Beeinflussung des Wirtschaftswachstums in Deutschland von 1883 bis 1913
durch das Bankensystem, Berlin 1970.
59. Lindert, P. H., Trace, K, Yardsticksfor Victorian Entrepreneurs, in: McCIoskey, D. N. (ed.),
Essays on a Mature Economy, Princeton 1971, pp. 239-274.
See also: Buxton, N. K., Entrepreneurial Efficiency in the British Coal Industry between the
Wars, in: The Economic History Review, 23(1971), pp. 476-497.
60. Kocka, J., Unternehmungsverwaltung und Angestelltenschaft am Beispiel Siemens, 1847-1914.
Zum Verhältnis von Kapitalismus und Bürokratie in der deutschen Industrialisierung, Stuttgart
1969.
Tilly, R, Zur Entwicklung des Kapitalmarktes und Industrialisierung im 19. Jahrhundert unter
besonderer Berücksichtigung Deutschlands, in: Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschafts¬
geschichte, 60(1973), pp. 145-165.
61. Daems, H., The Holding Company and Corporate Control, Leiden, Boston 1978.
62. The first results of this research project were published in Kuznets, S. (ed.), Income and
Wealth, vol. 2, 3, and 5, London, 1952, 1953 and 1955.
Summaries by Kuznets, S., Quantitative Aspects ofthe Economic Growth of Nations, in: Eco¬
nomic Development and Cultural Change, 1956 and following years.
63. Deane, R, Cole, W. A, British Economic Growth, 1688-1959. Trends and Structure, Cam¬
bridge 1969.
Jeffreys, J. B., Walters, D., National Income and Expenditure of the United Kingdom, 1870-
1952, in: Income and Wealth, Series V, London, 1956.
Mitchell, B. R., Deane, P., Abstract of British Historical Statistics, Cambridge 1962.
O'Brien, P. K., British Income and Property in the Early Nineteenth Century, in: The Eco¬
nomic History Review, 12(1959-1960), pp. 255-267.
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The publication of these national accounts was not very well received by most eco¬
nomic histonans
64
Indeed, the authors of these studies were severely cnticized by
their fellow histonans for relying uncntically on the histoncal sources, for unwisely
inter- and extrapolating to fill up data gaps, and for ignoring significant cycies by us¬
ing decenmal averages Some experts in more traditional histonography such as P
Chaunu completely denounced the idea of aggregation and fiercely argued for the
"histoire senelle"
65
Other histonans, however, accepted the pnnciple of aggregation
but calied for more careful apphcation of this principle and for special attention to
the reliability of the histoncal source while calculating time series Adopting this
more careful approach, F Crouzet and M Levy-Leboyer recalculated French annual
industnal production and annual agrarian income dunng the 19th Century
66
Under
the direction of P Leon in Lyons, new calculations were made on a regional basis
with the objective of constructing more homogeneous regional amalgamations
67
P Deane and C H Feinstein also recalculated the series for Great Bntam
68
Earlier publications were
Prest, A R, National Income of the United Kingdom 1870-1946 in The Economic Journal,
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In spite of the climate of distrust toward the construction of aggregated economic se¬
ries, scholars began to reconstruct series of national accounts in several other Euro¬
pean nations, including Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Italy, the Netherlands,
Hungary, Poland, and Belgium.69 In general, the scholars in these countries tried to
avoid the drawbacks found in the pioneering work in the United Kingdom, France,
and Germany. Most of the attention went to the construction of reliable series of
agrarian and industrial production, foreign trade, and investment in infrastructure.
An interesting example of this concern for Statistical reliability may be found in
P. Lebmn and J. Gadisseur's research on the Belgian economy in the 19th Cen¬
tury.70
The macro-approach became more and more geographically restricted as regional
growth disparities drew more attention. C. H. Lee and E. H. Hunt contributed much
to a better understanding of regional development in the U. K.71 L. H. Klaassen,
P. W. Klein, and J. H. Paelinck of the Netherlands proposed a model for the very
long term evolution of a system of regions at the Copenhagen Conference in 1974.72
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This model, however, has yet to be adequately tested G De Brabander has investi¬
gated the regional and sectoral speciahzation in Belgium and has tested the effect of
this speciahzation on regional growth disparities
73
Even though the vast majority of economic histonans seemed to prefer the indus¬
tnal sector and the macro-economic approach, considerable interest continued for
the agncultural sector74 This may be explained partiaUy because such study could
contribute to the macro-approach, and partiaUy because of the success of Malthusian
development theories, which strongly stressed the importance of the agranan sector
In the 1970's, more attention was paid to the shift from the agrarian to the industnal
economy and particularly to the stage of development between the two, namely, pro-
to-industnahzation
75
In Belgium, P Kiep developed a two-sector model, analyzing
this transition and the dual character ofthe Brabantine economy in the 18th and 19th
centunes
76
As a conclusion for the penod during which economic growth was the major topic
of research in Western Europe, we may state that the Amencan New Economic His-
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tory had an important but not overwhelming influence, and that thereby the depth of
economic-historical analyses clearly increased. Not being bound to the neoclassical
paradigm seems to have left room for the testing of, and contributing to, economic
theory. This approach, which was paired with more precise data reconstruction,
seems to have augmented significantly the scientific character of the study of eco¬
nomic growth.
III. Again Crisis Concepts
Since the middle of the 1970*s, after decades of intensive research on economic
growth, a clear shift has been perceptible in economic historical research, particu¬
larly with regard to the contemporary period. The reason for this was the realization
that the ongoing economic crisis ofthe 1970's and early 1980's was not so much con-
junctural as stmctural. This crisis has shocked the Keynesian optimism with regard
to the avoidance of economic regression and the neoclassical faith in steady real
growth. Economic historians started again to study the industrial crises of the 19th
and 20th centuries and began to see unbalanced growth as the rule instead of bal¬
anced growth. The long wave theories were again studied intensively and brought up-
to-date. Significant in this regard were the empirical testing of Schumpeter's innova¬
tion theory by G. Mensch and W. W. Rostow's book, The World Economy.71
Primarily in Europe, long wave research was progressing well by the end of the
1970's. J. J. Van Duijn of the Netherlands took up the old tradition of his country,
and an interdiseiplinary working group has been established in Amsterdam by
G. Van Roon for the study of the long wave theory.78 Two significant congresses
have been held in Bochum (BRD), and an interesting long wave reader with contri¬
butions from all over Europe is being published.79 In Britain, C. Freeman has dedi¬
cated a thematic number ofthe futurological joumal, Futures, to innovation and long
waves.80 In Belgium, L. H. Dupriez has actualized his theory, while E. Mandel has
developed a Marxian scheme in which the rate of profit is the crucial variable.81 In
Leuven, J. Delbeke is developing model based on a revised long wave concept inte¬
grating the real, monetary and financial sectors of the economy.82 And at the eco¬
nomic history congress to be held in Budapest in 1982, a B-section, under the direc¬
tion of J. Bouvier, has been set aside for the study of long waves.
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The increased interest in the long waves, however, seems to have proceeded in a
rather confused manner. On the theoretical level, many researchers tend to ascribe to
monocausal explanations, which was the case with the majority ofthe analyses ofthe
1930's and 1940's. The renewal, however, seems to lie more on the integrative level.
Furthermore, the importance of social and institutional changes has also been largely
underestimated.83 On the empirical level, the number of publications appearing is in¬
creasing rapidly. After an abundant presentation of long-term series in which move¬
ments can be distinguished, model-oriented approaches have also been undertaken.84
Nevertheless, in our opinion, the Solution lies more in the use of basic Statistical tech¬
niques rather than in empirical model construction, because long wave research pre-
sumes fundamental "variable parameters".
Moreover, we are convinced that a purely macro approach is not correct. New en-
treprenurial activity and technological and institutional innovations seem to be cru¬
cial, but their origins can only be studied on a very disaggregated level. Therefore,
long wave research has to be performed on the macro, the meso, and the micro lev¬
el.
It must be admitted, however, that the quantitative material is scarce. Within the
context of modern industrial civilization, we have only had three and a half long
waves. Therefore, it is not clear whether the past experiences, i. e. the periods of up-
and downswing, will repeat themselves in the future, Forrester and other futurolog-
ists claim that we are entering a post-industrial society.85 Others, such as Van Duijn,
Kleinknecht, Mensch, and Rostow, are more convinced ofthe repetitive nature ofthe
long wave.86 It seems to be an open question whether the uneven growth of the past
centuries has to be described as a long "cycle" (i.e a regulär and continued upward
and downward movement) or as a long "wave", which does not involve such narrow
constraints. Given the widespread skepticism vis-ä-vis the existence of a long wave
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regularity, which has been interpreted by R. Spree, we think that the fundamental
question of this research is whether or not our industrial society is behaving along a
life cycle.87 The answer to this question is crucial enough to give the research the im¬
portance it needs.
Conclusion
The interests of Western European economic historians have flexibly adapted in re¬
sponse to the economic problems of their time. First, interest shifted to the study of
economic growth after having been concentrated on economic movements. At the
end of the euphoric 1960's, the stress shifted back again to the study of long
waves.
While a large part of the quantitative economic research was concentrated on the
formation of a data base, important empirical studies have been undertaken that
have had repercussions on economic theory. The New Economic History, an Ameri¬
can phenomenon, thus has not had too large an effect in Europe, the reasons for
which have been thoroughly analyzed elsewhere.
Nevertheless, another and more important Observation must be made. The Western
European economic historians not only constructed more accurate data bases, they
also brought about significant changes in economic theory. It is in these changes that
their value must be sought. They have had the virtue of not being compelled to force
each economic historical phenomenon into a neoclassical strait jacket. It is to be ex¬
pected that, with more extensive use of Statistical economic methods, they will pro¬
ceed further in this direction.
In addition, it can also be stated that the national accounts that were constructed
will have to be thoroughly revised, even though they were milestones in postwar re¬
search. The constant growth averages that appear in them will have to be
amended.
Finally, we think that the productivity project that is now being conducted can
play an important role from both the empirical and the theoretical viewpoints. We
are convinced that more attention in long wave research must be given to the crucial
components of economic progress, namely, the process of factor Substitution and fac¬
tor use, and to comparisons between countries and sectors, the objective being to dis¬
cover specific leads and lags.
The discussions of this Symposium promise to be particularly useful in this re¬
gard.
87. Spree, R, Wachstumstrends und Konjunkturzyklen in der deutschen Wirtschaft von 1820 bis
1913, Göttingen 1978.
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Zusammenfassung:
Der Stand der europäischen Wirtschaftshistoriographie nach 1945
Das Forschungsinteresse westeuropäischer Wirtschaftshistoriker hat sich den jeweili¬
gen ökonomischen Problemen der Zeit flexibel angepaßt. Nachdem es sich zunächst
auf die Wirtschaftskonjunkturen gerichtet hatte, verlagerte es sich auf das Wirt¬
schaftswachstum. Gegen Ende der euphorischen 1960er Jahre widmete man sich al¬
lerdings erneut der Untersuchung langer Wellen.
Zu einem großen Teil befaßte sich die quantitative Wirtschaftsgeschichte mit der
Erstellung einer Datenbasis. Daneben gab es bedeutende empirische Untersuchun¬
gen, die Auswirkungen auf die Wirtschaftstheorie ausübten. Die aus Amerika stam¬
mende New Economic History School zeigte keine allzu lang anhaltende Wirkung in
Westeuropa. Gründe dafür wurden ausführlich an anderer Stelle dargelegt.
Wichtiger ist allerdings wohl, daß westeuropäische Wirtschaftshistoriker neben
dem Aufbau stärker abgesicherter Datensammlungen bedeutsame Ändemngen in der
Wirtschaftstheorie herbeiführten. Mit diesen wichtigen Änderungen der Theorie ist
der Historiker aus der Zwangslage befreit, nun jedes wirtschaftshistorische Phäno¬
men dem neoklassischen Rahmen einfügen zu müssen. Bei stärkerem Einsatz stati¬
stisch-ökonomischer Methoden werden die Wirtschaftshistoriker noch weiteren Ein¬
fluß auf die Wirtschaftstheorie nehmen können.
So müßten die volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnungen, die bisher aufgestellt
wurden, gründlich überprüft werden, selbst wenn sie einst in der Nachkriegszeit ei¬
nen Meilenstein der Forschung darstellten. Die konstanten durchschnittlichen
Wachstumsraten, die in diese volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnungen eingingen,
müssen abgeändert werden.
Man kann erwarten, daß das Forschungsprojekt zur Produktivitätsentwicklung, an
dem jetzt gearbeitet wird, einen wichtigen Beitrag sowohl zu empirischen als auch zu
theoretischen Aspekten zu leisten vermag. Bei der Forschung über die langen Wellen
muß sicher mehr Gewicht auf die entscheidenden Komponenten des wirtschaftlichen
Fortschritts gelegt werden, nämlich auf Vorgänge der Faktorsubstitution und der
Faktorverwendung. Größere Aufmerksamkeit sollte auch den Länder- und Sektoren¬
vergleichen zukommen, mit denen man jeweils ein Führen oder Nachhinken ("leads"
und "lags") aufspüren könnte.
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Richard Tilly
Per Capita Income and Productivity as Indices of
Development and Welfare. Some Comments on
Kuznetsian Economic History
1. The Growth Paradigm
The point of departure of this paper is that a close connection exists between the use
of the national income accounts in economic history and the importance for that dis¬
cipline of what one might call the "Growth paradigm".1 Insofar as the long run
growth of the Wealth of Nations is the concern of economic historians, there is no
better frame of reference available for their work than the income accounts. Indeed, I
doubt whether meaningful research into the comparative history of economic growth
can be done without reference to those accounts (or to some Surrogate based on the
same principles). Nevertheless, this perspective has limitations—of which two are
worth mentioning here. First, it imposes a modern set of values on the past. In Kuz¬
nets' words, "the accepted definitions and measures of national product reflect the
broad features of modern societies dominated by the ideas of secularism, egalitarian-
ism, and nationlism". These imply that "if we want to contrast modern economic
growth with earlier periods and patterns of growth, we must evaluate and appraise
the earlier periods also in modern terms in füll knowledge that part of the difference
would be due to the fact that societies of the earlier times did not share many of the
notions of means, ends, and values that constitute impulses to growth is modern
times."2 The cost of this perspective is our inabüity to focus on the older values, insti¬
tutions and activities which may have had to be transformed or eliminated before
modern economic growth could begin. Second, the growth paradigm and its account¬
ing complement (national income) implies the primaey of consumption of goods and
Services as the aim of economic activity and subordinates all other processes—of
govemment, capital accumulation, or even production—to that end. Economic his¬
tory of this genre is a drama featuring man's conquest of nature for man's material
enjoyment. It is a fascinating drama and well worth our attention. However, there are
plausible alternatives—for example, the Marxist drama featuring class conflicts and
Cf. Tilly, R., Das Wachstumsparadigma und die europäische Industrialisierungsgeschichte, in:
Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 3 (1977); also Parker, W., Economic History seen through the
Income Accounts, in: Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 124 (1968). This volume
was also a Festschrift for Walther Hoffmann edited by Giersch H., and Sauermann H.,
(Quantitative Aspekte der Wirtschaftsgeschichte).
Kuznets, S., Modern Economic Growth. Rate, Structure and Spread, New Haven 1966.
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treating economic growth as a largely unintended consequence of those conflicts.3
For those of us who opt for the growth paradigm, of course, there is need for neither
self-congratulation nor apology, only for recognition of a conscious choice and, if
possible, acceptance of its limiting implications.
2. An Analogy
The argument of much of the paper is based on a general behavioral assumption and
an analogy. The behavioral assumption is that people generally act as if they would
rather be rieh than poor. The analogy is between individuals and economies. Just as I
believe that individuals prefer wealth to poverty, so too do I believe that poor coun¬
tries strive to become rieh ones. And in both cases I believe the relationship to be
non-reversible. Rieh people and countries do not strive to become poor ones. This
non-symmetrical relationship is important for the rest of the argument of the paper,
for it serves as a justification for comparing rieh and poor countries using the Stand¬
ards (or price weights) of the richer country as a measuring rod. Comparing condi¬
tions in this manner is to state how far along a given poor country is on its way to at-
taining the position occupied by a richer one. And to complete the analogy, we base
our comparisons of rieh and poor countries on the Standard of per capita income—
which means that we work with the individualistic notion of the representative con¬
sumer and make national economic welfare a function of individual welfare.4 Coun¬
tries—or regions—are thus seen as discrete bundles of individuals, a decisive number
of which are striving for higher incomes. Were this not the case, the long debate on
economic growth of the past three or four decades, it seems to me, would make little
sense.
3. Per Capita Income as Welfare Index
Using per capita income as a comparative index of economic welfare implies, then, a
unity of opinion about the individualistic ends and the means of economic activity.
Kuznets has written: "There is, after all, a strong element of community of human
wants and needs, translatable in the modern economic epoch into a set of widely pre¬
valent notions of means, ends, and values of economic activity".5 The sad truth, how¬
ever, is that such unity of opinion in societies over time and space is extremely hard,
if not possible, to document empirically. Significant criticism of per capita income as
3. In this sense W. W. Rostow's The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge 1960, was, in fact,
a kind of non-Communist Manifesto, for it did see consumption and technology as the mas¬
ter processes of economic history, if not history in totum.
4. On an empirical level, per capita income appears to be much more closely related to a num¬
ber of important aggregate structural features of developing economies—e. g. the share of to¬
tal employment and product originating in the agricultural sector, the share of total income
spent on foodstuffs and the share of income saved—than is total income. That makes per
capita income a more useful instrument for comparative analysis. See esp. Chenery, H.,
Structural Change and Development Policy, Oxford 1979 or Chenery H., and Sirquin M, Pat¬
terns ofDevelopment, Oxford 1975. On the analogy between individual and national per cap¬
ita income see also Usher, D., The Measurement ofEconomic Growth, Oxford 1980.
5. Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth, p. 24.
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a welfare index stems, ultimately, from doubts conceming that unity. For the pur¬
poses of this paper, this criticism may be devided into üve points:
(1) the problem of non-material or non-economic welfare;
(2) the exclusion of non-market activities;
(3) the definition of final (or intermediate) goods;
(4) the assumption of constancy of preferences and production possibilities; and
(5) the problem of income distribution and community welfare.
a) Non-material Welfare
The first criticism is that improvements in economic welfare which rising per capita
incomes could conceivably reflect say nothing about non-material or non-economic
welfare. Non-materialist ends might have priority over material ones in certain socie¬
ties and, theoretically, satisfaction of the former could deteriorate as a result of im¬
provements in respect to the latter.6 This possibility is discussed below in connection
with "social indicators", but in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, we can
only assume that changes in economic welfare are not systematicaUy (and negatively)
related to changes in non-material wellbeing.
b) Non-market Activities
The second and third criticisms really tum on the proper definitions of the ends of
economic activity and the resultant definition of the final produets going into na¬
tional income calculations. National income is a flow statistic reflecting market
transactions over a given period. For some countries and periods we have imputa-
tions for the value of non-marketed goods and Services such as rental income from
owner-oecupied housing and farm-consumed agricultural produets, but, on the
whole, market transactions are disproportionately represented. This means that, on
the one hand, comparisons of per capita income between developed market econom¬
ies and societies in which specialization of economic activity and 'hence' market rela¬
tionships are only weakly developed, could be biased against the latter unless correc-
tions are made for their relatively significant non-market activity. On the other hand,
there are some offsetting biases against modern economies for which imputations
might well be in order, e. g., the productive work of housewives (as Substitutes for
domestic servants), time spent in educational institutions, or the value of leisure time
generally. Thus, Nordhaus and Tobin have estimated the value of non-market activ¬
ity in the U.S. in the 20th Century at between 40 and 50 percent of GNP while Kuz¬
nets has suggested an upward adjustment for the leisure in the same country of as
much as 40 percent ofthe estimated national product.7 My impression is that the bias
against underdeveloped countries will be strongest for comparisions covering the
transitional or "take-off phase of industrialization, subsequently turning the other
way. For western European countries, I suppose, the shift in bias for intertemporal
6. See Gould, J. D., Economic Growth in History, London 1972, pp. 5-6.
7. See Nordhaus W., and Tobin J., Is Growth obsolete? in: Moss M. (Ed.), The Measurement
of Economic and Social Performance. (Studies in Income and Wealth, vol. 38) N. B.E. R,
N.Y. 1973, and Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth, pp. 220-34 and esp. p. 221. Also Ken-
drick J., Economic Accounts and their Uses, N. Y. 1972. For a brief discussion of this question
as applied to American economic history see. Davis L., et aL, American Economic Growth. An
Economist's History ofthe United States. N.Y. 1972, pp. 42-50. Cf. also Section 5 below.
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comparisons would come around 1900. This is a matter which only further research
can clarify.
c) Intermediate andfinal Products
The distinction between inputs, intermediate and final produets lies behind a further
set of possible biases. National income, as indicated, is convenrionally defined as a
net flow of final goods and Services over time. To avoid double-counting, the value
of produets used in the production of other final produets must be dedueted from the
value of total output—as in the classic textbook case ofthe flour used in the produc¬
tion of bakery goods. Problems arise when goods and Services satisfy intermediate
and final demands and Convention assigns them exclusively to one of those two
classes, or where such Conventions vary across time and countries. Per capita income
comparisons are biased upward in favour of the more industrialized countries where
goods and Services such as vehicles, transportation, water supply, sanitation and pol-
icing—which are in part costs of urbanization and industrialization and hence akin
to intermediate produets—are treated as part of final produets. This amounts to dou¬
ble counting insofar as other final produets embody these costs.8 The bias is easy to
conceptualize, but in practice, it is virtually impossible to distinguish the part of the
total product which is intermediate from that which represents final consumption.
Some urban amenities, after all, do (or could) reflect increased consumer Utility. Eco¬
nomic historians working in this area will have to decide for each country and period
under investigation, (a) which items are ambiguous and (b) how to allocate them.
A similar difficulty relates to the role of capital formation. Net capital formation is
commonly regarded as part of final product—on the convincing grounds that it
forms the basis of long-run and future consumption. It is difficult to identify, howev¬
er, because (a) some activities or commodities can be defined as either capital forma¬
tion or intermediate product and because (b) the flow or capital goods over time is a
gross figure and will inciude the production of replacements for capital used up over
a period, i.e. capital consumption allowances, whereas there is no clear rule for esti¬
mating the latter. Intercountry and intertemporal comparisons of per capita income
obviously will be biased against those economies which work with the narrowest def¬
inition of capital formation and/or make the largest deduetions for depreciation.
Typical problem topics are the treatment of government expenditure on social over-
heads or infra-strueture as intermediate produets, the treatment of current spending
by integrated business firms on construction of new plant and equipment as interme¬
diate output, or the maintenance of Standard deduetions on a capital stock of rising
durability.9 This should be, I suggest, an important target area for historical work on
comparative real incomes.
8. Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth, pp. 225-27. Intersocietal and intertemporal comparison
will reveal some of these "intermediate" goods to be only present in the more developed
economy, thus posing, in addition, a weighting problem. More on this below. See also on all
of these problems Ruggles N. and R, The Design ofEconomic Accounts, N.Y. 1970, esp. pp.
38-48. For Germany, Stobbe A., Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung, in: Handwörterbuch
der Wirtschaftswissenschaft. Vol. 8, Stuttgart and N.Y. 1980.
9. Capital formation raises problems of theory into which the discussion above does not go.
See Usher, Measurement, esp. Chapter 5. On the measuring problems also Kuznets, Modern
Economic Growth, Chapter 5.
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d) The Assumption of Constant Preferences
Intersocietal comparisons of per capita income levels are dogged by the necessity of
the unrealistic assumption of constant preferences and production possibilities.
Much scattered evidence exists on the variability and mutability of tastes through
history, for example, in the discussion of protoindustrialization or of the economics
of peasant society, and who could deny that the emergence of new produets and
product quality changes are an important part of the history of economic develop¬
ment?10 Strictly speaking, absolute, incontrovertible proof of vast differences in pre¬
ferences across countries or time should mle out income comparisons qua welfare
Table 1: Illustration of Real Income Measurement over
Two Periods under Different Assumptions
Good A
Good B
Income
Period 1
Qo Po
20
50
2
1
Qo Po
40
50
90
Period 2
Q1 P1 Q1 PI
(a)
Qo PI
(b)
Q1 Po
Good A
Good B
Income
40
100
4
2
160
200
160
80
100
Tffo
80
100
T5o
Good A
Good B
Income
Index
Period 3
Q2 P2
160
200
2
2
I : ÄQ1
IIa :£Q1
IIb :^Q1
lila :^Q2
Illb : 27Q2
PI
P1
Q2 P2
320
400
720
/SQo Po
/sQo P1
Po /eQo Po
P2 /eQ1 P2
P1 /£Q1 P1
(a)
Q2 P1
640
400
1040
= 400
= 200
= 200
* 257
= 289
(b)
Q1 P2
80
200
250
(Paasche Index)
(Laspeyres
"
)
(Paasche
"
)
(Laspeyres ")
10. For the general problem, see Gould, Economic Growth, pp. 7-9; for "protoindustrialization"
and consumer preferences see. Kriedte P., et al., Industrialisierung vor der Industrialisierung.
Gewerbliche Warenproduktion auf dem Lande in der Formationsperiode des Kapitalismus,
Göttingen 1977, esp. Chapter 2 pp. 138-54; on "peasant economics" see Chayanov A. V., On
the Theory ofthe Peasant Economy, Edited by Thorner D., et al., Homewood 1966; Mathias
P., has raised almost the same question in "Adam's Bürden: Historical diagnoses of pover¬
ty", The Transformation of England, London 1979.
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comparisons Such proof, however, is not generally available for the period of mod¬
ern economic growth (since around 1750) and so we follow Kuznets and others in as¬
suming the broad community of wants and needs across countnes and time that the
income comparisons require
n
In so doing, to be sure, we are not free to do as we
please and are obligated to be as specific as we can about possible distortions (or
biases) in the comparisons executed In this connection we tread the ground well
known to economists as the "index number problem"—the essence of which is the
difficulty of comparing magnitudes which cannot be compared For comparisons of
real income—be they intertemporal or intersocietal—are only meaningful insofar as
they involve Indexes of prices and quantities of goods and Services having a common
denommator, and choosing the latter invanably mvolves creation of biases To make
this point clearer, a bnef digression on pnce index comparisons follows here
For Illustration purposes, take the example of a simple economy producing two fi¬
nal commodities A and B and compare two penods Table 1 below depicts the two
situations (with Q representing quantity purchased and P the pnce per unit of com-
modity) Three important, if banal, conclusions can be drawn from the Illustration
First, comparing the produets of pnce and quantity of different periods is not a
meaningful comparison of welfare if prices and quantities change, for pnce changes
alone do not represent changes in well-being and must be eliminated by deflation
This we may do by multiplying the quantities in both penods by the prices of penod
1 (Laspeyres Index) or of period 2 (Paasche Index) Either of these exercises will pro¬
duce the required common denommator and desired real income comparison
17
Sec¬
ond, the choice of deflator, i e , the period prices used as common denommator, will
have no effect on the welfare comparison only if either quantities of both goods or
prices of both goods change at the same rate as between two periods (as between pe¬
nod 1 and 2 in our table) Third, if relative pnces and quantities change (and that is
what we speak of when changes are not equiproportional) and quantities are nsing,
then the choice of first period prices will generally produce, ceteris paribus a higher
rate of change between periods than the use of end-penod prices (in the comparison
between period 2 and 3 of our example, e g 189 compared to 157 percent) This
makes sense in terms of the theory of demand, for that postulates a generally nega¬
tive relationship between price and quantity demanded and using the higher first pe¬
nod prices to value the larger end-penod quantities sets aside that "law of demand"
for the end period, so to speak, thus "permittmg" consumers to buy as much at
higher relative prices as they did when those pnces were lower Just the opposite ap¬
phes to the use of end-penod prices as weights (These yield a lower rate of real m-
11 J Mokyr's bnef survey of demand as a factor in the Industnal Revolution does not explore
the possibility of preference shifts except in connection with a presumed trade off between
leisure and money income He concludes that autonomous demand shifts were of httle de
monstrable importance for industnalization and pleads for supply onented analysis If his
survey is representative, there are few data available on this question See Mokyr J , Demand
vs Supply in the Industrial Revolution in Journal of Economic History 37(1977) Cf also
Mathias P, "Leisure and Wages in Theory and Practice, The Transformation who identifies
some possible data sources but on the whole coneurs with Mokyr s judgement
12 In terms of our table Index I has no relevance For completeness' sake it may be pointed out
that pnce Indexes bearing the names Laspeyres and Paasche have the opposite construc
tions, with the Laspeyres ~ Ipiq0/Ipoqo and the Paasche — Sp^/Ipoqi
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come change than the "law of demand" would seem to Warrant). It is in this sense
that we may speak of a "bias" in estimates of real income based on the deflators or
price weights used.
Turning back to the historical problem of real income estimates, we may ask
whether the empirical record confirms such theoretical expectations. The answer is
rather ambivalent. There is some seeming confirmation, both for intertemporal and
cross-country comparisons. It is believed, for example, that the rate of growth of real
incomes in the U.S., 1840-1900, is higher when 1860 prices are used as deflators than
when 1900 prices are so employed.13 And estimates ofthe GNP growth ofthe Soviet
Union, 1928-37, employing 1928 price weights are nearly 100 percent larger than esti¬
mates using 1937 ones (11.9 percent per annum instead of 6.2. percent!). Sectoral
time series studies support this argument.14 On the other hand, there are exceptions,
demonstrated, for example, in a careful study of Swedish income growth by Krantz
and Nilsson. In part, this reflects differing levels of aggregation: the broader the cate¬
gories aggregated, the weaker the Substitution effect. In any case, the exceptions re-
mind us that even a theoretical discussion of index number bias in growth measure¬
ment must make provision for the possibility of demand shifts (caused either by
shifts in tastes or income elasticities of demand.15 In fact, on theoretical grounds
alone, with income effects compensating Substitution effects, we can expect index
number bias to be negligible.
However, no discussion of the historical use of price indexes will be complete
without a few words on the conceptually trivial, but practically significant, question
of data comparability. In a strict sense, the world of economic theory with its prices
and quantities of individual commodities has no counterpart in reality, and both eco¬
nomic historians and national income accountants have to make do with improvisa-
tions and analogies. National income statistics reflect average prices and quantities,
but it is apparent that such averages reflect both different data processing Operations
and different types of transactions. Take the average price of a ton of Ruhr coal in
1855 and 1900: the estimated difference of 21 Pfennige (8,53 (1900) and 8,32 (1855))
or two percent, seems small, but it refers to two quite different commodities: anthra¬
cite or hard coal in the first year, and bituminous of soft coal in the second.16 Now
13 See Davis, American Economic Growth, p. 49.
14. Gould, Economic Growth, pp. 18-20, discusses this point, citing Moorsteen R., and Powell
R, The Soviet Capital Stock, 1928-1962, Homewood 1966 and also Gerschenkron A, A Dol¬
lar Index of Soviet Machinery Output, 1927-28 to 1937, Santa Monica 1951. Gerschenkron
has elsewhere discussed this phenomenon of a Laspeyres vs. Paasche "bias" as an essential
part of growth, so that the phenomenon itself has been dubbed the "Gerschenkron Effect."
See Gerschenkron A, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Cambridge 1962,
Chapter 8 and 9, where the difference between the two prices indexes is seen as a measure of
structural change.
15. Krantz O., and Nilsson C.-A, Swedish National Product, 1861-1970, Lund 1975, deal expli¬
citly with the "Gerschenkron Effect" and attribute its Virtual absence in Sweden to signifi¬
cant demand shifts (Ibid., 196-202). See also Solow R, and Temin R, Introduction: The In¬
putsfor Growth, in: Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Vol. 8, Edited by Mathias R,
and Postan M., Cambridge 1978, p. 6.
16. Cf. Holtfrerich C.-L., Quantitative Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Ruhrkohlenbergbaus im 19. Jahr¬
hundert, Dortmund 1973, p. 18.
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coal probably represents a resolvable problem, but what about iron or steel9 Here it
is not merely a matter of specifications of physical properties of the commodity, e g ,
its subdivision into components such as bars, plates and rails and standardized
weight measures, but also of knowing whether the prices averaged reflect a Standard
procedure for estimating transportation cost from plant to representative consumer,
discounts for volume and cash purchases, etc etc
17
Then there is the question of uncertainties in the estimation of quantity data For
example, for the Prussian and German agricultural sector, the choice of penod, the
treatment of intermediate produets, and assumptions about slaughter rates and
weights are much more important determinants of the measured rate of growth of
output than are the choice of pnce weights This can be demonstrated by means of
the following estimates
18
Aggregate Output, Prussia, 1816-49 (vF) 2,1% p a
Aggregate Output, Prussia, 1816-49 (GH) 2,2% p a
Net Output, Prussia, 1816-49 (RT) 2,6% p a
Net Output, Prussia, 1816-52 (RT) 2,1% pa
Net Output, Germany 1846/49-1910/13 (L) = l,46, (P)=l,40 pa
Net Output, Germany 1850/54-1910/13 (L)= 1,85, (P)= 1,83 pa
Index number problems are not a neghgible factor and Warrant further consideration
in connection with productivity measurement But the point is, histonans of 19th Cen¬
tury productivity may face more dangerous enemies
We have already calied attention to the symmetry of time series and cross-sectional
comparison We thus expect the estimated income differences between nch and poor
countries to be larger using the latter's prices as weights Patel's expenments with In¬
dian and American data for 1959 showed a difference of 100 percent, i e , India's per
capita output was more than twice as high in U S dollars when measured in U S
17 Morgenstern O, On the Accuracy of Economic Observations 2d Ed, Princeton 1965, esp
Chapter 10 It should be pointed out that inferences about costs on the basis of pnce data
depend on assumptions about competition which require investigation They can be entical,
as the discussion of British, German and American productivity in the steel industry seems
to indicate See, e g Allen R C , International Competition in Iron and Steel 1850-1913 in
Journal of Economic History, 39 (1979), esp pp 933-37, where a debate with the study of
McCIoskey D , Economic Maturity and Entrepreneunal Decline Cambndge 1974, is joined
See also Webb S
, Tariffs Cartels Technology and Growth in the German Steel Industry 1879
to 1914 in Journal of Economic History, 40 (1980), esp pp 321-23
18 von Finckenstein, Graf M W , Die Entwicklung der Landwirtschaft in Preußen und Deutsch
land 1801-1930 Wurzburg 1960, Helling G , Berechnung eines Index der Agrarproduktion in
Deutschland im 19 Jahrhundert in Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 4 (1965) Tilly R,
Capital Formation in Germany in the Nineteenth Century in Mathias P, and Postan M ,
(eds), Cambndge Economic History of Europe, vol 7, Cambndge, 1978 Jacobs A, and
Richter H
,
Die Großhandelspreise m Deutschland von 1792 bis 1934 Sonderheft des Instituts
für Konjunkturforschung Berlin 1935 The abbreviations vF, GH and RT in the text refer to
the sources von Finckenstein, Gerhard Helling and R Tilly, respectively L to Laspeyres
pnce weights and *P* to Paasche ones
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prices as when measured in Indian prices and much closer to American levels.19 A
less extreme but nevertheless significant difference was produced by Gilbert and
Kravis—by somewhat different methods—in their classic study of purchasing power
parity exchange rates between European countries and the U.S. in the early postwar
period.20 Table 2 summarizes their findings.
Table 2: Income per capita in Different Countries According to Exchange Rates and
Purchasing Power Parities, 1950 (U.S. per capita Income = 100)
Country
Exchange
Rate U.S. Prices
100
European Prices
U.S.A. 100 100
U.K. 37 63 53
France 35 53 42
Germany 26 43 33
Italy 16 30 22
Source: M. Gilbert and I. Kravis,
An International Comparison of
National Products and the Purchasing
Power of Currencies (Paris, n.d.)
Last but not least I should mention here O'Brien and Keyder's study comparing
Great Britain and France as one of the first significant attempts to extend this kind of
analysis to 19th-century economic history.21 In this case, however, the fact that
French per capita incomes seem relatively higher with French price weights than
with British ones is not unambigously interpretable in terms of our rieh country—
19.
20.
21.
Patel S., The Economic Distance Between Nations: Its Origin, Measurement and Outlook, in:
Economic Journal, (1964). See also Kuznets, Modem Economic Growth, pp. 374-84.
Gilbert M., and Kravis L, An International Comparison of National Products and the Purchas¬
ing Power of Currencies. A Study ofthe U.S., the U.K., France, Germany and Italy, Paris
n.d.
O'Brien P., and Keyder C, Economic Growth in Britain and France, 1780-1914. Two Paths to
the 20th Century, London 1978. It is useful to note, however, that in this comparison, differ¬
ing national output structures are used to weight two national consumption "baskets" (in¬
cluding items common to both countries) which, by means of Substitution of each country's
prices into the other country's "basket", yield two "exchange rates". These are then applied
to the money income of one country to permit one-currency income comparisons. That is,
Poqo/piqo or piqj/poqi where 0 = Great Britain and 1 = France. Their exercise involves only
conversion of French incomes into Sterling or: French income/p0qo/piqo and French in-
come/p^i/poqi.
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poor country dichotomy; for the country differences may have been small. In dis-
cussing how this method gets around some of the difficulties of using official ex¬
change rates for a cross-country income comparison, O'Brien and Keyder suggest
calculating two rates of exchange for every two-country comparison: the purchasing
power parity of Sterling in terms of francs (or the number of francs needed to pur-
chase a basket of goods representative of British consumption patterns costing 1 £ in
Britain) and the purchasing power parity of francs in terms of Sterling. This Sugges¬
tion correctly emphasizes that (a) the rate reflecting one country's price weights, say,
Britain's, permits conceptualizing how well off an average inhabitant of that country
would be in Britain with the average income of inhabitants of another country—in
this case, France; that (b) the same experiment with the other country's price weights
permits the opposite comparison, (c) that both rates are equally 'Valid", and (d) that
the difference between the incomes so converted reflects differences in preference
patterns but also gives us an idea of the maximum and minimum size of real income
differentials. Like all such explicit comparisons it is an exercise in hypothetical histo¬
ry. This particular case, to be sure, is a double exercise.
These observations return us to Kuznets' interpretation of real income compari¬
sons across time and space as being produets of a point of view rather than reflec¬
tions of universally objective measuments. The point is well taken, but we should not
forget that Kuznets also suggested that in long-run historical comparisons, some
points of view may be more valid than others. Where income gaps between countries
are large, he recommended use of the preference and production patterns, i. e., the
price weights, of the more advanced, high-income country for comparative purposes
on the grounds that poorer countries strive to become richer but not vice-versa.22
This brings us füll circle and back to the remarks about the universal community of
wants and needs and the analogy between rieh and poor persons with which this sec¬
tion began. It amounts to an endorsement of the use of per capita income as an index
of economic development, though the endorsement is a qualified one. In the next
section, we must conclude our discussion ofthat index by examining what is perhaps
the single most important qualification—the unresolved problem of distribution.
e) Income Distribution and Community Welfare
An increase in a country's per capita real income could mean an increase in its eco¬
nomic welfare in the sense of increased satisfaction of material wants, but such an in¬
crease will reflect the distribution of income, since, obviously, only those wants
backed up by income can be made effective. One could take the position that every
society gets the income distribution it deserves and regard per capita income as ever-
optimally distributed—be it in a social-democratic, welfare-state economy, a laissez-
faire liberal one, or a totalitarian communist dictatorship. But this would be pan-
glossian. Alternatively, one can impose modern distributional "welfare functions" on
the historical Situation investigated. On only moderately egalitarian assumptions
about the Utility of income to different classes of individuals in society, we have to
recognize, it seems to me, that increases in per capita income might not reflect in¬
creases in aggregate welfare at all, for example, if they were accompanied by a sharp
22. Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth, pp. 23, 484-85.
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redistribution of income in favour of the wealthiest members of the community and/
or against a great majority of Iow-income receivers.23
Given the fact of distributional inequality and the practical impossibility of assign¬
ing generally accepted Utility weights to different income groups, quite a few scholars
have chosen not to interpret real income per capita as an index of welfare at all, but
rather as an index of productive capacity, as an index of potential welfare, so to
speak. According to Harvey Leibenstein, for instance, increasing per capita income
represents increasing "possible achievement" i. e., a larger sum available for poten¬
tial redistribution, should that be found desirable.24 I disagree with the notion of
"potential welfare"25 and wish to return to the related interpretation of real income
per capita as productive capacity shortly; but for the moment, let us note that such a
reaction depends on one's ideas about the behavior of income distribution. In the
face of compelling evidence confirming the stability of income distribution across
time and countries, most economists and economic historians, I suspect, would find
it difficult not to interpret increases in per capita real income as improvements in
community welfare. And evidence showing non-negligible increases in the inequality
of income distribution, it follows, could be seen as reductions in community welfare,
deductible, as it were, from any increases in per capita real income.
In any case, that is the sensible approach followed in a number of important trea-
tises on economic development, notably those by H. Chenery and his collaborators.26
The schemes devised in these studies weight income growth in the different income
classes by the number of persons in them. Given the disproportionately large share of
population in the lowest groups, this amounts to assigning Utility points to increases
in the share of income increases going to the lowest income groups of a given coun¬
try. The logic of this procedure derives from its frequently practiced opposite: to
view aggregate per capita real income growth as welfare growth is, in fact, to weight
increases in the average income of the wealthy, say, the top 20 percent of income re-
23. Usher, Measurement, Chapter 3, lists identical tastes, equal shares in ownership of the fac¬
tors of production and/or unitary income elasticities of demand for all goods as the condi¬
tions for interpreting real income estimates based on observed prices and quantities as a
community welfare index.
24. Cf, e. g., Leibenstein H., Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth, N. Y. 1963, Chapter
2; also Viner J., International Trade and Economic Development, Oxford 1953, Chapter 6.
25. The problem with "potential welfare" is that it is misleading, for a Situation with more po¬
tential welfare can quite easily be a Situation with less actual welfare if the contingent redis¬
tribution does not take place. The notion of "potential welfare" thus settles nothing. On this
and other related matters, see. Sen A., The Welfare Basis ofReal Income Comparisons: A Sur¬
vey, in: Journal of Economic Literature, 17 (1979). Sen, in fact, proposes some measures of
inequality of income distribution which are worth considering, but he appears, in general, to
take the position that a country's economic welfare is not measurable in terms of its per cap¬
ita income. I have a less rigorous understanding of economic welfare than Sen and persist, in
this paper, in associating it with per capita income—subject to one qualification to be men¬
tioned shortly. See also Usher, D., The Welfare Basis of Real Income Comparisons: A Com¬
ment, in: Journal of Economic Literature, 18 (1980).
26. Chenery, H., et al., Redistribution with Growth, Oxford 1974; Chenery H, Structural Change
and Development Policy, Oxford 1979; Chenery H, Armut und Fortschritt—Alternativefür die
Dritte Welt, in: Finanzierung und Entwicklung, 17 (1980); also Sen, Welfare Basis, pp. 30-
31, and some of the literature cited there.
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ceivers—who typically obtain 50 percent of a given income increase in poor coun¬
tnes—about 10 times higher than the income gains of the representative poor—
whose aggregate increment typically accounts for five percent of the total27 Alterna-
tively, weights can be assigned to increases in the share of the population living
above some matenally defined Standard of poverty The importance of such possible
adjustments lies in the fact that growth of per capita incomes has not automatically
contributed to alleviation of poverty in poor countnes in recent years Indeed, ac¬
cording to Chenery, in some places and times income growth has achieved less than
specific distributional policies have done In this connection we are invited to com¬
pare the experience of slow growers such as Cuba or Sri Lanka with fast growers
such as Brazil28 Histoncal extensions of the argument readily suggest themselves
They mn from the famous "Standard of living" debate concerning British workers
dunng the Industnal Revolution, through S Kuznets' well-known thesis on the in¬
verted U-curve of income inequahty dunng economic development (e g, increasing
inequahty in the early stages) to more recent work on Britain and the United States
by J Wilhamson, P Lindert and others
29
I have no wish to review this literature here
and only mention it as a way of suggesting that the distribution of income may repre¬
sent an important modification of per capita as a long-run development welfare in¬
dex
However, the word "may" in the previous sentence was used advisedly, for certain
problems emerge with this use of distributional considerations that have not yet been
satisfactonly resolved Their mention therefore concludes this section of the paper
The relevance of distribution for welfare interpretations of per capita income growth
will depend on answers to three questions (1) to what extent are we free or obligated
to impose our presumably modern welfare Standards on the past—even in the face of
evidence on the prevalence of wholly different welfare notions among the popula¬
tions being investigated Put in a comparative context do we impose one Standard on
two societies and will there be "bias" as a consequence9 (2) To what extent does a
distributional correction of per capita income Indexes imply recourse to a Standard
of individual aspirations which, strictly speaking, requires additional correction, e g ,
for average age and hfe cycle experience ofthe population9 (3) The evidence cited
above to the contrary notwithstanding, is a distributional correction necessary9 Or
rather what is the long-run relationship between income growth and the equality of
its distnbution9 I submit that if our answer to the last question is "positive"30 we can
27 Chenery suggests (in Redistribution with Growth) the following measure of development as
welfare G = w,g, + w2g2 + w3g3 + w4g4 4- w5g5 where g = the mean income of each quintile
of the population of income recipients and w = the population weight of each quintile
28 Cf esp Chenery, Armut und Fortschritt p 13 also Chenery et al, Redistribution
29 Cf Taylor A , (Ed ), The Standard of Living in Britain in the Industnal Revolution London
1975, Kuznets S , Economic Growth and Income Inequality American Economic Review, 45
(1955), J Wilhamson, Earnings Inequality tn Nineteenth-Century Britain in Journal of Eco
nomic History, 40 (1980), Williamson J , The Sources ofAmerican Inequality 1896-1948 in
Review of Economics and Statistics, 58 (1976) and the interesting observations on links be
tween inequahty and cost of Irving Indexes by David P , and Solar P, A Bicentenary Contri
bution to the History of the Cost of Living in Amenca, in Uselding P, (Ed), Research in
Economic History, Greenwich 1977
30 Some evidence points in this direction See e g Chenery, Stmctural Change, Chapter 8
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avoid some very difficult conceptual and empirical problems, though that will not
obviate the necessity of mobilizing the distribution data themselves. They remain as
significant desiderata of the comparative history of income growth.
4. Social Indicators and the Income Concept
Dissatisfaction with per capita income as a development and welfare measure pro¬
duced in the 1960's the so-called "social indicators movement". It represents the
search for quantitative indicators reflecting dimensions of social experience pre¬
sumed not to be covered by the national income accounts. Before taking up the social
indicators, however, I would like to make a few comments on some extensions ofthe
concept of national income which are closer to its original meaning and were men¬
tioned briefly earlier under the heading of "imputations". In the early 1970's, W.
Nordhaus and J. Tobin offered one of the most comprehensive Suggestion for exten¬
sions in the form of a "Measure of Economic Welfare" (M.E.W.). As the name sug¬
gests, their concern was with developing a more consistent measure of welfare than
GNP or income per capita were believed to provide. Welfare is defined as the con¬
sumption of final goods and Services including an allowance for leisure and a deduc-
tion for environmental deterioration plus the investment expenditures neccessary to
insure maintenance of the current rate of productivity growth into the future. Their
calculation thus (1) divides govemment expenditures into final consumption and in¬
termediate goods and Services ("regrettables" such as defense and other "inputs" to
other sectors); (2) divides household expenditures into consumption and investment
and intermediate activities (such as expenditures for travelling to work); (3) expands
the concept of capital formation to take account of consumer durables, education
and health investment, as well as investment (already mentioned) needed to insure a
given current rate of productivity advance; (4) expands the concept of final product
to assign to leisure time activities consumption values (this is by far the largest modif¬
ication, amounting to more than GNP for 1929, e.g.); and (5) makes a calculation of
the social costs of growth especially, those related to environmental deterioration.
Table 3 suggests their 20th-century importance.31
I must confess to mixed feelings about suggestions such as these. On the one hand,
we should think seriously about expanding historical national income statistics in a
similar direction, for a good a priori case can be made for some ofthe extensions sug¬
gested and, in any case, we are faced with the need to estimate the value of historical
transactions on the basis of evidence just as suspect and as indirect as that employed
by modern "imputers".32 On the other hand, a case can also be made—for some pur¬
poses such as the analysis of cycies—for reducing or limiting the measured product
31. This discussion is based on Nordhaus and Tobin, cited in note 6 and the discussion in that
NBER volume, see also Usher, Measurement Journal of Economic History, Chapter 7, Kuz¬
nets, Modern Economic Growth, pp. 220-34, and Kendrick J., Economic Accounts and their
Uses.
32. For example, agricultural income is derived from crop and animal output estimates applying
market prices to /ion-market production, and much of non-agricultural income also must be
imputed, e.g., that of self-employed artisans.
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Table 3: Gross National Product and M.E.W, in the U.S.A.,
1929-65 (billions of dollars, 1958 prices)
1929 1935 1954 1965
1. Gross national product 203.6 169.5 407.0 617,,8
2. Capital consumption
NIPA -20.0 -20.0 -32.5 -54.,7
3. Net national product
NIPA 183.6 149.5 374.5 563..1
NIPA final output reclas-
sified as regrettables
and intermediates
a. Government -6.7 -7.4 -57.8 -63.2
b. Private -10.3 -9.2 -16.4 -30.9
5. Imputations for items not
included in NIPA
a. Leisure 339.5 401 .3 533.2 626.9
b. Nonmarket activity 85.7 109.2 211 .5 295.4
c. Disamenities -12.5 -14.1 -24.3 -34.6
d. Services of public and
private capital 29.7 24.2 48.9 78.9
6. Additional capital con¬
sumption -19.3 -33.4 -35.2 -92.7
7. Growth requirement -46.1 -46.7 -63.1 -101 .8
8. Sustainable MEW 543.6 573.4 961 .3 1.241 .1
NIPA= national income and product accounts.
Source: Nordhaus and Tobin as cited in note 7.
to market or quasi-market transactions. This is owing to the absence of annual data
for imputed items and the resultant necessity of extrapolaüng and interpolating for
missing observations. If the trade-off between observable market activities and im¬
puted non-market ones is subject to cyclical influences—modifications by means of
trend relationships may produce a distorted view of economic growth patterns and
also of welfare, as for example Nordhaus and Tobin's data do for the 1929-35 period
of U. S. economic history (when much involuntary leisure time emerged). The point is,
one's particular research interest may have to determine one's choice of definitions
of national product.
Turning away from national income to the "social indicators movement", we
should first note that in one sense this movement represents a step backwards: none
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of the proposed indicators are themselves as comprehensive as the income accounts,
and in contrast to the components of those accounts they cannot be added up to
something comparable to GNP. However, for many of the experts working in this
area of applied statistics the data requirements of GNP and its underlying assump¬
tions seemed to go well beyond available knowledge, particularly where comparisons
with less developed countries of the past and present were sought. One idea was to
collect those concrete data which were believed to represent development indicators,
were readily available, and posed no difficult valuation problems: for example, tons
of wheat or steel production per annum, numbers of bicycles or radio sets per head
of population, number of crude births per 1,000 inhabitants, and so on. Comparison,
it was hoped, could thus be extended to countries having no national income statis¬
tics.33 On the whole, however, this attempt has not been particularly successful,
either because the indicators or their averages, taken by themselves, had no clear
meaning, (either as welfare or capacity indicators) or because, where they were
linked via correlation analysis to GNP, they became no more than rather poor prox-
ies for the latter.
Table 4 illustrates the bind we are in. There is good correspondence in an or¬
dinal ranking sense, but the scales of the variables are multi-dimensional and hence,
quantitatively non-comparable. This means that for ranking purposes the indicators
are superfluous—since we already have per capita income statistics—but for quanti¬
tative extensions into times and countries with deficient data, inadequate, especially
when we note the irrelevance of some of the indicators for historical work on the
19th Century (e.g., radios or electricity).
The "social indicators movement", however, aimed in two other directions as well.
One of those reflects modem-day concern in industrial nations with the "costs of
economic growth". It is in search of indicators of social and environmental change
generally believed to affect social welfare. Here, the idea has been to develop an in¬
dex of the "quality of life" which could be combined with GNP to help to decide
whether economic change over a given period has been, on balance, socially benefi-
cial or detrimental for the population affected. This effort is closely related to the ex¬
tensions of the concept of real income discussed earlier (as "imputations"). It is
much too early to say what will come out of this attempt, but two tentative observa¬
tions seem relevant for our purposes. First, as in the correspondence "test" just dis¬
played, most of the indicators of social well-being are positively associated with
changes in GNP per capita. Given the widespread belief that the direction (or sign)
33. See on this, Gould, Economic Growth, pp. 11-14; Beckerman W., and Bacon R., International
Comparisons ofIncome Levels: A Suggested New Measure, in: Economic Journal, 76 (1966);
or the discussion of social and economic indicators developed by the UN in Nohlen D., and
Nuscheier F., (Eds.), Handbuch der Dritten Welt, I, Hamburg 1974. It may be added that
Gerschenkron's wellknown approach to European industrialization limited quantitative
growth analysis to industrial production, for want of more comprehensive, yet reliable, data.
Cf. Gerschenkron A., The Approach ofEuropean Industrialization: A Postscript, and Problems
of Measuring Long-Term Growth in Income and Wealth, in: Economic Backwardness, esp.
pp. 353-54; also Gerschenkron, The Early Phase of Industrialization in Russia: Afterthoughts
and Counterthoughts, in Rostow W. W., (Ed.), The Economics of Take-Off into Sustained
Growth, N.Y. 1963, esp. pp. 161-63.
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Table 4 (GNP per capita and Corresponding Indicators)
Life Expectancy (In Years)
P Employed as % of Labor Force
Average No of persons per Room
|3 Rate of Pnmary and Secondary
School Enrollement (%)
% of Dwelhngs with Electncity
% of Male Labor Force in Agnculturs
Manufactunng as % of GNP
|a % of Population in Cities with
20000 Inhabitants
£ Per capita Consumption of Animal
Protein (grams per day)
o No of Radios (Receiver per 1000
Inhabitants)
^ No of Newspaper (Daihes per 1000
Inhabitants)
|g GNP per capita (1960 $)
"jj Agncultural Output per male
00
Agncultural Worker 1960 $)
y Per capita Energy Consumption
(In kilos of coal Equivalents)
fe Rate of Enrollment Higher Education
(% of 20 29 Age Group)
1° Value of Foreign Trade per capita
(1960 $)
o Steel Consumption per capita (Kilos)
|§ Electncity Consumption
(Kilowatts per capita)
§ No of Telephones (per 1000
Inhabitants)
Source U N Research Institute for Social Development (Reprinted in D Nohlen and
F Nuscheier (Eds), Handbuch der Dritten Welt I (Hamburg, 1974), p 248
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of this correlational relationship is negative, that is an important result.34 Second, the
indicators are aggregative and say nothing about distributions and/or social inequal¬
ity. If we wish to correct GNP for changes in the degree of economic inequality, an
analogous correction for these indicators will also be in order.
A second prong of the "social indicators movement" has focused on the under-de-
veloped countries. Its proponents have interpreted economic growth as part of a
broader cultural process embracing social and political change. Such an interpreta¬
tion calied for (a) data on social and political change and (b) analysis ofthe links be¬
tween such data and more conventional indicators of economic development. I. Ad¬
elmann and C. T. Morris, in one of the more ambitious examples of this genre, have
shown that the interdiseiplinary data approach can enlighten.35 Applying factor anal¬
ysis to a cross-country array of many economic, social and political indicators—fac¬
tor analysis being particularly useful where an inductive approach is preferred and
no specific hypotheses are used to pre-strueture the data—they find that (estimated)
GNP per capita is closely associated with the non-economic factors of development,
but that the complex "factor" of "soc/oeconomic" indicators (including such varia¬
bles as "extent of dualism", importance of an indigenous middle class, etc.) corre¬
sponds much better to what we commonly think of as the conditions of underdevel¬
opment than the purely economic "factor" does.36 In addition, tracing the links be¬
tween economic, social and political variables leads Adelmann and Morris to a use¬
ful three-stage version of underdevelopment in which GNP per capita becomes more
closely related to purely economic factors as development proeeeds (from "very un-
derdeveloped" to "less developed") and also, in the third stage of underdevelop¬
ment, more closely associated with political ones.37 To sum up: these results suggest
to me that historians of development have something to gain by an extension ef the
indices of measurement to non-economic factors, particularly for study ofthe earliest
phases of industrialization, However, for investigations of western European devel¬
opment since around 1850—corresponding to the third phase—they are not likely to
be misled very much by relying on per capita income—so long as their main concern
34. Cf. e.g., King M. A., Economic Growth and Social Development, in: Review of Income and
Wealth, 20 (1974). I owe this reference to Rolf Dumke. For Germany, see Zapf W., Lebens¬
qualität in der Bundesrepublik. Methode der Messung und erste Ergebnisse, in: Soziale Welt
(1977).
35. Adelman L, and Morris C. T, Society, Politics and Economic Development: A Quantitative
Approach, Baltimore 1967. Their goal, to be sure, is an improved explanation of economic de¬
velopment, not an analysis of "modernization". That branch of the indicators movement is
not discussed here at all.
36. One way of putting this is that GNP per capita categories bring together much more diverse
collections of countries with respect to socio-economic characteristics (such as size of tradi¬
tional agriculture, extent of dualism, etc.) than the "factor" "Socioeconomic Variables"
does. See Adelman and Morris, Society, p. 169, and the appendix to this paper where some
of their results are reproduced. See also Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth, pp. 437-60, for
a discussion of non-economic characteristics of underdeveloped countries.
37. The Adelman and Morris discussion of this third stage with its emphasis on the emergence
of strong leadership commitment to economic growth and corresponding economic and fi¬
nancial policies gives it a resemblance to the experience of some European countries in the
19th Century, e.g., Germany in its "Take-Off* phase (in the 1850's and 1860's).
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is with economic development, and not the social and pohtical changes which accom¬
panied it
5 Productivity
Aggregate labor productivity bears a close resemblance to per capita income Indeed,
where the entire population is gainfully employed, capital consumption negligible,
and the foreign accounts are in balance, the two are virtually identical This concep¬
tual hkeness is important, for it reflects a duahty in the way we look at the economy
and the real income it generates it may be seen as a system of pnces and quantities
of goods and Services generating real income and welfare as a function of consumer
preferences, or it can be interpreted as a system of production possibihties generat¬
ing output (real income) as a function of technology For some purposes either per¬
spective will do, but where interest centers on the measurement of real income as an
index of development economists differ on this issue As suggested earher, quite a
few economists believe that interpreting output or income per capita as an index of
productive capacity avoids the problems of interpersonal compansons of utihty and
distributional considerations associated with income seen as welfare
38
They see de¬
velopment as an economy's progression from, say, position A to position B, where B
represents an economic state capable of producing all of the goods produced (per
capita) in position A plus some non-negligible quantity of goods reflecting income
growth, call it P—for increased productive capacity Thus B = A + P The words
"capable" and "capacity" are used to stress that while B represents more "potential
welfare" than A, it need not mean more realized welfare
I disagree with this Interpretation In terms of the example just given, I suspect
that we are likely to say that an economy is better off in position B than in position
A, a Statement which to my way of thinking has welfare connotations The notion of
"potential welfare" is, on this view, unnecessary baggage More importantiy, histori¬
cally relevant comparisons will typically involve economies with different bundles of
goods and Services Referring back to our example, we may wish to view states A and
B as two separate economies If we observe them to produce the same produets, x
and y, but B to produce more of each, there is no ranking problem However, it is
thinkable that we might observe that economy B produces more of final goods x and
y than economy A but much less of an intermediate good z (say, transport), mainly
because consumers in economy B have locahzed tastes causing locahzed consump¬
tion and reduced need of transportation Even if relative prices of goods x and y were
identical as between economies A and B, so long as transportation is an intermediate
good (and resources are perfectly convertible) there would be a difference in per cap¬
ita real income between A and B dependent upon demand differences
39
38 Leibenstein, Economic Backwardness p 12 This distinction has sometimes been applied in
the national accounts to the difference between national income at market pnces (welfare
measure) and at factor costs (productive capacity measure) See, e g , Gilbert and Kravis, In
ternational Comparison (cited in note 20) For critical discussion of this dismction see Usher
Measurement Chapter 4, and Sen, Welfare Basis
39 The example and much of this entire discussion is derived from Usher, Measurement Chap
ter 4
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Alternatively, turning to the topic of productivity comparison, we can imagine
economy A having a higher productivity or output per head than B in the production
of the only commodity it is capable of producing, say, good x, but B having the abü¬
ity to produce a greater variety of goods and Services, say, goods x and y rather than
just x. Any comparison ofthe productivity ofthe two economies will have to take ac¬
count of a bias connected with the comparison of non-identical bundles of goods and
Services. We have here, once again, the "index number problem", in this case in an
extreme form. Now, if we were to Substitute into our example the economies of the
American ante-bellum South (for B) and the North (for A), we could cite in support
of our argument an important criticism which P. David and P. Temin levelled against
Fogel and Engerman's analysis of slavery in their book on the American South—
Time on the Cross.40 Those reviewers argued that the extent of the South's productiv¬
ity (or "efficiency") advantage over the North in agriculture was dependent on the
relative price of cotton (and other goods) in 1860 and not only or even mainly on the
superior productive Organization and "labor efficiency" of Southern plantations. Be¬
cause the South could produce much cotton and because world demand for it was
buoyant, the value of its agricultural output could and did expand above Northern
levels. These values, divided by estimates of the available productive factors, pro¬
duced a "relative efficiency" or "productivity" differential favoring the South. But
behind that differential lay the crucial weight of demand. For this reason, David and
Temin suggested replacing the terminology "relative efficiency"—having physical
and technical connotations—with the label "revenue—getting efficiency".41
I have neither the competence nor the desire to adjudicate in the ongoing debate
on American slavery, but the particular criticism of interpretation of productivity in-
40. The literature of criticism of this book is immense. Some ofthe landmarks are: Fogel R. W.,
and Engerman S. L., Time on the Cross, Vol. I: The Economics of American Negro Slavery;
Vol. II: Evidence and Methods, Boston 1974; David P., and Temin P., Slavery: The Progres¬
sive Institution?, in: Journal of Economic History, 34 (1974); the entire issue of Explorations
in Economic History, 12 (1975); R. W. Fogel and S. L. Engemarn, Explaining the Relative Ef¬
ficiency of Slave Agriculture in the Antebellum South, in: American Economic Review, 67
(1977); Haskeil, T., et al., in: American Economic Review 69, (1979); and Fogel R. W., and
Engerman S. L., Explaining the Relative Efficiency of Slave Agriculture in the Antebellum
South: Reply, in: American Economic Review, 70 (1980); and David R, et al., Reckoning
with Slavery, N.Y. 1976.
41. The David-Temin discussion (in 1974 and 1977) suggests that the bias favoring the South is
unknown, but that it could, in the extreme, explain the whole of the relative advantage re¬
corded by Fogel and Engerman. Interested readers are referred to the Fogel-Engerman reply
to this criticism in the American Economic Review, 70 (1980). I should add that the point I
am making is not identical with the general thrust of the David-Temin critique of Time on
the Cross. For the purposes of the present argument, the South's alleged productivity lead
can be seen as a welfare advantage over the North, though one which is demand-dependent.
David and Temin, however, would doubt whether the assumptions of welfare economics ap¬
ply to unfree societies such as the antebellum South at all. I find it hard to resist their argu¬
ments on this point, though I have the feeling that a strict construction of their remarks
could considerably narrow the ränge of comparative economic growth history. My point, it
must be reemphasized, is that productivity comparisons will involve welfare judgements in
many relevant cases. The reader is referred, once more, to the rather loose, non-optimal con¬
cept of welfare applied here—and discussed in sections 3d. and 3e. of the paper.
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dices as indicators of physical or technical efficiency articulated there does have gen¬
eral validity for all comparative studies of productivity. For there are not very many
sets of productivity figures which will stand comparison without translation into
some common denominator. There are some, e.g. grain yields, or tons of coal mined
per miner-hour, but their ränge of application is limited. The desired translation, in
any case, will involve consideration of prices and quantities of commodities, weight¬
ing them, and as an inevitable part of the counterfactual experiment which choosing
such weights involves, bias. Historians of comparative productivity, that is the con¬
clusion to be drawn here, should neither deny the existence of such biases nor seek to
escape them, but should instead attempt to construct their studies so that the inevita¬
ble biases will not invalidate their results.
Although I do not believe that productivity data offer us more "objective" evi¬
dence of economic progress than do those on real incomes per capita, they are nev¬
ertheless essential. They are essential, because the supply side is just as indispensable
to analysis of economic development as the demand side and probably more accessi¬
ble to research. For this reason an entire generation of economists and economic his¬
torians over the past several decades has discussed economic growth in terms of
them. Those scholars have conceived of economic growth (or development), for bet¬
ter or worse, as a technical process in which inputs of productive factors are trans¬
formed via a production function into output. They have retained this schema of re¬
lationships while disaggregating the process down to the sectoral or regional level,
and they have managed to refine some of the input measures (e. g., by Converting the
labor input with the help of educational data into a ränge of labor inputs of differing
quality) without making the entire set of accounts—for that is what this system of
production—function relationships is—inconsistent or noncomparable.42 Given its
widespread acceptance, this system of relationships offers possibilities for further
comparative study which it would be foolish to ignore.
A possibly superficial, but nonetheless logical, argument for focusing on produc¬
tivity change is the latter's contribution to long-run changes in per capita income.
Long-run economic growth in those countries for which estimates exist, has resulted
largely from increased Output per unit of input, i.e., from productivity growth.43
42. This is clearly not the proper place for a bibliographical survey, but a few major contribu¬
tions to the "growth paradigm" should be mentioned: Abramovitz M., Resource and Output
Trends in the United States since 1870, in: American Economic Review, 56 (1956); Solow R.
M., Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, in: Review of Economics and
Statistics, 39 (1957); Denison E., The Sources ofEconomic Growth and the Alternatives before
Us, N.Y. 1962; Ibid, Why Growth Rates Differ, Washington 1967; Jorgenson D., and Gril-
iches Z., The Explanation of Productivity Change, in: Review of Economic Studies (1967);
Kuznets, in Modern Economic Growth and elsewhere has extended the empirical basis for
growth studies and thus deserves mention here. I have found useful discussions of growth
and technical change in Usher, Measurement, Chapter 12, and also in Gould, Economic
Growth, Chapter 5,
43. See, for example, the discussion of Denison's findings for the U.S. (1909-57) in Kuznets
Modern Economic Growth, pp. 80-82 (where an anual rate of growth per capita income of
1.44 per cent is attributed to the growth of capital and land inputs (.18), quality improve¬
ments of labor (.58) and factor productivity (.67). See also the correlation between per capita
income and output per man-hour for 14 industrial countries (1870-1965) indicated in Gould,
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There is no need to reproduce the basic estimates here, for they are common knowl¬
edge. Rather more useful may be some discussion ofthe qualifications ofthose find¬
ings, for they are likely to be relevant to some of the historical studies of productivity
currently getting underway.
Our point of departure is the discussion ofthe so-called "residual", the increase in
total factor productivity which—according to the earliest estimates of aggregate pro¬
duction functions—accounted for between 50 and 85 percent of modern growth in
industrial countries such as the U. S.A. (in the 20th Century).44 Diagram 1 taken from
J. D. Gould's excellent survey of growth history, offers an incomplete list of dangers
associated with residual analysis. Missing there, but worthy of mention, are quality
changes or differences in the inputs of labor (obvious and often noted), capital (less
obvious, but also of probable significance), and natural resources. This deserves
mention because the productivity of these factors should be standardized according
to quality or comparisons will be misleading. In the studies cited by Gould (and oth¬
ers), for example, stronger, healthier and better educated labor as well as improved
capital equipment contribute to enlargement of the measured productive inputs and
reduction of their measured productivity.45 What the diagram—and the literature
supporting it—makes clear is that many factors explain (measured) productivity
growth. That could mean that the traditional emphasis upon the role of technical
change—on one interpretation "Di" in the diagram and according to another inter¬
pretation. "Ci"—requires modification. In its place we might want to install im¬
proved allocation of resources (C2), economies of scale (C3), and/or what historians
tend to call "entrepreneurship" (here D2). However, no consensus on the weighting
of these various components has yet emerged, so it is too early to forecast a justified
neglect of technology.46
Some of the components listed in Gould's diagram have their counterparts in the
recent historical literature on economic growth. Interestingly, agricultural history is
relatively rieh in examples. To mention just three, David and Griliches for the U. S.
in two different periods, and O'Brien and Keyder in their 19th-century British-
French comparisons, have identified both improved resource allocation and econom-
Economic Growth, p. 22. However, these results depends on the assumption that the factor
inputs have been correctly measured—and the assumption has been questioned. Index num¬
ber bias may be significant. On this see Usher, Measurement, Chapter 12.
44. The earliest and perhaps most striking result was Solow's finding that about 85 per cent of
American productivity change, 1909-1949 was attributable to technical change. Correction
for the quality of labor, however, reduced this contribution to the share indicated in the pre¬
vious footnote. Further research brought further fluctuations in the share, one study (by Jor-
genson and Griliches) even virtually eliminating technical change (or factor productivity).
But see on this Usher, Measurement, Chapter 12.
45. In Why Growth Rates Differ (Chapter 7-9 and Appendix F) Denison justifies an increase in
the growth share attributable to the labor input for "Northwest Europe", 1950-62, from .52
to .83 per cent when the latter is corrected for education and age-sex composition. This re¬
duces the "residual" from 3.33 to 3.07 in percentage points of change per annum.
46. Much depends on how technical change has been and is understood. One can clearly fore¬
cast a reduced importance for concern with technical change in the narrow, engineering
sense. Technical change, however, can take on an extremely broad meaning, e.g., to inciude
changes in the quality of output. It is not inconceivable that experiments along these lines
could enlarge the residual once again. On this see Usher, Measurement, Chapter 12.
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ies of scale as major sources of productivity growth and/or productivity differ¬
ences.47 D. Mc Closkey, R. Allen, and S. Webb, on the other hand, have discussed
these sources plus entrepreneurship and technical change against the background of
the comparative history of heavy industrial growth in Great Britain, Germany and
the U. S. in the 19th Century—without arriving at any general agreement on their rela¬
tive importance.48 Disagreement can be instructive, however, and in the case at hand,
we come to realize how much results depend upon assumptions (e.g., concerning the
degree of competition), the choice of data, and/or the scope of the investigation. For
example, whereas the Mc Closkey study concluded—on the basis of international in¬
put and Output price comparison and the competitive, marginal-cost pricing assump¬
tion—that British steel producers were losing ground to U.S. and German rivals to¬
wards the end of the 19th Century because of demand and relative input cost shifts
but not because of declining relative efficiency, both Allen and Webb challenged this
pricing assumption—particularly as applied to German data. Allen examined both
German and American costs and prices and Webb German ones, and both showed
that the use of cost data not deduced from prices indicates a clear British lag in rela¬
tive efficiency, i. e. a lag in relative total factor productivity. What is not clear from all
of this, as suggested above, is whether such a lag represents a deficiency in "entre¬
preneurship", a technological gap, an economies of scale gap, a lack of demand, or
all of these things. The answer to this question, it seems, will require further modell¬
ing.49
It would be easy to expand on the relationship between the "residual" and compa¬
rative productivity history. The preceding remarks have barely scratched the method¬
ological surface. But instead of continuing this rambling journey through the litera-
47. David R, The Mechanization of Reaping in the ante-bellum Midwest, reprinted in David P.,
Technical Choice, Innovation and Economic Growth, Essays on American and British Experi¬
ence in the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge 1975; Griliches Z., The Sources of Measured Pro¬
ductivity Growth: United States Agriculture, 1940-60, in: Journal of Political Economy, 71
(1963); O'Brien and Keyder, Economic Growth, Chapter 5. It may be worth adding that this
is consistent with the traditional view that the reallocation of labor out of agriculture into in¬
dustry must have been a major source of aggregate productivity growth in the 19th Century,
but that consistency cannot be assumed. For the postwar European Situation see Gould, Eco¬
nomic Growth, p. 320 (drawing on Denison, Why Growth Rates Differ).
48. McCIoskey D., Economic Maturity and Entrepreneurial Decline: British Iron and Steel, 1870-
1913, Cambridge 1973; Allen, International Competition; Webb, Tariffs.
49. The summary in the text cannot pretend to do justice to a complicated "cliometric" debate.
On the German side, Webb stresses market imperfection and scale economies leading to
more investment and "embodied" technical change. By implication, the lack of these factors
could explain Britain's relative Stagnation. For Britain, however, McCIoskey and even Allen
acknowledge natural resource disadvantages with consequences for technical change, profit-
ability and investment. McCIoskey, to be sure, tends to stress slow demand in Britain rather
than slow productivity as the reason for this industry's relative decline and he expressly re-
jects the thesis of "entrepreneurial failure", whereas Allen finds slow productivity change
and possibly faulty entrepreneuership. Given the comparative nature of much of the analy¬
sis, it is rather surprising to find virtually no discussion of index number problems—either
on the output or input side. That could be a source of bias in the results reported. On the
whole, this discussion casts doubt on the operational usefulness of the residual components
of Diagram1 for quantitative sectoral studies of productivity.
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ture, let me conclude by returning, once more, to the discussion of Fogel and Enger-
man's controversial Interpretation of slave agriculture in the ante-bellum Amencan
South
The justification for taking up this particular example is that it illustrates better
than most the key significance which productivity measurement can have for major
historiographical questions I believe that Fogel and Engermann approached an im¬
portant question—the problem of southern slavery—correctly They wished to estab¬
lish, in a quantitative manner, what the economic bases of southern slavery were,
without losing sight of the broader issues of social and pohtical history at stake I
happen to disagree with their own Interpretation of their findings,50 but for present
purposes it is the findings themselves and their denvations which deserve discussion
It must suffice here to point out that both findings and interpretations have enor¬
mous imphcations for history, that is, that the example is not a trivial, obscure, or
narrowly technical one
Our concern is with the productivity or "relative efficiency" question Fogel and
Engerman argued that, contrary to what a generation of histonans had believed and
propagated, the ante-bellum slave economy was not only highly profitable for its
plantation-owning ehte but also relatively efficient—as measured by its aggregate
rate of growth of output per head of population and per input of productive factors,
and as measured by the level of its Output per factor input in relation to the rest of
the United States By a process of ehmination, those authors attnbuted this "relative
efficiency"—and here is where controversy arose—to the high quality or efficiency
of slave labor Our discussion touches on four points (1) the representativeness of
the data, (2) the identification of labor efficiency as the key factor, (3) the quality of
labor inputs, and (4) the quality of land mputs (1) Despite its lengthy discussion of
sources and methods (in Volume II) Time on the Cross does not permit readers to
clearly identify the sample of evidence going into the estimates of relative efficiency
(or total factor productivity) It is clear that the U S Census of Agriculture for 1860,
with data on individual farms and plantations operating in that year, is the main
source We also know the basic sample used (taken from the 1860 census and known
as the "Parker-Gallmann sample" after the names of the two economic histonans
who produced it) However, that Information on the size distribution of these pro¬
duction units or on the variance of productivity measures across it which Time on the
Cross gives does not suffice to firmly establish the representativeness of the data
50 I disagree with their clear distinction between slavery as a retrograde pohtical and moral in
stitution and slave agriculture as a viable, successful economic system Since the essence of
slavery was, in G Wnght's succinct words, the "involuntary reallocation of family labor
from nonmarket economic activity to production of crops for sale, it meant a loss of leisure
and freedom which had, in terms of the imputations discussed earher, a significant eco
nomic dimension imperfectly reflected in the market results summarized under the heading
of "efficiency" Cf Wright G , The Efficiency ofSlavery Another Interpretation in Amencan
Economic Review, 69 (1979), p 225 I also disagree with their belief that the demonstration
of high productivity and positive work attitudes among black slaves rescues them from pos
thumous demgration On the contrary, one could argue that since, historically, much mean
ingfui labor protest has taken the form of Sabotage of work processes through slowdowns
absenteeism and breakage, Fogel and Engerman's attempt to find positive work attitudes
among slaves amounts to an attempt to denigrate them
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base. Since the basic, Parker-Gallmann sample was restricted to counties speciahzing
in cotton production, it is hard to know how generalizations about the South as a
whole or comparison between free farming and slave farming within the South
should be assessed. Thus, the findings that slave agriculture was 28 percent more effi¬
cient than free agriculture in the South in 1860 or that Southern agriculture was 35
percent more efficient than Northern agriculture in the same year are difficult to in¬
terpret.51 Finally, we are not told to what extent the findings are sensitive to the dis¬
proportionate weight of 1860 data. It seems doubtful whether the entire ante-bellum
period (1820-60?) is well characterized by this procedure. (2) Among the many com¬
ponents of productivity increases, Time on the Cross Singles out the "personal labor
efficiency" of black slaves as the main source of the superiority of Southern slave agri¬
culture (in Diagram 1, C 4). In so doing, they assign to the other components such as
economies of scale, technical know-how or managerial ability, an insignificant role.
They do find scale effects on large, slave plantations, but choose to interpret them in
part as a product of the character of slave labor. Management ability receives the
same treatment: "In a certain sense", they write, "all, or nearly all ofthe advantage is
attributable to the high quality of labor, for the main thrust of management was di¬
rected at improving the quality of labor".52 The trouble is, there is no clear demon-
stration of how their implicit weighting of the sources of productivity differentials
(between slave and free labor) can be justified. (3) Fogel and Engerman's compara¬
tive estimates of agricultural labor inputs in 1860 are biased upward against the
North (i. e., they understate the Southern input relative to the North). The reason for
this is that they treat a southern man-year as equal to a northern man-year in spite of
the fact that (a) the southern climate permitted a fuller utilization of the entire work-
year—possibly by as much as 60 days, or at least one third of the northern work-
year—and although (b) slaves worked more hours per year than did free farm work¬
ers (in the North and South) and were significant, of course, only in the South.53
Plausible corrections, suggested by David and Temin in their critique of Time on the
Cross and based on a comparison of hours worked by blacks before and after eman-
51. The two estimates may not be comparable since the latter figures must represent a weighted
average of a sample whereas the former may or may not. They rest on the Parker-Gallman
sample, but nothing is said on extrapolation techniques or sample variances. In fact, the
book contains very little raw data with which readers could check on the Fogel-Engerman
Claims. See David and Temin, Progressive Institution?, pp. 764- 65, esp. notes 37 and 38.
52. Fogel and Engerman, Time on the Cross, I, p. 210. I find this plausible, given the nature of
slave agriculture and the input shares Fogel and Engerman use. However, those shares are
not explicitly justified—they could embody an index number problem of their own—and
even if they could be deemed satisfactory, we are given little basis for choosing between a
high work intensity caused by management and that produced voluntarily by labor. See Has¬
keil T., Explaining the Relative Efficiency of Slave Agriculture in the Antebellum South: A
Reply to Fogel-Engerman, in: American Economic Review, 69 (1979).
53. As David and Temin point out, Time on the Cross does not document its assertion concern¬
ing the rough equality of the workyear in slave and free agriculture. Moreover, in one huge
correction they deduct 25 per cent of rural slave labor from their input measure on the
grounds that this share represented "domestics". But they do not make it clear whether this
deduction is maintained in the next estimate, which is corrected (downward) for age-earn-
ings profiles. This amounts to a bias ageinst the North whose labor force is not so cor¬
rected.
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cipation, lead to an increased labor input to slave agriculture of between 28 and 34
percent. (4) By using average land values to adjust acreage figures and, hence, land
inputs in North and South, Time on the Cross implicitly applies the theory of rent to
natural differences in soil fertility and assumes perfectly competitive national capital,
land and agricultural product markets. But given the high rate of interest on mort-
gages in the South and the preferred position of presumably risk-averse southern
landowners in the land market there, land prices in the South might well tend to un-
derstate the productive contribution of land's natural fertility. Moreover, land prices
would also be likely to be lower in an area relatively poorly served by transportation
facilities—such as the South—because prices received by farms for agricultural prod¬
uets in the South would be lower relative to final market prices (according to which
Outputs were weighted) than those received by farmers in the North. This could be
corrected for by reducing southern land productivity by the appropriate amount (or
by other means). In any case, recalculation of land inputs along these lines would in¬
crease Southern land inputs relative to the North.54
The upshot of this brief discussion is that a great deal can depend on historical
productivity measurement, whereas the latter can depend, in turn, on assumptions
about Outputs, inputs, and residual components whose verification may be extremely
difficult. In the present example, had the questioning of such assumptions early on
led in the directions suggested here, the puzzle of a high-produetivity slave economy
propelled by its qualititively superior labor force might have never emerged. The
moral of the story, for our purposes, is not simply that a provocative thesis may be
essential to get research activity into significant problems going, but also that where
such research is dominated by systematic and explicitly quantitatively comparative
methods, corrections of provocative theses and puzzles are possible.
Conclusion
Given the essentially descriptive and taxonomical character of this paper, it would be
inappropriate to conclude with Statements even more sweeping and summary than
those already made. I have attempted, no doubt presumptiously, to define the field of
national income and productivity history from the point of view of methodology. At
the same time, the paper seeks to call attention to certain areas within the field which
coincide, in my opinion, with the research needs and interests of comparative Euro¬
peans economic history (the comparative history of prices and consumption pattern
and tastes Stands out, it seems to me, as such an area). And finally, there is the ques¬
tion of the wider implications of comparative income and productivity history. The
last section ofthe paper discussed one example taken from American history (though
the comparison was m/ra-national rather than international) but European history
must also be bristling with comparable issues. One such might be seen in the liberal
agrarian reforms carried out in the nineteenth Century, and to which one may attach
the question: did they help, hinder, or result from productivity change? And to what
54. There is some reason for believing that national price weights overvalue southern agncul¬
tural output relative to the North in 1860. Cf. David and Temin, Progressive Institution9
p. 774.
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extent was the rise of free trade in western Europe during the middle decades of the
nineteenth Century the product of rising income and productivity levels? No doubt,
such themes lack the political clout of the problems of American slavery. But what
about the German Weimar Republic and its aftermath? If the problem ofthe Weimar
Republic in Germany can be seen as dependent upon gaps between real wages and
productivity, how are we to interpret that gap in other European countries during the
same time? And what about subsequent periods? Lack of patience, lack of knowl¬
edge, and perhaps lack of imagination, on my part, limit the list; but I am sure it can
be extended. The more difficult task will be the income and productivity studies
themselves. They will be welcome.
Zusammenfassung:
Pro-Kopf-Einkommen und Produktivität als Indikatoren
für Entwicklung und Wohlstand. Bemerkungen zur Kuznetsianischen
Wirtschaftsgeschichte
1. Die Verwendung der makroökonomischen Größe Volkseinkommen pro Einwoh¬
ner (VpE) in wirtschaftshistorischen Untersuchungen hängt mit dem sog. „Wachs¬
tumsparadigma" zusammen: geht es in solchen Untersuchungen um die Beschrei¬
bung und/oder Interpretation des Wirtschaftswachstums, so ist jene Größe (oder
ein gleichwertiger Ersatz) - und deren Komponenten - unentbehrlich. Kritik an
das Paradigma sollte dennoch von Kritik an der Größe selbst unterschieden wer¬
den.
2. Dieser Beitrag geht von der Annahme aus, daß Länder, wie einzelne Wirtschafts¬
subjekte, nach materieller Wohlstandsteigerung streben, und daß der Erfolg dieses
Strebens, d.h. Wohlfahrt, an der Entwicklung des VpE gemessen werden kann.
3. Kritik an der Verwendung des VpE als Wohlstandsindikator kann in 5 Punkten
aufgegliedert werden: (1) das Problem nichtmaterieller Güter; (2) das Problem der
nichtmarktwirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten; (3) die Definition der End- bzw. Zwi¬
schenprodukte; (4) die Annahme von konstanten Präferenzen (einschließlich In¬
dexzifferprobleme); und (5) das Problem der Verteilung. Diese Probleme qualifi¬
zieren die Interpretation von VpE als Indikator der Wohlfahrtssteigerung, recht¬
fertigen aber nicht deren gänzliche Zurückweisung.
4. Alternativen zum VpE wie z. B. Tobin und Nordhaus' M. E. W. oder die „sozialen
Indikatoren" sind in einzelnen Fällen empfehlenswert aber kein allgemein akzep¬
tabler Ersatz für das VpE.
5. Produktivitätsmessung als Instrument der wachstumsorientierten Geschichts¬
schreibung unterliegt demselben methodischen Problem wie das VpE. Dies kann
an der Diskussion einiger neuerer wirtschaftshistorischer Arbeiten insbesondere
der Arbeit von Fogel und Engerman über die amerikanische Sklavenwirtschaft im
19. Jahrhundert, gezeigt werden. Diese Diskussion zeigt aber zugleich die große
Bedeutung der „Produktivitätsgeschichte" für allgemeine historiographische Fra¬
gen.
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William P. Kennedy
Problems of Accountancy and Interpretation in
Assessing Long-Term Economic Performance
"In intensity of feeling ... and not in
statistics, lies the power to move the
world. But by statistics must this power
be guided if it would move the world
aright."
Charles Booth, 1891.
In the populär mind, economic growth has generally been regarded as a "good
thing." This attitude no doubt Springs from the widely-shared feeling that if only
one's (real) income were higher—that is, if economic growth in the past had been
more rapid—one would be better off in some concrete sense. It would then be possi¬
ble to afford better housing, better transport, more varied and interesting leisure, and
so on. A little daydreaming will generally be sufficient to Iengthen this list to almost
any desired limit. Although such attitudes not only suggest a natural and feasible
means of measuring economic activity but also accurately reflect important aspects
of that activity, historical analysis, in common with the demands of public adminis¬
tration, requires a more searching evaluation of economic effort. For the historian,
this requirement stems perhaps most fundamentally from the need to measure
change over time combined with the realization that societies are complex entities
made up of many individuals whose preferences differ and whose welfares are there¬
fore differentially affected by any given change. Thus important conceptual prob¬
lems arise both in aggregating for one individual the value ofthe different goods con-
sumed (because of the necessity of assuming identical marginal utüity of expendi¬
tures on all goods) and in aggregating across many individuals the value of the con¬
sumption ofthe same good (because personal circumstances differ). These problems
are then enormously compounded by the aggregation of all goods across all consum¬
ers. The use of market prices to aecomplish these essential tasks of aggregation, with¬
out which no analysis is possible, often imposes such unacceptable assumptions
upon the historian as the belief that all observed prices are full-information equili-
brium prices, that the distribution of wealth is "optimal", or that all individuals' pre¬
ferences are identical.1 But if observed market prices are rejected, how eise is meas¬
urement to be made? Moreover, factors such as productivity, widely recognised to be
1. Sen, Amartya K., The Welfare Basis of Real Income Comparisons: A Suwey, in: Journal of
Economic Literature, 17 (1979), pp. 3-35.
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of signal importance, depend for measurement critically upon the precise designation
and valuation of economic input and Outputs. Here again, any inadequacies of ob¬
served prices have very serious consequences for measurement and analysis as well
as for resource allocation.
Because historians have always been sensitive to the intricacy of the past and be¬
cause historians* purposes are those of broad assessment and evaluation, clumsy and
insensitive Systems of measuring economic change must invariably be disturbingly
inadequate. Yet the construction of satisfactory measures has proved to be almost
paralyzingly difficult. The result has been an uneasy, resented compromise between
what can be done and what should be done. While this Situation will not be altered
easily or quickly, the first step in amelioration must be for all historians, as both con¬
sumers and producers of statistics, to be more consciously aware of both the difficul¬
ties that have been encountered in the past and the possible strategies that may be
open for progress in the future. To that end this essay has three objectives: to review
the most important inherent difficulties in measuring economic activity; to consider
some ofthe most promising remedies offered for those difficulties; and, where possi¬
ble, to consider for the remaining problems some strategies that may prove fruitful in
the future.
The problems of measuring economic activity may usefully be divided into two cate¬
gories differentiated by their amenability to the use of observed price data.2 The first
and more tractible category contains those issues where prices that in principle can
be observed can be used. The second, more intractible and perhaps—at least for his¬
torians—more important, category contains those issues that must be resolved by the
use of estimated prices because observed prices are for a number of reasons defec-
tive. Such defects may arise because observed prices are in fundamental disequili-
brium and therefore, given the preferences, technology, and resources of a particular
economy, seriously deceptive; because observed prices change over time due to both
general inflation (or deflation) and relative price movements; because, observed
prices are deemed to be unacceptably determined by a particular, possibly arbitrary,
distribution of wealth; or because observed prices are considered distorted by tariffs,
quotas, or various other types of administrative action. The conventional National
Income and Product Accounts are constructed mainly using observed prices, al¬
though imputations of unobserved but market related prices are made in certain cru¬
cial instances—most notably the value of the Services accruing to the owner-occu-
piers of houses who pay no explicit rent for their accommodation and the value of
agricultural output consumed on farms—and most National Income and Product Ac-
The stress placed in this essay on the use of prices should not be construed as limiting the
analysis only to market economies. Centrally planned economies implicitly or explicitly,
consciously or unconsciously, must produce prices in order to co-ordinate activity and those
prices (or shadow prices) will reflect the strengths and weaknesses of the planning mechan¬
ism in the same way that market-based prices reflect the strengths and weaknesses of mar¬
ket mechanisms.
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counts (NIPA) provide estimates of income and output over a span of years in con¬
stant prices even though the prices used could have at best been observed at only one
instant.
At the present, however, even disregarding problems of the second category, the
conventional NIPA are inadequate for two main reasons. First, and less importantiy,
the accounts, even in their own limited terms of reference, are not yet completely
consistent logically. Broadly, the NIPA are designed to measure a nation's economic
activity in three theoretically independent methods. One method measures the in¬
comes of all factors of production (including those located abroad but owned or re¬
siding domestically and excluding those located domestically but owned or residing
abroad) before transfers for taxes, gifts, or other unilateral payments not matched by
a countervaüing flow of goods and Services. A second method measures net value ad¬
ded in economic activity by each of a nation's productive enterprises. The third
method measures the flow of national expenditures on final goods and Services, in¬
cluding exports but excluding imports. The accounts represent a series of compro¬
mises between what may be measured easily and accurately and what is logically re¬
quired. Although the resolution of such problems is comparatively easy, extensive re-
working of the conventional accounts is often necessary and the difficulties imposed
by the inevitable sparseness of historical data can transform tedious but conceptually
routine calculations into substantial and demanding tasks of indirect estimation.
An example of the sort of anomaly of this variety likely to cause historians diffi¬
culty can be drawn from the Convention employed in the British NIPA for measuring
the value added to national income by financial intermediaries. Financial interme-
diaries have two main sources of income: (1) service charges and commissions, which
together typically account for only a small proportion of their operating income, and
(2) the net revenue resulting from charging to final borrowers a higher rate of interest
than they as a group pay to depositors. However, the British accounts, in common
with many others, treat interest payments and receipts as transfers and not as pay¬
ments and receipts for final Services.3 Thus the net earnings of financial intermediar¬
ies are generally understated, the net earnings of borrowing companies are corre-
spondingly overstated and, to the extent that private individuals rather than compa¬
nies are final borrowers, consumers' expenditure on final goods and Services is un¬
derstated. Consistency would require (1) that non-financial Company profits be re¬
duced by the amount of net interest paid to intermediaries and intermediaries' net in¬
come be similarly increased and (2) net interest payments by the personal sector to
intermediaries be treated as payment for a final (consumption) service rather than as
a transfer. In the belief that sufficient accessible evidence has not been available to
permit such reallocations among companies and between companies and individuals,
the Central Statistical Office has decided that indirect imputation of intermediaries'
value added would be more misleading than the obvious paradox of flourishing in¬
termediaries appearing to make steady annual losses, a paradox that has been pre¬
served in Charles Feinstein's indispensible volume, National Income, Expenditure,
and Output of the United Kingdom, 1855-1965, in order to maintain consistency be¬
Maurice, Rita, (editor), Central Statistical Office National Accounts Statistics: Sources and
Methods, London 1968, pp. 204-205.
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tween current and historical data series.4 However, it is made abundantly clear on all
sides that the paradox in the British NIPA of intermediaries steadily making large
losses exists only for expediency and that logically acceptible, albeit labour intensive,
alternative accounting Conventions exist, as may be seen in proposals made by the
U.N. in A System of National Accounts and Supporting Tables (New York: United
Nations, 1964) and by the OEEC, A Standardized System of National Accounts
(OEEC: Paris, 1959). It is important to stress, however, that the fundamental problem
is not one of non-existent data or of unavoidable logical inconsistency but rather a
lack of commitment and interest by both the national income accounts authorities
and historians to utilize what is available. Indeed one might argue that the quiekest
way to secure progress in this area would be for an historian to make a provisional
allocation of interest payments as dictated by logical consistency, thereby exploiting
and drawing attention to the available data and setting upper and lower bounds
to the data series most affected. Although it is only to be expected that the first
estimates will be thouroughly revised, a successful pioneering effort, by clearly
defining the problem and identifying the necessary data will greatly aid subsequent
work.
Another anomaly of a related type likely to create difficulties for historians, simply
because it creates grave problems for conventional aecountants, arises in the treat¬
ment of profits, which conceptually are calculated net of depreciation to distinguish
them clearly from cash flow but are often reported gross of depreciation because de¬
preciation is so difficult to estimate, particularly when the quality and the relative
price of capital goods changes as a result of technological progress. At the very least,
the timing of profit peaks and troughs will be affected by the procedures for measur¬
ing depreciation, but it can easily be seen that other important issues related, for ex¬
ample, to the distribution of income and the size, composition, and productivity of
the capital stock are also involved. The treatment of depreciation also affects the
measured levels of of consumption, most notably the Services derived from consumer
durables such as automobiles and household appliances. Logically, these items
should be treated in the same way as houses, being noted as additions to the capital
stock—that is, as investment—upon completion and thereafter yielding a flow of
consumption Services gradually diminishing as depreciation occurs. Consumer dura¬
bles other than houses, however, are not treated as additions to the capital stock that
subsequently yield flows of Services but as consumption items that are counted as if
they were consumed immediately upon acquisition.5 Such treatment, if accepted
without reflection, leads to nonsensical results for it implies that for identically
priced goods the rate of depreciation does not matter whereas in reality it matters a
great deal. Cars that last for four years without major repairs yield a greater flow of
Services than do cars that last only for two, although this fact is ignored in the con¬
ventional accounts except to the extent that the price of the more durable car is
greater than the price of the less durable one. In this case, as in the case of the value
added by financial intermediaries, the remedy—allocating the value of the durable
good over the time period in which it depreciates while yielding service—is straight-
4. Feinstein, Charles H., National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom,
1855-1965, Cambridge 1972, pp. 141-43.
5. Maurice, Sources and Methods, p. 365.
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forward, albeit tedious in terms of calculation and demanding in terms of data requi¬
rements.6
The more important inadequacy of the contentional accounts, however, arises not
from logical inconsistency but from an inappropriate but understandable choice of
objective. The conventional accounts are designed to measure marketed production
whereas historians, in common with most other users of the accounts, are ultimately
interested in sustainable consumption, the obvious objective of all economic activi¬
ty.7 To be sure, marketed production is an important component, perhaps even the
most important single component, of consumption and in addition substantial bene¬
fits are derived from a choice of objective which lends itself—as marketed produc¬
tion does—to relatively straightforward extrinsic measurement. Nevertheless, mar¬
keted production is not in itself an objective of economic effort and is therefore in-
herently a poor indicator of it. Furthermore, in precisely those periods when eco¬
nomic activity is undergoing important structural changes—periods such as the clas¬
sical Industrial Revolution or the emergence of post-industrial society—the relation¬
ship between marketed production and non-marketed economic activity is most
likely to be changing as well. At such times, the conventional accounts will not be
merely an indirect and imprecise means of monitoring economic activity but will also
be systematicaUy misleading. As long as the relationship between measured and un-
measured activity is constant, the conventional accounts will at least reflect reasona-
bly faithfully changes in overall economic activity, but if the relationship itself is
changing, it is no longer possible, without additional information, to infer the charac¬
teristics of aggregate economic change.
The nature of the problems that arise from the consideration of marketed produc¬
tion rather than sustainable consumption might best be conveyed by illustration. It
has been stressed, for example, that virtually all societies at all times have provided
themselves by one means or another with textiles, tools and other simple manufac-
tures. For much of human history these simple goods have been produced directly by
those, or the mear kin of those, who were ultimately to consume them and this pro¬
duction was often totally removed from any sort of market transaction.8 Gradually,
6. It perhaps should be noted that William D. Nordhaus and James Tobin, in a preliminary
calculation, show that the depreciation of consumer durables other than houses is more sig¬
nificant for its logical implications than for its practical consequences. See Nordhaus, Wil¬
liam D., and Tobin, James, Is Growth Obsolete? in: National Bureau of Economic Research,
Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect—Economic Growth, Fiftieth Anniversary
Colloquium V, New York 1972. There is another complication, however, which Tobin and
Nordhaus do not consider. This concerns the incidence of capital gains and losses that oc¬
curs because of unanticipated changes in the relative prices of capital goods. Such relative
price changes cause the anticipated time profile of depreciation to differ from the actual pat¬
tem. If relative capital goods prices rise, the firm simultaneously realizes a capital gain (be¬
cause it bought the equipment relatively cheaply) but also must adjust upwards its deprecia¬
tion allowances (because the equipment is more expensive to replace). The reverse occurs
when relative capital goods prices fall: the firm suffers a capital loss and must adjust down-
wards the appropriate depreciation allowance.
7. It is necessary to stress "sustainable" consumption in order to exclude from consideration
consumption that is made possible by a temporary deterioration in the capital stock.
8. Hymer, Stephen, and Resnick, Stephen, A Model of an Agrarian Economy with Non-Agricul-
tural Activities, in: American Economic Review, 59 (1969), pp. 493-506.
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however, this domestic production became more specialized in certain regions and
surplus producers began to seil an increasing fraction of their output in formal mar¬
kets, often organized by a merchant entrepreneur who would "put out" raw materials
to cottage workers and market the finished goods produced by those workers. Even¬
tuaUy, when the technology of manufacture was sufficiently sophisticated, specializa¬
tion would advance further and workers would no longer toil in their own cottages
but were forced or lured into factories.9 Thus over time an increasing proportion of
economic activity came to be mediated by markets. If this process were to be mea¬
sured by the conventional NIPA, the rate of increase of output, which was often
quite rapid in any case due to undeniable technical progress, would be greatly over-
stated, for self-sufficient production would not be counted. Thus the changes re¬
corded in the NIPA would inciude the effects both of more productive techniques
and of changes in the proportion of total output marketed. The timing and intensity
of an "industrial revolution" can, by the mechanical application of conventional
methods, be more apparent than real, with output levels much higher at an earlier
date than indicated by the conventional accounts and growing much more slowly.
A problem similar in nature is currently affecting contemporary national income
accounting as female labour force participation rates rise.10 Imagine two neighbour-
ing households, in each of which a housewife does her own cooking and cleaning.
The NIPA would record only the intermediate inputs (e. g. unprocessed foods and
soap) that each bought, the value ofthe transformed inputs—the hot meals on the ta¬
ble and the clean sheets on the bed—being ignored. Now suppose that each house¬
wife decides to specialize, one doing only cooking and the other only cleaning, and
that each sells her surplus in a formal market and buys in the same market the good
she no longer produces. In this case, the market value of the labour of each woman is
duly recorded in the NIPA, along with, as before, any intermediate purchases. The
NIPA will record a great increase in activity but clearly a large fraction of this re¬
corded increase is nominal and not real because home labour was previously ignored
by Convention. To be sure, this change may also be accompanied by a legitimate Out¬
put increase as a result of economies of scale and technological progress, but such an
increase is likely to be small compared to the recorded change. This deliberately sim¬
ple example captures the essence of important structural changes currently taking
place in the labour forces of modern industrial economies. As an increased propor¬
tion of women leave their children in day-care centres, buy prepared foods in super-
markets and fast-food carry-outs, send their cleaning and mending to specialist firms,
recorded national income rises, but the increase is obviously greater than the increase
in real output simply because such a large proportion of home-centered production
had previously been ignored. This problem is the exact reverse of the one encoun¬
tered in the nineteenth Century British NIPA which show the rate of growth of house¬
hold production falling with the decline in the rate of increase of domestic servants.1
]
9. This process has recentiy been reviewed by Pollard, Sidney, Peaceful Conquest, London
1981, pp. 63-78.
10. The extent of this problem has been explicitly recognised by the British Central Statistical
Office. See Maurice, Sources and Methods, p. 8.
11. Ebury, Marke, and Preston, Brian, Domestic Service in Late Victorian and Edwardian Eng¬
land, 1871-1914: Reading Geographical Papers No. 42, Whiteknights/Reading/England
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It is safe to assume that consumption of household production did not fall as the re¬
corded number of domestic servants feil but rather that it was the market mediation
involved in household production that changed
The corrections of the obvious anomahes introduced into histoncal analysis by
changes in the extent of market mediation are not conceptually difficult to compre-
hend but are hkely to prove difficult to implement because the amount of indirect es¬
timation required is likely to be large and because the resulting estimates are unhkely
to be highly robust with respect to vanous assumptions Clearly what is needed is an
estimate in the one example of the manufacturing output of seif sufficient farms and
in the other an estimate ofthe value of vanous household tasks What is being sought
is a measure of final output for consumption that is independent of the degree of
market mediation If such a measure can be found, only real output changes that are
independent of marketing changes will be recorded Although this requirement is a
dauntmg one, before despairing, it should be recalled that it is with precisely such
matters and details that economic and social histonans have recentiy concerned
themselves While the necessary data may at present be highly fragmentary and in¬
complete, there is every prospect that it will become more complete in the future, es¬
pecially as research attention is directed to issues where competing histoncal inter¬
pretations are particularly sensitive to the choice of analytical assumption Further¬
more, recent advances in Simulation modeling offer means of utihzing fragmentary
Information much more efficiently than has been possible previously
13
Simulation
modeling involves describing a fragmentary data series by the known distnbution
(such as the normal, exponential, or gamma distnbution) which on both empincal
and theoretical grounds is most consistent with the currently available evidence and
then using combinations of such distributions to yield a distnbution of operating re¬
sults for the process being studied For example, Jeremy Atack used the procedure to
assess the relative capital and operating costs of steam and water power in the early
nineteenth Century American economy but it can easily be seen that the same tech¬
niques can be used to estimate the average costs of providing, for example, vanous
types of household consumption, using manuals of domestic management and iso¬
lated wage data for servants where Atack used contemporary engine pnce hsts and
engineenng estimates
Much more senous problems, both conceptually and quantitatively, anse in the
treatment of leisure, obviously a highly esteemed element of consumption The na¬
ture of this problem, which is clearly related to the general problem of assessing non-
marketed output, is easily seen Imagine two economies, identical in all respects ex-
1976, Table 5a, p 23 and Lewis, W Arthur, Growth and Fluctuations 1870-1913 London,
1978, Table A3
12 On pre-industrial manufacturing, see for example, Mendels, Franklin, F , Proto industnaliza¬
tion The First Phase of the Industnalization Process in Journal of Economic History, 32
(1972), pp 241-261 On household labour, see Goldin, Claudia, Household and Market Pro
duction of Famihes in a Late Nineteenth Century American City in Explorations in Eco
nomic History, 16 (1979), pp 111-131, Ebury and Preston, Domestic Service pp 85-104 and
Hörn, P , The Rise and Fall ofthe Victorian Servant London, 1975
13 See, for example, Atack, Jeremy, Fact in Fiction9 The Relative Costs of Steam and Water
Power a Simulation Approach in Explorations in Economic History, 16 (1979), pp 409-
437
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cept the way in which the benefits of technological change in a particular year are
consumed. Suppose that in the first economy the hours of work and intensity of ef¬
fort remain unchanged and that all of the benefits of the technological advance ac¬
crue in the form of more goods and Services. By contrast, suppose that in the second
economy the initial Output of goods and Services is maintained and that all of the
benefits of the technological advance accrue in the form of fewer hours worked in Or¬
der to obtain an unchanged level of material output. While by assumption, the two
economies differ only in the composition of consumption, they appear markedly dif¬
ferent in the conventional NIPA. In the first case, measured marketed income rises
by the maximum amount permitted by the hypothesized technological advance. In
the second case, measured marketed income does not rise at all although by assump¬
tion the increase in real productive capacity in the two economies was identical. It is
obviously a critical weakness of the NIPA that the measure of economic activity
should be so sensitive to its structure and composition. Moreover, in their pioneer re-
working of the conventional NIPA, William Nordhaus and James Tobin found that
the assumptions they employed to evaluate changes in available leisure dominated
their measure of sustainable economic welfare.14
This result stemmed from the authors* inability to determine whether leisure time
was itself a final consumption good or whether leisure time was only one of several
inputs into a consumption process. If leisure time itself were the final consumption
good, the necessary adjustments to the NIPA are straightforward. The change in the
number of leisure hours, measured most plausibly as reductions in Standard working
hours but strictly excluding involuntary unemployment, is estimated for the economy
as a whole and weighted by the average hourly earnings of those workers who obtain
such reductions.15 Note that this procedure assumes that workers are indifferent at
the margin between earning another hour's income with which to consume more ma¬
terial goods or forgoing the material goods in favour of leisure. In this case, where
leisure time itself is the final consumption good, comparisons across time are quite
easy. An hour of leisure in 1880 is worth in ultimate consumption exactly as much as
an hour in 1913 or in 1980 (assuming a constant marginal utüity of leisure).
If on the other hand, however, the historian wishes to argue that leisure time is
only one of a number of inputs into a consumption process, changes in the economy
over time, most notably technological and demographic changes, make intertemporal
comparisons for a particular economy or contemporaneous comparisons among
economies with different technological capabilities much more difficult. Consider,
for example, the impact of cheap rail transport in the nineteenth Century on the lei¬
sure activities ofthe British working class.16 The rapid growth of seaside resorts and
other amusement centres following the advent of cheap rail travel is strong testimony
of the contribution this form of technological change had on the enjoyment of leisure
14. Nordhaus and Tobin, Is Growth Obsolete?, pp. 38-48. Involuntary unemployment is strictly
excluded from measures of leisure time. (pp. 44-45).
15. Standard working hours may change through variations in the working hours per day, in the
working days per week, in the working weeks per year, or in the working years per life-
time.
16. Hawke, G. R., Railways and Economic Growth in England and Wales, 1840-1870, Oxford
1970, pp. 37-40, 52-54.
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time. Similar arguments can be made for the impact of cheap books and magazines,
bicycles, automobiles, cinemas, television, sports facilities and equipment and so
forth. To the extent that technological progress enlarges and enriches the consump¬
tion of leisure time, a comprehensive set of NIPA must value leisure more highly
over time as technological progress occurs. Nordhaus and Tobin propose doing this
by deflating the nominal value of leisure hours over time (and by implication, be¬
tween countries) by the price index of consumer goods, an index which over long pe¬
riods of time has risen less rapidly than an index of nominal wages or earnings. The
conceptual problems inherent in choice of index cannot readily be evaded because
the decision taken makes a crucial difference in outcome. Nordhaus and Tobin's esti¬
mate of the per capita increase in measured economic welfare in the U.S. between
1929 and 1962 is 18.6% if leisure itself is a final good but 126.4% if leisure is consid¬
ered a process fully participating in the benefits of technological change.17
Nordhaus and Tobin do not venture a resolution of the uncertainty created by the
need to devise an appropriate measure over time of the value of leisure. Their pur¬
pose rather was to illustrate a means by which a complex, vital problem could be ap-
proached, in the belief that sustained investigation would ultimately yield greater un¬
derstanding. In pursuing this problem further, historians may very reasonably em¬
ploy a much more detailed index of leisure activities than the illustrative one used by
Nordhaus and Tobin. Each component of a more detailed index would have its
own separate price deflator and the weights attached to each component would be
chosen to reflect the relative significance, as contemporaries are believed to have
seen it, of each component. Here again is an opportunity to use systematicaUy and
quantitatively the results of recent research in social history. Such work has added
greatly to the knowledge of how the past was actually lived by most people and the
revision ofthe conventional NIPA offers an opportunity to use this new knowledge
extensively.
Unfortunately, beneficial technological change is not the only influence on leisure
enjoyment which must be assessed. Non-market costs, particularly those associated
with congestion and overcrowding as more people tried to take advantage of new lei¬
sure facilities, must also be considered. There are a number of ways this task could
be approached. For example, cross-section studies could be used which would relate,
say, rent charges in various resort areas to the density of vacationers. The steepness
of the slope of such a relationship would permit appropriate adjustments for the ef¬
fect of congestion. The purpose of such adjustments would be more in the nature of
ascertaining the relative magnitudes of the considerations involved than of generat¬
ing precise estimates of what must ultimately be arbitrary magnitudes.
It is of great importance that historians do not expect resolution of the problems
raised by the consumption of goods and Services whose value cannot be directly cal¬
culated—goods such as proto-industrial manufactures and ill-defined but highly de¬
sirable Services such as leisure—to be achieved quickly. Rather resolution will occur
through the slow, controversy-prone process of creating a concensus among histo¬
rians regarding the significance of the various assumptions made to produce quanti¬
tative estimates. Progress will not occur because a correct answer can be found—for
there is unlikely to be a unique correct answer—but because the process of investiga-
17. Nordhaus and Tobin, Is Growth Obsolete?, Table A16, line 16, pp. 52-53.
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tion will methodically expose important issues and problems and allow the quantita¬
tive significance of different assumptions to be carefully recorded.
//
Concentration on marketed production rather than sustainable consumption encour-
ages the blurring ofthe critical distinction between intermediate and and final goods.
It is well-known that failure to preserve this distinction results in serious double
counting. The most obvious example of an intermediate service routinely recorded in
the British NIPA as a final output ist the expense incurred by workers commuting to
work.18 As in many other similar situations, this Convention has been adopted due to
a desire to obtain a precise measurement rather than engage in what amounts to spe-
culation, even if this requires an inappropriate definition of what is to be measured.
The problem is that it is difficult to distinguish travel for pleasure, indisputably part
of final consumption, from travel required for work. Thus expenditures on final
goods and Services are overstated by the amount spent on commuting, which is not a
consumption item but an intermediate input; factor incomes, which should be calcu¬
lated net of commuting expenses, are overstated to the extent such expenses are not
deducted; and value added by productive enterprises is overstated because the pay¬
ments for the intermediate inputs of commuters' travel have not been properly de¬
ducted. Double counting has taken place in this case just as if both the cost of bread
and the cost of the flour that went into the bread were added together to estimate to¬
tal expenditure. Commuters' expenditures, however, are only the most obvious form
of double counting. There are quantitatively much more important sources of this er¬
ror, the most important of which are connected with government expenditure. Such
government Services as national defense, police, and public health and sanitation are
not reasonably enjoyed for their own sake but because their provision makes possible
genuine consumption. It is of critical importance to realize that the decision to disal-
low such government expenditure as final consumption in no way implies that such
expenditures are not useful or important. Indeed, an inadequate provision of them
will invariably result in a sharp reduction in properly measured final consumption.
At the same time, the consistent Classification of such expenditures as intermediate
prevents any deterioration of a society's postition which necessitates higher levels of
national defense and police spending from being recorded as a condition that im-
proves social welfare. Accordingly, expenditures on intermediate government Ser¬
vices should be excluded from national income, factor incomes should be calculated
net of the taxes and other payments necessary to finance these Services, and calcula¬
tions of value added must be made net of the value of such Services which are prop¬
erly considered intermediate inputs. It remains an interesting exercise to recalcuate
conventional historical NIPA for the major European countries excluding such in¬
strumental and regrettably necessary intermediate expenditure as defense and police
Services. For example, the levels of regrettably necessary defense expenditures re¬
quired by the diplomatic and military positions of France and Britain respectively in
the years between 1871 and 1914 were sufficiently different to suggest that the differ-
18. Maurice, Sources and Methods, pp. 173-76.
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ence between the two countries in the level of net output, properly defined, and the
level of conventional output, counting defense Services in national output as a final
good, was sufficiently great that choice of accounting procedure, if applied uni-
formly in the two countries and making proper allowance for the value of con-
scripted soldiers' Services, would substantiaUy alter perceptions of economic Per¬
formance.
The existence of important intermediate goods such as national defense and police
protection present no difficult conceptual problems. The interpretive decisions are
made in determining what is to be designated a final good or service and what inter¬
mediate. Very little need be done to the present procedures for collecting statistics for
the NIPA. The conventional NIPA can be easily altered to yield estimates of final
output, expenditure, and related net factor incomes by re-allocation. However, con¬
cern with intermediate goods and Services that are properly considered regrettable
necessities and instrumental expenditures is closely related to negative externalities
and disamenities, the significance of which are much harder to measure, Nordhaus
and Tobin, who otherwise are able generally to suggest attractive, operational ap¬
proaches to national income accounting problems, have no systematic Solution to of¬
fer for the most fundamental problem that historians must consider in this regard:
whether population growth should be seen ultimately as the source of most negative
externalities and disamenities or whether population growth genuinely reflects both a
society's conscious desire and its physical ability to support more people. Because
population-related issues appear so frequently in the conceptually difficult area of
negative externalities and disamenities, consideration of this question is fundamen¬
tal. Wherever decreasing returns to scale exist, or where important resources such as
fuels, minerals, and arable land are in inelastic supply, a society's ability simulta¬
neously to support more people and to raise real living Standards is an impressive
economic achievement. Clearly, it costs societies a great deal in terms of forgone con¬
sumption to nurture and equip a growing labour force. Using a constant returns to
scale Cobb-Douglas production function, which assumes an economy-wide ease of
factor Substitution rarely encountered in specific industries, and making a variety of
assumptions about desired wealth-income ratios for given steady-state rates of pop¬
ulation increase, Nordhaus and Tobin estimated that for the relatively moderately
growing U.S. population of 1960, a move from an equilibrium population growth rate
of 2.14% per year to zero population growth would have raised per capita consump¬
tion levels by the order of 10%.19 The assessment of this figure obviously depends
upon how off-spring are regarded. The material value of off-spring can be estimated
by a variety of means. One of the most promising, for example, would use a sample
of linked Census and tax records to calculate age-specific fertility rates across in¬
come groups.20 A finding that wealthier families had on average fewer children and
that the fertility patterns of wealthier families were imitated in the rest of society with
a lag would lend support to the argument that in such circumstances the observed
material cost of child-rearing was greater than the anticipated gain. If the patterns
were reversed, with wealthier families for a long period of time having more children
19. Nordhaus and Tobin, Is Growth Obsolete?, pp. 18-24.
20. For the possibilities of record linkage in general, see McCIoskey, Donald N., Does the Past
Have Useful Economics? in: Journal of Economic Literature, 14 (1976), pp. 441-448.
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than poorer families, the conclusion that children were viewed as income elastic con¬
sumption goods would be appropriate. In any case, a careful study of the relation¬
ship between income levels and population growth for different countries at different
periods would offer a much richer data base from which to assess, as Nordhaus and
Tobin have done for the U.S., the material cost of child-rearing. These estimates in
turn would allow a calculation of the material gains (or losses) that should be con¬
trasted with the negative externalities and disamenities of population growth.21
Although at present there are only the crude estimates of consumption forgone in
favour of child-rearing derived from simple growth modeis, Nordhaus and Tobin do
offer an illustration inviting imitation of how the complex question of negative exter¬
nalities might be handled.22 They note that there appears to be a systematic Variation
in earnings across U.S. cities of different sizes, with earnings highest in the largest,
most densely populated cities most fully exposed to the costs and disadvantages of
congestion, pollution, and other negative externalities and disamenities. They then
suggest that two sets of factors might explain this pattern. In the first set are those
factors unrelated to negative externalities and disamenities: these are taken to be (1)
median years of schooling achieved by the labour force; (2) proportion ofthe popu¬
lation over 65 and presumed to be retired with low earned incomes; (3) proportion of
the population Negro and presumed to suffer from non-environmentally related dis-
crimination; (4) the migration rate where a net inflow is presumed to reflect anticipa-
tion of high and rising real incomes and a net outflow the reverse; (5) property taxes
per capita, included to capture the impact of physical capital which can be expected
to cause patterns of observed earned income, especially those of self-employed shop¬
keepers, merchants, and various other types of local businessmen, to vary; (6) local
government expenditures per capita, included to capture the benefits of public Ser¬
vices. The remaining factors are those related to environmental costs for which an
earnings premium would be necessary, other things being equal, in order to induce
people to work in a less pleasant environment. This second set of factors includes: (1)
population size; (2) population density; and (3) proportion of the population in a
metropolitan county Iiving within urban boundaries, a variable dictated by the man¬
ner in which the data were available. The logarithm of median family income in a
sample of metropolitan counties was regressed against the nine independent varia¬
bles listed above. The estimated coefficients on the three variables in the second set,
presumed to reflect negative externalities and disamenities, were then used to calcu-
late the implicit premiums necessary in order to compensate people for living in a
more crowded, dangerous, noisy, dirty urban environment. Nordhaus and Tobin esti¬
mated that for the U.S. in 1965 the premium was equal to 8% of average U.S. disposa¬
ble family income and that this figure would have risen to about 30% had the entire
U.S. population been concentrated in the most densely populated cities.
The great value of Nordhaus and Tobin's pioneering work is not so much the spe¬
cific quantitative estimates obtained, although those estimates are of great interest
because they represent the most informed evaluation currently available of the im-
21. Interestingly, Nordhaus and Tobin suggest that population growth in the recent U.S. past
has been as rapid as it has been because the social costs of children have not been borne by
parents but by society at large. See Nordhaus and Tobin, Is Growth Obsolete?, pp. 18-24.
22. Nordhaus and Tobin, Is Growth Obsolete?, pp. 48-54.
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pact of many important but hard to measure factors, but rather the opportunity it of¬
fers to ennch and extend the already elaborate histoncal collections of national in¬
come statistics
It is very reasonable to expect, on the basis of what has been done so far, that the
process of ennchment and extension will give new meaning and significance to his¬
toncal data that has not been heavily drawn upon for lack of a systematic means of
assimilation and assessment23 The NIPA, modified to ensure logical consistency and
refocussed to measure consumption rather than marketed production, provide a
framework capable of processing, categonzing and evaluating data on a much
greater scale than has been attempted so far Furthermore, the national income ac¬
counts, in both modified and unmodified form, can be combined with what Mervyn
King has described as "social indicators" to assess more broadly and more search-
mgly trends in welfare
24
King compiled an index of 17 social indicators scaled such
that high values reflected improvement and low values deterioration of welfare The
indicators, chosen for Wide coverage across countries rather than for intnnsic impor¬
tance, included public expenditure on education as proportion of GNP, students per
100,000 ofthe population, proportion of total students who were female, doctors per
10,000 persons, infant mortahty rate, suicide rate, stomach ulcer death rate, and tele-
phones per 100 persons Kmg's procedures could be easily extended to cover such in¬
dicators as male and female hfe expectancy, average length of work week and work
23 A vanant of Nordhaus and Tobin's procedure has already been applied to nineteenth een
tury Britain by Jeffrey G Wilhamson, Urban Disamenities Dark Satanic Mills and the Bnt¬
ish Standard of Living Debate in Journal of Economic History, 41 (1981), pp 75-83 His
conclusions are not dissimilar to Nordhaus and Tobin's Wilhamson found that the disa
menity premium required to induce workers to endure harsh urban environments was no
more than 8% of observed urban wage rates However, in two important aspects of his study,
Williamson appears to have biased downwards his estimate of the disamenity premium
First, he included a cost of living index as an independent variable to capture wage rate var
lations not related to environmental disamenities But, since the object of estimating the dis
amenity premium was to determine what proportion of higher nominal wage rates went to
compensate for the disadvantage of urban hfe, which would inciude high site rents as one
aspect of congestion, the highly significant coefficient on the cost of living index should
have been used in rather than excluded from the estimation of the disamenitv premium, par
ticularly since the cost of living vanable is picking up influences that would otherwise be
captured by the population density and population size variables Secondly, he assumed that
the vanable infant mortahty would pick up the main impact of urban disamenities But
many other factors, especially overall fertility levels, which in the short term are at best only
remotely related to either wage rates or urban disamenities will also effect infant mortality
and this remote relationship will be reflected in a small, relatively insignificant coefficient
On the other hand, Wilhamson did not control, as Nordhaus and Tobin did, for other fac
tors, notably returns to education and skills, differential labour force participation rates, and
migration rates, that would cause wage rates to vary, thus making his results incompatible
with Nordhaus and Tobin's and hard to Interpret
Wilhamson's effort does hold out the promise that further, systematic exploitation of histori
cal data will provide more Illumination on this issue To the extent that Wilhamson s objec
tive was to provoke further research, his paper is certain to be a success
24 King, Mervyn A, Economic Growth and Social Development A Statistical Investigation in
The Review of Income and Wealth, 20 (1974), pp 251-272
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year, occupational accidents, unemployment, divorce rates, strike records, public ex¬
penditure on leisure and the arts, and net migration. Such greater coverage would
make interpretation easier. For the 17 indicators that he did choose, King found that
the movements of his unweighted composite index tended to be positively correlated
with convenrionally measured economic growth, although the strength of this rela¬
tionship showed some signs of diminution over time. Such findings, if confirmed
more widely in historical studies for a broader ränge of social indicators would allow
researchers to use the conventional NIPA with increased confidence.
Such analysis also suggests a natural and practical way to modify the interpreta¬
tion of the conventional or modified NIPA when a substantial and persistent diver¬
gence in measures does occur. It would thus be possible to isolate those social indica¬
tors whose behaviour was particularly badly reflected by the income measures and to
identify the causes and to estimate the quantitative consequence of that behaviour.
In this regard, because of the quantitative importance of leisure in Nordhaus and
Tobin's study, it is interesting to note the high degree of correlation in late Victorian
Britain between the reduction of the length of the average full-employment work¬
week—a reduction which should be seen as increasing the amount of leisure time po¬
tentially available to workers—and the strength of convenrionally measured eco¬
nomic growth. Between 1860 and 1914, the length of the average British workweek
was reduced by 10%.25 The reductions occurred in discontinuous bursts concentrated
in periods of vigorous convenrionally measured growth.26 The period of greatest re¬
duction, accounting for perhaps two-thirds of the entire reduction in normal working
hours achieved between 1860 and 1914 occurred during the intense boom years of
1872-74. On the other hand, virtually no reduction at all occurred when the rate of
conventional growth perceptibly declined between the Boer War and the First World
War.27 The most plausible explanation of this pattern is that a reduction in the Stand¬
ard workweek was viewed by employers as a major and essentially irreversible con-
cession to the labour force and hence granted only in exceptional circumstances. In
the stable, competitive, environment of the pre-1914 British economy, only during
those infrequent times when both workers and employers could anticipate sufficient
technological advance to make the bargain feasible were normal hours reduced.
Without such expectations employers would, during periods of normal cyclical ex¬
pansion, "buy off demand for reduced hours by a combination of higher wages for
the normal workweek and an insistence that any reduction in hours be accompanied
by a proportional reduction in pay. During periods of cyclical contraction the work¬
ers' position was too delicate to withstand the effort to win a major concession. As
long as such factors are generally involved in the process of reducing normal working
hours, it is reasonable to anticipate that movements in convenrionally measured eco¬
nomic growth will generally be found, as they were in Victorian Britain, to be corre¬
lated with increases in leisure.
25. Bienefeld, Manfred Alfons, Working Hours in British Industry: An Economic History, Lon¬
don 1972, pp. 98, 111, 121, 146.
26. Bienefeld, Working Hours, pp. 193-94, 197, 201,
27. Bienefeld, Working Hours, pp. 146-48.
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The problems considered so far have all relied for their resolution, at least implicitly,
either upon observed prices directly or upon imputations based on observed prices.
The value of leisure, for example, was determined with reference to average income
payments for additional work. Where adjustment for enhanced leisure benefit due to
advances in transport or consumer durables was nesessary, the degree of adjustment
was calculated by deflating a suitable consumer price index. Allowances for urban
disamenities were evaluated by the observed earnings premium which had to be paid
to induce workers voluntarily to endure harsh urban conditions. The use of social in¬
dicators was linked to the degree of correlation between measured income and an in¬
dex of non-market indicators. Thus one way or another, directly or indirectly, ob¬
served market prices have represented an indispensible component of the assessment
and evaluation of economic activity.
But there are important circumstances where the historian may feel that observed
prices are fundamentally distorted and that any economic measure ultimately based
on such prices must be misleading, Fred Hirsch has recentiy presented a detailed crit¬
ique of economic growth based on a belief in the fundamental fallibility of observed
market prices.28 Hirsch argues that much of the consumption desired in modern
economies is centred on "positional" goods and Services whose value is determined
by the satisfaction they can provide through relative position alone, from the quality
of being in front or from the fact of others being behind.29 In this view the real value
of, for example, a desirable home site or the rewards of a responsible and fulfilling
job cannot greatly change. The value of purely positional goods is taken to be almost
completely independent of technological change. If consumers can use only so many
television sets or so many cars, after which the value of another such good becomes
virtually zero, then the limits to growth are clearly and unalterably set.
This argument is tantamount to the claim that if equilibrium prices could only be
known, the high and rising relative value attached to those things whose output could
not be increased would be clear, as would the low and falling relative value of those
things whose Output could be increased. Ultimately, in "true equilibrium" value
terms, real growth would be impossible as long as Substitution in consumption be¬
tween positional and material (or reproducible) goods was strictly limited. In this Sit¬
uation, the appearance of growth can only be an illusion created by weighting the
various categories of output by prices in fundamental disequilibrium. Such a proce¬
dure would give current period weights to positional and reproducible goods, ignor-
ing the fact that as reproducible output is increased the relative value of such output
would fall while that of positional goods would rise. Current period disequilibrium
prices undervalue positional goods and overvalue reproducible goods thereby creat¬
ing a "mirage" of economic growth, since the price weights attached to positional
goods, whose output cannot increase, rise over time whereas the price weights of re¬
producible goods, whose output can increase, fall over time. The presumed benefits
of growth thus continuaUy recede even as strenuous efforts are made to realize
them.
28. Hirsch, Fred, Social Limits to Growth, London, 1977.
29. Hirsch, Social Limits, p. 20.
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The implications of this line of argument for the interpretation of the national in¬
come accounts is serious, for it implies that the use of the observed prices upon
which the accounts are necessarily based are fundamentally incorrect and mislead¬
ing. Clearly Hirsch has identified a process which accounts at least in part for the
inabüity of even very rapid sustained economic growth to provide the füll anticipated
benefits. Yet the claim that positional goods are so dominant in aggregate consump¬
tion and so immune to Substitution by reproducible goods as largely to remove the
possibility of real economic growth is an empirical question which must be resolved
not by assertion but by extensive historical and international comparisons of eco¬
nomic development. Such research would probe the strangely ahistorical nature of
Hirsch's critique. On the one hand, the benefits of economic growth in the past are
acknowledged but on the other it is feit that continued benefits of growth cannot be
expected in the future. But why should such a Situation occur now and not a quarter
of a Century earlier or later? Comparative historical research would establish the ex¬
tent to which expenditure on specific positional goods actually has comprised, after
allowing for the effects of population growth which amplify the inherent scarcity of
positional goods, a stable or rising proposition of total real income, as Hirsch's anal¬
ysis predicts should occur.
Although it is not possible to anticipate completely the results of research still to
be carried out, it would appear Hirsch underestimated the ability of modern technol¬
ogy to create Substitutes for positional goods. Since Hirsch often illustrated his argu¬
ment by reference to the example of a limited number of desirable sites for houses, it
is useful to recall how transport improvements, trains in the nineteenth Century and
cars in the twentieth, by making accessable desirable sites that were previously too
remote or inaccessible for extensive use have increased the stock of choice sites,
thereby undermining in this instance the very concept of positional goods. Similarly
while it remains an open question whether the relative availability of rewarding and
fulfilling jobs and occupations has increased as measured growth has occurred, it is
clear that modern household appliances, like refrigerators, washing machines and
dishwashers, whose production and sale if not use is fully recorded in the conven¬
tional NIPA, have renoved a substantial amount of the drudgery that blighted and
limited the lives of most people in the past. Furthermore, it would appear that the
greater variety of consumption goods that has become available over time has acted
to diffuse both the pleasure of possessing highly esteemed positional goods and the
dissatisfaction of not doing so. After all, as R. C. O. Matthews noted in his generally
appreciative review of Hirsch's book, in an economy where no growth takes place, all
goods are positional and the possibilities for Substitution among consumption goods
is much more harshly limited than is true in an expanding economy.30 Finally, it
should be noted that health care and education, two Services whose provision has
moved in close parallel with movements in the conventional income accounts and are
thus manifestly not positional goods, have come to account for a larger share of Out¬
put in most countries over time.31 Ultimately Hirsch's argument serves to stress the
30. Matthews, R. C. O., Review of 'Social Limits to Growth', in: The Economic Journal, 87
(1977), p. 576.
31. Some care must be taken when measuring these Services to avoid double counting. Thus
education that is solely for occupational and professional advancement should be consid-
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importance of careful construction of indices of economic activity, supported by
close Observation of consumption patterns over time, a task in which Simon Kuznets'
pioneering work should offer a most useful base for further research.32 If anything,
Hirsch's reservations concerning the desirability or even the possibility of economic
growth provides further rationale for a revision ofthe conventional NIPA along the
consumption-oriented lines proposed by Nordhaus and Tobin.
There is, however, a dynamic variant of Hirsch's argument which increases even
further the importance of comparative, historical research. The variant was first given
explicit expression by E. J. Mishan and subsequently was formalized by Stephen
Glaister.33 The phenomenon that Mishan and Glaister were concerned with was the
potentially unstable nature of desirable economic equilibria and the subsequent like¬
lihood that normal competitive behaviour would lead to the abandonment of desir¬
able equilibria in favour of substantiaUy less desirable equilibria which would then
be very difficult to change. Indeed, in the final, undesirable, equilibrium position, the
structure of prices would create a very strong disincentive for any change. The argu¬
ment is most easily grasped in the form of an example, but it is readily seen that gen¬
eralizations can easily be made. Consider a transport system where no private vehi-
cles exist and only public trams and buses are available. Now suppose that one per¬
son suddenly realizes that with a private car be could reduce his travel time to work
by half, so long as his were the only private car on the road. If, however, many others
shortly afterwards make the same discovery independently and attempt the same ac¬
tion, without reckoning on the congestion costs, the anticipated benefits will prove il-
lusory for all. The congestion caused by only one car will be negligible, but the effect
of many people simultaneously switching to private cars, even if each is correct in re-
alizing that the impact of his own action alone is trivial, is not at all negligible. The
trouble is clearly that travellers are making decisions on information that will begin
to change and be incorrect as soon as the decisions are made, yet no individual trav-
eller can by himself know what the final outcome, and hence what the correct infor¬
mation for a rational decision, will be. In the example, eventuaUy a new equilibrium
is reached where many people use private cars, many fewer than previously use pub¬
lic transport, and travel time for all is increased. The previous equilibrium, where no
private transport existed, is actually superior to the one that eventuaUy emerges from
the introduction of private transport because of the unregulated increase in conges¬
tion. But for the same reasons which created the problem in the first place, the origi¬
nal equilibrium is very difficult to regain. The benefit perceived by any one individ¬
ual in taking public transport rather than his own car is negligible but if many could
be persuaded to take public transport, all would gain, those continuing to use their
earned incomes of those who received the education and should not, therefore, be counted
separately. The educational expenditure that should be recorded as final output must be lim¬
ited to that which enhances leisure and living in general. Similarly, expenditures on health
and medicine necessitated by environmental deterioration and occupational hazards must be
excluded.
32. Kuznets, Simon, Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread, New Haven/Conn.
1966, pp. 262-284.
33. Mishan, E. J., The Costs of Economic Growth, Harmondsworth/Middlesex/England 1969,
pp. 232-240, and Glaister, Stephen, Transport Pricing Policies and Efficient Urban Growth,
in: Journal of Public Economics, 5 (1976), pp. 103-117.
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own cars gaining most. Hence everyone hopes that everyone eise will take public
transport, but no one does and the Situation never improves. These obvious difficul¬
ties are greatly compounded if public transport is competitively eliminated as travell¬
ers switch to private cars. The greater is the proportion of fixed to total costs of pub¬
lic transport, the more dependent it is on intensive utilization and hence the more
vulnerable its revenue to any decline in traffic. The elimination of public transport,
by removing any choice in transport mode, clearly is the worst outcome, yet one
which may be difficult to prevent without the imposition by a central authority of a
set of "shadow" transport prices which take account of the costs of congestion and
the importance of choice. The calculation of efficient shadow prices is not simple.
The planning authority must correctly price a veriety of transport Systems whose Op¬
erations it cannot directly observe but must deduce from knowledge of both the tech¬
nical characteristics of transport equipment and the preferences of travellers and
shippers.34
In the Mishan-Glaister example, only with correct equilibrium shadow prices
could the benefits of current consumption be evaluated and plans for future invest¬
ment rationally made. Yet the congestion externalities that caused such price calcula¬
tions to be so difficult to make are likely to be a pervasive feature of modern eco¬
nomic life and to intensify as development proceeds, for they are, as in the Mishan-
Glaister example, created as a by-product of the same process of technological
change that is the source of economic growth in the first place. But if prices are syste¬
maticaUy distorted in the way suggested, the national income accounts will not just
measure the wrong thing; movements in the NIPA may even be perverse in relation
to the real underlying economy. In the example above, when private transport was
introduced, measured expenditure on private transport rose, measured expenditure
on public transport feil, and the benefits of private vehicle ownership increased. But
the increased benefits of private vehicle ownership were due to the deterioration of
public transport and it can be shown that the net change in total social welfare may
easily be negative even when observed total expenditure has risen, because more con-
sumer's surplus is being extracted by the provision of transport Services than was true
previously. In such a Situation, the same observed prices that lead to suboptimal re¬
source aUocations will yield incorrect and inappropriate national account esti¬
mates.
As the Mishan-Glaister example suggests, and Levin's study of railroad deregula-
tion confirms, the analytical derivation of even a few of the prices needed for ration-
aldecision-making and accurate NIPA is a difficult undertaking. For the foreseeable
future it will not be realistic to anticipate plausible calculations of equilibrium
prices.35 Thus the only reliable means of assessing the market prices the historian ob-
34. See Levin, Richard C, Railroad Rates, Profitability, and Welfare Under Deregulation, in:
Bell Journal of Economics, 12 (1981), pp. 1-26, for a discussion of the complex considera¬
tions involved in such analysis.
35. A recent paper by James, John A, The Welfare Effects ofthe Antebellum Tariff: A General
Equilibrium Analysis, in: Exploration in Economic History, 15 (1978), pp. 231-256, has de¬
monstrated that equilibrium price vectors of interest to historians can in principle be calcu¬
lated. It is likely that such work will become more common in the near future, offering histo¬
rians a very powerful new analytical tool.
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serves require extensive international, histoncal comparisons While it is, of course,
always possible that all countries will make the same mistakes and move towards the
same inferior equilibrium, it is not hkely Thus examples of unusually successful Or¬
ganization or of notably sustained advance may be effectively used to investigate the
nature of feasible equilibria While this procedure may fail to capture the best possi¬
ble outcome available to an economy at any point in time, it is unhkely that a large
number of societies with different economic, pohtical and technological arrange¬
ments and capabilities will all miss the best Solution equally badly The results of
such compansons may de difficult to interpret, but, since cross-country histoncal
compansons are as close as the economic observer can get to a controlled expen-
ment, there is very httle choice but to use them
If the analysis of economic Performance inevitably requires extensive international
compansons, more attention must be devoted to the notonously difficult task of im¬
proving the Statistical basis for such compansons While no comprehensive Solution
exists, two recent proposals promise marked improvement These proposals will also
aid in the comparison of a given economy's Performance at different points m its
own history
The first proposal advocates facing directly the problem that pnce stmctures are
determined jointly by the distnbution of wealth and productive capacity When com-
panng the efficiency of two economies, Performance is to be measured by reference
to how well the needs of specific groups common to both are met Such an approach
has been used by A K Sen to compare inter-state disparities of welfare Standards in
India
36
Sen explicitly gave higher consumption weights to the relatively poor so that
his comparison of Performance was particularly sensitive to the consumption experi¬
ence of his bench mark social group Such a procedure has the great benefit of mak¬
ing the welfare basis of comparisons exphcit Of course the assessment of Perfor¬
mance may vary with the benchmark consumer group chosen, but even this factor is
beneficial, for histonans have often realized that common developments have differ¬
ential impacts and the use of several benchmark groups, to the extent that expen-
ences are sharply different, serves to indicate quantitatively the vanety of expenence
the historian wants to examine Furthermore, because the approach using benchmark
groups rehes on knowledge of expenditure patterns, knowledge which is largely inde¬
pendent of the conventional accounts, it offers a valuable supplementary cross-check
to those accounts Also it can readily be combined with the second recent proposal to
aid international compansons
The second proposal has used detailed calculations of purchasing power panties
between countries in order to obtain a more "realistic" set of exchange rates
37
Such
adjustment is necessary because tanffs, quotas, and other forms of administrative In¬
tervention—such as central bank Operations—distort exchange rates from the levels
that would rule if only pure demand and supply factors were operating Furthermore,
even if exchange rates were in fundamental real equihbnum, countnes with different
productive structures or consumption patterns may have sufficiently different ratios
36 Sen, Amartya K, Real National Income in Review of Economic Studies, 43 (1976), pp 19-
39
37 David, Paul A , Just How Misleading Are Official Exchange Rate Conversions9 in The Eco
nomic Journal, 82 (1972), pp 979-90
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of tradeable and non-tradeable production that cross-country comparisons based on
exchange rates alone may be misleading or unnecessarily incomplete. The procedure
proposed by Paul David to adjust market exchange rates uses the relative price
weights that obtain in the benchmark country—in his case, the U.S. on the grounds
that by common consent for the period he was considering (1950-1965) the U.S. was
internationally the most advanced economy, with its structure increasingly approxi-
mated by the rest ofthe world—to value output and consumption in other countries.
The levels of Output in all countries are then compared using the benchmark coun¬
try's prices and the relative rankings of countries obtained on this basis are compared
with the relative rankings obtained by valuing national Outputs at market exchange
rates. Specifically, the following equation was estimated:
fYol 0.671 0.408 fYol
IY,J (0.063) (0.022) lYj
where Y0 = per capita Output in the benchmark country valued at the benchmark
country's relative prices.
Yj = per capita output in the ith country valued at the benchmark country's
relative prices.
Y, = per capita Output in the ith country valued in the benchmark country's
currency using the market exchange rate rather than the benchmark
country's relative prices.
The numbers in brackets under the estimated coefficients are Standard errors. The
equation may be interpreted to show that on average the difference in per capita in¬
comes in purchasing power parity terms38 between a given country and the U.S. was
only 40.8% ofthe percentage gap indicated by a straight exchange rate conversion ex¬
pressing all incomes in dollars. The explanation for this sharp reduction in income
differentials using purchasing power parity price weights and market exchange rates
is that the higher manufacturing productivity in the U.S. also raised the opportunity
cost of providing labour intensive Services which accounted for a substantial propor¬
tion of total consumption not only in the U.S. but also in all the other countries in the
comparison. When the U.S. price weighting, with its relatively high cost of Services
and low cost of manufactures was used to value Output in various developed coun¬
tries, those countries gained more in the revaluation of their comparatively abundant
Services than they lost in the revaluation of their comparatively sparse manufacturing
output.
David's procedure goes an important way towards adjusting exchange rate data to
permit its use in a much more meaningful way than was previously possible. The füll
potential in this procedure is gained when different countries are used as bench-
38. A classic index number problem prevents a true estimation of purchasing power parity. That
would require knowledge of what the Citizens of one country would have bought had they
faced with their incomes the price structure of another country. What purchasing power par¬
ity means here is a measurement of the bundles of Output in two different countries by the
same price structure. It is clear that even this restricted purchasing power parity concept al¬
lows a significant improvement on official exchange rate estimates of per capita income dif¬
ferences.
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marks in repeated calculations. Comparisons of the rankings obtained for a variety
of benchmark countries will offer a systematic means of identifying and assessing im¬
portant differences in the consumption and production structures of different coun¬
tries at different points in time. Furthermore, David's procedure can readily be com¬
bined with Sen's so that the purchasing power parity calculations are based on expli¬
cit welfare orderings rather than observed price structures which impose a welfare
basis founded on the existing distribution of wealth.39
As may readily be seen, these various procedures cannot be vested with an aura of
infallibility and precision. In their way, they are as arbitrary as the conventional ac¬
counting procedures they are intended to Supplement and replace. Their great virtue,
however, is that used in combinations they each illuminate in a different way a parti¬
cular aspect of a nation's (or a region's) historical experience. They allow most of the
subjective and judgemental differences that divide historians to be systematicaUy ex¬
posed and quantified. They permit sensitivity tests to determine which assumptions
are crucial to conclusions and which affect conclusions very little. They use in a
structured way vast amounts of historical data that simply cannot be assimilated
without an explicit analytical framework. The results of these efforts may never com¬
mand universal agreement, but the issues in dispute among historians will become
systematicaUy clearer because of them. And that surely can only be considered pro¬
gress.
Zusammenfassung:
Probleme der volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnung und
ihrer Interpretation bei der Bewertung langfristiger
wirtschaftlicher Leistungen
Hier wird davon ausgegangen, daß es bei der Messung ökonomischer Aktivitäten im
wesentlichen zwei Arten von Problemen gibt. Die erste besteht aus solchen Fragen,
die zumindest prinzipiell dadurch lösbar sind, daß man beobachtete oder abgeleitete
Marktpreise verwendet. Der zweite Problemtyp besteht aus Fragen, die nur über die
Verwendung geschätzter (oder „synthetischer") Preise gelöst werden können, weil die
beobachteten Preise aus vielerlei Gründen fehlerhaft sind. So könnte z. B. ein funda¬
mentales Marktungleichgewicht vorliegen oder eine nichttolerierbare Abhängigkeit
von einer besonderen - möglicherweise willkürlichen - Vermögensverteilung. Oder
es könnten Verzerrungen durch Schwankungen der relativen Preise oder auch durch
eine allgemeine Inflation oder eine Deflation hervorgerufen worden sein. Derartige
Verzerrungen können auch von Zöllen, von festgesetzten Handels- oder Produktions¬
quoten und unterschiedlichen anderen administrativen Eingriffen in den Markt ver¬
ursacht werden. Beide Problemtypen werden diskutiert und mit neueren Lösungsver¬
suchen dargestellt. Am Schluß der Arbeit finden sich einige Vorschläge zur weiteren
Forschung.
39. Incomes are converted into wealth equivalents by using the present discounted value of fu¬
ture income streams.
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Fragen, die zum ersten Problemtyp zählen, sind nach zwei übergeordneten Grup¬
pen klassifiziert. Die erste kleinere Gruppe befaßt sich mit logischen Widersprüchen
in der herkömmlichen volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnung, die bisher deshalb
hingenommen wurden, weil die verfügbaren Daten so leichter zu erfassen waren. Die
zweite weitaus größere und wichtigere Gruppe befaßt sich mit Problemen, die aus
der theoretisch unangemessenen Zielvorstellung über die zu messende Größe er¬
wachsen. Eigentlich sollte der Endverbrauch erfaßt werden, doch bezieht sich die
herkömmliche volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung im allgemeinen auf die ver¬
marktete Produktion. Die Diskussion der veränderten Meßmethoden, die bei einer
Abänderung der Zielgröße für die volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung erforderlich
wären, schließt die Darstellung der Pionierarbeit von Nordhaus und Tobin ein. In
diesem Abschnitt werden Punkte abgehandelt wie die Berwertung von nicht-ver-
markteter Haushaltsarbeit oder von Freizeit sowie Kosten und Nutzen des Bevölke¬
rungswachstums. Am Schluß wird die Möglichkeit erörtert, den Bereich der bisheri¬
gen volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnung durch die Einbeziehung sozialer Indika¬
toren zu erweitern.
Fragen, die zum zweiten umfassenden Problemtyp zählen, werden in Anlehnung
an das kürzlich erschienene Werk von Hirsch, Mishan und Glaister erörtert und mit
den Lösungsvorschlägen von Sen und David vorgestellt.
Nun können Historiker keine eindeutigen definitiven Antworten auf die Mehrzahl
der Probleme in der volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnung, wie sie in diesem Artikel
angesprochen wurden, erwarten. Die Vorschläge, die hier zu verschiedenartigen Re¬
visionen und Modifikationen der herkömmlichen volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrech¬
nung gemacht wurden, sollen vielmehr dazu dienen, daß die subjektiven Meinungs¬
unterschiede (die Historiker voneinander trennen) in systematischer Weise offen dar¬
gelegt und quantifiziert werden. Damit ließen sich fundamentale Fragen und Pro¬
bleme viel klarer umreißen, wenn nicht endgültig lösen.
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Patrick K. O'Brien
The Analysis and Measurement of the
Service Economy in European Economic History
1. Introduction*
The economic history of Western Europe in the 19th Century witnessed population
change of around 0.82% a year, a growth rate in the region's product of 1.74%, and
real per capita income increased at just under 1% per annum.1 This growth was ac¬
companied by structural change which refers to the fact that the rise in the volume of
output was accompanied by the reallocation of the work force in a clearly defined
way (see table 1) as well as the familiär change in the composition of national Out¬
puts.2
Table 1: The allocation of Labour in Europe, 1800-1900
Year Agriculture Industry Services
1800 (a)
1860 (a)
1900 (a)
1900 (b)
73%
57%
50%
34%
16%
26%
29%
36%
11%
17%
21%
30%
Notes: (a) excludes Russia;
(b) Western Europe only.
Sources: Bairoch, Paul, Corrmerce exterieur et developpement economique,
(1976), p.26, and Bairoch, Paul and Limbor, J. M., Evolution
of the Working Population in the World by Sector and Region,
in: International Labor Review (October 1968), p.330.
*
My ideas on the development of Services in the 19th Century were clarified by reading:
Fuchs, V. The Service Economy, New York 1968; Singleman, J., From Agriculture to Services,
London 1978, and Gershuny, J., After Industrial Society, London 1978. All three books are,
however, focused on the 20th Century.
1. Bairoch, Paul, Commerce exterieur et developpement economique, Paris 1976, pp. 148-53.
2. Kuznets, S., Economic Growth of Nations, Cambridge/Mass. 1971, chs. 4 and 6.
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This paper has been designed to stimulate discussion on the meaning and measure¬
ment of output from Services during the first phase of modern economic growth
(1800-1914). That design was in turn prompted by two suggestions: (a) that employ¬
ment in Services and output originating from the service sector are not well defined in
the literature on structural change, and, (b) that the contribution of Services to levels
of income and productivity observed across Western Europe could produce a mis¬
leading impression of levels of development attained by different national economies
before 1914.3
2. Taxonomy: Intermediate and Final Output
The service sector includes such a heterogeneous collection of economic activities
that it is difficult to see why it survives as an analytical category in economic history.
Nevertheless Services do possess one obvious feature which distinguishes them from
the produets of agricultural, extractive and manufacturing industry. Services are not
physical commodities which can be touched, weighed, measured or stored. Only phy-
sioerats and Marxists would deny that Services (as well as commodities) provide con¬
sumers with utüities and should, therefore, be counted and included in estimates of
national Output. For that purpose a service could be defined as something which sa¬
tisfies demand, which adheres not to goods but to producers of a service and which
disappear at the moment of production.
When historians try to measure the place of Services in national economy they nor¬
mally fall back upon the data and Standard classifications used by censuses of popu¬
lation and production to distinguish emplyment and output "originating in" particu¬
lar industries. In such documents certain industries (see the list under table 2 above)
are deemed to produce Services and others agricultural or industrial output. But cen¬
suses do not demarcate service occupations from those connected directly to the
transformation of inputs into commodities. Yet historians are certainly aware that
(for example) the German chemical industry employed doctors, that French steel
firms had lawyers on the payroll and that factories employed servants in their can-
teens. Jobs and Outputs emanating from these "service occupations" are, however,
classified in studies of structural change as industrial jobs which generated industrial
Outputs.
Service occupations were not confined to service industries.4 As the division of la¬
bour extended over the 19th Century the share ofthe work force undertaking service
tasks within the productive system went up. In occupational terms there was surely a
long term reallocation of labour away from eultivators, operatives, miners and artis¬
ans towards "service" jobs. That trend accompanied mechanization in industry and
agriculture. Slowly but steadily the majority of workers moved away from direct in¬
volvement with cultivation and with the transformation of raw materials into finished
industrial output. Our statistics on structural change grossly undereport the share of
the work force whose jobs should be calied Services.
3. O'Brien, Patrick, and Keyder, Caglar, Economic Growth in Britain and France, London 1978,
pp. 28-32.
4. Bauer, P., and Yamey, B., Economic Progress and Occupational Distribution, in: Economic
Journal, 61 (1951).
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My final taxonomical point concerns output which emanates from workers em¬
ployed in the service sector. Historians appreciate the distinction between final and
intermediate output. But once Services are also viewed functionally it becomes clear
that perhaps a majority of workers classified by censuses as employed in Services did
not produce Services as final output. They were not, on inspection, doctors, lawyers,
teachers, policemen, entertainers, domestics, etc.; from whose Services consumers de¬
rived direct and defineable Utilities. Rather they sold their labour time to producers
of commodities to facilitate the transformation of inputs into goods or they assisted
producers to distribute commodity output to consumers. A high but unmeasurable
proportion of the Output of the service sector was "intermediate" in the sense that it
was closely linked to and dependant upon the production of primary and industrial
commodities.
Unfortunately neither population nor production censuses assist historians who
wish to divide the labour force engaged in the service sector between workers supply-
ing final Output on the one hand and workers instrumental in transforming raw mate¬
rials into commodities and engaged in the distribution of those goods to consumers
on the other. They are stuck with categories found useful by officials concerned to
count and classify populations and to measure production in the 19th Century. De¬
tailed research on the original returns needs to be undertaken before anything firm
can be said about the proportion of the work force employed in the service sector
whose jobs simply complemented the production and distribution of commodities.
Meanwhile, and at this "premature" stage of the argument, I made some arbitrary
assumptions in order to manufacture rough orders of magnitude. Taking population
censuses for Britain, France, Belgium and Germany for selected years, just before
1914,5 I reclassified the work force employed in Services by assuming:
(a) everybody classified as employed in banks, insurance and finance, plus 50% of
those listed under professional occupations of all kinds were deemed to be indi¬
rectly engaged in the production of industrial and primary commodities;
(b) labour included in the censuses as employed in transport, commerce and whole¬
sale and retail trade supplied Services complementary to commodity produc¬
tion;
(c) half of all "non-military" employees in Government service assisted indirectly in
the Operation, expansion and protection of agricultural and industrial produc¬
tion;
(d)all other personnel (classified by the censuses as employed in Services and includ¬
ing: the armed forces, domestic and personal Services, 50% ofthe professions and
50% of Government employees) supplied their Services as final output to consum¬
ers.
This crude manipulation of the primary sources suggests that very high propor¬
tions of those classified by 19th Century population censuses (and by historians of
structural change) as employed in Services could be redefined (on a respecification of
their functions in the economic system) as engaged in the production of industrial
and agricultural goods. The proportions my arbitrary assumptions generated were:
for Great Britain 48%, Belgium 55%, for France 63% and Germany 64%.
The data are tabulated in Bairoch, Paul, et al., La Population active et sa structure, vol. 1 de
Statistiques internationales retrospectives, Brüssels 1968.
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But whatever definitions are adapted to rework the available data on the deploy-
ment of the work force the basic point that the majority of men and women (conven¬
rionally classified as employed in Services) worked to facilitate the production and
distribution of commodities will stand. Furthermore rates of growth of employment
in different branches of the service sector reveal that work forces engaged in activi¬
ties connected with industry and agriculture (particularly transport, finance and dis¬
tribution) increased more rapidly than work forces employed in sub sectors supply-
ing Services for final consumption. Over the 19th Century Services grew as some func¬
tion of commodity output and the long run development of Western Europe wit¬
nessed a Substitution of commodities for Services in final consumption. The econom¬
ies of early modern Europe consumed higher proportions of Services partly because
of low productivity and relatively high prices in commodity production and partly
because of an abundant supply of labour in relation to the demand for workers from
agriculture and industry. Modern economic growth gave people their opportunity to
consume more goods and the labour force was (despite the misleading impression
derived from census classifications) reallocated towards the production of commodi¬
ties.
3. The Service Sector and Economic Development
But this hypothesis seems to receive little support from the literature on structural
change which is not inclined to "associate" the long term (1800-1914) rise in per cap-
Table 2: Share ofthe Labour Force Employed in Services: 1840's to 1900's
Country 1900-10 1880-90 1860-70 1850-60 1840-50
30%
13%
22%
Netherlands 39% 36% 34% 31%
Great Britain 38% 35% 30% 28%
Norway 34% 28% 25%
Denmark 33% 22% 22% 22%
Belgium 31% 24% 18% 16%
Switzerland 28% 16%
France 28% 27% 22% 21%
Spain 24% 16% 16%
Sweden 27% 24% 19%
Germany 22% 16%
Italy 18% 19% 16%
Austria 18% 21%
Services inciude transport, storage, conraunication, public administration, aimed Services, professional
and business Services, entertainment, recreation and personal Services. The ratios
relate to a particular year during the decade specified.
Sources Bairoch, Paul, et al. La Population active et sa structure (1968) and
Kuznets, S. The Economic Growth of Nations (1971) and Modern Economic Growth (1966).
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ita income with a reallocation of the work force towards commodity production (see
table 2) or with any dechne in the share of national output emanating from Ser¬
vices
6
Except for Bntain variations over the long run in the share of the service sector m
GDP have not, however, been measured in current or constant pnces For Norway
the share (in current pnces) went up by 5% points between 1865 and 1910
7
Arthur
Young estimated that 31% of Bntain«s national income for 1770 onginated from Ser¬
vices By 1911 that share had risen to 55%
8
For the United States the proportion
moved from 21% in 1839 to 33% six decades later
9
Furthermore such evidence as ex¬
ists from the household budget surveys for the 19th Century (conducted by Engel,
Eden, Le Play and other investigators) suggests some positive correlation between
household incomes and the share of household expenditure on Services
10
Finally
cross sectional data from national accounts for the contemporary penod also reveals
a positive correlation between levels of per capita income and the share of national
income from Services
n
But histoncal trends cannot be inferred from cross country data for our own times,
particularly as the correlation coefficient between levels of per capita income and the
share of Services in GDP (measured in current pnces) for eight European countnes
for the penod 1900-10 turned out to be extremely weak
12
Evidence from household
budgets is, moreover, inconclusive because although there is (as one would expect)
some tendency for households with higher incomes to spend a higher percentage of
their incomes on Services, that tendency is not systematic across the income ränge
Nor is it inconsistent with a possible (indeed plausible) distnbution of the data in
which European households spent lower proportions of their incomes on final Ser¬
vices in, say, 1910, than they did a Century earlier The correlation may persist but the
mean proportion of total household income allocated to final Services could in the¬
ory dechne At present the growth of output from final Services has not been mea¬
sured To estimate it histonans are required to measure the value (in constant pnces)
6 Hartwell, R Max, The Service Revolution in Cipolla, C (ed ), The Fontana Economic His
tory of Europe, vol 3, London 1973
7 Kuznets, S, Modern Economic Growth New Haven 1966, chs 3 and 8, and Katouzian, M
A
,
The Development ofthe Service Sector A New Approach in Oxford Economic Papers, 22
(1970)
Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth p 89
8 Deane, P, and Cole, W A, British Economic Growth 1688 1959 Cambndge 1962, pp 156
and 166
9 Gallman, R E , and Weiss, T , The Service Industries in the 19th Century in Fuchs, V (ed ),
Production and Productivity in the Service Industries, New York 1969, p 291
10 Fishlow, A , Comparative Consumption Patterns etc in Ayel, E (ed ), Micro Aspects of De
velopment, London 1973, and Minchinton, W, Patterns of Demand 1750-1914 in Cipolla,
C (ed ), Fontana Economic History of Europe, vol 3, London 1973
11 Kuznets, Economic Growth of Nations ch 3
12 I correlated the share of Services to GDP (measured in current pnces to levels of per capita
income measured in dollars for 1913 The per capita income estimates are from Bairoch,
Paul, Europe s Gross National Product 1800-1975 in Journal of European Economic Histo
ry, (Fall, 1976) The ratio of Services to GDP was calculated from data in Kuznet's Economic
Growth of Nations ch IV and Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth ch 3 The correlation
coefficient for a sample of 8 observations was r = 0 4
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of output originating from the sale of Services to consumers for base and final years.
Both the output and inputs required to produce Services should then be double de¬
flated by indices which reflect movements in the prices of final output and the costs
of capital and raw materials embodied in that output. Ifsuch estimates (in constant
prices) could be manufactured they could then be compared with rates of growth of
GDP in order to ascertain how the ratio of Services to national output actually
changed over the 19th Century. Meanwhile, it cannot be taken as axiomatic that
countries with larger shares of their work forces engaged in Services and with bigger
proportions of their national incomes originating from the service sector were more
"developed" than their neighbours in Western Europe.
4. Services and Per Capita Incomes
In the last decade social accountants have moved forward in their attempts to devise
proxies for the "Outputs" provided by banks, shops, insurance companies, hospitals,
public administration and other branches ofthe service sector.13 Unfortunately, the
data at their disposal is rarely available to historians labouring to compile exceed-
ingly rough figures for the 19th Century and who are reluctantly compelled to meas¬
ure service output as equal to the sum of factor incomes (employment times remuner¬
ation) earned by those classified by population censuses as employed in Services.
While such compromises are inevitable, they systematicaUy bias the measured per
capita incomes of countries with relatively large service sectors in an upward direc¬
tion and thus lead to inflated notions of differences in levels of real per capita con¬
sumption attained by Western European economies during the 19th Century. The
force of this contention should become apparent as we now move on to consider:
first forces behind the variations in the recorded levels of employment in Services and
secondly the factors which helped to determine the remuneration ofthose engaged in
the service sectors of various European economies.
I have already argued that increases in the demand for labour to supply Services
was derived in large part from the growth of commodity output. But changes in the
level or service sector employment connected with the production and distribution of
agricultural and industrial output was not a simple function of the growth of those
sectors. Among other things it also derived from the Organization of industry and ag¬
riculture, the division of labour and the location of production. Figures in population
censuses which record the numbers of people employed in Services reflect levels of
commercialization, urbanization and specialization attained by economies in the
process of development. For example, the relationship between the share of com¬
modity Output marketed either inside or outside a country and the numbers of mer¬
chants, shopkeepers, Carters, carriers, etc. will be obvious. But the level of employ¬
ment in distribution also depended on the kind of Services required and the prefer¬
ences of consumers. Societies like Britain with a high import component in their con¬
sumption and which offered distribution Services all hours of the day and night
needed a larger work force to meet such demands.
13. Fuchs, (ed.), Production and Productivity in Service Industries and Moss, M., (ed.), The Meas¬
urement of Economic and Social Performance, New York 1973.
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The association between the growth of towns and employment in Services is also
not difficult to discern. Between 1860-80 about 55% of the urban work force in the
United States were employed in Services and something like 60% of the additional
jobs created in Services between 1840-1910 could be explained by the reallocation of
population between rural and urban areas.14 Again the mechanisms are not difficult
to describe. As manufacturing activity located in towns so did Services complemen¬
tary to industrial production. Geographically concentrated populations also required
more transport, distribution, environmental and other urban Services.
In essence the growth of employment in Services is yet another manifestation of
Adam Smith's division of labour. That process proceeded not merely within the
framework of an enterprise but as agricultural and industrial production grew this
created possibilities for the development of firms specialized on sales, transport, fi¬
nance, insurance, maintenance and other functions connected with the transforma¬
tion and distribution of commodities. Classical style entrepreneurs who in the early
stages of industrialization supervised nearly everything gradually evolved into formal
organizations—firms, whose Controllers found it efficient to "contract out" tasks tan¬
gential to their central objectives in order to realize economies of scale (e.g. the shift
from private to public transport Systems); and to reap advantages from purchasing
specialized knowledge (e.g. from bankers merchants and insurance agents) and to
eliminate the need to maintain underemployed employees for intermittent tasks such
as repairs and maintenance.
Any explanation for the growth of employment in Services solely in terms of de¬
mand would be seriously incomplete. For agriculture and for urban Services, to some
extent the supply of labour available created its own jobs. Urban history has re-
minded us that before 1914 Services remained as an area of residual employment for
thousands upon thousands of workers who could not obtain regulär and better paid
jobs in factories or farms. The sector almost certainly employed higher proportions
of child, female and part time labour than was typical of industry or even agriculture.
Apart from public transport, ratios of capital to labour for most branches of the Ser¬
vices sector were low and flexible. Entry into service jobs through family firms or seif
employment (isole) was relatively easy except for professional occupations which re¬
quired real skills or at least paper qualifications. Thus the skill structure ofthe work
force engaged in Services was skewed towards the professional salariat at one end of
the scale and a poorly educated and unskilled labour force engaged in transport, re¬
tail trade and domestic service at the other. Throughout Europe the service economy
ofthe 19th centurn towns supported large numbers of underemployed workers who
had somehow fitted themselves into an economic system which expanded too slowly
in relation to the pace of population growth and internal migration to provide some¬
what less than half of urban workers with jobs in manufacturing industry.
Turning to wages and salaries received by those employed in Services over the 19th
Century, three observations seem valid. Firstly, long run trends in remuneration de-
pended upon demands for labour in agriculture and industry and the growth of la¬
bour productivity in the service sector. Since the potential in most branches of that
sector for both technical progress and more capital intensive methods of production
14. Weiss, T., Urbanization and the Growth of the Service Workforce, in: Explorations in Eco¬
nomic History (1974), pp. 242-58.
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was limited, increasing the productivity of labour depended upon improving the
quality of the work force and extending the division of labour in order to realize
economies of scale and specialization. Apart from transport, productivity of labour
in the service sector increased at rates below those achieved in industry and agricul¬
ture.
Secondly, population growth and high rates of internal migration to towns re-
strained the rise in the wage rates of unskilled service workers which then rose in
large measure as a response to the growth of commodity Output. But supplies of
skilled and professional manpower available to the service sector were far less elastic
basically because capital markets to support private investment in vocational training
were almost non-existent and Government expenditures on education were negligi¬
ble before 1914. Both private and public investment required to meet the growing de¬
mand for skilled, professional and managerial workers to fill higher level occupa¬
tions in Services was surely sub-optimal. In such conditions the salaries of skilled la¬
bour went up rapidly but (with the possible exception of engineers) there can be no
assumption that the quality of the Services offered improved in line with the addi¬
tional remuneration commanded over time. It is far more likely that costs per unit of
labour time rose without any significant improvements in productivity.
Thirdly domestic labour markets for recruitment to the professions to commerce
and to public Services exhibit few of the conditions prescribed for the Operation of
efficient and competitive markets for labour. This group of workers presumably en¬
joyed rents—that is by institutional and legal restrictions they managed to command
wages and salaries above their social opportunity costs.
Now the threads of their argument can be drawn together. Europe's national ac¬
counts for the 19th Century have inevitably measured net value added generated by
the service sector as equivalent to estimates of factor incomes received by those em¬
ployed in Services. That procedure imparts an upward bias to measured national in¬
comes of economies with larger shares of their work forces classified by population
censuses as employed in Services. Over the 19th Century most of the growth of service
occupations (regardless of whether these jobs remained institutionally or legally
within the industrial or agricultural sectors or formed part of a sector of an economy
demarcated by historians of structural change as Services) can be attributed to the
growth of commodity output. For some economies (Britain, Belgium and Holland
come to mind) their levels of commercialization, urbanization and their Organization
of agriculture and industry promoted a division of labour which lead to a more rapid
emergence of a service sector which historians and social accountants readily demar¬
cated from industry and agriculture. What is being claimed here is that differences
across countries in the numbers classified as employed in Services is not simply a
manifestation of variations in the level of final output from Services but also reflects
the manifold ways in which the countries and regions of Europe organized their Sys¬
tems of production, located economic activity and carried on social life. The numbers
in Services also reflect the pressure which population growth exerted on rates of mi¬
gration to towns. Urbanized commercial societies spawned larger service sectors not
necessarily correlated with higher levels of final output and consumption. While Ser¬
vices performed to produce and distribute agricultural and industrial commodities
within the confines of rural and less commercialized societies are unlikely to be re¬
corded in ways that can be estimated by accountants of national income. Once a cen-
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sus has classified a worker as employed in distribution transport or some other
branch of Services his contribution to output is unlikely to remain unrecorded by his¬
torians. But the unspecialized and multifarious part time Services performed in less
commercialized economic Systems are easily missed—and are always difficult to
measure; particularly when national accounts can only be built up from the product
side. Finally two basic assumptions almost invariably deployed to estimate service
output are extremely dubious. First, I refer to the assumption that the work force in
Services was fully employed—surely a misapplied notion for a large percentage of
unskilled labour employed in that sector. Secondly our historical accounts are again
compelled to assume that the wage rates or salary and other figures we possess on the
remuneration of workers employed in Services reflect the social opportunity cost of
labour. That premise is valid only for competitive labour markets. And few historians
would be prepared to claim that the salaries of professional and skilled grades in Ser¬
vices were determined by conditions which produced anything other than a tangen¬
tial relationship between pay and the social value of the Services produced.
5. Services and Economic Welfare
One of the main tasks of economic history is to measure changes in the welfare of
populations over time and to compare levels of welfare across countries. To assist
with that objective European historians have put together sets of national accounts
which embody compromises between what is theoretically ideal and the data at their
disposal. Although there are serious problems involved in the estimation of commod¬
ity Output this paper has discussed the biases and ambiguities contained in the avail¬
able estimates of service Output. In brief, I have tried to argue that the available esti¬
mates of service output reflects the growth of commodity output and that urban com¬
mercialized economies generate higher levels of measured service output than less
urbanized rural based economies. Part of service product (as estimated) reflects a real
contribution to both international and to historical differences in consumer welfare.
But some unmeasurable but perhaps significant share of the extra service Output in¬
cluded in the national accounts of more urbanized economies reflects little more than
differences in the location and Organization of economic activity. Social accounts are
simply recording the 19th Century shift from household to market economies but they
generate indices where that shift emerges (or is interpreted as) "extra" output.
But long before 1800 households allocated labour time to education, to the care of
the sick, to entertainment, to protection, to repairs and maintenance and to the trans¬
port and distribution of agricultural and industrial goods they produced. Unfortu¬
nately, it is impossible to estimate much more than the value ofthe commodities pro¬
duced and sold in early modern Europe. The national accounts now available for the
years after 1800 pick up Europe's long transition from household to market econom¬
ies. In our times when the price of marketed Services goes up, and households find
they have more labour time available to them, the shift may be going the other way.
The modern trend for bourgeois families to do their own ("unpaid") cooking, house¬
work, cleaning, repairs, maintenance, health care, education of the young, etc., as¬
sisted by labour saving gadgets, packet foods, do-it yourself tools, Instruction manu-
als, etc. is familiär.
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Meanwhile, to make valid comparisons of welfare over long periods of time or
across countries seems to require sets of national accounts which measure changes in
the volume of service Output and a clear recognition that the majority of households
of early modern Europe produced Services. The current Convention of measuring ser¬
vice output as the sum of factor incomes earned by those classified by censuses as
employed in the service sector is clearly inadequate for the purposes of comparisons
of welfare.
Finally, historians must be more careful in accepting the Conventions adopted by
economists and social accountants to measure economic progress. For example, con¬
ventional definitions of final output inciude all expenditures on Services for the pro¬
tection of people and property. Now no dispute could emerge in relation to the
supply Services which improved or added to social welfare. But social and urban his¬
tory has again made us aware that an increased volume of "final" Services which
emerged when European societies became more urbanized served less to improve
and rather more to defend or maintain an environment and ways of life which had
for centuries been taken for granted. Examples are numerous and ränge from urban
police forces to garbage collection, sewage and other Services concerned to "main¬
tain" the health, safety and comfort of populations concentrated in the confined
spaces of towns. And there is no need to adumbrate upon those large transfer pay¬
ments to domestic servants which were features of an age of surplus population, ine¬
quality in the distribution of income and another manifestation of the break up of
household economies. Historians must continue to reflect on the nature and quality
of economic change. They alone can supply a view of a world that was lost despite
the "progress" which appears in the indices derived from national accounts.
Zusammetifassung:
Messung und Analyse des Dienstleistungssektors in
der europäischen Wirtschaftsgeschichte
Das westeuropäische Wirtschaftswachstum im 19. Jahrhundert ging mit einem Struk¬
turwandel einher. Bis 1914 stieg der Anteil des Bruttoinlandproduktes, der dem
Dienstleistungsbereich zuzuordnen ist, auf 25% bis 50% an, und der Anteil der im
Dienstleistungssektor Beschäftigten wuchs von ungefähr 11% im Jahre 1800 auf 21%
im Jahre 1900. Bei der fortschreitenden Arbeitsteilung im 19. Jahrhundert erhöhte
sich der Beschäftigtenanteil in verschiedenen Dienstleistungstätigkeiten, wobei die
verfügbaren Statistiken jedoch den Umfang der Dienstleistungsberufe in der Wirt¬
schaft unterschätzen. Weitere Verzerrungen treten auf, weil die Mehrheit der Be¬
schäftigten, die dem Dienstleistungsgewerbe zugeordnet wurden, tatsächlich keine
Dienstleistungen für den Endverbraucher erbrachte, sondern ihre Arbeitskraft an
Warenproduzenten verkaufte. Somit ist also ein großer Teil dessen, was die volks¬
wirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung als Dienstleistungen verbucht, tatsächlich Herstel¬
lung von Zwischenprodukten und folglich mit der Produktion von Primärgütern und
Industrieerzeugnissen eng verbunden. Für die Zeit von 1900 bis 1914 kann man den
Anteil der im Dienstleistungssektor Beschäftigten, die Zwischenprodukte herstellten,
in Großbritannien auf 48% schätzen, in Belgien auf 55%, in Frankreich auf 63% und
in Deutschland auf 64%.
Wirtschaftshistoriker, die sich mit dem Strukturwandel befassen, schließen aus
Zeitreihen und Querschnittsdaten auf eine Assoziation zwischen dem Niveau des
Pro-Kopf-Einkommens und erstens dem Anteil des Bruttoinlandsproduktes, das dem
Dienstleistungsbereich zuzuordnen ist, und zweitens dem Beschäftigtenanteil dieses
Sektors. Dem ist zweierlei entgegenzuhalten: Zum einen konnten keine stabilen Kor¬
relationen für das 19. Jahrhundert aufgestellt werden; zum anderen haben die vorlie¬
genden Schätzungen das langfristige Wachstum nicht in konstanten Preisen gemes¬
sen, zu denen die Dienstleistungen dem Endverbraucher verkauft wurden. Dieser In¬
dex hätte dann mit dem Wachstum des Bruttoinlandproduktes verglichen werden
müssen.
Vielmehr wurde diese Assoziation aus Schätzungen abgeleitet, die in laufenden
Preisen errechnet wurden. Das aber ist irreführend, denn man definiert diesen Out¬
put üblicherweise als die Summe der Faktoreinkommen, die aus diesen Dienstlei¬
stungen stammen. Der Beschäftigtenanteil des Dienstleistungssektors wurde aus fol¬
genden Angaben abgeleitet: Aus der Wachstumsrate der Warenproduktion, aus dem
Grad der Kommerzialisierung, der Urbanisierung und der Arbeitsteilung, aus dem
Umfang des Bevölkerungswachstums und aus der Binnenwanderung. Die Lohnsätze
im Dienstleistungsgewerbe dagegen wurden bestimmt durch die Produktivität in der
Landwirtschaft und in der Industrie, durch das Bevölkerungswachstum und durch
die Binnenwanderung (welche die Löhne der ungelernten Arbeiter niederdrückten)
sowie durch das unelastische Angebot von Facharbeitern und hochqualifizierten Be¬
schäftigten.
Der Beitrag entwickelt folgende Argumente:
1. Historiker haben das Wachstum der Dienstleistungen nicht in konstanten Preisen
gemessen, und es gibt keine gesicherte Korrelation zwischen dem Niveau des Pro¬
Kopf-Einkommens und dem Anteil der Dienstleistungen am Bruttoinlandpro-
dukt.
2. Wenn Dienstleistungen als die Summe der Faktoreinkommen, die in diesem Sek¬
tor verdient wurden, gemessen werden und man mit diesen Daten Trendentwick¬
lungen im Zeitverlauf oder das Pro-Kopf-Einkommen verschiedener Länder ver¬
gleichen will, so könnte das zu irreführenden Vorstellungen von den tatsächlichen
Änderungen des Lebensstandards im Zeitverlauf und im Ländervergleich in West¬
europa führen.
3. Nach der üblichen Meßmethode erbrachten Dienstleistungen im 19. Jahrhundert
einen großen und noch wachsenden Anteil am Volkseinkommen. Doch sind die
bisher verwendeten Daten fehlerhaft, verzerrt und mehrdeutig. Was wir mit unse¬
ren Zahlen bis jetzt aufspüren, ist nur teilweise ein zusätzlicher Beitrag zur Waren¬
produktion für den Endverbraucher und für dessen Wohlfahrt. Hauptsächlich
aber weisen die Zahlen lediglich die Verlagerung von bisher hauswirtschaftlich er¬
zeugten Gütern auf den Markt nach.
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Robert C. Allen
Recent Developments in Production, Cost, and Index Number
Theory, with an Application to International Differences in the
Cost and Efficiency of Steelmaking in 1907/9
I Introduction
In the middle of the nineteenth Century the British iron and steel industry was the
largest in the world and its exports dominated international markets. By the First
World War, the American and German industries produced considerably more steel
than the British and were major exporters. Britain, indeed, had become the world's
largest importer of iron and steel. The immediate cause of this reversal (at least the
reversal in international trade) was a change in relative production costs: in the mid¬
dle of the nineteenth Century British costs were lower than German or American
costs, but by 1913 the latter two industries produced more cheaply than Britain. This
paper is concerned with understanding why Germany and America produced steel
less expensively than Britain in the first decade of the twentieth Century.
In this paper it will be assumed that steel production exhibits constant returns to
scale so that long run average total cost is independent of the rate of production. In
that case, it is intuitively clear that differences in the prices of steelmaking inputs and
differences in the efficiency of production are the two factors that might account for
differences in unit costs. To explain the differences in international steelmaking costs
in the early twentieth Century, therefore, one must ascertain the relative importance
of efficiency differences and input price differences. (After this task is completed, the
analysis can go on to explain these differences themselves.) Recent work in duality
theory and the theory of index numbers provides the basis for this decomposition.
Since the problem is so common in economic history, we shall consider it thoroughly
both from a theoretical and a practical point of view. Then the theory will be applied
to the problem of ascertaining and decomposing relative production costs in Britain,
Germany and America at the time of their industrial censuses of 1907 and 1909.
// Productivity measurement and Cost Decomposition
There is no point developing theory independently ofthe data it will be applied to, so
we begin by specifying the data we intend to analyze. The data pertain to two firms
or industries (values for which are denoted by superscripts 0 and 1). The two indus¬
tries might be contemporaneous (i.e. the British and German steel industries in 1907)
or they might be the same industry or firm at two times (i.e. the German steel indus¬
try in 1870 and 1910). For each industry, the investigator observes Output, Q° and Q\
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the vectors of the quantities of the N inputs consumed, Z° = (Z?, ..., Z°) and
Z= (Zj, ..., Zj.), and the vectors of prices of those inputs w° = (w°, ..., wn) and
w1 = (w\ ..., wn). For instance, Q might be steel production in a year, the elements of
Z might be total man-hours worked, tons of iron ore smelted, tons of coke consumed,
etc., in the same year, and the corresponding elements of w would be the wage rate
per hour and the price per ton of ore and coke. Clearly, one can divide the total con¬
sumption of an input by the corresponding output rate, to determine unit input con¬
sumption :
xo_z°/Q0-(Z?/Q°,.... Z°n/Q°) = (x?,..., x°n) and
x1-ZVQ1 = (Zj/Q1, ..., Zj1/Q1) = (x], ..., xi). The data are specified in this way
since these are the sorts of data one might hope to obtain form two industrial cen¬
suses or from the income Statements of two firms.
One can directly compute unit production costs for the two industries,
n n
w°-x° = £ w? x? and w]-x]= £ w,1 x,1, and form their ratio w'-xVw^x0. This
1-1 1-1
number is relative production costs in the two cases. Our object is to work out how to
express w^x'/w0-*? as the product of two terms, one of which captures the effect on
costs of any differences in efficiency that might obtain between the two industries, and
the other of which encompasses the effect on costs ofany differences in the prices the two
industries (or firms) pay for their inputs. Only by Computing these two terms can we
talk clearly about the effect of efficiency differences and input price differences on
relative production costs.
It is simplest to start by considering the problem of measuring efficiency differ¬
ences. Economists usually define greater efficiency to be the "capacity to produce
more output from a given bündle of inputs" and that is the pertinent concept for the
problem at hand. We assume that the technologies of the two firms can be repre¬
sented by production functions and that the functions are identical up to a multipli-
cative coefficient: Q° = A°-f(Z°) and Q1 — A'-^Z1). f is assumed to be a linearly ho¬
mogeneous neoclassical production function. Since Q increases with A for an un-
changing Z, A indexes efficiency in the sense we are using it here. The problem of
measuring efficiency differences is, therefore, the problem of determining the relative
differences in A, i.e. ascertaining AVA°, from the quantities and prices ofthe inputs
and Outputs in the two situations. If f were known, AVA° could be imputed by direct
Substitution:
A1 QVQ°
A° f(Z!)/f(Z°)
l ]
In general, we do not know f so this straightforward calculation is not feasible. Later,
we shall see how different input quantity indices might be used to estimate f(Z*)/
f(Z°). At the moment, however, one might notice that the numerator of equation 1 is
relative output and the denominator is a ratio (mediated by 0 of relative inputs, so
the equation is a ratio of "total output" to "total input". We shall refer to ^Z1)/^0)
as the "true input quantity index" and to AVA° as the "true total factor productivity
index".
To decompose relative unit costs into efficiency and input price terms, one must
introduce further assumptions about the input markets and the behaviour of the
91
firms or industries. We shall assume that Z° and Z1 are available in perfectly elastic
supply at prices w° and w1. Further, we shall assume the industries minimize produc¬
tion costs given those input prices and their production functions. Minimized total
costs then depend on total production, input prices, the level of efficiency, and the
form of the function f. Since we are assuming constant returns to scale, we can speak
equally well of unit costs, which depend only on input prices, efficiency and f. More¬
over, since the efficiency term A was assumed to be multiplicatively separable in the
production function, the unit cost function, which shows how unit costs depend on
efficiency and input prices, has a particular form:
w°-x0 =^T (2a)
w'-x'-3£ (2b)
A
The functional form of c is determined by - in the Jargon is "dual to" - f. A repre¬
sents the impact of efficiency on unit costs. Since A is in the denominator, increases
in A lower costs. c(w) represents the inpact of input princes on costs. It can be shown
that c is increasing in w and linearly homogeneous as well, so that increases in input
prices raise costs and equiproportional increases in the prices of all inputs raise costs
in the same proportion.
By dividing equation 2 b by equation 2 a, we obtain an equation for decomposing
unit costs into efficiency and input price effects:
w^x1 A° c(w*)
(3)
w°.x° A1 c(w°)
The left side - relative unit costs - is observable. AVA1 is the term that indicates the
contribution of the difference in efficiency to the difference in costs. c(w1)/c(w°),
which is calied the "true input price index", represents the effect of input price dif¬
ferences on costs.
One can imagine proceeding in either of two ways: If c were known, c(w1)/c(w°)
could be computed directly, and then A°/A1 could be calculated by deflating relative
unit costs (the left side of equation 3) by the true input price index. Comparing A°/
A1 and c(w1)/c(w°) would then show the relative contributions of efficiency and in¬
put price differences on unit cost differences. Unfortunately, c is not known in gener¬
al, but we shall shortly show how to approximate the true input index by computable
price indices that allow the practical application of this procedure. Alternatively, of
course, one could compute ÄVA1 from equation 1 and proceed in a parallel manner
to the same end. Analagous index number problems still arise, however, as we have
already noted.
Before considering the Solution of these index number problems, we can give the
theory a geometric interpretation in terms of the Standard isoquant diagram. Since
we are assuming constant returns to scale, we can simplify the geometry by working
only with unit isoquants. Figure 1 shows these isoquants for the case of two inputs xt
and x2. The points x° = (x?, x°) and x1=(xj, xl) are the observed unit input vectors
for the two industries, and the unit isoquants are drawn through them. Since the pro-
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Note: ab and ef are parallel as are the two unit isoquants.
Figure 1: The Geometry of Cost Decomposition
duction functions are identical up to the multiplicative efficiency term A, the iso¬
quants are parallel, i.e. the isoquants have equal slopes for points that intersect the
same ray from the origin. It is assumed that x° and x1 are cost minimizing input com¬
binations so the slopes ofthe tangents to the isoquants at the points (lines ab and cd)
equal the prevaüing input price ratios. x° and x1 and the slopes of ab and cd are ob¬
servable. Point x2 is not observable. x2 is the input combination on the isoquant
through x° that would minimize costs at the input prices w1. (line segment ef is paral¬
lel to ab.) Since the isoquants are parallel, x2
x1.
The following identity is obviously true:
is on the same ray from the origin as
w^
w0-x°
wl w-x*
W -X W -X
(4)
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w°-x° is the unit cost of production for firm 0 at input prices w°, and w1 -x2 is the
unit production cost of the same firm at prices w1. Hence, by equation 2 a,
w0-x° = c(w0)/A° and w1-x2 = c(w1)/A°.
What ofthe term w^xVw'-x2? Since x1 and x2 are on the same ray through the
origin, x2 = Xx1 where X is a scalar. Substituting x2 = A,x* into w'-x'/w'-x2 yields
w^xVw^A-x^l/Ä,. But what is the meaning of XI It equals the true total factor pro¬
ductivity index. To see that, recall that x1 is on the unit isoquant for industry 1 so
l^A1*^1). x2 is, likewise, on the unit isoquant for industry 0; hence, l = A°-f(x2).
Equating these expressions and substituting x2=Xx* yields:
A1*f(x1) = A°.f(x2)
-A^fiV)
= XA°.f(x1)
since f is linearly homogeneous. Division gives the desired result:
A1
Making the substitutions w° • x° * c(w0)/A°, w1-x2-c(w1)/A°, and w^xV
w1-x2 = A°/A1, equation 4 becomes
w^x1 A° c(w')
w°-x°~ Arc(w°)
which is equation 3.
We can now interpret the terms of equation 3 in terms ofthe geometry of Figure 1.
Relative unit costs equals the product of two terms. The first term A°/A1, is the effi¬
ciency difference or the relative distance the two isoquants are from the origin. The
second term, c(w1)/c(w°), equals the impact on costs as one "slides along" an iso-
-
quant (i.e. adjusts the cost minimizing input mix) in response to differences in input
prices between industries 0 and 1.
To apply equation 3, i.e. to decompose relative units costs into efficiency and input
price terms, one must either ascertain f(Z*)/f(Z°) in equation 1 or c(w1)/c(w°) in
equation 3 or both. In practice, one uses input quantity and input price indices to ap¬
proximate these "true" indexes. There is a vast - indeed an infinite - number of in¬
dices one might use. Which should be chosen? Considerable progress has been made
by economists in recent years in solving this problem. A fundamental notion in this
work is that of "exactness". An input quantity index, for instance, is exact for a parti¬
cular production function f(Z), if the index number equals f^yfi^Z0). Similarly an
input price index is exact for a unit cost function c(w) if the index equals c(w1)/c(w°).
Perhaps the most obvious exactness relationship is that a geometric input index is ex¬
act for a Cobb-Douglas production function. Mathematical economists have worked
out the functions for which common index numbers are exact, and vice versa. Some
of these results are summarized in Table 1. The results are stated in terms of produc¬
tion functions and input quantity indices but analogous results are true for cost func¬
tions and input price indices. Notice that Paasche and Laspeyres indices are both ex¬
act for both Leontief and linear functions. Exactness relations are not unique. Exact¬
ness results have also been derived for a more general function that includes the
Törnqvist and square-root-quadratic functions as special cases. There are an infinite
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Table 1: Exactness Relationships
Production Function Corresponding Exact Index Number
Equation
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x 1
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ii
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ln f(Z) =a
0
+ Eo^ln Z
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1=1
'¦
üsü. ;f!ll'i
translog In f(Z) = Q + z a in Z
where Z a = 1. a = a
i=1
iJ J1
for all i,j and
f1 a » 0 for i = 1 N
Törnqyist f(z1i ¦ Kl (»x0 ? *>V
square-root-
quadratic
where a = a for all ij
Fisher ideal
f(z1) 1=1
i
_
"
1
l"
E w1 Z^
i=1
L x
r(z0)"
1=1 .i=1
1
'-
number of production functions and corresponding exact index numbers to choose
from. It must also be emphasized that these exactness relations only obtain if the
firms or industries concerned have minimized costs. In Table 1, the symbols s„ s,°,
and s,1 refer to the shares in cost of input i.
In his fundamental paper, "Exact and Superlative Index Numbers", Diewert1 has
suggested that one can discriminate among index numbers on the basis of the pro¬
duction and cost functions for which they are exact. Some functions (e.g. Cobb-Dou¬
glas and Leontief functions) can be shown to be first-order approximations to any
constant returns-to-scale production function whereas other functions (e.g. translog
and square-root-quadratic) can be shown to be second-order approximations to such
production functions. Since second-order functions would be expected to fit the data
better, Diewert urges that index numbers exact for such functions ought to be prefer-
red to index numbers exact for first-order functions. Diewert calls the index numbers
that are exact for second-order approximating functions "Superlative" index num¬
bers.
1. Diewert, W. E., Exact and Superlative Index Numbers, in: Journal of Econometrics, 4 (1976),
pp. 115-145.
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The Törnqvist and Fisher idea index numbers shown in Table 1 are Superlative.
Diewert has found that the dispersion among Superlative index numbers is generally
less than the dispersion among indexes exact for first order approximators when all
are evaluated for the same set of data.
In a more recent paper, Allen and Diewert2 have proposed another criterion for
solving the index number problem. The object of the index number, of course, is to
ascertain f^V^Z0) and c(w1)/c(w°). Since fand c are both linearly homogeneous, it
can be shown that they are bounded by Paasche and Laspeyres indices, irrespective
of the functional form of f or c. In other words, Paasche and Laspeyres input price
indices bound c(w1)/c(w°), and Paasche and Laspeyres input quantity indices bound
f(Zl)/f(Z°) so long as f exhibits constant returns to scale. This result is convenient if
the Paasche and Laspeyres indices are close together, for then one may closely bound
the cost decomposition without worrying further about the choice of an index num¬
ber. Provided either the input prices, w1 and w°, or the input quantities, Z1 and Z°, be
roughly proportional, the bounds will be tight and the problem of choosing an index
number satisfactorily finessed.
One is tempted to go somewhat further. The Fisher ideal index is a Superlative in¬
dex number and so favoured by Diewert's original criterion. Further, since it is the
geometric mean of the Paasche and Laspeyres indices, it always lies within those
bounds. No other Superlative index number has this property. Unless one had extrav-
eous information as the form of f or c, the Fisher ideal index might always be prefer-
red since it always satisfies both criteria.
777 Productivity and Steelmaking Costs, 1907/9
We shall now apply the theory developed in the last section to the problems of meas¬
uring productivity, input prices, and costs in the British, German and American steel
industries in the early twentieth Century.3
Equation 3 will be the fundamental tool. In the last section, it was suggested that
either AVA1 or c(w1)/c(w°) could be determined residually by dividing w1 «xVw0 • x°
by the other. In this section, we will use the equation differently. A°/A1 and c(w*)/
c(w°) will be estimated directly and w^xVw^x0 computed as their product.
First, the difference in total factor productivity (A°/A1) among the three countries
must be determined. Equation 1 is the relevant equation for this task. f will be as¬
sumed to be Cobb-Douglas so a geometric index of inputs will be used to compute
f(Zyf(Z°). In that case,
A1 Q7Q° " rQ,/x.r
AO" n rYl1S,
~ 11
i-i Lxt .1
1-1 Q°/x?J
(5)
2. Allen, R. C, and Diewert, W. E., Direct Versus Implicit Superlative Index Number Formulae,
in: Review of Economics and Statistics, 63 (1981).
3. The numbers discussed in this section were originally published in Allen, R. C, International
Competition in Iron and Steel, 1850-1913, in: Journal of Economic History, 39 (1979), pp.
911-937. Readers are referred to that paper for sources and elaboration.
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The right hand equality follows since the shares sum to 1. The difference in efficiency
(total factor productivity) is a weighted geometric average of the relative average
produets of the inputs (i.e. the various partial productivity indices). Notice that if the
average product of an input is the same in cases 0 and 1, the term for that input
equals one and, in that sense, disappears from the total factor productivity index.
In steelmaking, the four principal inputs were labour, capital, fuel, and metallic in¬
puts (mainly pig iron and scrap). 1907 and 1909 are the years chosen for the produc¬
tivity comparison because they were the years of industrial censuses in the three
countries. Unfortunately, as is often the case in historical work, the censuses were not
as complete as we would like or indeed presumed in the last section. Output and em¬
ployment were recorded for the three countries, as was installed horsepower, which
shall be used as a measure of the quantity of capital. The consumption of metallic in¬
puts and of fuel, however, was not consistently recorded. Elsewhere4 I have argued
that these inputs were consumed in technologically fixed proportions to output in the
early twentieth Century. That assumption will be adopted here, in which case, total
factor productivity will be measured as
A^
A°:
Q7L1
Q°/L°
QVK1
Q°/K°
(6)
where the shares are as indicated. Labour productivity was 47.5, 70.6 and 84.4 tons
per man-year in Britain, Germany and America, while capital productivity (measur¬
ing capital by installed horsepower) was 9.0, 14.6 and 7.8 tons per horsepower per
year, respectively. Taking the British values as case 0, Substitution into equation 6
shows both the German and American industries to have been 15% more efficient
than the British (i.e. AVA°= 1.15 for both the German-British and American-British
comparisons).
As equation 3 makes clear, the greater efficiency of the German and American in¬
dustries would tend to give them lower production costs than the British, but that ef¬
fect might either be attenuated or accentuated by the levels of input prices prevaüing
in the three countries. We explore that possibility by Computing an input price index
to estimate the true input price index in equation 3. It is convenient to distinguish
four inputs for this calculation - iron ore, fuel, scrap, and labour. The ratios of the
prices of these inputs in America to their prices in Britain in 1906-9 were .98, .73,
1.13 and 1.70 respectively. When we use a geometric input price index to aggregate
these price relatives we find that, on average, American input prices relative to Brit¬
ish were 9% higher (i.e. the index equals 1.09) in 1906-9. Comparing Britain and Ger¬
many in the years 1906-13, the relative prices ofthe inputs were .69, .88, .95 and .72 -
all were lower in Germany - and the input price index equals .83.
Equation 3 indicates that production costs in Germany relative to Britain can be
computed by multiplying the reciprocal of the German-British total factor productiv¬
ity index by the German-British input price index. Likewise for America. Table 2 dis-
plays the calculations. (Note that the reciprocal of the efficiency index equals
.87= 1/1.15.) German costs were 72% of British costs in the first decade of the twen¬
tieth Century. Germany's greater efficiency and lower input prices made approxi¬
mately equal contributions to her cost advantage. At the same time American costs
4. Allen, International Competition, pp. 919-920.
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Table 2: German and American Steelmaking Costs Relative to British
reciprocal of
relative cost = total factor
productivity index
1 1
W .X
0 0
w ¦ X
input price
index
n |" 11s.
n
w.
l
0
i
=1 w.
_
i
_
for German (l) - British (q) Comparison
.72 = .87 • 83
for American (l) - British (o) Comparison
.95 = .87 1.09
were 95% of British costs. America's costs were lower solely because of her greater ef¬
ficiency. In fact, American input prices exceeded British prices, mainly because the
American steel industry paid wages 70% higher than British wages. To put the matter
differently, the superior efficiency of the American industry allowed it to pay higher
wages and still produce at lower cost.
IV Conclusion
This paper has summarized recent developments in the theory of production and cost
functions, as well as in the theory of index numbers. This theory provides a powerful
set of tools to answer questions that have long concerned economic historians. These
methods were used to analyze the differences in the cost of producing steel in Ger¬
many, Britain and the United States in 1907 and 1909. It was found that the Ameri¬
can and German industries were each 15% more efficient than the British. Germany's
position in the world market was further enhanced by particularly low input prices,
while America's productivity advantage was somewhat offset by the high level of
wages prevaüing there.
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Zusammenfassung:
Neuere Entwicklung in der Produktions- und Kostentheorie
sowie in der Indexzifferntheorie und ihre Anwendung
auf internationale Kosten- und Leistungsunterschiede
bei der Stahlherstellung in den Jahren 1907 und 1909
Dieser Beitrag stellt neuere Entwicklungen in der Theorie der Produktions- und Ko¬
stenfunktionen sowie der Theorie der Indexziffern zusammenfassend dar. Die Index¬
zifferntheorie bietet das nötige Instrumentarium, um Probleme zu lösen, denen sich
Wirtschaftshistoriker schon lange gegenübersahen. Hier wurden diese Methoden an¬
gewendet, um die Kostenunterschiede bei der Stahlherstellung in Deutschland,
Großbritannien und in den Vereinigten Staaten in den Jahren 1907 und 1909 zu ana¬
lysieren. Dabei ergab sich, daß sowohl die amerikanische als auch die deutsche
Stahlindustrie um 15 Prozent effizienter produzierten als die britische. Darüber hin¬
aus vermochte Deutschland seine Position auf dem Weltmarkt noch durch besonders
niedrige Inputpreise zu verbessern, während Amerika seinen Produktivitätsvorteil
durch das dort vorherrschende hohe Lohnniveau ziemlich wieder einbüßte.
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Part 2: Empirical Studies
Angus Maddison
Measuring Long Term Growth and Productivity Change
on a Macro-economic Level
This note is intended as a comment on Patrick O'Brien's proposal for a cooperative
research effort to measure Performance of the West European economies. It has
three parts:
a) it summarises the findings of a study I recentiy finished on long term changes in
per capita income and productivity in sixteen advanced capitalist countries;
b) it makes some suggestions pertinent to further research by economic historians in
this area in which I stress the virtues of trying to make rather aggregative macro-eco¬
nomic measures for periods usually considered too remote for such treatment;
c) the annex provides long term estimates of GDP in 16 countries with source notes,
as an illustration of the wealth of material already available for Performance meas¬
urement on the macroeconomic level.
Findings
In my own recent work1 I have attempted to analyse the changes in the rhythm of
growth in capitalist countries since 1820, dividing the past 160 years into four phases,
each with significantly different economic Performance as measured by macro-eco¬
nomic indicators. I also made a rough comparison of the macro-economic Perform¬
ance ofthe "capitalist" epoch as a whole, since 1820, with characteristic Performance
in three preceding epochs in Western Europe's economic history, i.e. an epoch of
"agrarianism" from 500 to 1500 AD during which there were fluctuations but little
net growth in population and income; an epoch of "expanding agrarianism" from
1500 io 1700 during which population rose by half and real income per head by
about a quarter; and an epoch of "merchant capitalism" from 1700 to 1820 when
both population growth and real income per capita increased twice as fast as from
1500 to 1700.
Performance in the four epochs and four phases is summarised in table 1. It can be
seen that in all the four phases of "capitalist" development, macro-economic Per¬
formance has been very much better than in any of the previous epochs.
1. Maddison, A., Phases of Capitalist Development, Oxford 1982 (also in French, in 1981, Les
Phases du Developpement Capitaliste, Paris).
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Table 1: Performance Characteristics of Epochs and Phases
annual average Compound growth rates
Population
Epochs
500-1500 0.1
1500-1700 0.2
1700-1820 0.4
1820-1980 0.9
1820-1913 1.1
1913-1950 0.7
1950-1973 1.0
1973-1980 0.4
Phases
GDP per Head GE
0.0 0.1
0.1 0.3
0.2 0.6
1.6 2.5
1.2 2.3
1.2 1.9
3.8 4.9
2.0 2.5
Source: This table and the following ones are all derived from A. Maddison, Phases
of Capitalist Development, Oxford University Press, 1982 (available in French in 1981
Les Phases du Developpement Capitaliste, Economica, Paris).
For the periods before 1820, the quantitative evidence on growth is, of course, quite
weak, and it may seem foolhardy to advance quantitative assessments at all in such a
Situation. Nevertheless, given the fact that there are important differences of opinion
on Performance in e.g. the 1500-1700 period, even rough quantitative specification
of likely amplitudes helps to sharpen critical analysis of the evidence, and points to
areas where the evidence can be improved by further research. For 1500-1700, op-
posing schools of thought on Western per capita Performance are represented by
Kuznets and Landes on the one hand, Le Roy Ladurie and Abel on the other.2 My
own tentative view of Performance in this period (as represented in table 1) is a com¬
promise between the Kuznets and Le Roy Ladurie positions, but it is clearly possible
to improve on evidence by further research directed to the Performance of nation
states. One weakness of the distinguished work of French quantitative historians for
this period is that it is nearly all regional or oecumenic rather than national in
scope.
For the 1700-1820 period, more elaborate analyses of growth are available and the
best evidence on output trends in Western Performance is for France, the Nether¬
lands, and the U.K. I have relied heavily on the work of Phyllis Deane for the U.K.
2. Kuznets, S., Population Capital and Growth, London 1974, pp. 139 and 167 suggests a growth
rate of 0.2 per cent a year for per capita income in Europe from 1500 to 1750. Landes, D.S.,
The Unbound Prometheus, Cambridge 1969, p. 14 suggests that from the year 1000 to the
eighteenth Century European real income per head may have tripled. Le Roy Ladurie, E., Les
Paysans de Languedoc, Paris 1966 suggests stagnant income from 1500 to 1700. Abel, W.,
Agrarkrisen und Agrarkonjunktur, Hamburg 1978, pp. 285-9 suggests a per capita decline in
this period.
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and Jan Marczewski for France.3 For the Netherlands, which was still the economic
leader for most of this periods, there is a good deal of evidence on economic Per¬
formance which has yet to be recast systematicaUy in national accounting terms.4
There is rather little early evidence on working hours, activity rates or unemploy¬
ment, so estimates of GDP per man hour are more shaky than those for GDP per
head of population. However, if one relies on the reasoning of Esther Boserup5 about
the likelihood of increased labour effort as a source of increase in agricultural output
in the early stages of accelerated growth, it seems quite unlikely that in the pre-capi¬
talist epochs labour productivity grew faster than output per capita. If anything it
was likely to have grown more slowly.
Within the "capitalist" period since 1820, my estimates of labour productivity gen¬
erally start only in 1870, but since then average working hours have fallen by roughly
half, from around 3,000 to 1,600 a year, so it is clear that labour productivity has in¬
creased faster in the "capitalist" epoch than per capita GDP—probably around 20
fold from 1820 to 1980 compared with a 13 fold increase in per capita GDP.
Table 2: Growth of Output (GDP at Constant Prices) per Head
of Population 1700-1979
annual average Compound growth rates
to
1700 1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 1820
1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 1979 1979
Australia n.a. 0.6 0.7 2.5 1.3 n.a.
Austria 0.7 1.5 0.2 5.0 3.1 1.5
Belgium 1.9 1.0 0.7 3.6 2.1 1.7
Canada n.a. 2.0 1.3 3.0 2.1 n.a.
Denmark 0.9 1.6 1.5 3.3 1.8 1.6
Finland n.a. 1.7 1.7 4.2 2.0 n.a.
France 0.3a 1.0 1.5 1.0 4.1 2.6 1.6
Germany 1.1 1.6 0.7 5.0 2.6 1.8
Italy n.a. 0.8 0.7 4.8 2.0 n.a.
Japan 0.0 1.5 0.5 8.4 3.0 1.8
Netherlands -0.1 1.5 0.9 1.1 3.5 1.7 1.5
Norway 1.0 1.3 2.1 3.1 3.9 1.8
Sweden 0.6 2.1 2.2 3.1 1.5 1.8
Switzerland 1.7 1.2 1.5 3.1 -0.2 1.6
U.K. 0.4 1.5 1.0 0.9 2.5 1.3 1.4
U.S.A. 1.4 2.0 1.6 2.2 1.9 1.8
Arithmetic Average 0.2 1.1 1.4 1.2 3.8 2.0 1.6
a) 1701/10-1820
3. See their work cited in the annex. 4. See the annex.
5. See Boserup, E., The Conditions of Agricultural Growth, London 1965, for a major contribu¬
tion to anti-Malthusian analysis of growth processes and productivity.
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Table 3: Growth of Output (GDP at Constant Prices) 1700-1979
annual average Compound growth rates
to
1700 1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 1820
1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 1979 1979
Australia n.a. 3.2 2.1 4.7 2.5 n.a.
Austria (1.4) 2.4 0.2 5.4 3.1 2.0
Belgium 2.7 2.0 1.0 4.1 2.3 2.3
Canada n.a. 3.8 2.9 5.2 3.2 n.a.
Denmark 1.9 2.7 2.5 4.0 2.1 2.6
Finland n.a. 3.0 2.4 4.9 2.3 n.a.
France 0.6a 1.4 1.7 1.0 5.1 3.0 2.0
Germany 2.0 2.8 1.3 6.0 2.4 2.6
Italy n.a. 1.5 1.4 5.5 2.6 n.a.
Japan (0.4) 2.5 1.8 9.7 4.1 2.7
Netherlands 0.1 2.4 2.1 2.4 4.8 2.4 2.7
Norway (2.2) 2.1 2.9 4.0 4.4 2.7
Sweden (1.6) 2.8 2.8 3.8 1.8 2.5
Switzerland (2.5) 2.1 2.0 4.5 -0.4 2.4
U.K. 1.1 2.4 1.9 1.3 3.0 1.3 2.0
U.S.A. 4.4 4.1 2.8 3.7 2.7 3.8
Arithmetic Average 0.6 2.1 2.5 1.9 4.9 2.5 2.5
a) 1701-10 to 1820. The figures are adjusted to exclude the impact of boundary
changes.
One of the objectives of my study was to examine the Schumpeterian literature on
the dynamics of capitalist development, but I reject Schumpeter's theories about reg¬
ulär long term rhythms and waves of innovation in favour of more ad hoc explana¬
tions of changes in momentum which in my view are due to factors such as wars,
changes in economic policy, and in the productivity gaps between the successive lead
countries (the U.K. and the U.S.A.) and the follower countries. I also argue that the
pace of technical progress has been much smoother than Schumpeter suggested.
Another conclusion I reach is that the Rostow-Gerschenkron thesis of staggered
take-offs into capitalist type growth in the nineteenth Century is in conflict with the
evidence we have, and that all the sixteen countries I examined (except Japan and
possibly Italy) probably maintained a significant growth rhythm from 1820 onwards.
This conclusion is based largely on the GDP and GDP per capita evidence in tables 2
and 3 but is also buttressed by the evidence on foreign trade growth.
My productivity estimates are in terms of labour, rather than total factor produc¬
tivity. Estimates of the latter are now feasible, because measures of growth in capital
stock are available for the seven biggest countries over rather long periods, using ex¬
isting national estimates, of which those of Feinstein for the U.K. have the longest
coverage. Apart from major theoretical problems in finding appropriate weights for
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total factor productivity indices, there are obvious pitfalls in their use in historical
analysis as revealed in McCIoskey's comparison ofthe British and U.S. iron and steel
industry which finds little difference in the Performance ofthe two countries in terms
of total factor productivity.6 This tends to conceal the fact that U.S. labour produc¬
tivity grew faster than that ofthe U.K. because its investment effort was bigger.
Table 4: GDP per Man Hour in 1970 U.S. Relative Prices ($)
France Germany Japan Netherlands U.K. U.S.A.
1700 0.35
1785 0.33 0.32
1820 n.a. 0.38
1870 0.42 0.43 0.17 0.74 0.80 0.70
1890 0.58 0.62 0.24 0.97 1.06 1.06
1913 0.90 0.95 0.37 1.23 1.35 1.67
1929 1.31 1.19 0.64 1.82 1.70 2.45
1950 1.85 1.40 0.59 2.27 2.40 4.25
1960 2.87 2.72 1.03 3.17 2.99 5.41
1973 5.80 5.40 3.49 6.17 4.84 7.60
1979 7.11 6.93 4.39 7.48 5.48 8.28
Table 5: Gross Non-Residential Fixed Capital Stock per Person
Employed 1820-1978
(Dollars of 1970 U.S. purchasing power)
1820 1870 1890 1913 1950 1973 1978
Canada n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 16.279 29.760 33.553
France n.a. n.a. n.a. 6.481 10.346 23.653 28.800
Germany n.a. 3.597 5.311 7.888 9.386 26.733 34.877
Italy n.a. n.a. 2.059 3.150 6.151 16.813 20.178
Japan n.a. n.a. .713 1.178 2.873 14.172 20.103
U.K. 3.922 6.068 6.658 7.999 9.204 17.718 20.931
U.S.A. n.a. 5.066 6.838 13.147 18.485 30.243 32.001
Research Strategy in Measuring Productivity and Growth Trends
There is, of course, a huge literature on problems of growth analysis, and some of
6. See McCIoskey, D. N., Economic Maturity and Entrepreneurial Decline, British Iron and Steel
1870-1913, Harvard 1973.
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these e.g. index number problems, have been pretty exhaustively diagnosed. I confine
myself to four points which are relevant to the type of comparative research effort
which Patrick O'Brien has been advocating.
a) Use ofa National Accounts Framework
My first recommendation is to anchor analysis of growth trends in aggregates which
measure total economic activity. The economic significance of GDP or GNP as a
measure of economic Performance is clearer than that of partial measures such as ag¬
ricultural or industrial output, or indicators for individual commodities, which ear¬
lier growth analysts were forced to use. The fact that aggregate activity can be cros-
schecked in several dimensions e. g. as a sum of expenditures, of incomes, or of Out¬
put is also of major help. Estimates of these aggregates are now available for many
countries back into the nineteenth Century, and can be pushed back further. A con-
certed effort for a number of countries will throw up many hints of how data gaps
can be filled. It is now about twenty years since Kuznets and Abramovitz launched a
cooperative research effort of this type which led to production of Malinvaud's study
on France, Fua's on Italy, Ohkawa and Rosovsky on Japan, and the forthcoming
Matthews' study on the U.K.7 What I am suggesting is another round of this type but
pushed back to 1820.
There are, of course, problems in measuring output for the whole economy, but
this is true for partial measures too. The logic ofthe national accounts aggregates has
been explored in a highly sophisticated way over the past 40 years, and I think the lit¬
erature already provides negative answers to some ofthe arguments of O'Brien and
Keyder in favour of excluding Services from the aggregates to be studied.8
I am not suggesting that partial measures are not worth using in growth analysis,
but there has been a rather marked tendency in the past for users of partial measures
to claim that they can thereby discern movements in aggregate economic activity.
This temptation is much weaker if an articulate national accounting framework is
used.
b) Measure Levels as Well as Growth
A second point worth stressing in productivity or growth analysis is the great value of
benchmark estimates which make it possible to compare levels of Performance be¬
tween countries as well as their growth rates. Here O'Brien and Keyder are on the
right path in their U.K./French comparisons, but the whole business of international
comparisons has been greatly facüiated over the past thirty years by the work of
Irving Kravis.9 This work is another firm anchor for international comparisons
which should be exploited wherever possible in long run analysis of productivity
trends.
7. These studies are all cited in the annex, except Matthews, R. C. O., Feinstein, C, and Odling-
Smee, J., British Economic Growth, Stanford, forthcoming.
8. See O'Brien, P., and Keyder, C, Economic Growth in Britain and France 1780-1914, London,
1978, pp. 28-32.
9. See Kravis, I. B., Heston, A., and Summers, R., International Comparisons ofReal Product and
Purchasing Power, Baltimore and London 1978.
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c) Appropriate Periodicity
A third important problem in such studies is getting the most appropriate periodicity
for the analysis or comparison. Getting this right usually involves a good deal of iter¬
ative testing. But there are some traps to be avoided. One is to neglect the economic
history of war years. This has been the practice in several distinguished studies of
long term growth, e.g. Hoffmann's study on German growth. But if we compare
peacetime growth in Germany and another country with a totally different war ex¬
perience, judgements on the causes for differential peacetime Performance can be
heavily distorted. Another trap is to compare the growth Performance of one country
with that of another at a different period when they are alleged to have experienced
similar "stages of growth". This type of comparison must be handled very carefully
because the technological options of countries are different at different times, and
the lead country- follower country gap may also be very different.
d) Identifiable National Aggregates
Finally, I would stress that in spite of changes in boundaries, it is worth trying to
frame quantitative analysis of European progress over the past two centuries in terms
of national units. In the case of GDP or population it is probably possible to do this.
For individual sectors of the economy this is more difficult, and for foreign trade it
may be very difficult for periods when the customs boundaries were changed. These
problems are perhaps most important for Germany, and are not very satisfactorily
handled in Hoffmann's basic study. But the problem arises in several other countries
to an important degree, e.g. there is the problem of Ireland whose pace and level of
development was different from that in the rest of the U.K. economy in the nine¬
teenth Century. But this point is often neglected in international comparisons and
may lead to error.
Zusammenfassung:
Die Messung von langfristigem Wirtschaftswachstum und Produktivitäts¬
änderungen auf makroökonomischer Ebene
Mit diesem Beitrag soll ein Kommentar zu Patrick O'Briens Vorschlag geliefert wer¬
den, in einem kooperativen Forschungsvorhaben die wirtschaftliche Leistung westeu¬
ropäischer Länder zu messen. Die Arbeit gliedert sich in drei Teile:
a) zunächst werden die Ergebnisse meiner kürzlich fertiggestellten Studie über die
langfristigen Änderungen des Pro-Kopf-Einkommens und der Produktivität in
sechzehn fortgeschritten kapitalistischen Ländern zusammengefaßt;
b) sodann werden Wirtschaftshistorikern, die weitere Forschung auf diesem Gebiet
betreiben, einige Vorschläge gemacht. Vor allem wird dabei betont, wie sinnvoll
es ist, makroökonomische Messungen auf ziemlich hohem Aggregationsniveau
selbst für die Zeiträume durchzuführen, die wegen ihrer zeitlichen Distanz dieser
Methode nicht zugänglich sein sollen;
c) in einem Anhang sind langfristige Schätzungen des Bruttoinlandsproduktes
(Gross Domestic Product) von sechzehn Ländern aufgeführt. Die Quellenhin¬
weise dazu belegen, wie reichhaltig schon jetzt Material über die Messung wirt¬
schaftlicher Leistung auf makroökonomischer Ebene zur Verfügung steht.
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Table 6: Movement in G.D.P. 1700-1849a
1913 = 100
11.3) 12.6 24.2
13.2 26.1
13.4 25.1
13.4 26.5
13.8 27.6
13.9 26.6
14.1 27.2
14.5 27.8
14.7 28.0
14.4 28.7
14.527.214.427.514.830.114.7
30.4
15.530.015.431.815.431.215.832.615.9
33.0
16.1
30.4
16.634.716.635.116.734.917.6
35.4
18.537.522.519.036.023.619.435.223.719.340.524.420.3
38.4
21.539.9
:.5lb 11.20 3.91
i.52 10.50 5.52
9.13
10.93
L2 (11.2) 12.56 13.8 2.03
Austria Belgium Denmark France Germany Netherlands U.K. U.S.A.
1700
1760
1800
1810
1820
1821
1822
1823
1824
1825
1826
1827
1828
1829
1830 21.1
14.527.2
18.8
1831
14.427.5
14.6 19.7
1832
14.830.1
19.5
1833
14.7
30.4 19.7
1834
15.530.0
20.5
1835
15.431.8
21.6
1836
15.431.2
22.4
1837
15.832.6
22.1
1838
15.9
33.0 23.3
1839
16.1
30.4 24.4
1840 24.0
16.634.7
23.7 5.07
1841
16.635.1
23.2
1842
16.734.9
22.7
1843
17.6
35.4 23.1
1844
18.537.5
24.5
1845
22.519.036.0
25.8
1846
23.619.435.2
27.5
1847
23.719.340.5
27.7
1848
24.420.3
38.4 28.0
1849
21.539.9
28.5
a) Estimates adjusted as far as possible to exclude the impact of frontier changes. Fi¬
gures in brackets derived by interpolation or extrapolation.
b) 1701-10.
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Table 8 (Fortsetzung)
1913 = 100
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany
1907 80.0 91.4 89.2 70.4 82.9 82.6 85.5 82.5
1908 78.3 91.8 90.1 73.4 85.5 82.4 86.8 83.9
1909 82.1 91.5 91.8 81.7 88.8 83.0 88.2 85.6
1910 88.2 92.8 94.2 83.3 91.5 85.3 88.2 88.7
1911 91.3 95.7 96.4 90.5 96.4 88.7 92.1 91.7
1912 95.1 100.5 98.7 92.2 96.4 96.1 100.0 95.7
a) estimates adjusted to exclude the impact of frontier changes.
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Table 8 (Fortsetzung)
1913 = 100
Italy Japan Netherlands Norway Sweden Switzerland U.K. U.S.A.
87.1 88.2 87.1 80,1 83.1 91.1 85.5
87.0 88.8 86.9 82.7 83.4 87.4 78.5
92.4 88.7 89.7 84.9 83.6 89.4 88.1
87.7 90.2 89.3 87.9 88.8 92.2 89.0
93.1 95.0 91.6 90.6 92.6 94.9 91.9
95.3 98.6 98.6 94.7 96.1 96.3 96.2
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Annex
The annex indicates the sources I used to measure GDP growth. It is intended to pro¬
vide some indication of the wealth of the present literature in this field, and of the
gaps that remain to be filled.
Australia: 1861-1901, GDP from N. G. Butlin, Australian Domestic Product, Invest¬
ment and Foreign Borrowing 1861-1938/39, Cambridge 1962, pp. 33-4. 1901-51,
GDP at 1966/67 prices from M. W, Butlin, A Preliminary Annual Database 1900/01
to 1973/74, Discussion Paper 7701, Reserve Bank of Australia, May 1977. All figures
adjusted to a calendar year basis.
Austria: 1830-1913 from A. Kausei, Österreichs Volkseinkommen 1830 bis 1913, in:
Geschichte und Ergebnisse der zentralen amtlichen Statistik in Österreich 1829-1979,
Beiträge zur österreichischen Statistik, Heft 550, 1979. 1913-50 gross national pro¬
duct from A. Kausei, N. Nemeth and H. Seidel, Österreichs Volkseinkommen, 1913-
63, in: Monatsberichte des Österreichischen Institutes für Wirtschaftsforschung, 14th
Sonderheft, Vienna, August 1965. 1937-45 from F. Butschek, Die Österreichische
Wirtschaft 1938 bis 1945, Stuttgart, 1979, p. 65. The figures are corrected for territo¬
rial change which has been large (in 1911-13 present day Austria represented only
37.4 per cent ofthe total output ofthe Austrian part ofthe Austro-Hungarian Empi¬
re). They refer to the product generated within the present boundaries of Austria.
Belgium: 1846-1913 gross domestic product derived from movements in agricultural
and industrial output from J. Gadisseur, Contribution ä l'Etude de la Production Agri-
cole en Belgique de 1846 ä 1913, in: Revue Beige d'Histoire Contemporaine, IV
(1973), 1-2, and service output which was assumed to move with employment in Ser¬
vices (derived for census years from P. Bairoch, La Population Active et sa Structure,
Brüssels 1968, pp. 87-88). 1913 weights derived from Carbonnelle. 1913-50 gross do¬
mestic product estimates derived from C. Carbonnelle, Recherches Sur TEvolution de
la Production en Belgique de 1900 ä 1957, in: Cahiers Economiques de Bruxelles, No.
3, April 1959, p. 353. Carbonnelle gives G.D.P. figures for only a few benchmark ye¬
ars but gives a commodity production series for many more years. Interpolations
were made for the service sector to arrive at a figure for G.D.P. for all the years for
which Carbonnelle shows total commodity production. Figures corrected to exclude
the effect of the cession by Germany of Eupen and Malmedy in 1925, which added
0.81 per cent to population and was assumed to have added the same proportion to
output.
Canada: Gross national product (expenditure) from O. J. Firestone, Canada's Eco¬
nomic Development 1867-1953, London 1958, p. 276 for 1867-1926; 1926 to 1950
from National Income and Expenditure Accounts 1926-1974, Vol. I, Statistics Canada,
1976. Figures adjusted to offset the acquisition of Newfoundland in 1949 which ad¬
ded 1.3 per cent to G.N.P. and 2.6 to population.
Denmark: 1820-1950 G.D.P. at factor cost (1929 prices) from S. A. Hansen, Okono-
misk vaekst i Danmark, Vol. II, Institute of Economic History, Copenhagen 1974, pp.
229-32 (figures from 1921 onwards adjusted to offset the acquisition of North Schles¬
wig, which added 5.3 per cent to the population, and 4.5 per cent to G.D.P.).
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Finland: 1860-1950 GDP from O. E. Niitamo, National Accounting and National
Statistical Service on the Threshold ofthe 1980's, in: Finnish Journal of Business Eco¬
nomics, I, (1980).
France: For the eighteenth Century J. Marczewski has presented rough estimates of
economic growth based partly on the work of his colleague J. C. Toutain, who
showed a 60 per cent increase in agricultural output between the first and eighth de¬
cade. Toutain's estimates have been criticised by M. Morineau, Les Faux-Semblants
d'un Demarrage Economique, Paris 1971 who rejects all evidence of French progress
rather in the style of a prosecution attorney. E. Le Roy Ladurie presents a more bal¬
anced criticism and also presents an alternative estimate to Toutain which I have
used. The sources to 1820 were therefore: 1701-10 to 1820 movement in industry and
1781-90 to 1820 movement in agriculture from J. Marczewski, Some Aspects of the
Economic Growth of France, 1660-1958, in: Economic Development and Cultural
Change, April 1961, p. 375; 1701-10 to 1781-90 agricultural output increase assumed
to be 32.5 per cent, the mid point of the ränge suggested by E. Le Roy Ladurie, Le
Territoire de VHistorien, Vol. I, Paris 1973, p. 279. 1701-10 to 1781-90 output in Ser¬
vices assumed to move parallel with population. 1781-90 to 1820 output in Services
from J. Marczewski, The Take-OffHypothesis and French Experience, in: W. W. Ros¬
tow (ed.), The Economics ofthe Take-Off into Sustained Growth, New York 1965, p.
136. 1820-96 gross domestic product derived from separate indicators of industrial,
agricultural, building, and service Output. Industrial production, agriculture and
building from M. Levy-Leboyer, La Croissance Economique en France au XIXe Siecle,
in: Annales, July-August 1968, p. 802 bis. Service Output interpolated from J. Marc¬
zewski, Take-Off, p. 136. 1896-1950 GDP and 1896 sector weights from J. J. Carre, P.
Dubois and E. Malinvaud, La Croissance Frangaise, Paris 1972, pp. 35 and 637. Inter¬
polation between 1913 and 1920 based on figures for industrial and agricultural Out¬
put shown in J. Dessirier, Indices Compares de la Production Industrielle et Production
Agricole en Divers Pays de 1870 a 1928, in: Bulletin de la Statistique Generale de la
France, Etudes Speciales, October-December 1928; service output was assumed sta¬
ble in this period, and weights for the three sectors were derived from Carre, Dubois
and Malinvaud, Croissance. Interpolation between 1939 and 1946 was based on A.
Sauvy's report on national income to the Conseil Economique, Journal Offtciel, 7th
April, 1954. (Sauvy's estimates for this period seem reasonable when checked against
estimates of wartime agricultural and industrial output. See M. Cepede, Agriculture et
Alimentation en France Durant la Ile Guerre Mondiale, Paris 1961 and Annuaire de
Statistique Industrielle 1938-1947, Ministere de TIndustrie et du Commerce, Paris,
1948.) The figures from 1918 onwards were adjusted downwards by 4.6 per cent to
offset the impact ofthe return of Alsace Lorraine, figures for 1861-70 multiplied by
95.92 to offset for inclusion of Alsace Lorraine, and 1860 and earlier by 97.65 to off¬
set both the impact of acquisition of Nice and Savoy in 1861 and the Alsace-Lorraine
component.
Germany: 1816-50 GDP estimated from Prussian data in R. H. Tilly, Capital Forma¬
tion in Germany in the Nineteenth Century, in: P. Mathias and M. M. Postan (eds.),
Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Vol. VII, Part I, pp. 395, 420 and 441. Us¬
ing 1850 weights for agriculture, industry and Services from Hoffmann, p. 454, Prus-
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sian per capita output in agriculture and industry were multiplied by population in
Germany as a whole. Output in Services was assumed to move with population.
1850-1925 net domestic product (value added by industry) at factor cost from W. G.
Hoffmann, F. Grumbach and H. Hesse, Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft seit
der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, Berlin 1965, pp. 454-5. This source gives no figures
for 1914-24, but Starts again in 1925. The pattern of movement in individual years
1914-24 was derived from annual indices of industrial and agricultural output in
Dessirier, using Hoffmann's weights for these sectors and adjusting them to fit his
sectoral output benchmarks for 1913 and 1925. Service output was interpolated be¬
tween Hoffmann's 1913 and 1925 figures for this sector. 1925-39 GDP from Bevölke¬
rung und Wirtschaft 1872-1972, Statistical Office, Wiesbaden 1972, p. 250. 1939-44
GNP from E. F. Denison and W. C. Haraldson, The Gross National Product of Ger¬
many 1936-1944, Special Paper 1 (mimeographed), in: J. K. Galbraith (ed.), The Ef¬
fects of Strategie Bombing on the German War Economy, U.S. Strategie Bombing
Survey 1945. 1946 from Wirtschaftsproblemen der Besatzungszonen, Berlin 1948,
p. 135; 1945 was assumed to lie midway between 1944 and 1946. 1947-50 from Statis¬
tics of National Product and Expenditure No. 2, 1938 and 1947 to 1955, O.E.E.C,
Paris 1957, p. 63. The estimates are fully corrected for territorial change which
was extremely complicated in Germany. It can be summarised in simplified form
as follows (in terms of ratio of old to new territory 1870 96.15 per cent; 1918 108.39
per cent; 1946 155.35 per cent. (See A. Maddison, Phases of Capitalist Develop¬
ment, in: Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, June 1977, p. 133-4 for füll
detail.)
Italy: 1861-1950 gross domestic product at 1938 prices from P. Ercolani, Documen-
tazione statistica di base, in: G. Fua (ed.), La Sviluppo Economico in Italia, vol. III,
pp. 410-12, Milan 1975. The figures refer to Output in the present territory of Italy
("confini attuali", see p. 388). Figures in an earlier official study, Annali di Statistica,
Serie VIII, vol. 9, Instituto Centrale di Statistica, Rome 1957 show a gain in output
due to territorial change of 3.2 per cent after the first world war and a loss of 1.5 per
cent after the second world war (corresponding population changes were a gain of
4.1 per cent and a loss of 1.4 per cent respectively).
Japan: 1885-1930, gross domestic product at 1934-36 prices from K. Ohkawa, N.
Takamatsu and Y. Yamamoto, National Income, Vol. I of Estimates of Long-Term
Economic Statistics o Japan since 1868, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, Tokyo 1974, p. 227.
Rough estimate for 1870 was derived by assuming that per capita product rose by 1
per cent a year from 1870 to 1885. This is smaller than the later period, but 1870-85
saw major upheavals in which economic growth was probably slow. 1930-42, gross
national product at 1934-36 prices from National Income White Paper (in Japanese),
1963 edition, p. 178 adjusted (from 1946 to a calendar year basis. 1952 onwards from
National Accounts of OECD Countries 1950-78, Vol. I, pp. 28-9. In the above
sources, Okinawa is included up to 1945, and excluded from 1946 to 1972. An up¬
ward adjustment of 0.66 per cent was made for 1946 to offset the impact of territorial
change, and 1973 was adjusted down by 0.92 per cent of offset the impact of Okina-
wa's return.
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Netherlands: For 1700 it was assumed that Dutch GDP per head was a little more
than 50 per cent higher than that ofthe U.K. This rough assumption is based on com¬
parative evidence of economic structure and relative levels of international trade, in¬
vestment and government finance in the two countries as shown mainly in Jan de
Vries, The Dutch Rural Economy in the Golden Age, 1500-1700, Yale 1974, and P.
Deane and W. A. Cole, British Economic Growth 1688-1959, Cambridge 1964. In
1700 about two thirds ofthe U.K. labour force was in agriculture, and in the Nether¬
lands the proportion was about one third. I assume productivity was higher in indus¬
try and Services than in agriculture in both countries and the evidence suggests
strongly that Dutch productivity was higher in each sector. Dutch agriculture was
more specialised with a large internal trade carried by canal, exports of dairy prod¬
uets, a quarter of its grain was imported from Eastern Europe and cattle were im-
ported on a large scale from Denmark. Its industry was highly diversified with a
great deal of international trade, and the Dutch performing sophisticated finishing
processes (bleaching, printing, dyeing) for English woollens and German linens. Ac¬
tivity in international banking, insurance, shipping, warehousing was on a much
larger scale per capita than in the U.K. At the end of the seventeenth Century the
Dutch merchant fleet was about 50 per cent larger than the British but population
was a fifth ofthat in the U.K. (See R. Davis, The Rise ofthe English Shipping Indus-
triy, London 1962, p. 27 for the size of British fleets and W. Vogel, Zur Grösse der eu¬
ropäischen Handelsflotten im 15., 16. und 17. Jahrhundert, in: Festschrift D. Schäfer,
Forschungen und Versuche zur Geschichte des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit, Jena,
1915, p. 331, for Dutch shipping.) Gregory King estimated Dutch per capita income
as only 4 per cent higher than that of England in 1695 (see G. E. Barnett, Two Tracts
by Gregory King, Baltimore 1936, p. 55) but he overestimated Dutch population by
18 per cent. Assuming that this error was independent of his output estimate (which
is not clear) this would raise King's differential to about 23 per cent in favour ofthe
Netherlands as against England. Our own estimates for the U.K. (see below) imply
that U.K. per capita income in 1700 was about 4.5 per cent lower than that in Eng¬
land and Wales. Adjusting King again for this would produce a differential of 29 per
cent in favour ofthe Netherlands as against the U.K. However, King estimates Eng¬
lish consumption levels to be one third higher than the Netherlands (even after ad¬
justing for his population error). This seems implausible. Hence, the evidence of Gre¬
gory King, though it points to a lower Dutch advantage than I suggest is not too per-
suasive. (H. C. Bos, Economic Growth ofthe Netherlands, IARIW Portoroz 1959 (mi¬
meographed) presented a rough estimate of Dutch per capita income in 1688 com¬
pared with 1910 which is not different from my estimate, though the approach is
quite different.)
In the eighteenth Century the Dutch economy stagnated. The process is described
in detail without any aggregate quantification by Johan de Vries, De economische
Achteruitgang der Republiek in de Achttiende Eeuw, Leiden 1968. From 1700 to 1760 I
have assumed that Dutch per capita GDP feil by 10 per cent and then stagnated. Per
capita GNP probably did not decline because of the increase in foreign investment
and the receipts from it. These receipts, and GDP, were quite adversely affected dur¬
ing the Napoleonic wars and French occupation. I have not made any direct estimate
of 1820-70 growth, but this emerges as a by-produet from the above and from esti¬
mates backcast from 1970 to 1870 from the following sources. 1870-1900 GDP from
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S. Kuznets, Economic Growth of Nations, Harvard 1971, pp. 12 and 16. 1900-17,
1921-39, and 1948-50 net domestic product and 1917-20 national income at constant
market prices derived from 1899-1959 Zestig Jaren Statistiek in Tijdreeksen, Centraal
Bureau voor de Statistiek, Zeist 1959, p. 102. 1939-47 real product in international
units interpolated from C. Clark, Conditions of Economic Progress, 3rd ed., London
1957, p. 166-7.
Norway: Gross domestic product at market prices. 1865-1950 from National Ac¬
counts 1865-1960, Central Bureau of Statistics, Oslo 1965, pp. 348-59 (gross fixed in¬
vestment was adjusted downwards by a third to eliminate repairs and maintenance).
1939-44 movement in national income (exluding shipping and whaling Operations
carried out from Allied bases 1940-44) from O. Aukrust and P. J. Bjerve, Hva Krigen
Kostet Norge, Oslo 1945, p. 45. 1945 assumed to be midway between 1944 and 1946.
Sweden: 1861-1950 gross domestic-product from O. Krantz and C. A. Nilsson, Swe¬
dish National Product 1861-1970: New Aspects on Methods and Measurement, Kris-
tianstad 1975, p. 171.
Switzerland: 1890-1944 real product in international units from C. Clark, Conditions
ofEconomic Progress, 3rd edition, London 1957, pp. 188-9. The link 1938-48 is from
Europe and the World Economy, OEEC, Paris 1960. 1948-76 from Series Revisees de
la Comptabilite Nationale Suisse 1948-1970, Federal Statistical Office, Berne 1977,
pp. 26-7. The rough estimate for 1870 was derived by backward extrapolation ofthe
1890-1913 movement in output per head. There is a graphical indication of the
growth of Swiss real product in F. Kneschaurek, Probleme der langfristigen Markt¬
prognose, in: Aussenwirtschaft, December 1959, p. 336 for 1900-65. This shows faster
growth than C. Clark to 1938. U. Zwingli and E. Ducret, Das Sozialprodukt als Wert¬
messer des langfristigen Wirtschaftswachstums, in: Schweizerische Zeitschrift für
Volkswirtschaft und Statistik, March-June 1964, shows slower growth for 1910-38
than C. Clark.
U.K.: 1700-1800 England and Wales from P. Deane and W. A. Cole, British Eco¬
nomic Growth 1688-1959, Cambridge 1964, p. 78 (excluding government) and 1801-
1831 for Great Britain from p. 282. The Deane and Cole estimates were adjusted to a
U.K. basis, assuming Irish output per head in 1830 to be half ofthat in Great Britain
(as Deane herseif hypothesises in the source mentioned below) and to have been
stagnant from 1800-1830, assuming that Scottish and Irish output per head in 1800
were threequarters of that in England and Wales in 1800, and that output per head
increases by a quarter in these two areas from 1700 to 1800 (as compared with a
growth of 47 per cent in England and Wales). 1830-1855 gross national product at
factor cost from P. Deane, New Estimates of Gross National Product for the United
Kingdom 1830-1914, in: The Review of Income and Wealth, June 1968, p. 106,
linked to 1855-1950 gross domestic product at factor cost (compromise estimate)
from C. H. Feinstein, National Income Expenditure and Output ofthe United Kingdom
1855-1965, Cambridge 1972, pp. T 18-20. Figures from 1920 onwards are increased
by 3.8 per cent to offset the exclusion of output in the area which became the Irish
Republic.
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U.S.A.: G.D.P., 1820-40 at 1840 prices derived from P. A. David, The Growth ofReal
Product in the United States before 1840: New Evidence, Controlled Conjectures, in:
Journal of Economic History, June 1967. The method assumes that 1820-40 agricul¬
tural output moved parallel with total population, derives the agricultural productiv¬
ity movement from this and further assumes that agricultural and non-agricultural
productivity grew at the same pace. Agricultural productivity in 1840 is taken as 51
per cent of non-agricultural. 1840-1889 movement of G.N.P. in 1860 prices (The
movement in our estimates for the U.S.A. between 1840 and 1889 is very similar to
those of T. S. Berry, Revised Annual Estimates ofAmerican Gross National Product:
Preliminary Annual Estimates of Four Major Components of Demand, Virginia 1978,
which is not surprising as they are both benchmarked on Gallman. Before 1840 Ber-
ry's estimates show even faster growth than David's.) derived from R. E. Gallman,
Gross National Product in the United States 1834-1909, in: Output, Employment and
Productivity in the United States after 1800, N.B.E.R., New York 1966, p. 26. Gall¬
man does not actually give figures for 1840, 1850, 1860, 1870 and 1889. These were
extrapolated from neighbouring years. The movement in individual years 1870-1889
was derived by using the index of output in mining manufacturing and construction
in W. A. Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations 1870-1913, London 1978, p. 273, the index
of farm production from F. Strauss and L. H. Bean, Gross Farm Income and Indices
ofFarm Production and Prices in the United States 1869-1937, Technical Bulletin 703,
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Washington 1940, p. 126, table 61 (Laspeyre's index), and
interpolating the movement in Services from the residual derived from Gallman. 1889
weights (agriculture 28.1, industry 26.7, other 45.2 per cent) at 1929 prices were de¬
rived from The National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 1929-
1974, p. 186, and the 1889-1929 product movement by sector as shown in Kendrick,
pp. 302-3 as cited below. 1889-1929, gross domestic product from J. W. Kendrick,
Productivity Trends in the United States, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Princeton 1961, p. 298-9. 1929-79 GDP from The National Income and Product Ac¬
counts ofthe United States: An introduction to the Revised Estimates for 1929-80, in:
Survey of Current Business, December 1980, Figures corrected to exclude the impact
of the accession of Alaska and Hawaii in 1960. These two states added 0.5 per cent to
total product, but part was already included and the explicit addition was only 0.2
per cent, see Survey of Current Business, July 1962, p. 5.
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Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich
The Growth of Net Domestic Product in Germany
1850-1913*
/.
In 1965, Walther G. Hoffmann published his path-breaking collection of time series
on the growth ofthe German economy since 1850.' Subsequently, the data have been
used by economists to test empirically theories of economic growth2 and by eco¬
nomic historians as a quantitative framework for describing more exactly the process
of industrialization in Germany.3 Hoffmann's figures on aggregate output, its com¬
ponents and factor inputs thus served as a basis for evaluation of different modeis of
economic growth and of traditional interpretations of Germany's industrialization
process, especially for the period 1850-1913. The data themselves, however, their
sources, their compilation and their use in estimation procedures have not yet been
subjected to a comprehensive critical analysis. This may have to do with the immense
effort, which went into collecting and processing the data, especially so for the pe¬
riod before the First World War. At that time national income accounting had not yet
been developed and therefore Statistical offices failed to collect data with a view to
that concept. It probably exceeds the working capacity of an individual scholar to
undertake a thorough close examination of Hoffmann's numerous time series, espe¬
cially for the period 1850-1913, for which most aggregate data were produced by es¬
timation procedures selected by Hoffmann.
My contribution here has a more narrow focus and does not present the results of
a new investigation into the sources. Its limited aim is, first, to take a critical look at
* I would like to thank my Frankfurt colleague, Prof. Heinz Grohmann, for a critical discus¬
sion of statistical-methodological questions.
1. Hoffmann, Walther G. et al., Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft seit der Mitte des 19.
Jahrhunderts, Berlin 1965.
2. E.g. Gahlen, Bernhard, Die Überprüfung produktionstheoretischer Hypothesenfür Deutschland
1850-1913. Eine kritische Untersuchung, Tübingen 1968.
Gahlen, Bernhard, Der Informationsgehalt der neoklassischen Wachstumstheoriefür die Wirt¬
schaftspolitik, Tübingen 1972.
3. E.g. Andre, Doris, Indikatoren des technischen Fortschritts. Eine Analyse der Wirtschaftsent¬
wicklung in Deutschland von 1850 bis 1913, Göttingen 1971.
Schremmer, Eckart, Wie groß war der "technische Fortschritt" während der Industriellen Revo¬
lution in Deutschland, 1850-1913, in: Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschich¬
te, 60 (1973), pp. 433-458. Aubin, Hermann and Zorn, Wolfgang (eds.), Handbuch der
deutschen Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte. vol. 2: Das 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart
1976, especially the articles by Knut Borchardt.
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the estimation procedure, by which Hoffmann aggregated his time series on the
growth of Germany's real net domestic product at factor cost from data series on
production of different branches of the economy, and, secondly, to recalculate the
growth ofthe German net domestic product from 1850 to 1913 using an improved
method. The difference between Hoffmann's and my results will then give an idea of
the magnitude in which growth rates of Germany's net domestic product are deter¬
mined by the aggregation procedure, i. e. by the assumptions underlying each meth¬
od.
//.
Hoffmann presents data on the development of Germany's national product using
the three Standard approaches provided by national accounting: the output ap¬
proach, the income approach, and the expenditure approach.4 The result of the in¬
come approach is a time series on net national income in current prices; this does not
allow an assessment of economic growth in real terms. In contrast to this, using the
expenditure and the output approaches5 Hoffmann computed time-series on the de¬
velopment of real net national product and real net domestic product. The results of
the output approach are the preferred data on which to base a quantitative assess¬
ment of economic growth, because they are derived from observations of production
activity in the different branches of the economy which are then aggregated into an
index of production for the economy as a whole. Hoffmann's Table 101 presents the
index thus constructed for the development of the German economy's real net
domestic product at factor cost.6 This index is usually the basis for the quantification
of Germany's economic growth since 1850.
In detail, the index is constructed in the following manner: The total economy is
grouped into nine branches: 1. agriculture, forestry and fisheries; 2. mining and salt
works; 3. industry and crafts; 4. transport; 5. commerce, banking, insurance and
catering trade; 6. domestic service; 7. other Services without military Services;
8. military Services; 9. non-agricultural housing. For each branch Hoffmann has
compiled data on production of the main goods and Services. The time series thus
produced are valued at 1913 prices and transformed into indices of production
(1913 = 100). Where necessary, these indices were then aggregated into indices of
production for the above mentioned nine branches of the economy. Normally the
1913 value-added share of each product or product group was used as a weight in the
aggregation procedure; a product's share in employment in later and earlier years
was also sometimes used to adjust these weights. The indices of production in each
branch of the economy are thus principally based on price and value-added struc¬
tures in 19137 which are partly themselves estimates from data found for the interwar
years. Where weights were adjusted using employment shares in different years this
4. Hoffmann, Wachstum, pp. 165-170. See also: Stobbe, Alfred, Volkswirtschaftliches Rech¬
nungswesen, 5th Ed., Berlin 1980, esp. pp. 146-151.
5. Hoffmann, Wachstum, pp. 451-455, 827-828.
6. Hoffmann, Wachstum, p. 451-452.
7. Hoffmann, Wachstum, p. 7.
125
was done on the assumption that "the structure of net production value per person
employed ..., as [first] computed for 1936, can be assumed to be constant during the
whole period from 1850 to 1959".8
The requirement to hold prices and values constant in order to obtain an index of
production9 makes it understandable that Hoffmann assumed constant price and val¬
ue-added structures. It must be criticized, however, that constant weights are used
over so long a period which by definition of the industrialization process is charac¬
terized by great changes in the structure of production and prices. Therefore, Hoff¬
mann's index is bound to produce a bias in the estimate of economic growth which
must be expected to be higher the greater the distance between the year, for
which production is estimated and the year (mostly 1913), from which the weights are
taken.
The above criticism also applies to the index which Hoffmann constructed for
Germany's real net domestic product a factor cost, which was calculated on the basis
of the indices of the nine different branches of the economy. He used data from the
interwar years to estimate the share of value-added of each of the nine branches and
applied these as constant weights in aggregating the sector indices to an index of the
whole economy's value-added in constant prices (1913).10 This procedure has two
weaknesses. 1. Are the production indices of each branch also representative for the
development of value-added in each branch? Hoffmann was able to produce an in¬
dex of value-added, i. e. production minus intermediate goods, depreciation, inven¬
tory changes, indirect taxes,11 only for the primary sector. 2. The above criticism of
Hoffmann's calculation method for the branch indices also applies to his use of con¬
stant weights in Computing the aggregate index. This is the point of departure for my
following attempt to confront Hoffmann's procedure with a different method of ag¬
gregating the branch indices for the period 1850-1913 which takes into account
changes in the economy's value-added structure and uses weights currently adjusted
to the actual value-added shares in each year. This new procedure, of course, does
not solve the problem connected with Hoffmann's use of constant weights to pro¬
duce the branch indices themselves.
In connection with the income approach to national product, Hoffmann's book con¬
tains time series on the development ofthe value-added (labor and capital income) of
different branches. From these data I have calculated the share of each of the nine
branches of the economy in total value-added in current prices. Table 1 presents the
amount of value-added in current prices in each branch. In order to weaken the ef¬
fect Hoffmann's choice of the base year (1913 = 100) has on the index of growth in
the aggregation procedure, I have calculated annual growth factors —— from Hoff¬
mann's branch indices. t_1
8. Hoffmann, Wachstum, p. 389.
9. Yamane, Taro, Statistics. An Introductory Analysis, New York 1964, pp. 304-312.
10. Hoffmann, Wachstum, p. 453.
11. Hoffmann, Wachstum, p. 331-334.
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For each year from 1851 to 1913 I have then aggregated the growth factors of each
of the nine branches to produce a growth factor for the whole economy according to
the following formula:
T(D t(2) t(9)
T(I) VÄt-i
-r*
y(2) Vöt-i
-r -..
(9)
vs<!_>,
+
^r-vs<22,
+.
4U-. vsi9J, = gf,
I = index value of production in branches 1 to 9, as given by Hoffmann
VS = share of total value-added of each branch 1 to 9
GF = growth factor of the whole economy
The annual growth factors thus calculated are presented in Table 2. Annual growth
rates in percent result when the data are transformed into (GF—1)* 100.
TechnicaUy the growth factors could also easily be transformed into an index for
the period 1850-1913 similar to Hoffmann's (1913 = 100). This would, however, not
result in an index in the conventional sense because it would not be based on a con¬
stant weighting structure as required for indices of prices or production. In a strict
sense, only each growth factor in itself constitutes an index of production for the cur¬
rent year in relation to the preceding year (== 1). A time series of index values cumu¬
lated from the annual growth factors would be a concatenation of the series of an¬
nual indices. Such an index of production does not allow the quantification of aver¬
age annual growth rates over a very long period, such as from 1850-1913, because the
weighting structures at the beginning of the series are too different from those at the
end. But Hoffmann's index of production is also a doubtful basis for calculating the
average annual growth rate over the 63 years before the First World War; it is true
that it is computed with a constant weighting structure (1913), but the weighting
shares lose in validity the further away in time from the base year they are applied to
the aggregation of the branch indices to the index for overall production activity.
The growth rates, however, given in Table 2, should indicate annual growth of
Germany's net domestic product more reliably than those derived from the Hoff¬
mann index precisely because the weights are adjusted annually to the current
branch structure of value-added. Since this structure did not change dramatically
over a period of, say, one decade, in contrast to the longer period from 1850 to 1913,
it is justified to calculate from Table 2 average annual growth factors—the geometric
mean of the growth factors—over a period of ten years or so. The differences be¬
tween the average annual growth rates during such periods derived from the data in
Table 2, on the one hand, and from Hoffmann's index, on the other, are shown in Ta¬
ble 3.
The divergences tend to diminish in the course of the period from 1850 to 1913.
This is what had to be expected since the current weighting structures tend to ap¬
proach the one used by Hoffmann (1913 value-added structure). The differences are
greatest during the so-called take-off period of Germany's industrialization up to 1874.12
12. Rostow, Walt W., The Stages ofEconomic Growth. A Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge
1960, p. 38. Rostow, Walt W., The World Economy. History and Prospect, Austin, Tex.-Lon-
don 1978, p. 401.
Hoffmann, Walther G., The Take-off in Germany, in: Rostow, Walt W. (ed.), The Economics
of Take-off into Sustained Growth, London 1963, pp. 93-118.
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Table 2: Annual Growth Factors of Germany's Net Domestic Product
at Factor Cost 1851-1913*
1851 0.9980
1852 1.0192
1853 0.9956
1854 1.0219
1855 0.9905
1856 1.0873
1857 1.0565
1858 0.9960
1859 1.0023
1860 1.0632
1861 0.9872
1862 1.0483
1863 1.0797
1864 1.0356
1865 1.0105
1866 1.0137
1867 1.0013
1868 1.0644
1869 1.0067
1870 1.0033
1871 1.0377
1872 1.0765
1873 1.0373
1874 1.0813
1875 1.0064
1876 0.9963
1877 0.9928
1878 1.0485
1879 0.9794
1880 0.9935
1881 1.0255
1882 1.0168
1883 1.0534
1884 1.0271
1885 1.0235
1886 1.0071
1887 1.0434
1888 1.0432
1889 1.0333
1890 1.0343
1891 1.0006
1892 1.0399
1893 1.0495
1894 1.0263
1895 1.0500
1896 1.0351
1897 1.0377
1898 1.0404
1899 1.0371
1900 1.0459
1901 0.9785
1902 1.0227
1903 1.0581
1904 1.0415
1905 1.0238
1906 1.0314
1907 1.0468
1908 1.0146
1909 1.0211
1910 1.0390
1911 1.0359
1912 1.0413
1913 1.0461
* Each in constant prices of the previous period using current value-added shares as
weights.
Table 3: Comparison of Average Annual Growth Rates for Different
Periods between 1850 and 1913*
Net Domestic Product Population
according to according to Difference (Hoffmann,
Hoffmann, Table 1)
Table 101 Table 2
% % % %
1850-1857 2.13 2.36 0.23 0.48
1857-1863 2.56 2.88 0.32 1.00
1863-1874 2.94 3.31 0.37 0.73
1874-1883 1.14 1.22 0.08 1.02
1883-1890 2.81 3.02 0.21 0.97
1890-1900 3.46 3.62 0.16 1.30
1900-1907 2.71 2.87 0.16 1.46
1907-1913 3.26 3.29 0.03 1.29
* The periods correspond roughly to business cycies.
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The annual average growth rates derived from Table 2 exceed those derived from Hoff¬
mann's index by .2 and .3 percentage points during the years up to 1863, and by even
.4 percentage points in the period 1863-1874. These differences are substantial, for
they correct Hoffmann's annual average growth rates by between 11 and 13 percent
upwards. The cumulation effect of such an increase in the growth rates for almost a
quarter of a Century is great and important for the assessment of Germany's eco¬
nomic growth in this early period of industrialization. Its relative impact is even more
striking when annual growth is expressed in per capita terms, the rates of which
roughly result when subtracting the growth rates of population (also in Table 3) from
those of the net domestic product.
The differences between annual average growth rates of net domestic product cal¬
culated in the two ways narrow in the years 1874 to 1907 to a margin of .1 to .2 per¬
centage points. The margin practically disappears for the above mentioned reason
during the last period from 1907 to 1913.
It is, however, noteworthy that for all periods observed Hoffmann's growth rates
are lower than those derived from Table 2. The differences of up to .4 percentage
points indicate the magnitude, in which the growth rates of the German economy de¬
termined by Hoffmann, especially during the third quarter of the 19th Century, are
biased by his weighting method, namely by the use of constant value-added shares
(1913) over the whole period back to 1850.
Zusammenfassung:
Das Wachstum des Nettoinlandsprodukts in Deutschland, 1850-1913
Walther G. Hoffmanns Daten zum Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft seit 1850
sind bisher in vielfältiger Weise von Wachstumstheoretikern und Wirtschaftshistori¬
kern zur Überprüfung von Wachstumstheorien und wirtschaftshistorischen Interpre¬
tationen des Industrialisierungsprozesses in Deutschland herangezogen worden. Die
Daten selbst, ihre Quellen, ihre Zusammenstellung und die dabei benutzten Annah¬
men und Schätzverfahren haben bisher jedoch noch keine umfassende kritische Be¬
arbeitung erfahren. In diesem Beitrag wird die Methode, die Hoffmann für die Ag¬
gregation der Produktionsindizes von neun Sektoren der Wirtschaft zu einer Zeit¬
reihe für das Wachstum des realen Nettoinlandsprodukts zu Faktorkosten in
Deutschland 1850-1913 verwendet hat, kritisch vorgestellt. Sodann wird der Hoff-
mannschen Zeitreihe eine nach einem anderen Verfahren geschätzte gegenüberge¬
stellt, um die Größenordnung festzustellen, in der die Wachstumsrate des realen Net¬
toinlandsprodukts zu Faktorkosten in Deutschland in jener Periode von jeweils ge¬
wählten statistischen Verfahren der Indexberechnung abhängt. Während Hoffmann
die Struktur der Wertschöpfung seiner neun Wirtschaftssektoren aus dem Jahr 1913
als konstante Gewichtung für die Aggregation der Sektorindizes zum Index für die
Produktion der Gesamtwirtschaft in Deutschland benutzt, verwendet der Autor in
seinem Berechnungsverfahren eine jährlich über die Gesamtperiode 1850-1913 ange¬
paßte Wertschöpfungsstruktur für die Gewichtung der Wachstumsraten in den ein¬
zelnen Sektoren zwecks Aggregation zur jährlichen Wachstumsrate der Gesamtwirt¬
schaft.
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Im Ergebnis liegen die vom Autor berechneten Wachstumsraten des deutschen
Nettoinlandsprodukt höher als die von Hoffmann ermittelten. Die Unterschiede neh¬
men bis 1913 jedoch tendenziell ab, da sich die Gewichtungstrukturen beider Verfah¬
ren im Zeitablauf einander annähern. Die Unterschiede sind für die Periode des sog.
take-off der deutschen Industrialisierung bis 1874 am größten und machen in dieser
Periode im mehrjährigen Durchschnitt bis zu 0,4 Prozentpunkte aus. Dadurch wer¬
den die Hoffmannschen jährlichen Wachstumsraten um bis zu 13% nach oben korri¬
giert.
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Gabriel Tortella
National Income Estimation by Means of
Monetary Variables, the Case of Spain, 1772-1972.
Some Preliminary Results
The reason why we are trying to carry out this kind of exercise is the same which has
induced other researchers1 to attempt it for other countries, namely the lack of satis-
factory sources for national income estimates. It is expected, however, that in the not
too distant future our research on Spanish output and productivity in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries will have yielded, among other things, more direct and relia¬
ble national income estimates for the nineteenth Century, and at least some refine¬
ments upon those series now extant of Spanish national income in the twentieth Cen¬
tury. This could seem to make the present project redundant. In our view, however,
the project offers a series of advantages which make it worthwhüe. In the first place,
it will provide us with a first estimate in a relatively short time; this preliminary esti¬
mate should serve to orient us in research and as a possible test of some of our other
estimates. Furthermore, the relative abundance of data for the twentieth Century will
permit us to contrast the method, as we will presently see, and possibly to discrimi-
nate between the several extant estimates. Finally, the result of our work will be a test
of the method itself, and could suggest new ideas for further research.
The method of estimation is conceptually simple. Starting from the well known
Fisher identity, we solve for PT (= Y = Gross National Product). Our basic equation
would be
Y-MV, (1)
where M = Money supply, and V = Income velocity. By using the equation in this
form we are trying to take advantage of two facts: one, that we have a continuous se¬
ries of money supply from 1874 (plus some spot estimates for earlier years); and two,
that a considerable body of literature, plus our own calculations with the available
data on money and income suggest a remarkable stability of V.2
1. Hawke, G. R., Income Estimation from Monetary Data Further Explorations, in Review of
Income and Wealth, 21 (1975), no 3; Leff, Nathaniel, A Technique for Estimating Income
Trends from Currency Data and an Apphcation to Nineteenth-Century Brazil, in Review of
Income and Wealth, 18 (1972), no. 4.
2. For a brief and incomplete survey of the literature on this topic see Tortella, Gabriel, Estima-
ciön de la Renta Nacional espanola apartir de datos monetanos Consideracwnes prelimmares
(1789-1956), Typescript April 1981.
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Table 1: Money, Income, and Income Velocity, 1865-1972
(1) Money Supply (2) National Income (3) Income Velocity
3.3414
2.9o74
3.0447
3.o5o5
3.3445
3.144o
3.3983
3.4225
3.6191
3.8o34
3.9265
4.0598
4.2B22
4.229o
4.1141
4.2869
4.o39o
4.0792
4.3319
4.2627
4.6138
4.7432
4.2770
4.3729
3.7657
3.1385
3.0497
3.1731
3.24o4
3.4795
3.5335
3.3498
3.212o
3.2365
1865 1 51o
1879 1 792
1882 1 968
1888 2 199
1894 1 994
19o1 3 229
19o2 3 o63
19o3 3 141
19o4 3 o74
19o5 2 945
19o6 2 884
19o7 2 875
19o8 2 785
19o9 2 9o4
191o 2 926
1911 2 973
1912 3 129
1913 3 2o8
1914 3 32o
1915 3 849
1916 4 345
1917 5 37o
1918 6 856
1919 7 742
192o 8 727
1921 8 579
1922 8 414
1923 8 49o
1924 8 927
1925 9 o1o
1926 8 8o2
1927 9 327
1928 9 652
1929 9 839
5 o46
5 21o
5 992
6 7o8
6 669
1o 152
1o 4o9
10 75o
11 125
11 2o1
11 324
11 672
11 926
12 381
12 o38
12 745
12 638
13 086
14 382
16 4o7
2o o47
25 471
29 323
33 855
32 863
26 925
25 66o
26 916
28 927
31 35o
31 1o2
31 244
31 oo2
31 844
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Table 1 (Fortsetzung)
HL HL Ä2L
193o 1o 226 31 5o3
1931 1o 156 31 922
1932 9 986 32 921
1933 9 863 32 324
1934 9 946 34 892
1935 1o 4oo 34 358
1941 22 98o 56 562
1942 26 786 65 535
1943 28 776 68 771
1944 32 352 74 788
1945 36 o72 79 737
1946 45 191 11o 9o8
1947 51 67o 132 675
1948 53 259 141 052
1949 57 798 151 42o
195o 66 o44 182 o36
1951 77 535 241 174
1952 85 277 256 7o2
1953 91 691 272 635
1954 1o2 514 294 816
1955 117 695 327 693
1956 141 212 376 746
1957 164 758 439 516
1958 187 719 5o8 456
1959 198 883 523 o67
196o 197 829 532 7o1
1961 223 916 6o9 5o6
1962 265 367 7o9 623
1963 31o 416 841 29o
1964 368 55o 946 228
1965 426 557 1 117 82o
1966 477 971 1 274 6o1
1967 543 o39 1 4oo 759
1968 6o9 378 1 552 134
1969 698 765 1 7o7 747
3.o8o7
3.1432
3.2967
3.2773
3.5o81
3.3o37
2.4614
2.4466
2.3899
2.3117
2.21o5
2.4542
2.5677
2.6484
2.6198
2.7563
3.11o1
3.o1o2
2.9734
2.8759
2.7843
2.6679
2.6676
2.7o86
2.63oo
2.6927
2.7220
2.6741
?.71o2
2.5674
2,62o6
2.6667
2.5795
2.5471
2.4440
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Table 1 (Fortsetzung)
HL HL HL
197o 739 994
1971 915 144
1972 1 132 668
1 9o7 5o6
2 16o 481
2 52o 537
2.5777
2.36o8
2.2253
a Millions of current pesetas
Sources: Money: 1865, Tortella Casares, Gabriel, La economia espanola,
183o-19oo> in: Tortella Casares, Gabriel, et al. (eds.), Revolucion
burguesa, oligarquia y constitucrionalismo (1834-1923), Barcelona 1981,
p. 124. For the rest of the series, Bustelo, and Tortella, Monetary
Inflation, Table I.
Income: 1865-1894, Prados de la Escosura, Analisis, pp. 165-168,
211-212, esp. Table E-2. (The figure for 1865 has been interpolated
linearly). 19o1-1972, Alcaide, Rej/isi6n, pp. 1138 f.
Source: Table 1
1890 1940 i960 1970
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A continuous money supply series from 1874 to 1972 has been published by Bus¬
telo and Tortella
3
This senes comes from a variety of sources and can undoubtedly
be improved The 1918-1935 segment has been corrected by Pablo Martin Acena in
his yet unfinished doctoral dissertation, and the 1940-1954 segment should also be
revised In this paper we have been unable to incorporate these improvements, this is
one of the factors which make it provisional Though unrefined, however, the senes
is adequate for our present purposes
Couphng the Bustelo-Tortella monetary senes with the available national income
estimates we obtain the first histoncal series for Spanish income velocity hitherto
published (Table 1)
This velocity series ehcits a few comments In the first place, its stability is remark¬
able Over more than a Century its ränge has Iain between 4 74 (1917) and 2 21 (1945)
In fact, this stability is surpnsing in view of, among other things, the downward
trends displayed in the Doblin4 and other series The Spanish senes also exhibits a
downward trend in the long run, but it is a very slow trend, and with a strong reversal
in the years 1901-1917
In the second place, however, the shorter-term fluctuations can be explained by
taking account of the peculiarities of Spanish monetary and economic history Re-
stnctive monetary policies and the loss of gold in the last quarter of the nineteenth
Century checked the growth of M and kept V fairly stable The fall between 1894 and
1901 was due to the rapid expansion of paper money which accompanied the War of
Cuban Independence The war was followed by a very strict stabilization plan which
restricted budget expenditures and banknote circulation This explains the constant
growth of V until 1908, when restnctive policies were eased The next spurt of growth
in V took place during the First World War and was due to real rather than monetary
causes Spain remained neutral during the war, and had an export boom which pro-
voked scarcities and steep pnce rises prices running ahead of money brought about
increases in V The reverse process took place in the following years pnces dechned
faster than money and V dropped drastically between 1918 and 1922, it hovered at
around its 'normal' level (3 00-3 50) until the Spanish Civil War The trough reached
by V dunng the mid-1940's was probably due to the low levels of income which char-
actenzed the first years ofthe Franco era, and the mcrease in 1946-51 to the gradual
economic recovery towards prewar economic levels The relatively mild decline
which ensued must be attributed to the 'normal' decrease in V which is typical ofthe
early and middle stages of growth
5
In the third place, the relative stability of V over the long run, and the relative ease
with which we can explain shorter-run fluctuations are encoraging signs that the se¬
nes are reliable This is especially good news with respect to the nineteenth-century
income figures, which are based upon Mulhall*s estimates The provisional accepta-
Bustelo, Francisco, and Tortella, Gabriel, Monetary Inflation in Spam 1800-1970 in Journal
of European Economic History, 5 (1976), no 1
Doblin, Ernest, The Ratio of Income to Money Supply An Inter-National Survey in Review
of Economics and Statistics, 33 (1951), no 1
Anderson, Paul S , Behavior of Monetary Velocity in New England Economic Review (Fed
eral Reserve Bank of Boston), March-Apnl 1977
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bility of the Mulhall-Prados6 income figures is buttressed by a series of circumstan-
tial facts: first, they seem to tally well with the monetary series; second, they show
continuity with the Alcaide7 income series starting in 1901; and third, Mulhall's fig¬
ures for other countries have been vindicated by later research.
In the fourth place, while these figures and conclusions augur well for our ability
to reach our ends for the period from 1865, that from the end of the eighteenth Cen¬
tury to 1865 appears more problematic. It is very unlikely that we may obtain a yearly
series of money supply for that time span. Even decennial figures appear highly im¬
probable. The best we could realistically hope for would be a few scattered estimates
permitting reasonable interpolations. This attained, we could make some simple as¬
sumptions about velocity. One of these assumptions, probably the best, would be a li¬
near or exponential extrapolation ofthe trend in our 1865-1972 series. Other possible
assumptions could be a fixed V with maximum and minimum intervals or bands, and
the adoption of known velocities for other countries in comparable growth stages.
If not even this spotty series were available, then a second (or third) best Solution
would be just a simple benchmark figure which, in the Friedman-Leff manner, would
give us an estimate of the long-term growth rate of income.8
For this, from equation (1) we obtain:
y = m + v, (2)
where lower-case, dotted letters symbolize percentage rates of growth of the higher-
case variables.
Our benchmark money figure combined with, say, our 1865 figure, would give us
rh, while v would be estimated according to the assumptions mentioned previously.
In any case, v would be either negative or zero, so that
y < m.
This assumption of a decreasing or, at most, constant V is based upon the experi¬
ence of many other countries in their early stages of development,9 and will serve us
to discriminate between different possible estimates. For instance, Canga Argü-
ellesV0 estimate of a gold and silver currency stock for 1772 of 4,886 million reales
(accepted by Sardä11 with little questioning) is a gross overestimate, as our reasoning
will show.
6. Prados de la Escosura, Leandro, Anälisis economico del Comercio Exterior de Espana en los
siglos XVIII y XIX, Doctoral Thesis, Universidad Complutense de Madrid 1981.
7. Alcaide Inchausti, Julio, Una revision urgente de la serie Renta Nacional espanola en el siglo
XX, in: Datos bäsicos para la Historia Financiera de Espafia (1850-1975), vol. I, Madrid
1976.
8. Friedman, Milton, Money and Economic Development, New York 1973; Friedman, Milton,
Monetary Data and National Income Estimates, in: Economic Development and Cultural
Change, (April 1961); Leff, Technique.
9. See Doblin, Ratio; Anderson, Behavior; Leff, Technique; Cohen, Jon S., Italy 1861-1914, in:
Cameron, Rondo (ed.), Banking and Economic Development Some Lessons of History,
New York 1972.
10, Canga Argüelles, Jose, Diccionario de Hacienda, 2 vols., Madrid 1833-34.
11. Sardä, Juan, La Politica Monetaria y las Fluctuaciones de la economia espanola en el siglo
XIX, Madrid 1948.
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A simple interpolation of two estimates of national income by Grupo '7512 for
1755 and by Ajthur Young13 for 1792 shows that Spanish national income in 1772
was around 3,700 million reales (no space here to give details about the problems in¬
volved in these calculations; our reasoning admits very wide margins of error). This
would make the money supply larger than national income and, consequently, V less
than one (around .75 in fact). Such a small V at such early date is unbelievable. For
Canga's figure to be correct while V standing at around 3.5 (a very low bound), na¬
tional income would have had to be üwq times larger than our estimate. Among other
things, this would imply that income should have grown between 1772 and 1865 at a
rate below 0.1 percent and therefore that per capita income should have decreased at
a rate of perhaps —0.3 percent between the two dates (this is in current money; the
decline would be larger if we allowed for inflation). Such long-term depression is
clearly out ofthe question: Canga's estimate should be rejected in spite of his being a
respected source of macroeconomic information from his writing days in the early
nineteenth Century (I am leaving aside here his highly questionable estimation proce¬
dure).
To sum up, our method seems fruitful for our research, both as a way to check the
trustworthiness of existing income and/or money estimates, and to extrapolate and
interpolate a series. The problems, naturaUy, are less tractable for the first part of our
period.
Zusammenfassung:
Die Schätzung des Volkseinkommens anhand monetärer
Variablen am Beispiel Spaniens, 1772-1972
Hiermit werden einige Aspekte des Forschungsprojektes über "Einkommen, Output
und Produktivität in Spanien vom achtzehnten Jahrhundert bis in die Gegenwart"
vorgestellt. Eine Gruppe von Wirtschaftshistorikern arbeitet an diesem Projekt, das
von der spanischen Zentralbank gefördert wird.
In diesem Beitrag wird versucht, die möglichen wie auch die bereits erreichten Re¬
sultate darzulegen, die bei der Aufstellung einer Zeitreihe über das spanische Volks¬
einkommen auf der Grundlage von monetären Variablen zu erzielen sind. Monetäre
Angaben sind recht leicht zusammenzustellen und liegen jährlich bereits seit 1874
vor.
Milton Friedman hat dieses Schätzverfahren erstmals angewandt. Es geht von der
grundlegenden Voraussetzung aus, daß die Geldumlaufgeschwindigkeit (der Koeffi¬
zient von Volkseinkommen zu Geldmenge) eine ziemlich stabile Größe ist. Und tat¬
sächlich wird diese Annahme durch empirische Angaben aus einer Vielzahl von Län-
12. Grupo *75, La economia delAntiguo Regimen. La "Renta Nacional" de la Corona de Castilla,
Universidad Autönoma de Madrid, Departamento de Historia Contemporänea, Madrid
1977.
13. Young, Arthur, Travels during the years 1787, 1788 and 1789 in Francefor which is Added the
Register of a Tour into Spain, Dublin 1793 (cited in Prados de la Escosura, Anälisis,
p. 91).
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dern bestätigt: Bei nur geringen Abweichungen von Jahr zu Jahr weist die Umlaufge¬
schwindigkeit eine langfristige Tendenz zur Verlangsamung auf. In weit fortgeschrit¬
tenen Volkswirtschaften kehrt sich dieser Trend jedoch um, d.h., die Umlaufge¬
schwindigkeit hat die Tendenz, sich zu erhöhen, und auch dieses nur mit geringen
Schwankungen.
Die Umlaufgeschwindigkeit in Spanien scheint sich in dieses Muster einzufügen.
Unsere Zahlen belegen, daß die Umlaufgeschwindigkeit hier einen Trend zur Ver¬
minderung aufweist. In den Zeitspannen von 1901 bis 1908, von 1914 bis 1917 und
von 1946 bis 1951 jedoch kehrte sich als Folge von Kriegseinflüssen dieser allge¬
meine Trend um: Der kubanische Unabhängigkeitskrieg, der Erste Weltkrieg sowie
der spanische Bürgerkrieg waren für diese Trendumschwünge verantwortlich.
Doch sieht man von diesen Störungen einmal ab, so erweist die relative Stabilität
der Umlaufgeschwindigkeit, daß die vorgesehene Schätzmethode durchaus anwend¬
bar ist. Ajn Ende des Artikels werden einige Probleme umrissen, die dabei auf¬
tauchen, wenn man die Methode auf das frühe neunzehnte Jahrhundert anwenden
will; denn für diesen Zeitraum sind Schätzungen der Geldmenge nur schwer zu er¬
stellen.
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Jean Gadisseur
Output per Worker and its Evolution
in Belgian Industry, 1846-1910
Owing to its crucial role in the process of industrialization,—not only by its techni¬
cal, but also economic and social implications—the threefold relationship capital-
technical change-labour is of extreme importance in the explanation ofthe economic
development of Belgium during the XIXth Century.
The present study aims simply to estimate annual rates of increase in output per
worker in the main industries and sectors of industrial activity. It is a preliminary
step for a much larger study, which should embrace four aspects of the evolution of
industrial productivity:
- the technical aspect, including technological and organizational changes as well as
progress in skills;
- the micro-level approach, focused on the Substitution of capital for labour at the
level ofthe firm;
- such macro elements as the evolution of comparative costs and prices, the distribu¬
tion of returns between capital and labour;
- finally socio-demographic factors ranging from health—the physical ability to
work—to working hours.
1. The available data
1.1. The Input of Manpower
The numbers of workers and other employees engaged in each sub-division of indus¬
try has been derived and calculated from four sources:
a) the Industrial Censuses of 1846, 1880, 1896 and 1910;
b) Censuses of Population which classify the population by occupations and profes¬
sions ;
c) official mining statistics which contain annual estimates for the extractive, metals
and glass industries;
d) other sources, including reports of Chambers of Commerce, official estimates and
studies of particular industries.
The figures available for some branches of industry look sometimes very different.
But differences can usually be accounted for by a reference to the definitions and
rules utilized by any given source to deal with seasonal employment, unemployment
and home workers. The Industrial Census of 1880 has often been criticized because
its coverage is not exhaustive and it is clear that for several branches of industrial ac¬
tivity this census does underestimate the work force. Population censuses must also
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be used carefully because it is difficult to find a corresponding industrial division to
their classifications of the work force into occupations and professions. Mining sta¬
tistics are reasonably satisfactory. Although the categories used in this source do not
correspond exactly with such integrated industries as iron and steel. A detailed dis¬
cussion of the problems encountered and Solutions adopted would be out of place in
a short articie.1
The choices of particular figures or new estimates were made according to a Statis¬
tical criticism of the data, including tests for coherence across sectors and through
time. Final estimates are those presented in Table 1.
Table 1: The Allocation of Labour by Branches of Industry
1846 1880 1896 1910
Coal
Metal Mines
Quarries
Milling
Rice
Sugar
Sugar Refining
Glucose
Cocoa
Coffee
Chicory
Margarine
Beer
Alcohol
Tobacco
Wool-Preparation
Wool-Spinning
Wool-Weaving
Linen-Preparation
Linen-Spinning
Linen-Weaving
Jute
Hemp
Cotton-Spinning
Cotton-Weaving
Saw Mills
Woodwork
43,488 102,930 119,246 143,701
8,203 3,810 2,163 . 455
26,007 38,624 39,873
11,384 11,900 11,374 13,134
278 145 102
1,785 11,870 11,237 8,420
696 1,237 1,349 1,786
105 176 267
45 335 1,099 2,577
234 340 360 601
128 1,720 1,640 1,964
360 522
9,558 15,130 20,074 24,397
2,205 2,460 2,077 2,406
7,805 14,530 12,034 15,471
4,800 3,302 2,325 2,688
5,100 11,023 12,942 13,625
20,100 28,158 17,982 10,849
7,000 7,173 10,000 14,000
25,600 14,204 17,668 20,062
25,000 26,500 21,389 12,886
2,321 5,741
1,910 2,765 4,044 3,811
6,984 7,153 8,073 14,736
15,267 18,935 11,929 25,012
7,160 7,582 8,443 10,400
25,702 28,401 39,557 44,260
1. For further details on these estimates readers should consult the author and the reference un¬
der footnote 2.
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Table 1 (Fortsetzung)
1846 1880 1896 1910
Cabinet Making 3,705 12,629 17,812 23,573
Paper and Cardboard 2,262 7,130 9,575 12,434
Printing 3,591 6,645 14,810 21,308
Leather and Skins 3,113 5,173 5,047 6,774
Leather-Working 12,273 26,861 26,519 29,643
Rubber 15 245 1,235 2,146
Soda and Derivatives 132 987 903 1,639
Vegetable Oils 2,293 2,500 2,879 2,800
Wax and Polish 288 539 852 788
Coke 2,358 2,415 3,737
Coal Briquettes 1,334 1,999
Glass and Crystal 3,729 11,131 23,333 26,182
Pig Iron (Blast Furnaces) 3,288 3,452 3,305 4,214
Crude Iron (Puddled or Converted) 1,646 8,180 4,455 1,064
Finished Iron 1,547 7,689 4,512 2,087
Crude Steel 26 2,156 6,018 13,186
Finished Steel 26 1,678 5,218 10,694
Iron Foundries 1,596 6,693 7,785 9,937
Zinc Manufacture 1,205 3,277 4,970 7,745
Zinc Laminating 704 509 734
Lead Manufacture 134 278 527 727
Desilvering Lead 72 200 1,090
Copper 585 1,355 2,252 3,817
Machinery 6,815 21,390 37,778 55,025
Weapons 8,065 11,204 13,423 11,539
Precision Instruments 262 830 888
1.2. Production Statistics
The basic figures for production were produced by a former research.2 The series
used concern estimates of physical Outputs produced in the different industries and
cover one half to two thirds of total industrial activity. Most industries are repre¬
sented with the exception of the construction industry. (Although the quarrying of
stone is included under extractive industry). Using those estimates indices for total
industry and eight sub-groups were computed: extractive industry, food, textiles, ani-
J. Gadisseur, Le produit physique de Veconomie beige, 1831-1913—Presentation critique des
donnees statistiques. Doctoral Dissertation, Liege, 1980. The dissertation will be published in
Histoire Quantitative et Development de la Belgique, 1831-1913, under the auspices of Le Cen¬
tre d'histoire quantitative of the University of Liege directed by Professor Pierre Lebrun and
under the patronage of the Academie Royale de Belgique.
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mal and vegetable produets (including wood, leather, paper, printing group 1), chem-
icals (including coking plants and glass group 2), iron and steel, non-ferrous metals
and finally engineering (machines, weapons, etc ...). The indices are of a Laspeyres
type with fixed reference points and are base weighted. Four different sets of indices
were computed, with weights and bases corresponding respectively to the years 1846,
1880, 1896 and 1910.
2. The Method
2.1. Output per Worker in Industrial Branches of Industry
For each of the 53 individual industries Outputs taken into consideration are three-
years averages centred upon the Industrial Censuses of 1846, 1880, 1896 and 1910.
These averages were divided by the corresponding work force so that four levels of
output per worker were obtained. Since those Outputs per worker were of abstract
significance every time the estimates of Output are represented by indices, and since
sub-periods between censuses are of unequal length, annual rates of increase were
computed so that comparison between branches and through time would become
possible. Those annual rates are presented in Table 2. In order to facilitate interpreta¬
tion of those figures, Table 3 presents the corresponding average rates of increase in
total Output for the same sub-periods and branches.
Table 2; Annual Average Rates of Increase in Output per Worker (%)
1846 1880 1896 1846
1880 1896 1910 1910
Coal
Metal Mines
Quarries
Milling
Rice
Sugar
Sugar Refining
Glucose
Cocoa
Coffee
Chicory
Margarine
Beer
Alcohol
Tobacco
Wool-Preparation
Wool-Spinning
Wool-Weaving
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0.98 0.65 -0.55 0.56
0.93 0.56 5.61 1.84
-0.75 0.83 -0.02
2.30 0.88 1.63
4.75 0.38 2.69
3.10 7.19 1.11 3.66
1.45 5.98 0.07 2.26
5.88 -1.08 2.57
1.22 -0.22 2.95 -0.07
0.04 0.00 -0.13 -0.01
0.99 1.80 -1.97 -0.51
0.92 0.92
0.32 0.35 0.30 0.32
2.43 1.31 0.34 1.69
0.58 1.50 0.78 0.85
9.44 0.55 -0.75 4.88
2.76 1.56 0.70 2.00
5.34 5.42 4.56 5.19
Table 2 (Fortsetzung)
1846 1880 1896 1846
1880 1896 1910 1910
Linen-Preparation 2.94 0.15 0.80 1.76
Linen-Spinning 3.10 1.29 0.83 2.14
Linen-Weaving -0.11 1.85 5.39 1.56
Jute -2.35 -2.35
Hemp 4.73 0.34 1.28 2.86
Cotton-Spinning 3.64 1.11 1.39 2.51
Cotton-Weaving 3.25 4.87 0.13 2.96
Saw Mills 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.04
Woodwork 0.83 0.02 1.42 0.75
Cabinet Making -0.44 -0.29 6.29 1.03
Paper and Cardboard -0.12 0.70 1.70 0.48
Printing -0.38 3.23 1.29
Leather and Skins 0.79 0.94 1.74 1.04
Leather-Working -0.16 0.46 2.81 0.64
Rubber -3.65 7.10 1.23
Soda and Derivatives -0.51 4.74 0.07 0.91
Vegetable Oils 0.20 0.71 2.20 0.76
Wax and Polish -0.07 -0.23 3.64 0.69
Coke 1.16 0.02 0.62
Coal Briquettes 2.82 2.82
Glass und Crystal 1.71 -0.09 1.03 1.11
Pig Iron (Blast Furnaces) 3.08 3.56 3.09 3.20
Crude Iron (Puddled or Converted) 1.10 3.17 2.89 2.01
Finished Iron 0.96 3.51 2.62 1.95
Crude Steel 2.61 3.38 2.97
Finished Steel 2.41 3.22 2.79
Iron Foundries 0.53 6.07 3.69 2.58
Zinc Manufacture 2.85 1.09 0.39 1.87
Zinc Laminating -12.23 3.62 0.05 -5.85
Lead Manufacture 7.73 0.62 4.39 5.18
Desilvering Lead 3.44 3.44
Copper 1.65 0.31 0.72 1.11
Machinery 4.58 -1.50 3.64 2.82
Weapons 1.76 0.70 2.96 1.75
Precision Instruments -7.73 6.07 -1.53
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Table 3: Average Annual Rates of Increase in Production (%)
1846 1880 1896 1846
1880 1896 1910 1910
Coal 3.43 1.58 0.78 2.94
Metal Mines -1.32 -2.93 -5.52 -1.79
Quarries 1.73 1.06 2.94
Milling 2.01 1.92 1.62
Rice 0.57 -2,11 2.67
Sugar 9.01 6.82 -0.95 7.04
Sugar Refining 3.18 6.55 2.10 3.43
Glucose 9.35 1.91 8.33
Cocoa 4.79 7.48 9.41 4.96
Coffee 1.14 0.36 3.59 1.46
Chicory 6.88 1.50 -0.70 3.76
Margarine 3.63 3.39
Beer 1.69 2.13 1.71 1.53
Alcohol 2.76 0.25 1.40 1.75
Tobacco 2.43 0.31 2.61 1.91
Wool-Preparation 8.24 -1.63 0.29 3.18
Wool-Spinning 5.11 2.58 1.07 2.80
Wool-Weaving 6.39 2.51 0.86 3.28
Linen-Preparation 3.01 2.25 3.25 2.32
Linen-Spinning 1.33 2.68 1.75 1.43
Linen-Weaving 0.06 0.50 1.65 0.01
Jute 4.17 2.98
Hemp 5.88 2.76 0.85 4.20
Cotton-Spinning 3.71 1.88 5.84 3.25
Cotton-Weaving 3.91 1.89 5.56 3.21
Saw Mills 0.18 0.68 1.65 0.49
Woodwork 1.12 2.11 2.23 1.35
Cabinet Making 3.22 1.88 8.44 3.58
Paper and Cardboard 3.31 2.57 3.61 2.79
Printing 4.74 5.95 6.09
Leather and Skins 2.31 0.78 3.91 1.96
Leather-Working 2.17 0.37 3.63 1.82
Rubber 6.60 11.41 8.66
Soda and Derivatives 5.55 4.16 4.43 6.16
Vegetable Oils 0.45 1.61 2.00 1.06
Wax and Polish 1.79 2.67 3.07 2.36
Coke 1.31 3.18 2.15
Coal Briquettes 5.83 4.42
Glass and Crystal 5.03 4.64 1.87 4.17
Pig Iron (Blast Furnaces) 3.23 3.27 4.90 4.25
Crude Iron (Puddled or Converted) 5.98 -0.67 -7.11 1.50
Finished Iron 5.83 0.12 -2.88 2.56
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Table 3 (Fortsetzung)
1846 1880 1896 1846
1880 1896 1910 1910
Crude Steel
Finished Steel
Iron Foundries
Zinc Manufacture
Zinc Laminating
Lead Manufacture
Desilvering Lead
Copper
Machinery
Weapons
Precision Instruments
9.41 9.34 14.11
9.93 8.65 13.42
4.86 7.07 5.52 5.47
5.92 3.76 3.62 5.03
6.44 1.54 2.70 -4.30
10.07 4.72 6.81 7.91
16.76 11.75
4.20 3.55 4.58 4.27
8.16 2.06 6.46 7.43
2.75 1.84 1.85 2.47
-0.84 6.58 3.34
2.2. Output per Worker in 8 Broad Sectors of Industry andfor Industry as a whole
For those global group indices, the method of calculation is basically the same as de¬
scribed above (Section 2.1.). Because estimates do not start in 1846 for all branches of
industry, precautions were to be taken in order to avoid a bias in the estimation of
annual rates of growth in output per worker at the aggregate levels. For each sub-pe-
riod the average levels of output per worker were calculated by dividing the levels of
production given by the global or sectoral indices with weights and base correspond¬
ing to the beginning of the sub-period by the relevant labour forces. Thus the ränge
of produets taken into consideration varies from sub-period to sub-period and cover¬
age is, for example, more complete for 1896-1910 than for 1846-1880.
Table 4: Average Annual Rates of Increase in Output per Worker (%)
1846 1880 1896 1846
1880 1896 1910 1910
Extractive Industry 1.03 0.34 -0.16 0.60
Food 1.57 2.94 0.63 1.70
Textiles 4.01 2.64 1.74 3.17
Group 1 0.20 0.13 2.87 0.76
Group 2 1.29 0.21 1.71 1.11
Iron and Steel 0.93 4.07 3.21 2.20
Non-ferrous metals 3.10 1.05 1.00 2.12
Mechanical Engineering 3.74 -0.92 3.56 2.52
Total Industry 2.31 1.25 1.70 1.91
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Table 5: Average Annual Rates of Increase in Output (%)
1846 1880 1896 1846
1880 1896 1910 1910
Extractive Industry 3.46 1.53 0.86 2.91
Food 2.25 2.34 1.69 1.94
Textiles 2.22 1.80 2.67 2.22
Group 1 1.94 1.76 4.33 2.10
Group 2 3.49 3.97 2.92 3.92
Iron and Steel 5.64 3.96 5.25 5.38
Non-ferrous metals 5.48 3.63 4.76 4.77
Mechanical Engineering 5.58 1.94 5.49 5.55
Total industry 2.83 2.00 3.01 2.51
Table 4 displays annual rates of increase in output per worker for 8 sectors of indus¬
try and for total industrial output, while in Table 5 the corresponding rates of growth
of output are set out. The rates for the total period are weighted geometric averages
of the rates for sub-periods.
3. The Results
Since this research is still at a prelimary stage a complete interpretation of its results
would be premature. But some observations, principally methodological in character,
might be attempted at this point.
3.1. The Consistency ofthe Basic Data
Most of the rates of increase in labour productivity as set out in Table 2 are reassur-
ing because they generally correspond with our qualitative and historical information
on changes in technology and in legislation affecting the industry concerned. For ex¬
ample, the growth of productivity in coal mining was increasingly restrained by the
technical difficulties involved in exploiting a depleting natural resource and by the
reduction of working hours in 1910. The estimates for milling pick up the concentra¬
tion and mechanization ofthat industry after 1880, as a response to imports of Amer¬
ican wheat. Our figures are also congruent with what is known to historians about
arms manufacturing which remained a craft industry until the late 19th Century. They
also accord with changes in the soda industry from the Leblanc to the ammonia proc¬
ess which occured mainly between 1880-96.
Unfortunately not all the estimates are readily explicable in this way. Several "un¬
natural" rates of productivity change appear in the data—for example in zinc lami-
nation, for the jute industry and for precision instruments. Some exceptional rates
can be explained by the introduction of new technology (for example, the mechani¬
zation of washing, weaving and carding wool) but it will require a careful technologi-
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cal study industry by industry before all the statistics can be accepted or rejected In
several cases the movements probably reflect variations in the quality of output over
time (e g for rubber) or incorrect and uncertain data But on the whole and particu¬
larly for the broad amalgamated sectors of industry the statistics are plausible
3 2 Chronology
Unfortunately the timing of the Industrial Censuses did not always correspond with
turning points in the growth ofthe Belgian economy 1846 and 1896 seem fairly well
placed—the first at the end ofthe Industrial Revolution and the second at the begin¬
ning ofthe upswing following the Great Depression of 1874-95 But 1880 falls in the
middle of the Great Depression Thus the first period 1846-80 includes the years of
vigorous growth 1848-73 and a sigmficant part ofthe ensuing depression While the
second period, 1880-96, which Covers the darkest years of crisis, also includes a span
of years which witnessed a relative upswing in production Penodization has been
imposed by the sources, which makes histoncal Interpretation of the figures proble-
matical
3 3 The Rhythm of Progress
The rate of increase in labour productivity from 1846-80 which witnessed the diffu¬
sion ofthe technology ofthe First Industrial Revolution, was clearly faster than over
the subsequent period (1880-96)—a phase when progress slowed down and when the
dechne in the rate of growth of money wages hardly encouraged Investment aiming
at Substitution of capital for labour Nevertheless a number of branches of industry
continued with Investment designed to save on capital, on energy or raw matenal in¬
puts or designed to raise the quality of the product and then often led to improve¬
ments in labour productivity The deceleration in labour productivity growth can be
connected to the slowing down of the evolution of composition in global industnal
output the depression affected more deeply the most dynamic activities, that is those
industries which enjoyed the highest growth rates and also the highest Outputs per
worker
3
Labour productivity which accelerated again after 1896 can be connected to what
is mistakenly calied the Second Industrial Revolution which is really a phase of tech¬
nological renewal which manifested its effects through the apphcation of new forms
of power, such as the internal combustion engine and electncity to industnes un-
touched by the industnal revolution as well as further technological improvements to
industnes already mechanized (through such inputs as steel, gas turbines, industnal
electncity, mass production techniques, etc )
Belgian industry can be grossly divided into four broad groups classified in terms
of differences in the rates of increase in output per worker
a) Extractive industry, textiles, non-ferrous metals atteined first fairly high growth
rates in output per worker and then progressively slowed down This deceleration
was due to the precocity of their mechanization Production per worker seems
J Gadisseur, Croissance structure et cycies dans la production industrielle beige 1831-1913
(forthcoming) in Vortrage für Wirtschaftsgeschichte This paper shows that the pace of struc
tural change slowed at the same time as the growth of production and prompts one to regard
the Great Depression 1874-95 as a "structural malaise'*
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hardly affected by the Great Depression but it is possible that the problems ex¬
perienced from 1874 pushed industrialists into a search for economies by cutting
employment in these industries, in spite diminishing wages.
b) Food processing and the iron and steel industry experienced maximum growth of
output per worker during the period 1880-96. For the food industry this upswing
was connected to the expansion of the home market from 1886 and American
grain imports from 1880. After 1896 the progress slowed down considerably. Im¬
provements in the productivity of the iron and steel industry which had pro¬
ceeded rather slowly from 1846-80 changed dramatically thereafter and contin¬
ued (albeit at a slower rate) after 1896. The long term evolution of iron and steel
can be explained basically by reference to such innovations as the Bessemer Con¬
verter 1856, the Martin-Siemens process 1868 and the Gilchrist Thomas process in
1879, as well as developments in metallurgical industries using steel.
c) Traditional industries, dominated by leather, wood and printing, (group 1) dis¬
played weak rates of progress throughout the periods 1846-80 and 1880-96. The
Great Depression restrained the application of new technology in these indus¬
tries, so that an important increase in the output per worker did not appear before
the end of the Century.
d) Mechanical engineering and the industries of group 2 (chemicals, glass, coke,
etc..) experienced rapid progress at the beginning and at the end of the period—
interphased with a clear deceleration in 1880-96. Low wages certainly played a
role in the evolution followed by these industries, otherwise hardly affected by the
depression. For mechanical engineering the technological change that marked the
Depression (the transition from iron to steel and the emergence of electricity and
the internal combustion engine with its difficult but necessary adaptations) com-
plements movements in wages in the explanation for long Swings of rapid and
slower growth.
4. Towards a Conclusion
Conclusions from a preparatory study and preliminary calculations can only be ten-
tative and are simply reflections of a critical, methodological and economic nature.
We must first of all underline the risks involved in diachronic and intersectoral
comparisons even when those comparisons are based on a careful evaluation of the
data. Attention to the rules of Statistical method carries certain guarantees but in the
last resort only consistency with the füll historical record can allow firm judgements
to be drawn.
From the methodological point of view it is obvious that the study of technical and
economic progress in the history of industry cannot be limited to an examination of
the quantitative aspects of production. The variables of the production functions are
the costs and values; technique, Organization of production—and the choices they
are subject to—are their structural elements, however changing over time. Those
functions and their evolution are to be estimated—"historiometrically" if econome¬
trics should fail.
From an economic view the figures do trace significant variations in the evolution
of output per worker over the long run in the major branches and sectors of Belgian
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industry. The Great Depression 1874-95 emerges from the data in its many facets (in
costs of raw materials, changes in rates of growth, emergence and diffusion of tech¬
niques of production). The Great Depression is confirmed as more of a structural
discontinuity than a mere conjunctural episode in the economic history of Bel¬
gium.
Zusammenfassung:
Entwicklung der Arbeitsproduktivität in der belgischen Industrie
von 1846 bis 1910
In diesem Beitrag soll versucht werden, die jährlichen Wachstumsraten der Arbeits¬
produktivität in der belgischen Industrie für die Zeitspanne von 1846 bis 1910 zu
messen. Grundlagen dafür bilden die physischen Produktionsindices der belgischen
Industrie von 1831 bis 1913 sowie vier Schätzwerte über die Verteilung der Beschäf¬
tigten auf die verschiedenen Industriezweige. Sie basieren auf Angaben aus den Jah¬
ren 1846, 1880, 1896 und 1910, in denen Betriebszählungen durchgeführt wurden.
Die Wachstumsrate der Produktivität insgesamt wurde nach acht Industriezweigen
und 53 Untergruppen aufgegliedert. Mit ihnen ist der Großteil des Bergbaus und der
Industrie erfaßt.
In dieser Studie wird zum erstenmal eine umfassende Statistik über die Arbeitspro¬
duktivität in der belgischen Industrie während des 19. Jahrhunderts vorgelegt. Wenn¬
gleich diese Ergebnisse auch nur als vorläufig zu gelten haben, so lassen sich doch
methodologische wie auch ökonomische Schlußfolgerungen daraus ziehen. So wei¬
sen die Daten zum Beispiel nach, daß sich die Arbeitsproduktivität in den wichtig¬
sten Industriezweigen recht unterschiedlich entwickelte, und zwar entsprechend der
jeweiligen technischen Entwicklung. Sodann belegen die Daten, daß sich die Große
Depression von 1875 bis 1895 als „strukturelle Diskontinuität** in der Geschichte der
belgischen Industrie zeigte.
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Rainer Fremdling
Foreign Trade Patterns, Technical Change, Cost and Produc¬
tivity in the West European Iron Industries, 1820-1870*
My major research topic has been the development of the primary iron industry in
Belgium, France and Germany from the 1820*s to the 1860's. Let me briefly define
which part of the sector I am talking about: It is the primary iron industry with its
two stages of production. First, there is pig iron, which is smelted from the iron ore in
a blast furnace. Second, there is bar iron or wrought iron. This is refined from pig
iron by using either charcoal or hard-coal.
During the four decades from the 1820's onwards, the iron industries of Belgium,
France and Germany experienced the same fundamental change Britain had under-
gone in the 18th Century, namely the Substitution of mineral fuel for charcoal, that is,
the process of puddling, rolling and coke smelting diffused. But neither in Britain nor
on the Continent did this transition, however radical, spread fast or straightforward.
Rather both traditional methods of iron production alone and conbinations of the
old and new technology remained economicaliy viable for quite a long time,1
whereas the new techniques of smelting and refining iron hat to be improved consid¬
erably and to be adapted to the particular environments of the Continental countries
before they gained clear-cut cost advantages over modified traditional techniques.
Thus, it is misleading to confer distinct economic superiority on the finally most ad¬
vanced technology from the beginning on, in retrospection.2 This point has to be em¬
phasized because of a widespread misjudgment in the literature on technical change
in historical perspective ("Technikgeschichte"). That is, rashly lumping together
technical advances with major improvements in economic efficiency.
David Landes might be quoted as a prominent advocate of this approach. In as¬
sessing the different technological levels between Britain and Continental Europe
after the end of the Napoleonic wars he states:3
"In view of the enormous economic superiority of these innovations one would ex¬
pect the rest to have followed automatically".
* For helpful comments I wish to thank Richard H. Tilly.
1. Cf. Table A 1 ofthe appendix.
2. On this very common pitfall, namely the confusion of technical advance with economic su¬
periority, in the writing of economic history see the elaborated comment by Rosenberg, Na¬
than, Perspectives on Technology, Cambridge 1976, especially chapter 11 "Factors affecting
the diffusion of technology**, pp. 189-210.
3. Landes, David S., The Unbound Prometheus, Cambridge 1972, p. 126.
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I have tried to avoid this bias of the technological historiography and to describe
and analyse the processes of modernization in the primary iron industries by com¬
paring levels of prices and costs among different countries and regions over time. In
a market economy with sufficient competition, costs and prices reflect the endow-
ment with resources and the level of productivity. On this yardstick, technological
achievements only become apparent when they are economicaliy significant. Thus,
the potential economic relevance of an innovation in the long run is not identical
with its cost-saving contributions at the time of its first appearance, which were
usually rather modest. It is however difficult to obtain reliable data on costs and
prices which are representative of an entire country. Available data on costs and
prices often only refer to certain regions and enterprises. Furthermore, differences in
prices due to differences in quality of the product complicate comparisons.
In this articie, I want to set forth two aspects:
1. structural changes in international trade, and
2. productivity changes over time. Hence I do not intend to present direct evidence
here which would refute views as expressed by Landes.4
//
Let me now set forth the conclusiveness of structural changes, which took place in
the international trade flows and in the tariff policy accordingly, focussing on France
and Germany.5 The changing pattern of trade flows among nations and the corre¬
sponding tariff policy are useful indicators to detect the international competitive po¬
sition of the specific iron industry over time.
In Britain, the transition from charcoal to coke or hard-coal as a fuel for smelting
and refining iron had been achieved already in the 18th Century, whereas on the Con¬
tinent, charcoal techniques dominated until far into the 19th Century. Around 1820,
the British iron industry was not only free from any real competition on her domestic
market, but it was more and more able to export much of her output abroad. From
the 1820's to 1870, exports of all iron produets rose dramatically from one quarter to
roughly 60% of the total pig iron production.6 For the most part of the period in
question, British producers were the cheapest suppliers of iron internationally.
The French tariff policy reflects very clearly the cost and price advantage of British
suppliers in the early 19th Century. In 1822, France established nearly prohibitive du-
4. On this see my forthcoming manuscript on Untersuchungen zur Modernisierung der Eisenin¬
dustrie 1820-1860 — Zur Einfuhrung des Koksschmelzens und des Puddelverfahrens in Bel¬
gien, Frankreich und Deutschland
5. Belgium as the first country to catch up with British technology deserves a special attention
In this paper, however, I refer to her rather occasionally, but Belgium will be analysed more
thoroughly in my current research, see footnote 4 above
6. Hyde, Charles K., Technological Change and the British Iron Industry, 1700-1870, Princeton
1977, pp. 144, 172; British producers in general became increasingly dependant on exports
during this time, on this see Crouzet, Francois, Toward an Export Economy British Exports
during the Industrial Revolution, in: Explorations in Economic History, 17 (1980), pp 48-
93; and Davis, Ralph, The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade, Leicester
1979.
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ties especially against British iron. This law remained unchanged in principle until
the mid-1850's, and then it was replaced by the Cobden-Chevalier-treaty. Such a
highly effective and long-lived customs law deserves a closer look into its genesis.7
In 1814, the tariff on bar iron was set up in the following way: Swedish bar iron
reached French ports for 350 Francs per ton. Since French bar iron was sold there at
least at 500 Francs, the duty was fixed at 150 Francs, i.e. ad valorem more than 40%.
The fact, that the reference price was Swedish iron, reflects that Sweden was still con¬
sidered the dominating supplier of iron on the international market. Obviously, the
French were not yet aware that in the meantime Britain had become the supplier at
lowest prices on the world market. In spite of this high protective duty of 1814, Brit¬
ish bar iron was dumped in large quantities on the French market. In 1820 and 1821,
nearly 80% of all bar iron imports came from Britain. 1819 is the only year before
1822 for which a French output figure can be compared to imports: The ratio be¬
tween imports and production made up 0.14. These imports must have been percepti-
ble for French producers.
So the new tariff of 1822 was solely directed against British imports. Numerous pe¬
titions of iron masters had convinced the government of the necessity to increase the
duty on iron. The following calculation was made up: British bar iron was sold at 400
Francs per ton, including the already existing tariff. French bar iron could not be
sold cheaper than 500 Francs per ton, so the existing tariff of 150 Francs was raised
to 250 Francs. This measure was solely taken against British puddled and rolled bar
iron, whereas Swedish hammered charcoal bar iron still bore the duty of 1814. British
bar iron now suffered a duty of 100% ad valorem.8 This discriminatory duty had im¬
mediate effects on British bar iron exports to France: While in 1821 still one third of
all British bar iron exports had gone to France, this share dropped dramatically in
the following years. Not even the 8% of 1822 could be matched in the years to
come.9
In short, the wall of protectionism kept British bar iron imports down. And any
importation of pig iron, which might have been worked up to bar iron along the coast
should be blocked likewise. So the duty on British pig iron was raised adequately,
namely from 20 to 90 Francs per ton.10 Thereafter only foundries imported British
pig iron.11 These tariffs, both on bar iron and on pig iron, were not lowered markedly
7. Detailed documentation based on records in the "Archives Nationales" is to be found in
Fremdling, Rainer, Britische Exporte undfranzösische Schutzzollpolitik, Zur Entstehung und
Auswirkung der Eisenzölle von 1822, in: Scripta Mercaturae, 14 (1980), pp. 55-70.
8. According to the calculation of a government official the ad valorem duty, including the
"decime" (tith), was raised from 70 to more than 120 percent, Archives Nationales F 12
2529, Report of the 18.8.1821; see also Arne, M., Etüde sur les tarifs de douanes et sur les trai-
tes de commerce, Paris 1876, p. 145.
9. See Tables A 1 and A 2 of the appendix.
10. Before the new duty was introduced bar iron produced from imported pig iron had to bear a
duty of 30 Francs. An input-output-coefficient of 1.5 was assumed. The additional pig iron
duty of 70 Francs multiplied by 1.5 was about the 100 Francs increase on the bar iron duty.
On details of this calculation see the report mentioned in footnote 8.
11. Continental producers could hardly attain the quality of British foundry pig iron for certain
purposes. This was e. g. clearly expressed in the minutes of the Enquete sur les fers, Paris
1829, pp. 103-110, 151.
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before the 1850's, and finally by the Cobden-Chevalier-treaty in 1861. But even then,
they still made up between 30 and 40% ad valorem on bar iron, and between 20 and
30% on pig iron.12
Table 1: French Iron Production, Imports and Exports, 1825-1870, thousands of
metric tons and ratios, annual averages
Years Pig Iron
Production
'
(P)
Imports
(PI)
Exports
(X)
x - n
X + PI
PI - X
P
1824/30 22o.9 8.8 0.9 -o.81 o.o4
1831/4o 293.6 13.4 0.4 -0.94 o.o4
1841/5o 447.2 49.9 0.4 -o.98 0.11
1851/60 78o.o 7o.7
a
(+ 19.4)3
o.8 -0.98
(-o.98)a
o.o9
(o.11)a
1861/7o 1,191.5 79.1
(+ 73.1)3
o.7 -o.98
(-o.99)a
o.o7
(o.13)a
Years
1
Bar Iron
production
(9)
Imports
(PI)
Exports
(X)
X - Fl
X + PI
PI - X
P
1825/30 148.6 6.9 0.5 -o.86 o.o4
1831/4o 195.2 5.5 o.5 -o.84 o.o3
1841/50 3o1.7 6.7 0.8 -o.8o o.o2
1851/60 48o.o 18.1 a
(+ L9)a
2*1
a
(+5.1)3
-o.79
(-o.47)a
o.o3
(o.o3)
1861/7o 767.o 12.2
(+16.4)3
2*5
a
(+28.9)a
-0.66
( o.o5)
o.ol
(-o.oo4)
1 including rails
a The "commerce special" is a category in uhich imports alloued under
the System of "admission temporaire" are not included. It can be
corrected by means of the follouing formula; S = commerce special;
G » commerce general (PI- - PI-) -(X„ - Xg).
Sources: See appendix.
12. Cf. Boiteau, Paul, Les traites de commerce, Texte de tous les traites en vigueur notamment des
traites conclus avec VAngleterre, la Belgique, la Prusse (Zollverein) et Vltalie, Paris 1863, p. 10;
duties on bar iron and rails were reduced to 70 and 60 Francs per metric ton, and on pig iron
to 25 and 20 Francs, in 1860 and 1864 respectively.
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Table 1 demonstrates which impact the French tariff policy had on imports and ex¬
ports. The ratios in the last column show the relation of net imports to production.
The export-import-ratios were calculated after a Suggestion of Bela Balassa.13 They
reflect the "revealed comparative advantage", and indicate differences in costs and
other factors determining international trade, e.g. tariffs and transportation costs.
The value of these ratios could fluctuate between plus and minus 1. A high positive
value reveals a comparative advantage, the opposite is true of negative values.
These ratios clearly show that France had considerable comparative disadvantages
concerning pig iron over the whole time-span. The high import duties, however, kept
the level of imports in relation to production during the 1820's and 1830's extremely
low. But the refining branch south of the Belgian-French border had been a con¬
sumer of Belgian pig iron for a long time, and this Belgian pig iron could be im¬
ported at less than half of the rate for British iron.14 So northern France continued
buying Belgian pig iron, and bought even more since the 1840's. This coke pig iron
was worked up to bar iron in modern puddling and rolling mills.15 The imports
amounted to around 10% of the indigenous production, and they remained high.
But from 1855 on, Belgian pig iron had to bear the same duty as the British
product. From that time on, British exports surpassed those of Belgium by far, a
striking evidence that British suppliers were still producers at the lowest costs inter¬
nationally.
Throughout the period the level of bar iron imports to France remained very low
compared to that of the French production. The export-import ratios reveal a clear
comparative disadvantage well into the 1850's. However, the system of "admission
temporaire" provided an incentive to exports for works in the south and centre of
France. This Virtual premium on exports helped improve the French international
trade position considerably.16 In the 1860's, France even became net-exporter of rails
and bar iron.
13. Balassa, Bela, Trade Liberalisation and "Revealed" Comparative Advantage, in: Manchester
School of Economic and Social Studies, (1965), pp. 102f. and pass.; see also Dumke, Rolf
H., The Political Economy ofGerman Unification: Tariffs, Trade and Politics ofthe Zollverein
Era, Diss. University of Wisconsin, Madison 1976, pp. 151, 186.
14. On Belgian pig iron a duty of between 40 and 60 Francs per metric ton was levied, Archives
Nationales F 12 2513, Question des fers, Report of 1841.
15. There are reports that in the early 1840's Belgian rolling masters founded rolling mills south
ot the Belgian border in France to work up Belgian pig iron to bar iron and rails, Stainier,
Emile, Histoire commerciate de la metatlurgie dans le district de Charleroi de 1829 ä 1867,
Charleroi 18732, pp. 45 f.
16. The system of "admission temporaire" worked in the following way: E.g. exporters of rails
to Spain got a certificate to import free of duty an equivalent of pig iron. In general the ex-
porter of rails—let us say an iron master in the south of France—did not use this certificate
("aquits-ä-caution") to import pig iron himself but he sold it to an importer of pig iron in the
north of France. On this see Lexis, W., Diefranzösischen Ausfuhrprämien im Zusammenhang
mit der Tarifgeschichte und Handelsentwicklung Frankreichs seit der Restauration, Bonn 1870,
pp. 400 ff.; Ministere de Tagriculture, du commerce et des travaux publics, Enquete sur !'ap~
plication du decret du 15 fevrier 1862, relatif ä Vimportation en franchise temporaire des me-
taux, Paris 1867, pp. 25 ff; Levasseur, E., Histoire du commerce de la France, vol. 2, Paris
1912, pp. 304ff.
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In the next section, I want to discuss the tariff policy of Prussia/Germany The
Prussian tariff of 1818 was later adopted by the Zollverein
17
It exercised a great in¬
fluence on determining the route over which the new iron techniques penetrated into
the western parts of Germany, namely the Rhineland and Westphaha
18
The tanff on bar iron was fixed at 60 Marks per ton
19
From 1825 to 1830, the first
years for which Prussian data on foreign trade are available, this tanff rate meant an
ad valorem duty of 40 to 21% The French tanff on Bntish iron at the same pnce was
four times as high
20
At first sight it is astonishing that there was no duty levied on
pig iron Imports It was treated as a raw material, which could enter the country free
of duty according to the conception of the 1818 Prussian tanff system At the time
when the Prussian tanff was established, Bntish coke pig iron did not play any role
on the German market And the free importation of pig iron was granted because
Prussian refinenes should work up charcoal pig iron from other German states
21
Thus, the Prussian tanff policy was comparatively liberal And it could afford to be
so, as dunng the 1820's and the early 1830's, Germany's indigenous producers were
not senously challenged by British exports Only in slump years, when British pnces
were extremely low, Bntish bar iron and some pig iron penetrated into traditionally
iron-producing regions of Germany But by and large the domestic charcoal iron in¬
dustry produced at costs low enough to meet Bntish competitors on its internal mar¬
kets The low level of British iron exports to Germany at this time was partly due to
the structure of demand in Germany Traditional consumers of iron still prefened
traditionally produced charcoal iron
22
The special set-up of the tariff, however, brought about a rather peculiar moderni¬
zation process of the German iron industry This became palpable when the railway
construction in Germany increased the demand for cheap mass-produced iron, which
happened since the mid-1830's Until the early 1840's, the new railway demand was
mainly satisfied by British producers But in the second stage the German pnmary
iron industry modermzed quickly German iron masters were soon capable of pro¬
ducing puddled and rolled iron They used imported coke pig iron from Britain, and
since 1844 increasingly from Belgium, too, and worked it up to bar iron or rails in
their modern iron works Usually these new rolling mills did not have any blast fur¬
nace to smelt their own pig iron So they remained dependent on pig iron Imports
17 See Ohnishi, Takeo, Zolltanfpolitik Preußens bis zur Gründung des Deutschen Zollvereins
Diss Göttingen 1973, p 1, Dumke, Political Economy pp 247 ff Treue, Wilhelm, Wirt-
schaftszustande und Wirtschaftspolitik in Preußen 1815-1825 Stuttgart 1937, pp 114-159
18 On the iron duties see Sering, Max, Geschichte der preussisch deutschen Eisenzolle von 1818
bis zur Gegenwart Leipzig 1882
19 Sering, Eisenzolle p 20 and Anhang 2
20 Based on bar iron pnces in Liverpool and pig iron pnces in Glasgow, the freight rate was as
sumed at 16 Mark per metric ton to French ports and at 21 Mark to the Prussian boarder on
the Rhine On the pnces see Gnffiths, Samual, Guide to the Iron Trade of Great Britain new
ed
,
n p 1967, pp 288f , Meade, Richard, The Coal and Iron Industries ofthe United King
dorn, London 1882, p 741
21 Oechelhäuser, Wilhelm, Der Zollverein Seine Verfassung sein handelspolitisches System und
die Entwicklung der Tarifsatze seit 1818 Frankfurt a M 1851, pp 58 f
22 At that time the finishing branches of the iron industry were still dominated by small, rural
works
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That is why the import Substitution process on the level of bar iron and rails was ac¬
companied by a dramatic increase of imported pig iron since the early 1840's.23
This development in the refining branches challenged the producers of charcoal
pig iron seriously. Just a bit of the incremental demand for railway construction was
directed to them, and even worse, their traditional customers of bar iron were learn¬
ing how to use puddled bars. And these had either been imported or more and more
of them had been produced in Germany from imported coke pig iron. In the early
1840's, this development coincided with very low prices on the world market.
To protect the smelting branch of the iron industry the Zollverein introduced a tar¬
iff on pig iron, which amounted to 20 Marks per ton. As a compensation for the in¬
creased input prices iron masters with their modern rolling mills now had to bear, the
duty on bar iron was raised accordingly, namely from 60 Marks to 90 Marks per
ton.24
In 1844, this specific tariff meant 70% ad valorem on bar iron, and nearly 30% on
pig iron, based on British prices before the German border on the Rhine. The com¬
parable French duties were two or three times as high.25
The 1844 tariff granted Belgium special treatment. Belgian iron exporters had to
bear only half of the pig iron duty and half of the incremental duty on bar iron. After
1844, therefore, Belgian coke pig iron succeeded at the expense of British iron, and
now rolling mills on the right bank of the Rhine also used Belgian instead of Scottish
pig iron. For some years, Belgium's exports to Germany even surpassed those from
Britain. So the Belgian success on exports markets proved Britain's world domina¬
tion there to be vulnerable.26
After 1854, Belgium lost her privilege, and even then she still exported large quan¬
tities into the Zollverein. The fact that Belgian producers maintained a strong posi¬
tion on the French and German market even after they had lost their preferential
treatment indicates that Belgium's productive capacity had grown considerably.27 At
least since the mid-1850's, Belgium produced iron at costs not much higher than in
Britain. But for all that, Belgian costs actually were a bit higher, which may be con-
23. This argument has been developed more thoroughly in Fremdling, Rainer, Railroads and
German Economic Growth: A Leading Sector Analysis with a Comparison to the United States
and Great Britain, in: Journal of Economic History, 37 (1977), pp. 583-604, and Fremdling,
Rainer, Britische Exporte und die Modernisierung der deutschen Eisenindustrie während der
Frühindustrialisierung, in: Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 68 (1981),
pp. 305-324.
24. An input-output-coefficient of 1.5 was assumed. The pig iron duty of 20 Mark per metric ton
multiplied by 1.5 matched the increase ofthe bar iron duty. See Sering, Eisenzölle, pp. 65 ff.,
74.
25. See footnote 20.
26. Sydow, Helmut, Die Handelsbeziehungen zwischen Belgien und dem Zollverein 1830-1885,
vol. 1, Cologne 1979, pp. 79ff.; Oechelhäuser, Wilhelm, Denkschrift über den Vertrag des
Zollvereins mit Belgien und die Lage der vereinsländischen Eisenindustrie, Frankfurt a.M.
1851, pp. 6 f. and pass.
27. The precise figures of Belgian exports broken down to receiving countries are to be found
in: Le Ministere de 1'Interieur, Tableau general du commerce de la Belgique avec les pays
etrangers, pendant Vannee 1,831 ff.
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cluded from larger British import shares both in Germany and in France during the
late 1850's and 1860's.
Table 2: German1 Iron Production, Imports and Exports, 1825-1870, thousands of
metric tons and ratios, annual averages
Years Pig Iron Imports Exports X - PI PI - X
production X + PI P
in (n) fx)
1825/3o 56.8 3.8 3.5 -o.o3 o.oo4
1831/33 71.o 5.0 1.9 -o.45 o.o4
1834/4o 149.0 14.2 1.8 -0.77 0.08
1841/So 196.4 75.2 1.8 -o.95 0.37
1851/6o 411.5 150.5 5.3 -a.93 o.35
1861/7o 1,o22.5 154.0 41.5 -o.5B 0.11
Years
2
Bar Iron
Production
(P)
Imports
(n)
Expor
(x)
ts X - PI
X + PI
PI - X
P
1825/3o
1831/33
34.1
4o.7
3.7
5.3
1.8
3.4
-o.35
-0.22
o.o6
o.o5
1834/40 66.0 13.1 2.3 -0.71 o.16
1841/5o 128.4 35.2 2.2 -o.88 o.26
1851/60 257.6 2o.1 6.1 -o.53 o.o5
1861/7o 528.5 13.9 28.8 o.35 -o.o3
1 until 1833 Prussia; from then on ths Zollverein
2 including rails
Sources; See appendix.
Table 2 reflects the shifts in the foreign trade position of Prussia or the Zollverein. In
the 1820's, the export-import-ratios for pig iron reveal no clear-cut comparative dis¬
advantage yet, but from the 1830's until the late 1850's, the ratios become unfavoura¬
ble. In the 1860's, Germany could improve her trade position by exporting large
quantities of bar iron, though the level of imports still remained quite high. The ex¬
traordinary importance of imports compared to the domestic production is shown in
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the last column of Table 2. These high ratios indicate that the development of the re¬
fining branch, the puddling and rolling mills, could not have been achieved without
Britain and Belgium delivering the necessary inputs. In this way the refining branch
with its bar iron and rail production modernized earlier and faster than the smelting
branch. The ratios for bar iron indicate that the comparative disadvantage became
more pronounced until the 1840's. The high net-imports in the late 1830*s and in the
1840's were mainly caused by the extraordinary demand for railway construction.
But from then on, the foreign trade position of Germany improved considerably. The
process of import Substitution was completed when Germany became a net-exporter
of rails and bar iron in the 1860's.
Looking back at the development of the German and French primary iron industry
one may briefly note some simüarities or differences: In Prussia/Germany the mod¬
ernization started later, but was carried through more rapidly than in France. By the
late 1850's, both countries had reached a similar technical level. This level can be de¬
fined as the degree to which mineral fuel was used for smelting and refining iron.28
In both countries, the second stage of primary iron production modernized sooner
and much faster than the first. Each of them became a net-exporter of bar iron and
rails in the 1860's. In both countries, pig iron imports still played a major role in the
1860's, thus providing the reflnery branches and foundries with cheap inputs at suffi¬
cient quantities. A principal difference lay in the tariff policy and the resultant role
of imports over the period: In France, high tariffs allowed a delayed, long-drawn and
rather smooth transition making more use of internal resources. In Germany, lower
tariffs led to a fast and rather abrupt change drawing considerably on external inter¬
mediate produets.29 It seems that by the 1860's both countries had acquired produc¬
tivity gains high enough for them to lower their tariffs on primary iron produets. At
this point, they simply could afford a Hberalization, e. g. that of the Cobden-Cheval¬
ier-treaty.30
The shifting international trade positions of west European countries are mirrored
in the British foreign trade statistics. The bulk ofthe data is not presented here, but is
confined to the shifts in British exports of bar iron and pig iron. Table 3 presents ra¬
tios of bar iron to pig iron, and they clearly indicate that right from the 1820's on¬
wards, Britain began losing her absolute advantage in the refining stage of the pri¬
mary iron industry much faster than in the smelting stage. In exporting huge amounts
of pig iron she even supported the catching-up process in other countries.
28. During the most part of the period in question both countries ranged far behind Belgium.
See Table A 1 of the appendix.
29. France exploited much longer the wealth of the charcoal iron producing regions, the
wood.
30. Mark per metric ton:
Pig iron: D 1865 = 15 M, 1868 = 10 M, 1870= 5 M;
F 1855 = 32 M, 1861 = 20 M, 1864= 18 M;
Bariron: D 1865 = 50 M, 1870 = 35 M;
F 1855-80 M, 1861 = 54 M; 1864 = 48 M
Sering, Eisenzölle, Anhang 2;
Archives Nationales F 12 2513, Etudes sur les resultats ...;
Boiteau, Traites, p. 10.
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Table 3: British Iron Exports, 1821-1870, thousands of metric tons and ratios,
annual average
Years Pig
total
Iron (1)
to Germany
+ Holland
Bar
total
Iron1 (2)
to Germany
+ Holland
Ratio
total
(2) / (1)2
to Germany
+ Holland
1821/25 4.5 o.2 3o.5 2.2 8.5 13.8
1826/3o 8.5 1.2 49.3 5.8 7.3 6.0
1831/35 21.6 2.1 76.4 9.1 4.4 5.4
1836/40 44.5 1o.3 112.8 14.9 3.2 1.8
1841/45 1o3.7 45.3 183.o 52.5 2.2 1.4
1846/50 165.0 43.7 3o4.3 36.3 2.3 1.o
1851/55 276.4 72.4 575.7 41.0 2.6 o.7
1856/60 366.1 136.3 742.2 64.0 2.5 o*6
1861/65 47o.o 157.2 627.5 48.8 1.7 0.4
1866/70 626.5 187.8 874.6 46.8 1.7 o.3
1 including rails
2 for bar iron a multiplier of 1.25 uas used to obtain pig iron
equivalents
Sources: See appendix.
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In the last section of this paper, I want to present some comparable data on costs and
prices mainly for 1860 or 1861. Further, I intend to measure productivity gains over
time by using price ratios of the major input and the output.
Table 4 gives data on variable costs. The cost structure within the iron industry is
relevant for the approach in which productivity levels are measured across countries
or over time periods. As already Donald N. McCIoskey31 has written in his study on
the British iron and steel industry, this sector is characterized by "material-intensity
and capital-lightness", notwithstanding common belief. Productivity measurement in
this industry has to take into account the peculiar structure of inputs.
"
'Productivity' is customarily defined as output per man or output per composite
unit of men and machines, setting aside inputs of material from other industries. Al¬
though this definition is appropriate for measuring productivity in the nation as a
whole, it is not for measuring it in one industry alone, whatever the end in view. It is
inappropriate if the measure is meant to reflect the increased national income gener¬
ated by technological change or improved efficiency in the industry, for these events
31. McCIoskey, Donald, N., Economic Maturity and Entrepreneurial Decline, British Iron and
Steel, 1870-1913, Cambridge Mass. 1973, p. 74.
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release for alternative employment the labor and capital embodied in materials used
by the industry as well as the labor and capital used directly. And it is also inappro¬
priate if the measure is meant to reflect the responsiveness of entrepreneurs to mar¬
ket pressures to minimize costs, for these pressures induce entrepreneurs to save ma¬
terials as well as labor and capital directly employed in the industry. Measures of
productivity change for single industries should inciude material inputs."
The shares which costs of fuel and iron ore took, clearly reveal that material inputs
made up most of the costs of pig iron production by far. But there are striking varia¬
tions among different countries, regions or enterprises in the shares of costs of fuel or
Table 4: Pig Iron Costs, percent and Mark (M) per metric ton
Year Country
(0
Fuel in
* of (3)
I:
%
(2)
ron Ore
of (3)
(3)
in Variable
Costs
(D 1841 Blair
Scotiand (GB)
32.2 46.7 29.9 pi
(2) 1843 Champagne (F) 68.2 14.2 113.0 PI charcoal pig
iron (includes
"frais generaux")
(3) 1847 Dowlais
South-Uales (GB)
24.3 61.4 56.2 PI
(4) 1846/
1847
9.A.PIarcinelle
et Couillet (GB)
29.3 42.9 79.o M
(5) 1847 S.A.Esperance
Seraing (8)
32.1 30.2 7o.2 PI
(6) 1848 S.A. Cockerill
Seraing (B)
42.8
43.3
44.1
41.6
75.9 PI pig for
castings
48.3 M forge pig
(7) 186o S.A. Cockerill 3o.3-31.4 53-54 56-54 PI
Seraing (B)
(8) 186o Alais 54.1 33.9 54.6 P) pig for rails
Dipt. Gard (F) 54.2-57.2 38.0-37.7 83.7-89.0 PI pig for "fer
marchand"
(9) 1861/
1862
Hochdahl
Düsseldorf (D)
27.7 57.8 71.6 PI
(lo) 1862 Siegerland
Uestphalia(D)
59.7 36.9 67.o PI charcoal pig
iron
(11) 1867 France
Auerage (F)
62.9 16.4 52.o-56.o PI
(12) 1867 Cleveland (GB) 46.2 32.9 48.8 PI
1 Franc = o.8 Plark = o.8 Shilling; GB ¦ Great Britain, F ¦ France,
B = Belgium, D = Germany.
Sources: See appendix.
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ore Besides my British data in Table 4, which vary considerably, one can draw on
Robert Allen's data
32
In the 1850's, fuel costs made up 44% of nable costs in Cleve¬
land, 22% in Scotiand, and 18% in South Wales, whereas the fuel shares of Cockenll
and Hochdahl amounted to around 30%, and the extremely high French values were
around 60% The last figure was matched or even surpassed by traditional charcoal
blast furnaces
All these data, and I could add more on different regions and periods, support the
Statement, that one cannot assume a world, which followed a Cobb-Douglas-produc-
tion-function for the period in question The data do not fit into a system with con¬
stant factor shares and the same corresponding elasticities of production across
countnes and over time Hence, this theoretically easy way to combine output-mput-
ratios to indices of total factor productivity cannot be pursued This procedure would
have been comphcated on empincal grounds anyway During the time-span from the
1820's to the 1860's, it is extremely difficult to get reliable and representative time se¬
nes on physical mput-output-quantities and ratios as e g the coke rate
33
The Infor¬
mation is rather sparse and fragile, and could easily lead to enors in measurement
I suppose, a safer way to measure productivity gains over time might be to use
pnce senes of output and inputs Within the framework of neoclassical theory, as it
was put forward by Donald N McCIoskey and others, this approach might be equi¬
valent to the use of physical mput-output-quantities
34
Even in penods, when suffi¬
cient competition is not always granted, prices could be used to estimate productivity
over time
"One way to apply the reasoning is to compare the prices of produets at different
dates The price of a fmished product, heavy steel rails, say, rose and feil because of
changes in the pnces of inputs, changes in productivity, and changes in the degree of
monopoly power The pnce of the most important input, pig iron, is readily availa¬
ble The observed ratio of the rail price to the pig iron price will reflect productivity
and the degree of monopoly power The trend in the ratios is an estimate of the
trend of productivity in railmaking
"35
Following this reasoning I estimated the growth rates in Table 5 At first I refer to
the pig iron production As it is commonly assumed that ore requirements are not
subject to productivity improvements,361 only used the other major input, the fuel, to
detect productivity changes over time
37
Due to the lack of data I had to calculate the
32 Allen, Robert, C, International Competition in Iron and Steel, 1850-1913, in Journal of
Economic History, 39 (1979), p 921
33 I e the amount of coke needed to produce one ton of pig iron For Britain Riden has re
cently emphasized that it was extremely difficult if not impossible at all to get consistent
time senes on physical consumption of raw materials, Riden, Philip J , The Iron Industry in
Church, Roy (ed ), The Dynamics of Victorian Business, London 1980, pp 71 ff
34 McCIoskey, Economic Maturity pp 29, 86, Temin, Peter, Iron and Steel in Nineteenth-Cen¬
tury America Cambridge Mass 1964, p 187
35 McCIoskey, Economic Maturity pp 24 f
36 McCIoskey, Economic Maturity pp 77 f , Allen, Robert C , The Peculiar Productivity Histon
of American Blast Furnaces 1840-1913 in Journal of Economic History, 37 (1977), p 608
37 E g Labour costs usually were below 10 percent, Isard, Walter, Some Locational Factors in
the Iron and Steel Industry since the Early Nineteenth Century in Journal of Pohtical Econ
omy, 56 (1948), p 203, footnote 4
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growth rates for different comparable time periods With the exception of the De¬
partment Loire and the Ruhr area the ratios of pig iron to fuel prices show the ex¬
pected picture Continental countries or regions achieved considerably higher pro¬
ductivity gains between 1845 (or 1850) and 1870 than Britain
Thus, the shifting foreign trade position between Britain and Continental coun¬
tnes, with these countnes lowering their import duties mainly in the 1860's, corre¬
sponds very well with the fact described here, that Continental iron producers were
able to reduce the cost differences in producing pig iron Bntain remained producer
at lowest costs, however
Obviously, Continental iron masters had been forced to economize on fuel rather
early, whereas British producers had been used to drawing on cheap readily available
fuel This is explicitly stated in the Report on Coal
38
"It is certain that until recentiy there has been both an enormous waste of fuel in
the production of heat, and a considerable waste of heat when produced, m all fur¬
naces in which it has been necessary to obtain an elevated temperature
"
In the min-
utes to this report, Isaac Lowthian Bell, an authority on the iron industry, said
39
"If
you go back 40 years the small coal was so complete a drug in the market that
immense quantities were wasted, the consequence was that an immense quantitiy
of coal was left under ground, and the portion which was separated by the screens
was allowed to accumulate at the pit head, and there it took fire and was lost"
In this case it seems that Continental iron masters enjoyed the advantage of back¬
wardness At a time when Bntain could still draw on her immense supplies of cheap
fuel Continental producers were much more forced to apply fuel-saving devices
Thus, the Continent rapidly adopted the hot blast, which had been developed in
Scotiand, but which was applied in other British iron producing regions rather hesi-
tantly
40
And there were innovations on the Continent to use the waste gases of the
blast furnace to heat the hot blast and subsequently puddling furnaces as well Not
by accident was the utihzation of waste gases developed within the field of tradi¬
tional charcoal iron industry, which was much more under pressure to economize on
fuel
41
I have mentioned above that the Ruhr area and the Departement Loire had excep-
tionally low growth rates concerning the ratios for pig iron In order to explain why
the Departement Loire in the south of France merely achieved significantly lower
productivity gains than the Departement Nord, specific enterprises in both regions
38 Report ofthe Commisswners Appointed to Inquire into Serveral Matters Relating to Coal in the
United Kingdom in Parhamentary Papers, XVIII (1871), p 96
39 Reportfrom the Select Committee on Coal with the Proceedings ofthe Committee Minutes of
Evidence in Parhamentary Papers, X (1873), p 237
40 The introduction ofthe hot blast led to drastic reductions in fuel consumption Thus its cost
saving function was highest where fuel costs were highest Within Bntain this was true of
Scotiand compared to South-Wales and internationally it was true of Continental countnes
compared to Bntain Hyde, Technological Change pp 146-159, Bell, Isaac Lowthian, The
Iron Trade ofthe United Kingdom Compared with ofthe other chief Iron-Making Nations
London 1886, p 100
41 E g in Württemberg (southern Germany), where since 1830 Faber du Faur had developed
several devices to use waste gases Beck, Ludwig, Die Geschichte des Eisens in technischer und
kulturgeschichtlicher Beziehung 1801-1860 Braunschweig 1899, pp 412ff, 434f
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ought to be scrutinized and compared. But let me simply try an informed guess here:
It is conspicuous that the Departement Loire considerably increased its productivity
of rail-making, as measured in Table 5. My explanation for this seeming inconsis¬
tency is that pig iron prices here do not reflect the considerable improvements in the
quality of the pig iron produced. I assume that over time in this region the amount of
pig iron necessary to produce a certain quantity of rails had dropped considerably. I
know this for sure concerning a comparable region, the Departement Aveyron. There
the quantity of pig iron needed to produce rails dropped dramatically, whereas the
prices of pig iron feil only slightly.42 This argument gives a hint of the limitations of
measuring productivity changes over time by using price data. Certainly, this ap¬
proach is biased when quality changes are not taken into account.
The case of the Ruhr area requires a different explanation. The most striking evi¬
dence here seems to be the lateness of introducing coke blast furnaces into this re¬
gion. The first one was successfully put into blast only in 1849.43 Given the fact that
the Ruhr area had drawn considerably on cheap foreign coke pig iron for quite a
time it seems plausible that entrepeneurs could afford to wait for the blast furnace to
have developed a high practice Standard. And only then did the Ruhr iron masters
enter the pig iron market and erect a lot of modern blast furnaces of their own.
Hence, the works of Hochdahl, which were considered to be representative of the
price and qualitiy of forge pig iron, could experience only slight decreases in costs
during the 1860's: Having taken up the production of pig iron in 1861 at a highly
modern Standard they could hardly develop further in the 1860's.44
Let me now turn to the refining sector. The overwhelming cost factor to produce
bar iron or rails is pig iron, which amounted to usually more than 50%.45 If we ex¬
clude rail prices the trend functions on the ratios of bar iron to pig iron prices are not
significant. By this measure the refining branch does not show any traceable produc¬
tivity gains, neither in Britain nor on the Continent.46 But the fact that bar iron prices
moved parallel to pig iron prices intimates that there must have been certain produc¬
tivity gains in the refining branch, too.
42. E.g. in the Departement Aveyron the extraordinary amount of 1.75 tons of pig iron was
needed to produce one ton of bar iron in 1834. The average price for pig iron was 70 Mark
per metric ton between 1834 and 1840, and 72 Mark between 1861 and 1870, compiled from
the various issues ofthe French mineral statistics: Source, see the note on France of Table 5.
As suggested by Francois Crouzet in the discussion of this paper the Departement Loire had
already developed the best practice Standard very early, therefore the possibility of produc¬
tivity gains in the years to come could not exceed those of the pacemaker i. e. Britian.
43. Lange-Kothe, Irmgard, Die ersten Kokshochöfen in Deutschland, besonders im Rheinland und
in Westfalen, in: Stahl und Eisen, 85 (1965), pp. 1053-1061.
44. On the costs of the Hochdahl iron works see Reichs-Enquetefür die Eisenindustrie, n. p. or d.,
p. 254; as another example, where the coke rate did not show any decrease from 1854 to
1870, the "Eisenhütte Berge-Borbeck'* is presented by Fischer, Wolfram, Herz des Reviers,
Essen 1965, pp. 100 f.
45. Conseil superieur de Fagriculture, du commerce et de Pindustrie, Enquete, Traite de com¬
merce avec VAngleterre, Industrie metallurgique, vol. 1, Paris 1860, p. 643f.; Glamorgan Re¬
cord Office Cardiff, Dowlais Works, D/DG Sect. C Box 4.
46. Concerning Britain see Hyde, Technological Change, pp. 166, 176.
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As the technology of puddling and rolling was rather easy to adopt it was applied
everywhere in the relevant Continental countries quite successfully already in the
1820's. Since these techniques could be used to work up charcoal pig iron as well (it
was often mixed with coke pig iron) the modern mineral fuel techniques spread
much faster through in this stage than the coke blast furnace.47 Hence, it seems plau-
Table 6: Pig Iron Prices at the Works, Mark (M) per metric ton, 1860 or 1861
D (D Düren (l8ft bank of the Rhine
near Aachen)
75 n
85.3 M (charcoal pig)
(2) Dortmund (eastern Ruhr) 81.7 n
(3) Oberhausen (uestern Ruhr) 76.3 M
(4) Düsseldorf (Hochdahl) 85.1 M
(5) Georgs-Marien-Hütte
(south of Osnabrück) 84.4 M
(6) Upper--Silesia 66-72 M
ti 9o M (charcoal pig)
B (7) Seraiiig (S.A. Cockerill) 6o-64 P)
(8) National Average 63.6-65.1 PI
ii 1o2.5-1o5.9 M (charcoal pig)
F O) Dept. Haute Marne 99 M (charcoal pig)
(1o) Dept. Nord 96-1o1 PI
(11) D&pt. Loire 81-84 M
(12) Dfipt. Aveyron 8o m
(13) Dßpt. SaÖne-et-Loire 76-77 M
(14) Dept. Mo seile 74-75 M
n 124-128 n (charcoal pig)
GB (15) Glasgow 48.5-52.9 M
(16) South Wales 69.0-83.1 H
Import Duties: D 2o PI p t
B 16 M p t
F 32 M p t (2o |*l from 1861 onwards)
Costs of transportation to Continental ports, around: 16 PI p t
Sources: See appendix.
47. France is a good example, for the 1820*s see Enquete sur les fers, pass.
167
sible that already during the mid-1840's the costs for working up pig iron were not
significantly different from those in Britain. And still existing productivity differ¬
ences, e. i. of the puddlers, which are reported by contemporary observers, were com-
pensated for by adequate reductions in wages on the Continent.
To conclude the tentative reasoning on the data presented in Table 5 a major
shortcoming should be mentioned: The whole charcoal iron industry was missed out,
although this branch was still very important in the mid-century. For example in the
years of 1848 to 1850, in France only 41% ofthe pig iron were smelted with coke as a
fuel and in Prussia only 23%.48 Therefore, a thorough analysis of the primary iron
sector from the 1820 to the 1860's has to pay due regard to this traditonal branch.
But notwithstanding all developments on the Continent, it is worth repeating that
even around 1860 Britain had in general maintained her position as lowest cost pro¬
ducer, both of pig iron and of bar iron. Comparing prices (as shown in Table 6) it is,
however, pretty clear that the still existing import duties and transportation costs al¬
lowed indigenous producers in France, Belgium and Germany to satisfy the demand
in most parts of their home countries at prices equal to the British prices or even
lower.
Appendix
Sources on Table 1:
On the production figures see the notes on Table AI. On the foreign trade figures see
Administration des Douanes, Tableau general du commerce de la France avec ses colo¬
nies et lespuissances etrangeres, pendant Vannee..., Paris..., Years 1825-1870.
Sources on Table 2:
On the production figures see Marchand, Säkularstatistik, pp. 88, 115, 129. On the
foreign trade figures see Ferber, C. W., Beiträge zur Kenntniß des gewerblichen und
commerciellen Zustandes der preußischen Monarchie, Berlin 1829, pp. 29ff.; Ferber,
C. W., Neue Beiträge..., 1832, p. 23; Dieterici, C. F. W., Statistische Uebersicht der
wichtigsten Gegenstände des Verkehrs und Verbrauchs im preußischen Staate und im
deutschen Zollverbande, in dem Zeiträume von 1831 bis 1836, Berlin 1838, p. 95; Ser¬
ing, Max, Geschichte der preussisch-deutschen Eisenzölle von 1818 bis zur Gegenwart,
Leipzig 1882, pp. 290 f.
Sources on Table 3:
The iron export data are to be found in the respective yearly volume of the Parlia¬
mentary Papers. Cf. 1825 XXI; 1829 XVII; 1830-31 X; 1831-32 XXXIV; 1833
XXXIII; 1835XLVIII; 1839 XLVI; 1840 XLIV; 1842 XXXIX; 1843 LH; 1844 XLV;
1845 XLVI; 1846 XLIV; 1847-48 LVIII; 1849 L; 1851 LIII; 1854 LXVI; 1854-55 LI;
1856 LVI; 1857 XXXV; 1857-58 LIV; 1859 XXVIII; 1860 LXIV; 1861 LX; 1862
48. Cf. Table A 1 of the appendix.
168
LVI; 1863 LXV; 1864 LVII; 1865 LH; 1866 LXVIII; 1867 LXVI; 1867-68 LXVII;
1868-69 LVIII; 1870 LXIII; 1871 LXIII P. IL Exports to Ireland, the Channel Is¬
lands (Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney) and the Isle of Man were subtracted from the total.
Sources on Table 4:
(1) Hyde, Charles K., Technological Change and the British Iron Industry, 1700-
1870, Princeton 1977, p. 153;
(2) Archives Nationales Paris, F 12 2223, Fonderies de Dammarie to Le Directeur
General des Forets, 16.-11.-1843;
(3) Glamorgan Record Office Cardiff, Dowlais Works, D/DG Sect. C Box 4;
(4) - (6) Valerius, Benoit, Theoretisch-praktisches Handbuch der Roheisen-Fabrika¬
tion (German by C. Hartmann), Freiberg 1851, pp. 474-478;
(7) Conseil superieur de l'agriculture, du commerce et de Tindustrie, Enquete, Trai-
te de commerce avec VAngleterre, Industrie metallurgique, vol. 1, Paris 1860, pp.
640 f.
(8) Archives Nationales Paris, F 12 2884, Rapport... sur le prix de revient de la
fönte et du fer dans les usines du Departement du Gard par M. Dupont, pp.
17f.;
(9) Reichs-Enquete für die Eisenindustrie 1878, n.p. or d., p. 254;
(10) Wedding, Hermann, Die Resultate des Bessemer'sehen Processes für die Darstel¬
lung von Stahl und Aussichten desselben für die rheinische und westfälische Eisen-
resp. Stahlindustrie, in: Zeitschrift für das Berg-, Hütten- und Salinenwesen, 11
(1863), p. B. 265;
(11) Ministere de l'agriculture, du commerce et des travaux publics, Enquete sur Tap-
plication du decret du 15 fevrier 1862, relatif ä l'importation en franchise tempo¬
raire des metaux, Paris 1867, p. 215;
(12) Report ofthe Commissioners appointed to inquire into the several matters relating
to Coal in the United Kingdom, vol. 1, in: Parliamentary Papers, 18 (1871), p.
151.
Sources on Table 5:
Great Britain, coke pig iron at Glasgow: Meade, Richard, The Coal and Iron In¬
dustries of the United Kingdom, London 1882, p. 741; Sering, Geschichte, p. 302.
Hard coal, Annual average price of all exports: Mitchell, B. R. and Deane, Phyllis,
Abstract of British Historical Statistics, Cambridge 1962, p. 483. Bar Iron at Liver¬
pool: Griffiths, Samual, Guide to the Iron Trade of Great Britain, new ed., n.p.
1967, pp. 288 f.
Belgium, coke pig iron, national average: Reuss, Conrad et al, Le Progres Economi¬
que en Siderurgie, Belgique, Luxembourg, Pays-Bas, 1830-1955, Louvain 1960, p.
396. Hard coal: Stainier, Emile, Histoire commerciale de la metallurgie dans le dis¬
trict de Charleroi de 1829 ä 1867, see. ed. Charleroi 1873, Appendix VI; Commis¬
sion Centrale de Statistique, Expose de la Situation du Royaume de 1861 d 1875,
Brüssels 1885, vol. II, p. 646. Bar Iron (i.e. "fers finis") and Rails: Reuss et al., Pro¬
gres, p. 400.
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France, coke pig iron, bar iron ("gros fer, fer marchand"), rails: Compiled from the
various issues of the French mineral statistics, Direction generale des ponts et
chaussees et des mines, Compte rendu des travaux des Ingenieurs des mines pendant
Vannee... (1833-1835), Paris 1834-1836; Ministere du commerce et des travaux
publics, Direction generale des ponts et chaussees et des mines, Resume des trav¬
aux statistiques ... (1835-1836), Paris 1836-1837; Ministere des travaux publies et
du commerce, Resume des travaux statistiques de Vadministration des mines en ...
(1837-1846), Paris 1838-1847; Ministere de l'agriculture, du commerce et des trav¬
aux publics, Direction des mines, Resume des travaux statistiques de Vadministra-
tion des mines en ... (1847-1872), Paris 1854-1877. Hard coal: Ministere des trav¬
aux publics, Statistique de Vindustrie minerale et des appareils ä vapeur en France et
en Algerie pour Fannee 1893, Paris 1894, diagramme 1.
Germany, Ruhr, coke pig iron: Däbritz, Walther, Entstehung und Aufbau des rhei¬
nisch-westfälischen Industriebezirks, in: Matschoß, Conrad (ed.), Beiträge zur Ge¬
schichte der Technik und Industrie, 15, Berlin 1925, p. 1906. Hard coal: Holtfrerich,
Carl-Ludwig, Quantitative Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Ruhrkohlenbergbaus im 19.
Jahrhundert, Dortmund 1973, pp. 22f. Bar iron: Holtfrerich, Quantitative Wirt¬
schaftsgeschichte, pp. 145 f.
Upper Silesia: Jacobs, Alfred and Richter, H., Die Großhandelspreise in Deutschland
von 1792 bis 1934, Berlin 1935, pp. 62f.
Sources on Table 6:
(1) Zeitschrift für das Berg-, Hütten- und Salinenwesen, 9 (1861), p. 14.
(2/3) Zeitschrift für das Berg-, Hütten- und Salinenwesen, 10 (1862), p. 170.
(4) Reichs-Enquete, p. 254.
(5) Reichs-Enquete, p. 272.
(6) Zeitschrift für das Berg-, Hütten- und Salinenwesen, 10 (1862), p. 167.
(7) See note (7) on Table 4.
(8) Reuss, et al., Progres, p. 396.
(9)-(14) Ministere de l'agriculture, du commerce et des travaux publics, Direction
des mines, Resume des travaux statistiques de Vadministration des mines en 1860
ä 1864, Paris 1867.
(15) See note on Table 5.
(16) Archives Nationales, Paris, F 12 2513, copy from the Mining Journal.
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Table A 1: Iron Production in Belgium (B), France (F) and Prussia (P), 1836-1870,
thousands of metric tons and percentages
Year Pig Iron Production Bar Iron Production
1ooo tons by coke or 1ooo tons by hard coal
mixed fuel
1836 B 1o1.4-115.B 67,5-71.5
F 3o8.4 15.0 21o.6 47.3
P 88.7 5o. 5 32.1
1837 B 118.1 72.1
F 331.7 15.9 224.6 51.o
P 99.5 9.6 58.7 31.8
1842 B 81.3 9o.8
F 399.5 25.6 284.8 61.1
P 1o1.o 18.0 79.3 39.5
1847 B 248.4 89.5 8o.9
F 591.6 42.6 376.7 74.3
P 137.9 158.5 7o.2
1848/ B 151 .5 89.8 65.9
185o
F 43o.8 4o,9 255.3 71.4
P 126.7 22.7 117.8 59.3
1851/ B 274.3 95.7 143.1
186o
F 78o.o 58.6 48o.o 79.9
P 3o5.5 38.3 239.8 85.4
1861/ B 442.2 99.2 358.8
187o
F 1191.5 84.1 767.0 9o.6
P 819.9 91.5
Notes and sources on Table A1: The bar iron production includes rails. For Belgium
this category represents total wrought iron production. The years were chosen accord¬
ing to information available for Prussia. On France and partly Belgium more Infor¬
mation is published in the cited sources.
Belgium: 1836, 1837, 1842, own estimate based on the number of furnaces in blast.
For the calculation methods see Fremdling, Rainer, Untersuchungen zur Modernisie¬
rung der Eisenindustrie in Westeuropa 1820-1860, manuscript 1982.
For the other years, Statistique generale de la Belgique, Expose de la Situation du
Royaume, 1841-1850, 1851-1860, 1861-1875, Brüssels 1852, 1865, 1885.
France: All years are covered, in: Ministere de l'agriculture, du commerce et des
travaux publics, Direction des mines, Resume des travaux statistiques de Vadministra¬
tion des mines en ... (1847-1872), Paris 1854, 1861, 1867, 1874, 1877.
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Prussia: On pig iron production see Marchand, Hans, Säkularstatistik der deutschen
Eisenindustrie, Essen 1939, pp. 39, 88; on the production by charcoal for 1837, 1842,
1849 see Oechelhäuser, Wilhelm, Vergleichende Statistik der Eisen-Industrie aller
Länder und Erörterung ihrer ökonomischen Lage im Zollverein, Berlin 1852, p. 35; for
1848 see Althans, E.s Zusammenstellung der statistischen Ergebnisse des Bergwerks-,
Hütten- und Salinenbetriebes in dem preußischen Staate während der zehn Jahre von
Table A 2: French Iron Imports, 1815-1828, thousands of metric tons and
percentages
Year Bar Iron from
(fer en barres) Great Britain Belgium Susden/Noruay
tons % % %
1815 6.9
1816 4.0
1817 13.8
1818 1o.1
18-jg 1o.7
182o 8.9
1821 13.8
1822 5.1
1823 4.5
1824 5.8
1825 6.1
1826 9.6
1827 7.3
1828 6.6
76.8 1o.1 ?
79.2 4.9 ?
48.5 8.1 37.1
33.7 6.7 53.9
17.7 3.0 67.1
? ? ?
? ? ?
6.7 o.7 74.3
15.9 o.3 72.3
Pig Iron (fönte brüte)
1815 0.9
1816 2.3
1817 2.8
1818 3.4
1819 2.7
182o 5.4
1821 7.7
1822 8.3
1823 7.8
1824 7.2
1825 7.4
1826 11.4
1827 7.8
182B 8.8
35.6 42.0
3o.7 41.5
41.7 39.0
24.9 47.4
? ?
? ?
28.6 46.1
29.9 44.2
All figures are related to the "commerce special", i.e. imports
entering the French market for consumption.
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1852 bis 1861, in: Zeitschrift für das Berg-, Hütten- und Salinenwesen in dem preu¬
ßischen Staate, Suppl. to vol. 10 (1863) p. 85; for 1850 see Oechelhäuser, Wilhelm,
Die Eisenindustrie des Zollvereins in ihrer neueren Entwicklung, Duisburg 1855, p. 14;
for 1851-1870 see Marchand, Säkularstatistik, p. 39.
On bar iron production see Marchand, SäkularStatistik, p. 88; on the production
by hard coal for 1836 see Marchand, Säkularstatistik, p. 37; for 1837, 1842, 1847-
1860 see Althans, Zusammenstellung, p. 101.
Sources on Table A 2:
Ministere du Commerce et des Manufactures, Enquete sur les fers, Paris 1829, pp. 21,
23; Douanes Royales de France, Tableau des quantites et de la valeur approximative
des marchandises etrangeres importees en France pour la consommation pendant Van-
nee..., Paris..., Years 1820-1824; Administration des Douanes, Tableau general du
commerce de la France avec ses colonies et les puissances etrangeres, pendant Van-
nee..., Paris..., Years 1825-1828; Archives Nationales, F 12 2513.
Table A 3: British Iron Exports to France, 1815-1828
Year Bar Iron Pig Iron
1ooo of as percentage 1ooo of as percentage
metric tons of total metric tons of total
exports exports
1815 o.o9 0.5
1816 1.1 5.3
1817 11.8 34.3
1818 8.8 2o.8
1819 5.3 22.3
182o 7.7 21.1
1821 11.4 33.7
1822 2.6 7.6
1823 2.4 7.1
1824 1.4 5.5
1825 1.5 5.9
1826 2.7 8.0
1827 1.7 3.8
1828 2.1 4.1
o.8 19.9
o.9 27.8
o.2 16.6
1.4 52.0
3.1 68.1
3.4 66.1
4.1 53.1
0.9 43.7
1.1 37.7
3.9 58.3
2.7 37.8
2.2 28.4
Exports to Ireland, the Isle of Plan and to the Channel Islands
were subtracted from total exports.
Source: Parliamentary Papers, 1819, vol. XVI; 1825, vol. XXI; 1829, vol. XVII.
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Zusammenfassung:
Außenhandelsstruktur, technischer Wandel, Kosten und Produktivität
in der Eisenindustrie Westeuropas, 1720-1870
Dieser Aufsatz ist Teil eines umfassenderen Projektes, in dem die Diffusion des
Koksschmelzens und des Puddelverfahrens in Belgien, Frankreich und Deutschland
von den 1820er Jahren bis in die 1860er Jahre untersucht wird. Großbritannien als
wirtschaftlich führendes Land in der Eisenindustrie ist darin vorrangig in seiner Mo¬
dellfunktion sowie als Exporteur primärer Eisenprodukte (Roh- und Stabeisen) ein¬
bezogen. Wesentliches Anliegen der Arbeit ist, den Diffusionsprozeß aus ökonomi¬
schen Erwägungen zu erklären. Damit soll der gängige Fehler vermieden werden,
technische Fortschritte verkürzt mit wirtschaftlichen gleichzusetzen. Traditionelle
Verfahren oder teilweise modernisierte Techniken waren nämlich lange Zeit den je¬
weils „modernsten" Techniken unter wirtschaftlichen Gesichtspunkten (d. h. hinsicht¬
lich der Produktionskosten) durchaus ebenbürtig.
Aus der umfangreicheren Themenstellung werden hier zwei Teilbereiche herausge¬
griffen, und zwar:
1. Strukturwandlungen des Außenhandels,
2. Produktivitätsentwicklungen im Vergleich von Regionen bzw. Ländern.
Die Strukturwandlungen des Außenhandels (Punkt 1) wurden zwischen Frankreich
und Deutschland verglichen. Als ausgeprägte Unterschiede erwiesen sich dabei die
Zollpolitik und die Rolle von Importen. In Frankreich ermöglichten hohe Zolltarife
einen verzögerten, langgezogenen Übergang zur Steinkohlentechnologie, wobei man
stärker auf vorhandene inländische Ressourcen zurückgriff. In Deutschland dagegen
bewirkten die niedrigen Zolltarife einen schnellen und eher abrupten Wechsel, wobei
in beträchtlichem Ausmaß Zwischenprodukte (Roheisen) von außerhalb eingesetzt
wurden. In den späten 1850er Jahren hatten beide Länder in der primären Eisenin¬
dustrie ungefähr den gleichen technischen Standard erreicht. Die Produktionskosten
waren dann so weit gesenkt, daß man sich die niedrigen Zolltarife im Rahmen des
Cobden-Chevalier-Vertrages leisten konnte.
Unter Punkt 2 wurde versucht, die Produktivitätsentwicklung bei der Herstellung
von Roheisen und Stabeisen zu messen, indem die Outputpreise dem Preis des wich¬
tigsten Inputs (nämlich Steinkohle für das Roheisen und Roheisen für das Stabeisen)
im Trend gegenübergestellt wurden. In der Roheisenerzeugung zeigten die kontinen¬
taleuropäischen Länder in der Zeit zwischen 1845/1850 und 1870 deutlich höhere
Produktivitätsfortschritte als Großbritannien. In der Stabeisenherstellung dagegen,
d.h. beim Puddel- und Walzprozeß, wiesen alle Länder kaum Produktivitätsfort¬
schritte auf. All diese Kosten- und Preisvergleiche zeigen aber, daß Großbritannien
in den 1860er Jahren immer noch der Anbieter zu niedrigsten Preisen war, wenn¬
gleich kontinentaleuropäische Eisenproduzenten inzwischen so weit aufgeholt hat¬
ten, daß sie unter dem Schutz der noch immer existierenden Zolltarife und der Trans¬
portkosten ihr Eisen in ihren Ländern ebenso billig, wenn nicht gar billiger anzubie¬
ten vermochten.
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Rainer Metz
"Long Waves" in English and German Economic Historical
Series from the Middle of the Sixteenth to the Middle
of the Twentieth Century*.
/. State of research and scientific interest
Upswings and downswings taking irregulär courses, exhibiting both different rates of
Variation and changing directions, and which moreover manifest themselves in eco¬
nomic time-series, and thus indicate phases of prosperity and depression of capitalist
economies, at least for the last 150-200 years, constitute the empirical background on
which the current discussion about the phenomenon of "long waves" is taking
place.1 It is chiefly in recent discussions that the attempt has been made to integrate
these long wave cyclical fluctuations into an approach which Starts from the study of
all relevant economic and social factors This approach tries to find out, to what ex¬
tent economic, political, and social events are dependent on such fluctuations.2
Although such an approach implies the conviction that it is worth while dealing
with "long waves", it should not be overlooked, however, that this conception has
departed a long way from a view which regards ups and downs as the regulär course
of all economic and historical events.3 The hypothesis of a fundamentally cychcal
course inherent in the system, which is basic to the classic theory,4 seems to be of mi-
* I owe much gratitude to my esteemed teacher Prof Dr Franz Irsigler for his engaged help
and useful contributions to the discussion while I was composmg this paper
1 For the current discussion see Petzina, D , van Roon, G Konjunktur, Knse, Gesellschaft
Wirtschaftliche Wechsellagen und soziale Entwicklung im 19 und 20 Jahrhundert (Ge
schichte und Gesellschaft Bochumer Historische Studien, Bd 25) Stuttgart 1981, and
Schröder, W H , Spree, R Historische Konjunkturforschung Stuttgart 1980
2 See Petzma's comments on this approach "Lange Wellen" und "Wechsellagen" Die der¬
zeitige Diskussion In Petzina/Roon Konjunktur, Knse, Gesellschaft (supra, n 1), p 17,
as to the problems attached to such a view see Schröder/Spree Histonsche Konjunkturfor¬
schung (supra, n 1) Important impulses were given by Hans Rosenberg's book Große De¬
pression und Bismarckzeit Berlin 1967, who attributed a twofold function to the long oscil-
lations of the economic development One of these functions was to be "reales Erkenntnis¬
objekt, . , ebenso Ergebnis wie Anlaß von spezifischen Wirkungszusammenhangen, loc
cit., p. 19
3. The evident trend phases constitute the actual object of investigation, the question whether
they necessarily recur as cyclical fluctuations, or not, is of secondary importance
4 This paper cannot claim to analyze the history of scientific dogmas, it must be pointed out,
however, that Kondratieff, van Gelderen and others were of the opinion that the reasons for
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nor importance in such an approach. Therefore the question whether there is a possi¬
bility of identifying long-term cycies with the aid of a Statistical procedure indepen¬
dent of the object that is to be analyzed, appears to have become less significant.5
It is not very surprising in this context that the serious problems of an empirical
test and conceptualization of "long waves", which have not yet been solved, have
nearly always been ignored.6 Two important points should, however, not be left out
of account:
- "Long waves" as they are discussed nowadays are regarded as a cyclical phenome¬
non and as actual indicators of the course of economic processes.7
- Serious methodical objections have been made against all attempts of finding em¬
pirical proofs of long-term cycies; for this reason, the empirical evidence of "long
waves" is still regarded as an unsolved problem.8
This paper is conceived as a contribution to the discussion about the problems of a
methodical-statistical proof of the existence of "long waves", and it introduces meth¬
ods which to some extent have been completely newly developed to solve this prob¬
lem.9 Whereas the exact determination of the trend has been the main problem of the
treatises which have hitherto dealt with this topic, because only trend-free time series
can be tested with regard to their cyclical structure, a method for the elimination of
the existence of "long waves'* are necessarily inherent in the capitalist way of production
and that there is no capitalist production which does not exhibit such a wavy course. See
e.g. the very instructive comments by Ekland, Klas: Long Waves in the Development of
Capitalism. In: Kyklos 33 (1980), pp. 383-419; or Duijn, J. J. van: De lange golf in de econ¬
omic Kan innovatie ons uit het dal helpen? Assen 1979, pp. 27-38.
5. Stier, however, holds the opinion that "die Frage nach geeigneten statistischen Verfahren
eigentlich am Anfang aller Untersuchungen stehen muß", see Stier, W.: Zur Rolle und
Funktion statistischer Verfahren in der empirischen Wirtschaftsforschung und der Wirt¬
schaftsgeschichte. In: Petzina/Roon: Konjunktur, Krise, Gesellschaft (supra, n. 1) p. 297.
6. This is true of all treatises which take the existence of "long waves" for granted, but do not
analyze empirical series statistically. See e.g. Spree, R.: Was kommt nach den langen Wel¬
len? In: Schröder/Spree: Historische Konjunkturforschung (supra, n. 1), p. 305.
7. This fact is illustrated in Petzina's survey of research, Petzina, D.: "Lange Wellen" und
"Wechsellagen" (supra, n. 2). The approaches which put the trend periods at the centre of
interest differ very much from this one. W. W. Rostow is probably the most exposed repre¬
sentative of this view, see his survey: Kondratieff, Schumpeter and Kuznets: Trend Periods
Revisited. In: Journal of Economic History 35 (1975), cf. Sprees comments: Wachstums¬
trend und Konjunkturzyklen in der deutschen Wirtschaft von 1820-1913. Göttingen 1978,
esp. pp. 32-97.
8. See the fundamental comments by Stier, W.: Zur Rolle und Funktion (supra, n. 5); and
Stier: Die "langen Wellen" in der Konjunktur. Einige statistische Bemerkungen. In: Wirt¬
schaftsdienst 1976 XII, p. 637ff.; Nullau's articie is also very instructive; Nullau, B.: Die
Kondratieff-Wellen—Ein Slutzky Effekt? In: Wirtschaftsdienst 1976/IV. p. 177ff.; cf. the
methodical literature in n. 42.
9. The filter-methods developed by Prof. Stier and his team collaborators are mainly dealt
with in this paper. The development of these methods is described in: Stier, W.: Konstruk¬
tion und Einsatz von Digitalfiltern zur Analyse und Prognose ökonomischer Zeitreihen.
Opladen 1978; Stier, PF.: Über eine Klasse von einfachen FIR-Tiefpass-Selektionsfiltern.
In: Allg. Stat. Archiv, Heft 3, 1978. I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Stier and
Dr. Schulte for their useful help and support.
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the trend is introduced in this paper which achieves the necessary exact determina¬
tion ofthe trend
10
Clear hints as to the existence of "long waves" can only be gained
with the aid of spectral analysis which is based on trend-free series
n
The more important question concerning the shape and position of these long-term
cycies within their histoncal dimension of time can only be solved if these clear hints
are available To represent the problem of proving the existence of "long waves" in
such a way, is the only possibility of making a critical analysis of the postulated cych¬
cal phenomena The results of the analysis will show to what extent traditional con¬
ceptions which have sought to explain the phenomenon of "long waves" ought to be
put in a new light and also, how the present State of research ought to be revised, or
at least partly revised The Statistical methods introduced in this paper cannot, how¬
ever, claim to be conclusive and, therefore, we hope that from the Statistical stand-
point the last word has not yet been spoken on this problem
12
The current discussion13 about long-term cycies is marked by extremely controver¬
sial views
14
In addition to the older treatises15 on "long waves", which in most cases
made use of the histoncal-descnptive method, in subsequent years, diverse modeis
10 The fundamental work is Schulte H Statistisch methodische Untersuchungen zum Pro
blem langer Wellen = Schriften zur wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Forschung, Bd 135,
Meisenheim 1981, and Schulte Em neuer statistischer Ansatz zur Identifizierung von Wel
lenbewegungen in der langfristigen Wirtschaftsentwicklung In Petzma/Roon Konjunk
tur, Knse (supra, n 1), pp 300-322
11 As far as I know, an analysis which makes use of modern filter methods has only been
made once in Metz R Spree R Kuznets Zyklen im Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft
wahrend des 19 und frühen 20 Jahrhunderts In Petzina/Roon Konjunktur, Knse (su
pra, n 1) p 343 ff The recentiy published treatises which have been concerned with this
problem are in most cases confined to a spectral analytical proof of long waves See e g
Bossier F Huge P An Empincal Examination of Long Cycies from Belgian Data In
Petzina/Roon Konjunktur, Krise (supra, n 1), pp 331-342
12 The empincal results will show that quite a lot of filter types are still needed to provide op
erable procedures for important scientific concepts
13 Important aspects of this discussion can be found in the omnibus volumes publ by Petzi¬
na/Roon Konjunktur, Krise (supra, n 1) and Schroder/Spree Histonsche Konjunktur
forschung, also in Delbeke s short but instructive articie Delbeke Jos Recent Long Wave
Theones A cntical survey In Futures, Aug 81, p 246 ff
14 On the one hand there is the opinion that it would be better die 'langen Wellen des Wirt
Schaftswachstums und der Konjunktur endlich zu begraben \ see Spree R Was kommt
nach den "langen Wellen" (supra, n 6), p 314, on the other hand it is argued that there
certainly exists a prima facie case for the existence of Kondratieff cycies worthy of further
investigation", Research Working Group upon Cyclical Rhythms and Secular Trends Cy
chcal Rhythms and Secular Trends of the Capitalist World Economy Some premises hy
potheses and questions In Review, II (4) p 487, cit according to Gordon D D Stages of
Accumulation and Long Economic Cycies In Hopkins T K Wallerstein I Processes in
the World System Beverly Hills, Calif forthcoming
15 See e g Parvus H A Die Handelskrisis und die Gewerkschaften München 1901 van Gel
dern I Fedder I 'Spnngvloed, Beschuwingen over industrielle outwikkelning en pnjsbe
wegung In Die Nieuwe Tijd 18 (1913) Wolff S de Prospentats u Depressionsperioden
In Festschnft K Kautsky Jena 1924, but also Spiethoff, Schumpeter and Kuznets
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have been designed which have regarded long-waved fluctuations as the essential
and intrinsic course of capitalist economies.16
All these authors have aimed at proving those factors within the socio-economic
process that cause the regulär change from prosperity into Stagnation, and vice versa.
It is typical of all these modeis that they try to explain this phenomenon with the aid
of a very small number of variables, which in turn are either defined as economic en¬
dogenous or exogenous factors.17 The essential point is, however, that both the em¬
pirical evidence of "long waves" and their specific length are assumed as a matter of
fact, and as being determinable through experience. This circumstance is rather as-
tonishing, considering the great number of serious objections to the procedures
which have hitherto been used.
The main reasons why it is so difficult to give empirically exact proofs of "long
waves" are the following: In order to prove "long waves" as a cyclical phenomenon
it is absolutely necessary to dispose of very long series which ought to be several
times as long as the postulated length of the cycies. In reality, it is, however, hardly
possible to compile numerical expressions of identical phenomena over such long
periods of time. That is either because the necessary sources are not available, or the
economic variables have changed so much in meaning that the identity of the phe¬
nomena measured cannot be secured, regardless of the fact that methods of measur¬
ing and of collecting data permanently change.18
Even if one does not take these data-problems into consideration, and surmises,
for example, that time series meet these requirements to a certain extent,19 the Statis¬
tical proof presupposes an appropriate transformation of the scientific concept into a
workable Statistical proposition.20 All attempts which have hitherto been made have
16. See Delbekes survey: Recent Long-Wave Theories (supra, n. 13) and the articie written by
H. van der Wee and J. Delbeke in this book.
17. In this context, the meaning of basic innovations, capital-accumulation, over-investment,
technological development, industrial concentration are discussed, although there is no
common agreement on the decisive interrelationship between the variables.
18. These data problems especially arise, when the 20th Century is the object of analysis, cf. the
fundamental remarks on this problem by Borchardt, K.: Wandlungen des Konjunkturphä¬
nomens in den letzten hundert Jahren. - Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Sit¬
zungsberichte Jhg. 1976, Heft 1. All relevant books point to the difficulties which arise, if
one tries to compile Statistical long-term series, cf. Mitchell, B. R.: Statistischer Anhang
1700-1914. In: C. M. Cipolla; K. Borchardt (Hrsg.): Europäische Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Bd.
4, Stuttgart/New York 1977; also see van der Wee, H.: European Historical Statistics and
Economic Growth. In: Explorations in Economic History 13 (1976), pp. 347-351.
19. Especially with regard to grain prices of the pre industrial period, these requirements are in
most cases fulfilled. If, however, series of price indices are used, considerable problems ar¬
ise. See e.g. van der Wee, H.: Prices and Wages as Development Variables: A Comparison
between England and the Southern Netherlands 1400-1700. In: Acta Historiae Neerlandi-
cae 10 (1978), pp. 58-78.
20. The problems attached to such a transformation are discussed in statistics as so-called "ad¬
equacy problems"; see Menges, G.: Ätialität und Adäquation. Dem Andenken an Heinrich
Hartwig (1907-1981). In: Statistische Hefte 22 (1981) Heft 2, pp. 144-149; Bott, D.; Ad¬
äquationsprozeß und Entscheidungsproblem. In: Statistische Hefte 22 (1981) Heft 1, pp. 2-
24, general Statements on these problems also in Metz, R.: Theoretische Aspekte der stati-
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failed in achieving this adequate transformation, and as has been pointed out al¬
ready, it should have been a matter of the staüsücian's scientific honesty to declare
that the hypothesis formulated cannot, or cannot yet be proved for purely Statistical
reasons,21 for if one considers "long waves" as a cyclical phenomenon, as most of the
older treatises do, to eliminate the trend as a non-cychcal course from the series, be¬
forehand, cannot be avoided
22
Even a spectral-analytical proof of cycies of the
"Kondratieff-type" can only be achieved, if the series which is to be analyzed has a
completely stationary, i e trend-free course The procedures which have hitherto
beed used to eliminate the trend from the senes were either only capable of deter¬
mining the trend in such a way that if there existed any "long waves" they were elim¬
inated, or as it happened with polynomial approximation, their way of Operation
could not be numencally tested
23
In this context the following aspects are of great importance
1 There is no generally accepted model to give a sufficient descnption of a cyclical
course of this length, which may be caused either by endogenous, or exogenous
factors In consequence, the respective length of a cycle cannot be theoretically
deduced
2 The reduction of a model to a very small number of explanatory vanables is un¬
satisfactory, both from a theoretical point of view, and within the histoncal con¬
text Concerning the modeis to which these objections do not apply, or only partly
apply, the fluctuations ofthe trend are at the centre of interest This is for example
true of Rostow's model, which exceeds all other modeis in its histoncal complexi¬
ty,24 Rostow has made the attempt to explain the histoncal trend-penods as the
result of different combinations of variable factors
It is commonly agreed that it is formally impossible to test, with the aid of empin¬
cal methods, whether the trend-penods have a cyclical course Such a view of the
problem consequently excludes the question of cychcity of trend-penods because
it cannot be checked
25
stischen Analyse langfristiger Konjunkturschwankungen In Petzina/Roon Konjunktur,
Knse (supra, n 1) and the literature given there
21 This opinion is held by Stier W Die "langen Wellen in der Konjunktur (supra, n 8), p
637
22 This adequate trend elimination is the necessary prerequisite of any proof of long waves
apart from the above mentioned methodical hterature, see Konig H Wolters J Zum
Problem langfnstiger Wachstumszyklen Eme Spektralanalyse der englischen Entwicklung
von 1700-1913 In Zeitschrift f d ges Staatswissenschaft 128 (1972), pp 72-96
23 This pnncipally apphes to all procedures which are neither linear, nor time invanant AI
though these procedures achieve an elimination ofthe trend, their effect both on the differ
ent oscillations (frequencies) and thus also on the long waves cannot be tested See e g
Schulte H Ein neuer statistischer Ansatz (supra, n 10) p 303, and Komg/Wolters Eine
Spektralanalyse (supra, n 22), p 94
24 Rostow gives a comprehensive description of this approach, Rostow W W The World
Economy History & Prospect Austin, London 1978 Comments on this approach are given
by Holtfrerich C-L Wachstum I Wachstum der Volkswirtschaften, in Handwörterbuch
der Wirtschaftswissenschaften, 17/18 Lfg Stuttgart 1979, p 413ff, and Spree R Was
kommt nach den "langen Wellen" (supra, n 6) p 308 f
25 A lowpass filter which achieves a clear Separation between the low frequency bands would
be the appropriate method to analyze trend penods As to the construction of such filters
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3. An adequate Statistical apparatus, which is a necessary prerequisite of such an em¬
pirical proof, was not available. As far as the methods which have hitherto been
used are concerned, they have all failed in achieving a clear Separation between
the trend and the "long waves" and, therefore, no definite clues to the existence of
"long waves" could be derived by means of spectral analysis.
4. In most cases, the material available does not meet the requirement of being uni¬
form. The few long-term series available are highly disaggregated product and
price series, which have only limited value as indicators of the relevant processes.
Moreover, they necessarily span several phases of the structural change of the
whole society, and thus simulate a structural uniformity, which in itself constitutes
a historical problem.26
The pessimistic tenor of these remarks is still enforced by the fact that all modeis
of "long waves" cannot be sufficiently verified with the aid of Statistical methods.27
There are, however, several reasons why it is worth while making a new attempt to
prove the existence of "long waves".
1. As long as a more or less great heuristic value is attributed28 to long-term cycies of
the "Kondratieff-type" both in history and in the analysis of the current economic
development, an empirical test is absolutely necessary.
2. The filter-method above mentioned renders it possible to test the existence of
"long waves" empirically, in a completely new way. The problem of eliminating
the trend can be solved by means of this method.
3. The fact that we use highly disaggregated series guarantees that approximately
identical phenomena are measured.
4. It is commonly agreed that long-term analyses are necessary and practicable. Al¬
though in most cases no continuous long-term series are used to this purpose, the
intention is yet nearly the same; the derivation of informations about tendencies
with special regard to structural peculiarities.29
see Stier, W.: Verfahren zur Analyse saisonaler Schwankungen in ökonomischen Zeitrei¬
hen. Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1980, p. 127 f.
26. This opinion is held by Knut Borchardt: Wirtschaftliches Wachstum und Wechsellagen
1800-1914. In: Handbuch der deutschen Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte, Bd. 2, hrsg. v.
H. Aubin und W. Zorn, Stuttgart 1976, p. 200.
27. Spree, R.: Was kommt nach den "langen Wellen" (supra, n. 2) p. 305.
28. This function seems to be increasingly attributed to long-term cycies, not only in treatises
dealing with economic-historical topics, but also in the current economic-political discus¬
sion. Only a few examples can be mentioned here: Fischer, W.: Die Weltwirtschaft im 20.
Jahrhundert, Göttingen 1979, p, 43; Fels, G.: Erklärungshypothesen zur internationalen Re¬
zession, In: Die Rezession 1974/75—ein Wendepunkt der längerfristigen Wirtschaftsent¬
wicklung? Symposium zum 50jährigen Bestand des Österreichischen Institus für Wirt¬
schaftsforschung, hrsg. v. H. Seidel, F. Butschek, Stuttgart 1977, pp. 19-31; cf. the discus¬
sion on the approach of the Kieler working-group which is based on the "distribution-the-
ory", Glismann, H, H.; Rodemer, H.; Wolter, F.: Lange Wellen wirtschaftlichen Wachstums
(Replik und Weiterführung). In: Petzina/Roon: Konjunktur, Krise... (supra, n. 1), p. 66ff.,
as to the criticism of this concept, see the literature given there. Concerning the pre-indus¬
trial period see Haan, H.: Prosperität und Dreißigjähriger Krieg. In: Strukturprobleme der
Frühen Neuzeit. = Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 7. Jhg. Heft 1, Göttingen 1981, pp. 91-118.
29. From the great number of books and articles dealing with this problem the following ones
shall be mentioned: Bairoch, P.: Niveau de developpement economique de 1810 ä 1910. In:
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The methods and results described in this paper can be regarded as the first at¬
tempts to prove oscillations of the "Kondratieff-type" within some selected long-
term senes The Intention of this paper exceeds all other research work which has hi¬
therto been concerned with this problem in so far, as it intends to determine the
shape and position of these long-term cycies They will only be accepted as patterns
of Interpretation of economic and social developments if there is a possibility of
charactenzmg them by their upswings and downswings, and their specific length
within their histoncal dimension of time
The analysis is confined to 9 time-series, which cover the space of time from 1531
to 1979
30
6 out ofthe 9 series are pnce series, which have only limited value as being
representative of economic processes This paper does not aim to test theoretical
modeis of economic development but, on the contrary, tries to find clear clues as to
the empincal evidence of "long waves" within economic time-series As the empin¬
cal matenal on which the analysis is based also Covers the pre-industnal period, it
can be expected that the results achieved will give us some hints towards the model
of "säkulare Wechsellagen",31 which has been developed by agrarian history Al¬
though the contents of the model of "Wechsellagen", developed in reference to the
pre-industrial period, fundamentally differs from the concept of "long waves", a de¬
scriptive comparison between the pre-industrial and the industnal period seems to be
very promising, above all, as grain prices to which such a comparison should be con¬
fined represent an economic factor of the first rank for the pre-industrial penod
37
Pragmatic aspects were decisive for the choice of the time-series
33
In particular,
we have analyzed the following series
34
Wheat and rye prices from 1531-1959 as in¬
dicators of the development of grain prices in the "Deutsches Reich", wheat pnces
from Exeter/GB (1531-1938), and a pnce index of English vegetable agranan prod¬
uets (1661-1938) as indicators of the movement of pnces of agrarian produets in
Great Bntain, one indicator for both, the English coal and cotton-yarn production
Annales ESC 15(1965) Bairoch P Europe s Gross National Product 1800-1975 In
The Journal of European Economic History 5 (1976), pp 273-340 Maddison A Long
Run Dynamics of Productivity Growth In Banca Nazionale de Lavoro Quarterly Review
32 (1979)
30 As to the descnption of the empincal material see the comments in the appendix
31 This kind of model which was mainly developed by W Abel has recentiy been discussed in
connection with the dynamics of the feudal production, see e g Kriedte P Spatfeudahs
mus und Handelskapital Gottingen 1980, Kriedte P Spatmittelalterliche Agrarkrise oder
Knse des Feudalismus In Strukturprobleme der Frühen Neuzeit = Geschichte und Ge
Seilschaft 7 Jhg Heft 1, 1981, pp 42-68 Without further discussing the problems attached
to this model, it must be pointed out that in this model a central importance is attnbuted to
long-term fluctuations of gram prices both as conditioning, and as conditioned elements
32 It has been pointed out already that such a comparison would be very important for a great
deal of research work into business cycies, see e g Ebeling D Irsigler F Zur Entwick
lung von Agrar und Lebensmittelpreisen in der vorindustneUen und der industnellen Zeit
Beobachtungen am rheinischen Beispiel In Archiv f Sozialgeschichte 19 (1979), pp 299-
329, who followed a Suggestion of Knut Borchardt
33 Such a kind of procedure can easily be reproached with "Measurement without Theory
The Statements given above ought to have shown why I thought it unnecessary to take re
course to a theory
34 The exact descnption of the material will be found in the appendix
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from 1700-1950, and one index respectively, of real wages as indicator of the long-
term movement of real wages in England and Germany from 1809-1970, and finally
the real gross domestic investments ofthe United Kingdom from 1830 to 1979.
//. Methodical problems and Statistical procedures
Inspite of long-lasting and intensive discussions, there is no common consent over
what is to be regarded as "long wave". Terms like trend-fluctuations, trend-cycles,
"säkulare Wechsellagen", "Wechselspannen", "Kondratieff-cycles", etc., partly desig-
nate different and partly identical phenomena.35 The cyclical character of the phe¬
nomenon, which is the basic requirement of the whole concept, suggests the follow¬
ing definition as a working hypothesis:
"Long waves" are cycies within trend-free series with an average duration ranging
from about 30 to 60 years; the specific length ofthe cycle may very well vary within
certain limits.36
The following comments shall explain the difficulties that arise if one tries to prove
the existence of long-term cycies:
If one regards a concrete time-series as the result of a great number of oscillations
of different frequencies and different strength of amplitude, spectral analysis gives
informations both about the oscillations existing in a concrete time-series37 and
about the relative importance of different oscillations for the total fluctuation which
determines them. Oscillations spanning long periods of time generate spectral mass
at the zero point, or within a small space around it within the spectral density func¬
tion. The more distinct these oscillations prove to be within the concrete time-series,
the higher is the spectral value within the density function. The fact that the spectral
value is as high as that, restricts the importance of spectral analysis as a method of
Splitting up frequencies to such an extent that actually existing oscillations of higher
frequency cannot be proved. Consequently, the spectral density function exhibits a
monotonous downward course from the left upper side to the right lower side of the
graph.38 This course is typical of economic time-series.
35. Rosenberg has already pointed to this semantic confusion. Rosenberg, H.: Große Depres¬
sion (supra, n. 2), p. 8.
36. The essential point is that this definition does not anticipate any decision about the use of
certain procedures. The procedures were designed in such a way that cycies which are
shorter than 20 years cannot be represented in the dimension of time.
37. Several treatises clearly show the conditions under which spectral analysis constitutes a
useful analytical instrument in economic historical research. See e.g. Granger, C. W. J.;
Hatanaka, M.: Spectral Analysis of Economic Time Series, Princeton 1964; König, H.;
Wolters, J.: Einführung in die Spektralanalyse ökonomischer Zeitreihen. Meisenheim am
Glan 1975; Koopmans, L. H.: Spectral Analysis of Economic Time Series. New York 1974;
Fishman, G. S.: Spectral Methods in Econometrics. Cambridge Mass. 1969, and the litera¬
ture mentioned in Metz, R.: Agrarpreiszyklen und Wirtschaftskonjunktur. Spektralanaly¬
tische Untersuchungen zu Kölner Agrarpreisreihen des 19. Jahrhunderts. In: Schröder/
Spree (Hrsg.): Historische Konjunkturforschung (supra, n. 1), p. 255ff.
38. Granger already described this shape as typical spectral shape of economic variables, see
Granger, C. W. J.: The Typical Spectral Shape of an Economic Variable. In: Econometrica
34(1966), pp. 150-161.
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Fig. 1: Spectrum of wheat prices before trend removal
Figure 1 shows a spectral density function for the series of wheat prices (1531-
1959). The space within which presumably existing "long waves" ought to exhibit
peaks within this spectrum is limited by X* and a.*+p. An informative spectral analy¬
sis presupposes the elimination of the trend from the series beforehand. The effect of
such a trend elimination on the different frequency bands of a time-series can be il¬
lustrated with the aid of the transfer function, provided that the elimination pro¬
cedure is linear and time-invariant: Figure 1 shows that the transfer function39 is only
39. The opportunity of analyzing the effect of different methods constitutes a great progress in
the field ofthe analysis of time-series; cf. the report on S. Heileres lecture given in presence
ofthe committee of "Deutsche Statistische Gesellschaft für Neuere Statistische Methoden"
on: Zeitreihenanalyse heute—Ein Überblick—. In: Allg. Stat. Archiv 65 (1981) 1 Heft, p
99 ff. Newbold's articie shows that a great deal of current research in this field is of little
relevance for economic historical research. Newbold, P.: Some Recent Developments in
Time Series Analysis. In: International Statistical Review 49 (1981), pp. 53-66.
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allowed to have the zero value at the zero point, or within a small space around it,
and ought to have reached the value 1 not later than at the point X* to make sure that
"long waves" are not unintentionally eliminated by the trend elimination.40 Filters
which approximate such a course are calied highpass Filters because they only trans-
mit high frequency oscillations into the filter-output series. Figure 2 shows the trans¬
fer function of a highpass filter, which has hitherto met these requirements better
than all the other ones. The positions of X* and A*+ß show, however, that this filter is
of no use for our Statement of the problem because the frequency components in
which we are interested, are out-filtered with the trend.41.
This fact, which is true of all highpass filters which have hitherto been used means
that a spectral analysis based on series that are filtered in such a way cannot give any
clues to the existence of "long waves" because they ought to have been al-
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Fig. 2: Transfer function of a highpass filter
40. The transfer function indicates the value with which the input frequency is multiplied be¬
fore being transferred into the output series. The value, zero, indicates that the frequency is
totally eliminated, the value, one, that the frequency is transferred unchanged; all other val¬
ues indicate that an intensification or decrease, repeated ever so often, is taking place. The
difficulties attached to the search of filters with an "optimal transfer function" are de¬
scribed by Wasch, P.: Zur Berechnung von Filtern im Frequenzbereich, In: Vierteljahres¬
hefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung, Heft 4, 1971, pp. 320-329, see Stier, W.: Über eine Klasse
von einfachen FIR-Tiefpass-Selektionsfiltern. In: Allg. Statist. Archiv (1978), p. 161 ff.
41. The graph has been taken from Schulte, H.: Statistisch-methodische Untersuchungen (su¬
pra, n. 10), p. 138. Apart from the fact that this kind of filter does not possess ideal transfer-
characteristics, it is almost impervious in the domain ofthe "long waves"; this feature is
clearly shown by the course of the function within the hatched plane.
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ready out-filtered with the trend.42 Filters that prove to have intensifying effects on
the frequency domain cannot be used, either; because if one makes use of these Fil¬
ters, cycies can be ascertained by means of spectral analysis, even if they do not exist
within the original series.43 There are also serious methodical objections to the at¬
tempt to determine the course of the trend with the aid of polynomials Apart from
the fact that it is very difficult to determine the polynomial degree scientifically, it is
impossible to determine the transfer function of polynomials and, therefore, the ef¬
fects of the trend elimination cannot be numerically determined.44 To regard the
analysis of time-series as a "Filter-Design-Problem",45 is a methodically completely
new approach. This concept consists of two main steps: Firstly, a transfer function
adequate to the scientific concept is given, and then an optimal filter is constructed
accordingly.46 This procedure constitutes from the methodical view a complete break
with the classic component model and that means that considerations formulated
with the aid of the estimate theory are no longer decisive for the evalution of the
trend elimination.47
The necessity of determining an optimal transfer function beforehand presupposes
a clearer definition of scientific terms within the frequency domain Therefore, the
researcher has to determine clearly, in advance, what is to be defined as trend. The
course of the transfer function realized changes along with the factors that have been
determined beforehand. This comparatively strong link between economic-histoncal
concepts and formal-statistical criteria can only be of advantage if scientific interpre¬
tations and analyses onentate themselves by the numerical results of Statistical meth¬
ods, as is clearly examphfied by research into business-cycles and economic growth.
In accordance with these considerations, in the following pages, we define trend as
those oscillation components ofa time-series which generate spectral mass within the
frequency bands between zero and X*
48
42 This problem has not yet been adequately solved in all the analyses of "long swmgs" See
e g the spectral analytical investigations of the "Kuznets-cycles" by Adelmann 1 Long
Cycles-Fact or Artifact9 In American Economic Review 60 (1965) p 444 ff , Harkness J
P A Spectral Analytic Test of the Long-Swing Hypothesis in Canada In The Review of
Economics and Statistics 50 (1968), p 429 ff , Howrey, Ph E A Spectrum Analysis of the
Long-Swing Hypothesis In International Economic Review 9 (1968) pp 228, Klotz, B P
Neal, L Spectral and Cross-Spectral Analysis ofthe Long-Swing Hypothesis In Review
of Economic Statistics 15 (1973)
43 This fact is examphfied by König/Wolters Eine Spektralanalyse (supra, n 22) with the aid
of the analyses made by Hoffmann and Kuznets
44 See Schulte's remarks, Schulte, H Statistisch-methodische Untersuchungen (supra, n 10),
p 112ff
45 The theory of linear, discrete, time-invariant Systems which are of great importance particu¬
larly m natural sciences, constitutes the theoretical foundation for it As fundamental litera
ture dealing with this topic see Cadzow, James, A Discrete Time Systems An Introduction
with Interdiseiplinary Applications Englewood Cliffs 1973, Rabiner L R Gold B The¬
ory and Apphcation of Digital Signal Processing Englewood Cliffs 1975
46. An attempt to outline the theoretical problems attached to such a kind of procedure is de-
senbed in Metz, R Theoretische Aspekte (supra, n 20)
47 See Stiels remarks Verfahren zur Analyse (supra, n 25), p 112 ff
48 As to the Operation and justification of such a definition, see Schuhes comments Stati¬
stisch-methodische Untersuchungen (supra, n 10), p 140 ff
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Fig. 3: Transfer function of a notch-filter
In empirical research only time-series of a definite length are available. Therefore
it is useful to confine the analysis to those oscillations the periodical duration of
which is not longer than the number of values of the time-series. The X* mentioned
above is consequently the inverse-value of the length of the time-series.49 By means
of a special combination of parameters, a so-called notch-filter is designed which ex¬
actly achieves this Separation.50 Figure 3 shows the transfer function of such a kind
49. On principle, the maximal length of a provable periodical oscillation is identical with the
length of the time-series. Because of practical reasons it is useful, however, to analyze
only those oscillations the maximal length of which is equivalent to half of the length of
the time-series. See Schulte, H.: Statistisch-methodische Untersuchungen (supra, n. 10),
p. 157 ff.
50. As to the determination of these parameters by means of which the zero points of the
notches, the opening of the notches and the normating frequency are determined, see
Schulte, H.: Statistisch-methodische Untersuchungen (supra, n. 10) and Stier, W.: Ver¬
fahren zur Analyse (supra, n. 25), in particular, the band-width calculated by means of the
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of filter.51 In this connection the essential point is that a trend formulated, in ad¬
vance, is transformed with the aid of the filter theory, and that this trend is not in¬
fluenced by the Statistical procedure, but is, on the contrary, defined by the scientist,
beforehand, or rather results from the specific formulation of the question. This kind
of filter-construction, as well as the transformation of scientific concepts into statisti¬
cally operable procedures, leave a subjective margin of decision because what is to
be defined as trend can only be determined within certain limits.52 Spectral analysis
can, however, supply us with useful criteria of decision for this delimitation. As the
n r
0 00 0 08 0 24 0 32 0 40
FREQUENCY
Fig 4 Spectrum of wheat prices after trend removal
51.
52
opening ofthe notches—in time units—, p 74 ff, concerning the effect ofthe vanations of
the zero points and notches on the spectrum ofthe series, see Metz/Spree Kuznets-Zyklen
(supra, n. 11), pp 346-354
The course of the function within the hatched field shows that possibly existing "long
waves" are transferred unchanged into the initial senes
Stier, W Verfahren zur Analyse (supra, n 25), p 79 ff, discusses these problems with re¬
gard to methods of seasonal adjustment
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trend mamfests itself as spectral mass within the space around the zero-frequency,
spectral analysis will be used in the following as a method of testing the effects of the
notch-filter on the low-frequency oscillations of the different senes
53
Figure 4 shows the spectrum of the series underlying Figure 1 after the trend has
been determined by means of the notch-filter
54
The function has now nearly reached
the value zero at the frequency band zero and exhibits a clear peak above the fre¬
quency band 1/60, a "long wave" with an approximate length of 60 years is implied
therein Figure 5 shows the course of both the trend-free senes and the original se¬
nes
1720 1760
YEARS
X NOMINAL PRICES
O PRICES AFTER TREND REMOVAL
Fig 5 Wheat pnces in Germany 1531-1959
53
54
Spectral analysis is very often used to analyze the effect of filters in the frequency domain,
particularly with regard to methods of seasonal adjustment see Stier, W Verfahren zur
Analyse (supra, n 25), p 106 ff, additional literature is given in Konig/Wolters Einfuh
rung (supra, n 37), p 106ff Analyses comparable with Stier's (cf supra) for the high fre
quency domain are not known to me concerning the low-frequency domain
The respective filter parameters Two zero points at the frequencies 0 and 0 00233, Delta of
the first notch 0 05, Delta ofthe second notch 0 025, normating frequency 0 015922, con
cerning the determination of the Deltas see Schulte H Statistisch-methodische Untersu¬
chungen (supra, n 10) p 157 ff
FREQUENCY
Fig 6 Spectrum after modified trend removal (Delta = 0 025/0 0125)
The above mentioned margin of decision which is involved in the definition ofthe
trend concerns the determination ofthe stop-band through the choice ofthe parame¬
ters A
Figure 6 shows the spectrum of grain prices after the passband of the filter has
been enlarged by means of a reduction of Ai and A2 As has been expected, the spec¬
tral mass ofthe zero-frequency band is larger than before and, therefore, the question
anses which kind of spectral density function indicates the optimal adequation be¬
tween the filter and the scientific concept This problem cannot, however, be solved
with the aid ofthe filter theory because no adequate Statistical test criteria are availa¬
ble
55
The following points should, however, be kept in mind The notch-filter designed
by Schulte/Stier achieves an exact Separation between the trend and the long-term
cycies, which has been thought impossible up to now
55 After the use of both filters time-series are stationary, this is necessary for spectral analysis
In the subsequent remarks these problems will be taken up again
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The filtered series are completely stationary time-series. They can be exactly
proved with the aid of the filter theory and, therefore, guarantee that the cyclical
components analyzed in these series are not artifacts, which might be conditioned by
the different filters. The series filtered are fundamental for the spectral analytical
proof of cycies of different length within the frequency domain.
Whereas most of the recentiy published, methodically orientated treatises on this
problem have confined themselves to such a spectral analytical proof, in the follow¬
ing, further steps of analysis will be made to determine the position and shape of
these long-term cycies within their course of time.56 Because of the fact that within
the spectrum of the trend-free series a considerable number of high-frequency oscil¬
lations can still be discerned, it is necessary to try to eliminate these short-term cycies
in order to isolate the long-term cycle. To this purpose, as a rule, one makes use of a
lowpass filter which only transmits low-frequency oscillations into the initial filter se¬
ries and, consequently, any existing trend. If one, however, filters a series from which
o
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Fig. 7: Spectrum after trend- and high frequency removal
56. Cf. also the methodical remarks in Metz/Spree: Kuznets-Zyklen (supra, n. 11), p. 346 ff.
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the trend has already been eliminated, the desired effect of a bandpass filter is
achieved. The series filtered does not contain any other components of oscillation
than those that vary between the "Normierungsfrequenz" ofthe notch-filter and the
cut-off frequency of the lowpass filter,57 and at best contain exactly the "long wave"
with a possible length between 20 and 60 years within the dimension of time.
In Figure 7 spectral analysis shows the effect of such a lowpass filter method on
the grain price series after trend- and high frequency removal.
///. Main characteristics of "long waves"
In Table 1 (see appendix), the results achieved from the different series by means of
spectral analysis after the trend elimination with the notch-filter have been compiled.
In each of the series long-term cycies can be ascertained. In all the series of agrarian
prices that precisely fix the index of the value aspect of agrarian cycies, at least tili
1850,58 cycies of the "Kondratieff-type" with an average length of about 60 years be¬
come visible. An alternative estimate made for the pre-industrial period from 1531-
1796 did not bring about any other results concerning the length of the different cy¬
cies. In this context it is remarkable, however, that in the pre-industrial period the
short-term harvest-cycle seems to be of the same importance for the total variability
ofthe series as the "long-wave"; if the estimate however concerns the whole period
of time, the cyclical Variation of the series turns out to be clearly dominated by the
"long waves". This fact clarifies from a comparison between the two different spec¬
tral density functions. They clearly illustrate a decrease in the vulnerability of the
agrarian production to crises. By means of a rise in productivity, the extreme price-
fluctuations of the classic harvest-cycles could be removed to a high degree.59
Concerning the English coal and cotton-yarn production and the investment series,
shorter cycies seem to prevail. The proved length of the different cycies fluctuate
between 40, 32, and 19 years. The validity of these results is limited, however,
57. A Kaiser-filter was used for the high-frequency elimination of the filtered series with
N = 23, cut-off-frequency 0.05. It is not necessary to take account ofthe phase as this filter¬
type is symmetrically implemented; as to the calculation of such filters see Stier, W.: Kon¬
struktion und Einsatz (supra, n. 9), p. 14ff; Rabiner/Gold: Theory and Application (supra,
n. 45), p. 93 ff.
58. Analyses have shown that value and quantity indicators of the agrarian cycle differ, both
regarding their cyclical structure, and their dependency on other indicators of cyclical de¬
velopment; see Metz, R.: Agrarpreiszyklen und Wirtschaftskonjunktur (supra, n. 37), p.
273 ff., as to the problem of agrarian cycies within the process of industrialization, see
Spree, R.: Wachstumstrends (supra, n. 7), p. 125ff.
59. This development was very much influenced, of course, by the expansion of traffic, and the
resulting growing market-integration, and also by the increase in the supply with substitu-
tional goods, see Teuteberg, H.-J.: Die deutsche Landwirtschaft beim Eintritt in die Hoch¬
industrialisierung (— Kölner Vorträge und Abhandlungen zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsge¬
schichte) Köln 1977; Abel, W.: Geschichte der deutschen Landwirtschaft—vom frühen
Mittelalter bis zum 19. Jahrhundert. = Deutsche Agrargeschichte, Bd. 2, hrsg. v. G. Franz,
3. Aufl. Stuttgart 1978; Boserup, M.: Agrarstruktur und take-off. In: Rudolf, Braun u.a.
(Hrsg.): Industrielle Revolution. Wirtschaftliche Aspekte. Köln/Berlin 1972, pp. 309-330.
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by the fact that in some of the series trend can be proved with the aid of spectral
analysis even after the trend elimination has been carried out.60 This peculiarity, as a
rule, occurs if the original series exhibits a clear exponential growth. The trend-free
values of such time-series are marked by extreme fluctuations at the end ofthe series.
These series are no longer stationary covariant, and because of this reason, the re¬
quirements attached to the use of spectral analysis are only partly met.61 Additional-
ly, series of that kind had to be made trend-free with a modified notch-filter in order
to check undesirable effects of distortion.62 The cycies evidenced remain unchanged
even after the modified trend elimination has been carried out. This fact can be taken
as a clear hint on the existence of cycies of this very length. It must be confessed,
however, that the lengths of the different cycies, which have been evidenced, are of
historical value, only for the period since 1840/50, as the majority of the total var¬
iance ofthe series refers to this period. This fact is, for example, clearly to be seen in
Figures 17, 18, and 21 (see appendix).
Concerning the series of agrarian prices, a significant change in the length of the
cycies, which might be caused by the beginning of the industrialization, can hardly
be discerned.63 The lengths of the cycies of the production series, however, seem to
have reduced since the middle ofthe 19th Century. Besides, the numerical course of
the trend-free production series exhibits strong dynamics in the cyclical behaviour
during this period. Although the material compiled by Hoffmann cannot be used for
any far-reaching interpretation because of its heterogeneous character, clear differ¬
ences become visible if one compares the period before the middle of the 19th Cen¬
tury with the one afterwards, and the curves of production series with the cyclical
course ofthe series of agrarian prices. The rapid growth which is of fundamental im¬
portance for the process of industrialization64 is primarily expressed in the cyclical
course of the production indicators, without at the same time determining the fluc¬
tuations of prices in the one, or the other way.
Long-term cycies can thus be sufficiently described in their historical course by
means of their formal characteristics. These are the following: The position and
60. Similar results were achieved when the attempt was made to isolate "Kuznets-cycles" see,
Metz/Spree: Kuznets-Zyklen (supra, n. 11), p. 353 ff.
61. Stationary processes are the necessary prerequisite of spectral analysis. In practice, a con¬
stant mean value (E(u) = 0 is generally assumed) and a time-invariant covarianee are re¬
quired. The second requirement does not seem to be met in these series and consequently
trend can be ascertained within the spectrum see e.g. Granger/Hatanaka: Spectral Analy¬
sis (supra, n. 37), p. 190 ff; König/Wolters: Einführung (supra, n. 37), p. 150 ff. As far as I
know, reliable estimate procedures for series with a non-stationary covarianee are not
available, cf., however, Priestly's treatises, e.g. Priestley, M. B.: Evolutionary Spectra and
Non Stationary Processes. In: Journal ofthe Royal Statistical Society, Ser. B 27 (1965), pp.
204-237.
62. With the aid of such a filter, additional low-frequency oscillations are outfiltered through a
third zero point; in this way we succeed in confining the leakage problem.
63. That means that the differences between the respective lengths of the cycies are as great
with regard to the 19th and 20th centuries as they are with regard to the preceding period.
See Tables 13a and b.
64. This course which is typical only of production series, is surely one of the reasons, why it is
so difficult to achieve clear hints as to concrete cycle lengths by means of spectral analy¬
sis.
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Table 1
Output of the Prussian
coal-mining industry
English coal production
peaks
1839
1867
1885
1902
troughs
1846
1876
1890
peaks
1828
(1863)
1901
troughs
(1854)
1876
1917
yarn production of the
cotton spinning industry
English cotton-yarn
production
peaks
1839
1855
1871
1892
troughs
1847
1864
1880
peaks
1826
(1853)
1872
troughs
(1847)
1861
1895
the length of the upswings and downswings, the turning points, and the position
and length of the amplitude.65 The question whether the cycle of the production se¬
ries, which was at first designated as "long wave", is according to its formal charac¬
teristics rather to be numbered among the "Kuznets-type" after the year 1850 can
only be discussed in this paper by means of one example.66
The following table lists the troughs and the peaks of the English coal- and cotton-
yarn production in the 19th and in the beginning ofthe 20th Century67 and, more¬
over, contrasts them with the turning points of the Kuznets-cycles ascertained for the
65. In Table 3 (appendix) the troughs and peaks and in Table 4 (appendix) the resulting up¬
swings and downswings were compiled. Figures 13a and 13b are graphical transformations
of Table 4 and show the temporal course of these cycies. The short intermediate cycies
which can be ascertained in Figs. 10, 14, 15-21 (appendix) were not taken into considera¬
tion because they are only the results of an insufficient lowpass filtering.
66. Regarding the results achieved, a further analysis of this question appears to be of advan¬
tage, above all, because the empirical and theoretical fundament of the "Kuznets-cycles"
appears in a more positive light, see Q.g.Aldcroft, D. H.; Fearon, P,: British Economic Fluc¬
tuations 1790-1939. London 1972; Easterlin, R. A.: Population, Labor Force and Long
Swings in Economic Growth. New York 1978; see e.g, Metz/Spree:Kuznets-Zyklen (supra,
n. 11). This, however, requires an analysis of standardized material by means of identical
methods.
67. As to the English series, the years which are put in brackets are intermediate cycies which
were not taken into consideration when dating the "long waves", but which mark, however,
a relative trough, or peak, in the numerical course of the series.
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1) Yarn production of the cotton-spinntng
industry
2) Enghsh cotton-yarn production
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3)Output of the Prussian coal-minmg
industry
4) English coal production
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Fig. 8: Schematic course of the long term cycies of table 1
German series.68In Figure 8 the resulting upswings and downswings are graphically
represented.69
Inspite of the fact that the trend has been eliminated from series of different
length, with the aid of different notch-filters, we nevertheless get some useful hints
for the Solution of the question mentioned above. Notwithstanding the fact that the
series are based on very heterogeneous material, they exhibit homogeneous turn-
ing-points; conceming the coal production: 1863/67, 1876, 1901/02; concerning the
yarn production: 1847, 1853/55, 1861/64, 1871/72.
The degree of conformity is very astonishing. More detailed analyses into the
problem should be made, above all, as the historical value and the empirical plausi¬
bÜity of the "Kondratieff-hypothesis" largely depend on the Solution of this prob¬
lem, at least as far as the period of high-industrialization is concerned.70
In all the series that have been analyzed, a high degree of Variation can be dis-
cerned within the specific lengths of the different cycies.71 Concerning grain prices,
the shortest cycle measures at about 40, and the longest one at about 70 years. The
lengths of the upswings and downswings vary to the same extent. Both the English
and the German grain prices pass through a complete cycle from the beginning of the
18th Century until 1775. The English upswing phase is, however, twice as long as the
German one, concerning the downswing phase, just the opposite is true.
68. Without considering the shorter intermediate cycies, the corresponding years can be easily
derived from the graphs printed in Metz/Spree. Kuznets-Zyklen (supra, n. 11).
69. Cf. the course of the series in Fig. 17 and 18 in the appendix.
70. A similar view is supported by Metz/Spree. Kuznets-Zyklen (supra, n. 11), p. 365.
71. The following comments refer to the results which emerge from Figures 13a and 13b.
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It is very astomshing that the different upswings and downswings of the series of
agrarian prices nearly synchronize, except for the series of the English wheat pnces,
which take a different course dunng the period from 1580 to 1650 This exception is
not very important, however, considering the high degree of synchronity of the series
Both the English and the German development of agrarian prices seems to be
marked by much shorter upswings and downswings from the end ofthe 18th until the
middle of the 19th Century, compared with the period before and afterwards
Whereas the lengths of the cycies referring to the pre-industrial and industnal pe¬
nod prove to be fairly stable, important changes in the dimensions of the amplitudes
ofthe different cycies become visible at the beginning ofthe 19th Century
Until about 1780, there is a possibility of linking the upper and the lower turning-
points of the "long waves" of grain prices (see Figure 14) by a honzontal straight
line If these "long waves" of grain prices are interpreted within a cycle-model which
aims at descnbing the dynamics of the "feudal production",72 the turning-points
mark the temporal change of the secular development73 The strength of the amph-
tude, which proves to remain unchanged during a space of time of 250 years, charac-
tenzes the narrow corndor in the limits of which the agricultural productivity fluc-
tuated
74
In consequence, the turning-points clearly reflect the so-called "plafond
plunseculaire"75 of the pre-industrial production, which has been a very important
topic in French agrarian histoncal research
72 G Bois Cnse du feodahsme Economie rurale et demographie en Normandie onentale du
debut du 14e siecle au milieu du 16e siecle, Paris 1976, has developed this model, which
constitutes an attempt to combine the mam ideas of the theory of agranan crisis with the
theory of feudal production See e g Kriedte P Spatmittelalterhche Agrarknse oder Krise
des Feudalismus In Geschichte und Gesellschaft 6 (1980)
73 It should not be left out of account, however, that the way in which secular trends of grain
pnce senes of the pre-industnal period are dated, as a rule, is incompatible with the
"
long
waves" which are analyzed in this paper As to such a dating see Imbert G Des mouve
ments de Longue Duree Kondratieff Aix en Provence 1959, p 18 a dating which ob
viously goes back to this treatise Le mouvement Kondratieff In Bulletin hebdomadaire
35 (1978) See also K Borchardt's "Überblick über die säkularen Bewegungen der Wirt
schaff In Borchardt K Grundriß der deutschen Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Gottingen 1978,
p H
74 This margin of productivity becomes evident in the ratio between seed and harvest The
fundamental treatises dealing with this topic are Shcher van Bath B H Yield ratios, 810-
1820, In A A G Bijdragen 10 (1963), Jansen has recentiy published a very informative
analysis of these problems Jansen J C G M Landbouw en Economische Golfbeweging
in Zuid Limburg 1250-1800 Van Gorcum/Assen 1979 See, as well, the omnibous volume
which is representative of French research in the agrarian cycies, Goy J Le Roy Ladurie
E Les fluctuations du produit de la dime Conjoncture decimal et domamale de la fin du
Moyen Age au XVIIIe siecle (Cahiers des etudes rurales) Pans-The Hague 1972
75 This thesis of a "plafond plunseculaire", which has been developed by le Roy Ladurie, is
very much at the centre of interest of French research, see Neveux H Die langfristigen Be
wegungen der franzosischen Getreideproduktion vom 14 bis zum 18 Jahrhundert In
Scnpta Mercaturae 13 (1979), pp 75-88 For an excellent short charactenstic of French re
search deahng with these problems see Irsigler F Möglichkeiten und Grenzen quantifi
zierender Forschung in der Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte des Spatmittelalters und der
frühen Neuzeit In Rhein Vjjbl 43 (1979), pp 236-259
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It has not yet been tested, however, whether the phenomena described are condi¬
tioned on monetary factors. If this proved to be true, they would only be expressions
of a long-term fluctuating currency stability76, but could not contribute to the expla¬
nation of real economic phenomena. In order to get some hints for the Solution of
this question, the Cologne wheat prices77, which were passed to us in money of ac¬
count, that means as nominal prices,78 had to be deflationed.79 By means of this pro¬
cedure, only those price-variations that arise from a change in the silver equivalent of
the money of account are eliminated from the series. Other monetary influences,
which might have resulted from an absolute increase in the total amount of money,
or from an increasing circulation rate of the total amount of money, could not be
taken into consideration.
Figure 9 representing the "long waves" of the trend-free and deflationed prices
shows that the process of deflationing prices neither influences the shape, nor the po¬
sition of the long-term cycies. The trend of these deflationed prices appears to take
an approximately stationary course since the beginning ofthe 17th Century, whereas
concerning the 16th Century, an increasing trend can be ascertained within the series,
now as before. Because of this fact, there is no doubt that the price-revolution which
occurred in this Century was not due to a debasement of the circulating silver mon-
76. Long-term cycies were very early explained by changes of monetary variables see e. g. Kon¬
dratieff: Die langen Wellen (supra, n. 15), p. 595 ff., this question is still under discussion,
cf. e.g. Rostow, W. W.: Why the Pour get Richer and the Richer Slow Down, Austin 1980,
esp., Money and Prices, p. 189ff., concerning the pre-industrial period see Braudel, F. P.:
Spooner, F.: Prices in Europe from 1450 to 1750. In: The Economy of Expanding Europe
in the 16th and 17th Centuries. = The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. IV,
publ. by E. E. Rieh and C. H. Wilson, Cambridge 1967, and also Abel's remarks, Abel, W.:
Agrarkrisen und Agrarkonjunktur. Hamburg/Berlin 1978, p. 13ff.; p. 188f.
77. See the detailed criticism of the historical sources in Ebeling/Irsigler: Getreideumsatz, Ge¬
treide- und Brotpreise in Köln, 1368-1797, 1. Teil, Mitt. aus dem Stadtarchiv von Köln,
Köln/Wien 1976, p. 11 ff. As the prices are handed down in money of account, they are
very much influenced by inflationary movements. The actual value ofthe money of account
can be determined with the aid of the silver contents of the coins which were actually
minted. In order to exclude the changes in prices which were due to the demonetization of
the money of account, all prices were multiplied with the silver weight of the albus of ac¬
count.
78. All pre-industrial grain price series are nominal price series, see Sprenger, B.: Preisindizes
unter besonderer Berücksichtigung verschiedener Münzsorten als Bezugsgrößen für das 16.
und 17. Jahrhundert — dargestellt anhand von Getreidepreisen in Frankfurt/Main. In:
Scripta Mercaturae 1 (1977), pp. 57-72; concerning the Situation in Cologne see Ebeling/Ir¬
sigler: Getreideumsatz (supra, n. 77) p. 32 ff.
79. In order to deflate these prices we have made use of the tables published in Ebeling/Irsig¬
ler: Getreideumsatz (supra, n. 77) p. 38 ff. Within a project which is concerned with the
"Geld- und Währungsgeschichte Mitteleuropas von 1300-1800", and is promoted by the
"Stiftung Volkswagenwerk", a group of scientists under the leadership of Prof. F. Irsigler at
the University of Trier is attempting to compile such long-term tables for other towns, too.
See Irsigler, F.: Das Projekt: Geld- und Währungsgeschichte Mitteleuropas im Spätmittel¬
alter und der Frühen Neuzeit. In: Quantitative Methoden in der Wirtschafts- und Sozialge¬
schichte der Vorneuzeit, hrsg. v. F. Irsigler. Stuttgart 1978 (= Historisch Sozialwissen-
schaftl. Forschungen Bd. 4).
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1640 1660
YEARS
X DEFLATIONED PRICES
O TREND FREE PRICES
? LONG WAVES
Fig 9 Long waves of deflationed wheat prices
ey
80
The presumption that long-term cycies are only expressions of the fluctuating
cunency stability81 cannot be supported by these few results, on the contrary the
system of small change, which proves to have been extremely unstable in the pre-in-
80 The term "pnce-revolution" is used in hterature to describe the process of rise in pnces
There is not yet a common agreement on the causes of this phenomenon See Abel W
Agrarknsen (supra, n 76), p 122 ff, see as well Irsigler F Getreidepreise, Getreidehandel
und stadtische Versorgunspolitik in Köln vornehmlich im 15 und 16 Jahrhundert In Die
Stadt in der Europaischen Geschichte Festschnft Edith Ennen, hrsg v W Besch, K Fehn
u a Bonn 1972, who excellently discusses the fundamental problems and functions of gram
pnces in pre-modern times with the aid of the Cologne example
81 The term "currency stabüity" designates the contents of precious metal ofthe coins which
were mmted over a long penod of time The other monetary factors ofa possible destabili-
zation of the economic system were not taken into consideration, as to these factors see
Schuttenhelm, J Der Geldumlauf im sudwestdeutschen Raum vom Rudhnger Munzver-
trag 1423 bis zur ersten Kipperzeit 1618 Eine statistische Munzfundanalyse unter Anwen
düng der elektronischen Datenverarbeitung, 2 Bde (under preparation) and Spooner s
treatise which is of general importance, Spooner, F C The International Economy and
Monetary Movements in France, 1493-1725, Cambridge Mass 1972
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dustrial period, seems to have effected only the trend, but not the long-term cyclical
variations of the price series.
If, however, the long-term movement of the English and German real wage index
is included in the comparison,82 a striking uniformity of both series, the courses of
which are quite the reverse of the long-term movement of grain prices, can be dis-
cerned tili the 70s/80s ofthe 19th Century. This result emphasizes the importance of
the development of agrarian, especially of grain prices for the change of the level of
real wages until the beginning of the industrial "take-off. In the following period
more complex factors seem to have operated, therefore, a model which is based on
such a small number of factors does not suffice any longer to explain the economic
development In this context, it is very remarkable that the German development is
marked by much shorter cycies since the 70s/80s of the 19th Century, whereas the
English index passes through one more complete "long wave" since 1890.83 These re¬
sults can only be interpreted, however, with serious provisos because the deteriora-
tions caused by the two World Wars can hardly be measured.
IV. Comments on the problem of interpreting "long waves" within their historical
dimension of time
In the following paragraph the importance ofthe "long waves" deduced with the aid
of a small number of indicators and their Classification in the present State of histori¬
cal growth and business-cycle research shall be described in rough outlines. The au¬
thors who have been concerned with the problem of dating trend-periods and "long
waves" of the pre-industrial period have, as a rule, based their analyses on series of
grain prices. These series have been analyzed with the aid of rather different meth¬
ods.84 Irrespective of this fact, a comparison between the results achieved seems to be
82. This analysis of the real wage indices does not intend to contribute to the discussion about
the development of real wages and of the living Standard. The only aim is, to test whether
long-term cyclical oscillations of the Kondratieff-type emerge from these series, or not. The
economic and social relevance of such a pattern of oscillations for the question ofthe living
Standard is quite a different problem. Apart from the literature mentioned in n. 122 see De¬
sai, V.: Real Wages in Germany 1871-1913, Oxford 1968; Bry, G.: Wages in Germany
1871-1945. Princeton 1960; Weigand, E.: Zur historischen Entwicklung der Löhne und Le¬
benshaltungskosten in Deutschland. In: Historische Sozialforschung 19 (1981), July; for
England e.g. Hobsbawm, E. J.: The Standard of Living during the Industrial Revolution. A
Discussion. In: Economic History Review 16 (1963); Flinn, M. W.: Trends in Real Wages
1750-1850. In: The Economic History Review 27 (1974), pp. 395-413; Tunzelmann, G. N.
von: Trends in Real Wages, 1750-1850, Revisited. In: The Economic History Review 32
(1979), pp. 33-49.
83. See the comments made by Gömmel which concern this period: Realeinkommen in
Deutschland. Ein internationaler Vergleich. Nürnberg 1979 (= Vorträge zur Wirtschafts¬
geschichte, hrsg, v. H. Kellenbenz; J. Schneider, Heft 4).
84. Apart from Abels and Neveux's treatises, which have already been mentioned, see Rostow,
W. W.: The World Economy (supra, n. 24), pp. 81-90; van der Wee, H.: Prices and Wages
as Development Variables (supra, n. 19); Freiburg, H.: Agrarkonjunktur und Agrarstruktur
in vorindustrieller Zeit. In: Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 64
(1977), pp. 289-327.
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of advantage because of the uniformity of the material that has been used. For in¬
stance, the "long waves" of grain prices were determined by Ebeling/Irsigler by
means ofthe Cologne grain prices.85 The dating of these series was based on material
that had been smoothed by means of a binomial filter. The trend periods were conse¬
quently at the centre of interest. This procedure differs from the method I have intro¬
duced in this paper, both from the methodical point of view and in the way it concep-
tualizes the object which is analyzed. Nevertheless, fairly astonishing results were
achieved: showing identical turning-points, the upswings from 1620-42, 1668-98 and
1736-70, to which Ebeling/Irsigler refer, are all characterized in our representation
by cyclical downswings. As this kind of dating ofthe upswings largely corresponds to
the results achieved by other scientists,86 a more precise analysis of the state of af¬
fairs proves to be necessary.
To this end, the trend eliminated with the aid ofthe notch-filter was calculated and
represented in a graph: The trend determined with the aid ofthe filter theory reveals
a mounting course with wavy tendency (see Fig. 10). The upswings and downswings
1720 1760
YEARS
X LONG WAVES
O TREND
? TREND-FREE PRICES
Fig. 10: Trend and long waves of wheat prices
85. Ebeling/Irsigler: Getreidepreise (supra, n. 77), p. 47.
86. As to such datings, the corresponding periods are in most cases interpreted as phases of en-
forced economic growth. See e.g. Braudel/Spooner: Prices in Europe (supra, n 76), p. 436,
whose comments mainly refer to Baehrers treatises.
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of the trend take a course that is quite the reverse of the "long waves" of the trend-
free series.
The supposition that this result is due to the method that has been used requires a
careful analysis of this phenomenon. To this end, the attempt has been made of elim-
inating the trend from the series with the aid of modified filter parameters in a way
that any wavy movement ought to be eliminated from the trend.87 Figures 11 and 12
indicate that this aim cannot be achieved without abandoning the previous definition
of trend that underlies this procedure.88
Although the frequency domain within which the notch-filter is meant to out-filter
frequencies can be reduced in size, as much as you like, non periodical oscillations
are simultaneously transferred into the filter-output in increasing numbers. This kind
of procedure soon collides with the trend-definition given beforehand.89 The effect is
1720 1760
YEARS
X LONG WAVES
0 TREND
Q TREND-FREE PRICES
Fig. 11: Trend and long waves of wheat prices ** Delta = 0.01 **
87. The ulterior motif was to transfer more low-frequencies into the filter-output by means of a
diminution of the Delta, in order to smooth the trend.
88. In this series, the spectrum clearly exhibits a "trend" in the trend-free series.
89. As to these problem see, Schulte, H.: Statistisch-methodische Untersuchungen (supra, n.
10), p. 157 ff.
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Fig 12 Spectrum of trend-free wheat prices in Fig 11
that the spectral density function exhibits an increasing quantity of spectral mass
within the zero frequency band As has been expected, the numerical course of the
filtered senes changes along with the change of the trend-defimtion, and from this re¬
sults a shifting ofthe turning-points of the "long waves" That is due to the fact that
with the reduction of the notch such a great number of low-frequency oscillation
components are transferred into the filter-output that the initial senes and the filtered
senes are in extreme cases nearly identical
90
Consequently, both senes achieve an
identical dating of the "long waves" The questions whether this procedure leads to a
colhsion between the purposes, or whether the results achieved have only been con¬
ditioned by peculianties of the trend elimination, which in turn might depend on the
procedure itself, shall be left undecided
90 With regard to "seasonal adjustment" Stier W Verfahren zur Analyse (supra, n 25), p 89
describes this effect
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In this context, is must be pointed out that the trend eliminated from the series
which show exponential growth does not take a wavy course, which might be the re¬
verse of the trend-free series, on the contrary, the trend proves to take an exponen¬
tiaUy increasing course.
If, however, this phenomenon does not result from a methodically exact Separation
of oscillations in the low-frequency domain, it ought to lead to a revision of handed-
down conceptions in economic history. The problems attached to these questions are
evident: A methodically exact trend removal, which can be tested by means ofthe fil-
ter-theory, eliminates a kind of trend that has hitherto been identified and interpreted
as "long waves". By means ofthe trend removal, the existence of "long waves" can
be proved within the trend-free series, which in turn take a course that is inverse to
the wavy course ofthe trend. The connection between both movements has, however,
not yet been explained.
Some theoretical considerations shall be added which are meant to make the pre¬
liminary result of the inverse course appear more plausible, at least for the pre-indus¬
trial period. In times of economic growth, which manifests itself in the secular move¬
ment of prices, an increase in productivity in its first phase can be ascertained. This
results in the long term, in an improvement in the supply of grain. Owing to this, the
cycies of the price curve, which indicate short-term tendencies of shortage and sur¬
plus within this process of improvement in supply, move erratically down; in conse¬
quence, the short-term cyclical Variation becomes less erratic. This development
abruptly changes at the upper turning-point of the trend-period. The short-term cycle
is enforced, in that, an increased strain on the level of demand and production is evi¬
dent, which in turn leads to a rise ofthe long-term cycle. These considerations appear
to be fairly plausible to explain the movement of grain prices in the pre-industrial pe¬
riod. Production series, however, only partly exhibit the same phenomenon: The
trend course is quite the reverse ofthe "long wave"; that is true as long as the course
of the values of the different series does not show any exponential growth, that
means, before the period of high-industrialization. Because of the fact that such an
inverse-development which can be discerned in production series cannot be plausibly
interpreted, the presumption suggests itself that these results concerning the dating of
the turning-points are conditioned by the method itself. Further analyses ought to
show whether this supposition is really founded on facts and what kinds of methodi¬
cal peculiarities achieve such a result.91
By means of one more example, the results achieved concerning the cycle-length
shall be critically compared with other analyses which have relied on different meth¬
ods. Glismann/Rodemer/Wolter92 made the attempt of achieving an international
comparative dating of "long waves" by means of several series for the period from
1800-1979. The methodical procedure can be regarded as representative of a great
number of treatises that have been concerned with this problem. The trend is esti-
91. Because of this reason, the data given in Tables 3 and 4 can only be used with the proviso
of further analyses. It must, however, be mentioned once again that the determination of
the cycle-length and of the lengths of the upswings and downswings does not depend on
this problem.
92. Glismann, H. H.; Rodemer, H.; Wolter, F.: Lange Wellen wirtschaftlichen Wachstums (su¬
pra, n. 28).
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mated as exponential trend according to the least Squares method
93
This estimate
cannot, however, be numencally determined within the frequency domain
94
The se¬
nes of Investments in the United Kingdom from 1830 to 1975, for instance, exhibits
several cycies, at least tili about 1890, whereas its course escapes a clear Interpreta¬
tion for the period from 1914 tili 1940
95
The authors deduce from this and other sim¬
ilar courses of different series that the economic development in the United King¬
dom may be fitted very well into the pattern of "Kondratieff-cycles"
96
This result is
very surprising in connection with the Statement of these authors97 that there is a pos¬
sibility of denving long-term oscillations with a duration of 30 or more years from
some of the German index numbers, l e, long-term cycies which are shorter than
"Kondratieff-cycles" This hypothesis can be supported by comparative analyses
which I have recentiy made The spectral analysis of senes from which the trend has
been eliminated by means of the notch-filter reveals the existence of a cycle with an
average length of nearly 36 years
98
Leaving aside the problem of how to date the
turning-points, the course of the series shows much shorter cycies than is typical of
the "Kondratieff-cycles" The course of the senes, which has been made trend-free
by means of the exponential function,99 clearly shows that the exponential trend un-
derestimates the cyclical development tili 1880, consequently, nearly all values are
marked by a positive amphtude tili that date If the trend is, however, calculated by
means of the procedure discussed in this paper, the effects which it has on the fre¬
quency domain are already known, much shorter cycies are indicated within the
course of the trend-free series If the attempt is made to transform the trend by means
of the filter-theory, the great cycle, which Ghsmann/Rodemer/Wolter deduced as
"bürgerlicher Kondratieff proves to be a sequence of much shorter-term cycies in
which trend is still discernable Without discussing the serious problems attached to
such an approach any further, it should be noted that a proof of really existing cycies
presupposes an exact determination of non-penodical oscillations within the time-se-
nes, with the aid ofthe filter-theory That is the only possibility of preventing oscilla-
tion components, which must be taken into consideration as part of the trend be¬
cause they do not prove to have a periodical course, from influencing the dating of
cyclical phenomena Combined with spectral analysis this procedure offers the only
opportunity of distinguishing between the different types of cyclical fluctuations
which are of histoncal relevance, in an analyticaUy exact way In view of the impor¬
tance attached to empincal results in economic-histoncal modeis, the discussion
93 This procedure is justified as follows "Der gewählte Funktionstyp muß die tatsächliche
Entwicklung (stressed by R M) möglichst genau beschreiben
*
Glismann et al p 77
This, however, presupposes that this development is known beforehand
94 See the cntical comments on an exponential trend course, Schulte H Statistisch methodi
sehe Untersuchungen (supra, n 10), p 115
95 This emerges from Figure 4 pubhshed by the authors, p 105
96 Glismann et al, p 80 Inspite of these 'international parallelen Entwicklungen deviations
can be ascertained, of course
97 Glismann et al, p 77 "Aus einigen Kennziffern konnte gefolgert werden, daß möglicher
weise eine längerfristige Schwingung mit einer Phase von 30 oder mehr Jahren besteht
98 See the values in Table 2 and Figure 21 concerning the course of the trend-free senes
99 See Figure A 4, Glismann et al, p 105
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about the peculiarities which are conditioned by the procedure ought to be intensi¬
fied in a way that has hitherto been thought unnecessary.
V. Summary and prospects
The results of spectral analysis indicate the existence of long-term cyles in all the se¬
ries that have been analyzed. Such a proof presupposes an exact transformation of
those components of oscillation of a series which cannot be proved any Ionger as pe¬
riodical oscillations within the respective length of the series, and which are as a rule
subsumed under the term "trend". It is, however, only in agrarian price series that
those cycle-lenghts which are regarded as typical of the "Kondratieff-type" can be
proved by means of spectral analysis.100 The other series that have been analyzed ap¬
pear to exhibit much shorter cycies, at least during the period of evident growth.101
After the series have been filtered with the aid of several other filters, the courses of
the long-term cycies reveal clear differences in respect to their formal characteristics.
These extreme differences in the lengths ofthe different cycies and in the duration of
the upswings and downswings are of great importance for a further evaluation and
interpretation of this pattern of oscillations. There is, however, much reason to doubt
whether such a sequence of cycies can still be interpreted theoretically or whether it
must be regarded as the result of specific historical events and detached from a con¬
cept of relations between variables.102 On the other hand, the representation of these
long-term cycies within their dimension of time clearly shows the heuristic value of
modeis which starting from a hypothetical cycle-length try to define those complexes
of variables that generate cycies of this very length, or at least try to make them plau¬
sible.103 The scientist must, however, be always aware of the danger of constructing
approaches of explanation of phenomena which in reality do not exist, or which exist
in a completely different form.
As the course of the "long waves" represented here appears to result from a wavy
Variation of the level of shorter-term cycies, it is worth while questioning to what ex¬
tent "long waves" are only formal expressions of specific characteristics of succes¬
sive shorter-term cycies.104 It depends on the answer to this question whether "long
waves" can be of use as autonomous explanatory elements.
100. An average length of about 50 years is generally assumed, see e.g. Rostow, W. W.: The
Long Cycle: An Integrated View. In: Rostow: Why the Poor get Richer (supra, n. 76),
p.4.
101. Both, the results ofthe spectral analysis, and the historical course of these cycies confirm
this fact.
102. An approval of this view would limit the explanatory value of such a model very much;
Spree, R.: Was kommt nach den "langen Wellen" (supra, n. 2), p. 311.
103. See Wagner, A.: Demographische Ursachen langfristiger Wachstumszyklen? Fragen zur
Konzeption ökonomischer Zyklentheorien. In: Schröder/Spree: Historische Konjunktur¬
forschung (supra, n. 1), p. 339 ff. Although Wagner argues that this hypothetical cycle-
length is problematic, he tries to overcome this difficulty by taking recourse to the demo¬
graphic development, but without determining the uncertain cycle-length empirically, be¬
forehand. Wagner is not the only one who tries to solve this problem in such a way.
104. As to the relevance of such an idea for the Kuznets-cycles, see Metz/Spree: Kuznets-Zyklen
(supra, n. 11), p. 365.
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Irrespective of these problems, the fact that short-term cycies exhibit a specific
course requires an explanation of those factors of macro-economic dynamics which
cause the turn of the course of the different cycies with an appreciable regularity.
Even if the scientist regards "long waves" as a sequence of phases of the structural
change ofthe whole society, he has to explain those factors beforehand.105 The inter¬
pretation of empirical evidences is rendered more difficult by the fact that if one tries
to date the turning-points, it cannot be estimated how far the results that have been
achieved, especially the inverse course of the upswings and downswings in the
trend and in the "long wave," are conditioned by the Statistical procedures. This re-
Pnce index of agrarian
produets - England
Wheat pnce England
Rye price Germany
Wheat price Germany
1540 70 1600 30 60 1700
Fig. 13a: Schematic course of the "long waves" in the individual series 1531-1700
sult ought to be carefully analyzed with the aid of the filter-theory, in particular the
special characteristics ofthe phase ofthe filter within the low-frequency domain.106
Filters which dispose of a piain zero-phase, and which moreover achieve an exact
Separation between the trend and the "long wave" are being developed and, there¬
fore, relevant results might be achieved by future research work.107
Notwithstanding the fact that these methodical difficulties have not yet been
solved, the use of formally exact methods already indicates the necessity of revising
105. See Spree, R.: Was kommt nach den "langen Wellen" (supra, n. 2), p. 311.
106. On principle, the phase of these recursive filters can only be analyzed with certain provisos,
see Stier, W.: Verfahren zur Analyse (supra, n. 25), p. 67 ff. The results which have been
achieved, however, imply that the filter causes a phase shift near by the zero point.
107. These filters work according to a principle that differs very much from the one of the recur¬
sive filters. See the report on Stier's lecture before the commitee of the "Deutsche Stati¬
stische Gesellschaft für Neuere Statistische Methoden" on: Konstruktionsprinzipien digi¬
taler Filter. In: Allg. Stat, Archiv 65 (1981), 1. Heft, p. 101.
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traditional conceptions about the shape and the contents of economic terms. Con¬
tents that are constituent of economic terms have nearly always been derived from an
inadequate use ofthe results of simple Statistical procedures, as for example from the
calculation of polynomials of low degree. The analytical tools which are roughly de¬
scribed in this paper achieve an exact transformation of scientific terms into ade¬
quate formal-statistical concepts, i. e., into different types of filters. The fact that a
clear Separation between the trend and the "long wave" can be achieved by means of
these filters indicates the necessity of defining scientific terms more precisely and
with more attention to the methods than has hitherto been done. An empirical-statis-
tical analysis ought to be preceded by a new attempt to define the main terms of eco-
1720 1760
YEARS
600 1840 1880
X NOMINAL PRICES
O TREND-FREE PRICES
? LONG WAVES
Fig. 14: "Long waves" ofthe German rye prices 1542-1948
nomic and historical research in a way that shall be appropriate to the new methods
of analysis of time-series, if an empirical proof cannot be achieved otherwise. This
kind of empirical research also points to the difficulties which arise if ambiguous
economic terms are transformed into formal-statistical terms without being scientifi¬
cally conceptualized beforehand. This, for example, applies to the decision about
what is to be defined as trend, in terms of the filter-theory. The empirical results
prove that by means of spectral analysis only the limits within which a sound defini-
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Fig. 15: "Long waves" ofthe English wheat prices 1542-1927
tion is to be found can be determined. This fact clearly shows that statistical-mathe-
matical procedures cannot claim to offer an opportunity of determining the meaning
and dimension of economic terms. On the contrary, the important function of such
methods for economic history is to confront economic and historical terms, modeis
or theoretical Systems with empirical evidences, in order to deduce clear Statements
about the explanatory value of such theoretical constructions. Statistics can play an
important role in this research-process only if the empirical evidences which contra-
dict these modeis induce the scientist to revise his theoretical concepts.
Appendix
Description ofthe empirical data.
The Cologne wheat and rye prices were drawn from the edition published by Ebe¬
ling/Irsigler.108 As regards the quotations of prices, they are unweighted nominal av-
108. See the exact description of the source in Ebeling/Irsigler: Getreideumsatz (supra, n. 77).
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erage annual prices of the Cologne weekly market from 1531 to 1796 In order to
compare them with quotations of pnces of later periods, the Cologne prices had to be
uniformly converted into Reichsmark per ton, to this end, all quotations of pnces
had to be multiphed with the silver equivalent of the albus of account109 of 1777 and
the results had to be divided through the fictive silver content of the 'Reichsmark',
which was measured at 5 56 gramme
n0
In addition, the weight per malter, which was
-) r
1620 1660 \7S0 1820
YEARS
X LONG WAVES
<!> TREND FREE VALUES
Fig 16 "Long waves" ofthe English agranan pnce index 1672-1927
109 Because of reasons of compatabihty all the pnces had to be reduced to gramme silver the
use of the last given value of silver of the "Albus of account' guarantees that there is no
shift of level within the series The silver value is 0 157 g, see Ebeling/Irsigler Getreideum
satz (supra, n 77), p 42
110 See Abel W Agrarkonjunktur (supra, n 76), p 290 ff concerning the problems of reduc
tion of coins and measures esp p 293
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Fig. 17: "Long waves" ofthe English cotton yarn production 1711-1939
measured at 117 kg for wheat, and at 108 kg for rye,111 had to be converted into units
of 1,000 kg. The analyses referring to the period from 1797 to 1817 were based on the
Berlin wheat prices, which have been published in Wilhelm Abel's book. In order to
avoid a shift ofthe price level of these series, they had to be chained statistically.112
The quotations from 1818 to 1850 and from 1876 to 1913 refer to the Cologne wheat
prices, as well; those concerning the period from 1851 to 1875 had to be completed
with quotations drawn from the "Vierteljahresheft zur Statistik des Deutschen
111. There are different data in literature concerning dry measure reductions. The data pub¬
lished here are based on the malter weights given by Ebeling/Irsigler. Abels data are
slightly different: Agrarkrisen (supra, n. 76), p. 294.
112. As to the Statistical problems see Anderson, O.: Indexzahlen. In: Handwörterbuch der
Wirtschaftswissenschaften, 4. Bd., Stuttgart/New York 1978, pp. 98-108.
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Fig 18 "Long waves" ofthe English coal production 1711-1939
Reiches"
113 The quotations of prices concerning the period from 1914 to 1959 were
drawn from the senes of producers' pnces of agncultural produets pubhshed by
Hoffmann m All these quotations of prices are nominal pnces,115 the same is true of
the rye pnces
The senes of the English wheat prices referring to the period from 1531 to 1770
were taken from the Exeter wheat prices published by Beveridge, and those concern-
113 Concerning the descnption ofthe material see Ebeling/Irsigler Zur Entwicklung (supra, n
32), p 301 ff
114 Hoffmann W G , Grumbach F Hesse H Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft seit
der Mitte des 19 Jahrhunderts Berlin 1965
115 This is not even altered by a multiplication with a constant silver weight
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Fig. 19: "Long waves" ofthe real wage index in Gemany 1820-1959
ing the time from 1771 to 1938 were drawn from the "London Gazette"116, which
published the official prices for England, Wales and Scotiand.117 All the prices had
to be converted into Shilling per Imperial Quarter (Winchester Quarter = 281,9 liters,
Imperial Quarter=290,8 liters).118 The series concerning the English vegetable agrar¬
ian produets contains three different series of indices. These series were in turn se¬
lected with regard to the highest degree of uniformity of the data inquiry and of the
contents of the shopping-basket, moreover, the material had to be comparable with
116. Price indices were taken from Mitchell, B. R.; Deane, Ph.: Abstract of British Historical
Statistics. Cambridge 1971, p. 484ff.
117. As to this material, cf. also Abel, W.: Agrarkrisen (supra, n. 76), p. 295 ff.
118. According to Abel, a.a.O., p. 296f. the Winchester Quarter comprised 281,9 and the Imper¬
ial Quarter 290,8 liters.
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Fig. 20: "Long waves" ofthe real wage index in England 1820-1959
the German series. In detail, the following indices were chained statistically:
Schumpeter's index to "Consumers' goods (a)" from 1661 to 1822; from 1822 to 1913
Rouseaux's index to "Vegetable Products (a)"; from 1914 to 1938 Sauerbeck's index
to "Vegetable (a)".119 In contrast to the index determined by Gayer, Rostow,
Schwartz, which can be regarded as the best of all price indices for the period from
1790 to 1850, all the indices mentioned above were calculated without being
weighted before.
The quotations concerning the English cotton-yarn production were drawn from
Hoffmann's book.120 Hoffmann compiled this index series with the aid of different
119. Regarding the index series see Mitchell/Deane: Abstract (supra, n. 116), p. 468 ff., the let¬
ters put in brackets refer to the respective footnotes of the series in Mitchell/Deane.
120. As to the following remarks see Hoffmann, W. G.: British Industry 1700-1950. Oxford
1965, p. 228-230, 254 f.
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Fig. 21: "Long waves" ofthe real gross domestic investments in the United Kingdom
1841-1968
series; their representative value consequently varies from series to series. For in¬
stance, the cotton stored in England until 1800 was completely left out of considera¬
tion. It is due to the fact that the contents ofthe different series of indices are subject
to permanent changes that the results achieved can only be interpreted with great
provisos. Moreover, it must be taken into account that the series concerning the pe¬
riod from 1700 to 1800 differs very much in its indicatory function from the series
which refers to the subsequent period. The same applies to the series of the English
coal production. From 1700 to 1853 the content of this series differ very much from
that which refer to the subsequent period.
The compilation ofthe English series of real wages required some additional steps.
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Table 2: Results of the spectral analysis referring to the "long waves"
in the individual series
(Cycle-length in years, short-term cycies were not listed)
TRE1* TRE1 a.K.** TRE1
(3 notches)
Wheat prices Germany
Rye prices Germany
Wheat prices Cologne (1531-1796)
Wheat prices England
Agrarian price index England
Coal production England
Cotton yarn production England
Real wage index England
Real wage index Germany
Real gross domestic investments U. K.
1830-1979 33 33
* after trend elimination with a notch-filter
** after trend elimination with a notch-filter and subsequent lowpass filter (Kaiser-
filter)
This was due to the fact that the real wage index determined by Phelps Brown121
does not start before 1860. To this end, the nominal wages paid for both industrial122
and agricultural labour123 had to be summed up to one total index according to the
percentage of persons employed in the different sectors of production. In order to
achieve an appropriate weighting for each year, the estimates made by Deane/Cole
about the percentage of persons employed in the lines of production: agriculture,
forestry, fishing, manufacture, mining, and industry had to be lineary interpoled.124
The total wage index resulting from this procedure was thereupon deflationed until
60 60 -
60 60 -
60 60 -
60 60 -
55 55 -
40 40 40
30 30 30, 19
50 50 -
NF, 40 32 32
121. Phelps Brown, E. H.: Levels and Movements of Industrial Productivity and Real Wages In¬
ternationally Compared, 1860-1970. In: The Economic Journal 83 (1973), pp. 58-71.
122. As to the period from 1809-1850, the index series of average wages of different professions
publ. by Mitchell, B. R.: European Historical Statistics, 1750-1970. London 1975, p. 184
and p. 190 is concerned. As to the period from 1850-59, the series is based on Wood's trea¬
tise. G. H. Wood: Real Wages and the Standard Comfort since 1850. In: Journal ofthe
Royal Statistical Society (1909).
123. The data concerning wages in agriculture in England and Wales were taken from Mitchell/
Dearte; Abstract (supra, n. 116), p. 348 ff.
124. The relative importance of the wages of the different lines of production for the whole
wage level can be estimated to some extent by means of the proportion of persons em¬
ployed in the different branches of production. Although the data published by Deane/
Cole: British Economic Growth 1688-1959. Cambridge 21969, p. 142, may be faulty, they
were nevertheless used to determine the index of real wages as they appeared to reflect the
general tendency rather correctly.
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1850 with the general price index determined by Gayer/Rostow/Schwartz125 and for
the period from 1851 to 1859 with Rousseaux's price index,126 which to this end had
to be chained, before, with the index determined by Gayer/Rostow/Schwartz. The
real wage index that resulted from this procedure until 1859 was finally statistically
chained with Phelps Brown's index (1860-1970).
In order to calculate the German real wage index, only two series of indices had to
be chained. For the period from 1809 to 1859 the index compiled by R. Gömmel,127
which seemed to be the most appropriate one to be compared with the English index,
was involved; for the period from 1860 to 1970 Phelps Brown's index was used once
more.
Zusammenfassung:
"Lange Wellen" in wirtschaftshistorischen Reihen Englands und
Deutschlands von der Mitte des 16. bis zur Mitte des 20. Jh.
Angesichts der gegenwärtigen weltweiten Rezession ist das Interesse am Phänomen
der Kondratieff-Zyklen wieder stark belebt worden. Trotz einer intensiven wissen¬
schaftlichen Diskussion und zahlreicher empirischer Analysen besteht bis heute kein
Konsens in der Frage der Realität solcher Zyklen. Zwar zeigen sich in vielen ökono¬
mischen Indikatorenreihen Trendschwankungen, doch es ist sowohl in der theoreti¬
schen wie der statistischen Forschung ungeklärt, ob sich diese Schwankungen mit ei¬
ner angebbaren Regelmäßigkeit wiederholen.
Die Nichtlösbarkeit des Problems in der bisherigen Forschung ist einmal auf das
Fehlen geeigneter Datenreihen zurückzuführen, zum anderen auf den Umstand, daß
kein brauchbares statistisches Verfahren für eine gegenstandsneutrale Untersuchung
zur Verfügung stand. Die zunächst mit hohen Erwartungen eingesetzte Spektralana¬
lyse wird neuerdings mit Recht starker methodischer Kritik unterzogen; denn der in
allen ökonomischen Zeitreihen vorhandene Trend macht eine informative Spektral¬
analyse unmöglich, da diese immer ein Ergebnis liefert, dessen Form bereits Granger
als "typical spectral shape of an economic variable" bezeichnet hat. Ein spektralana-
lytischer Nachweis langer Wellen erfordert daher immer die vorherige Trendbereini¬
gung der Zeitreihe.
Diese exakte Trendbereinigung gelang bislang nicht. Entweder wurden die langen
Wellen mit dem Trend ausgefiltert oder es waren die Auswirkungen der Trendberei¬
nigung im Frequenzbereich nicht überprüfbar, so daß immer offen blieb, ob eventu¬
ell ausgewiesene lange Schwingungen erst durch das Verfahren erzeugt wurden
(Slutzky-Effekt). Die Nichtüberprüfbarkeit der Hypothese von der Existenz langer
Wellen war insgesamt ein sehr unbefriedigender Zustand.
125. Gayer, A.D.: Rostow, W. W.; Schwartz, A. J: The Growth and Fluctuation of the British
Economy 1790-1850, 2 vols., Oxford 1953, vol. 1, p. 468-470.
126. The index can be found in Mitchell/Deane: Abstract (supra, n. 116), p. 471.
127. Gömmel, R.: Realeinkommen in Deutschland. Ein internationaler Vergleich 1810-1914 (su¬
pra, n. 83).
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Ein völlig neuer Weg zur Lösung dieser Frage besteht darin, Zeitreihenanalyse als
Filter-Design-Problem zu begreifen und sich methodisch ganz vom klassischen Kom¬
ponentenmodell zu lösen. Einer Arbeitsgruppe um Prof. Stier in Bochum ist es gelun¬
gen, Filter zu konstruieren, die jene scharfen Trenneigenschaften aufweisen, mit de¬
nen das Problem der langen Wellen optimal angegangen werden kann. Der Schlüssel
liegt in der Kombination dieser neuen rekursiven Filter mit der Spektralanalyse. Da¬
mit lassen sich, über die Intention bisheriger Arbeiten hinausgehend, Form und Lage
von Langfristzyklen in der historischen Zeitdimension erstmals darstellen.
Das Verfahren wurde auf verschiedene Zeitreihen (Preisserien, Produktions- und
Lohndaten) angewandt. Von den z.T. überraschenden Ergebnissen seien nur einige
kurz skizziert: Langfristzyklen sind in allen untersuchten Reihen nachweisbar. Aller¬
dings zeigt sich der typische Kondratieff-Zyklus nur in Preisreihen. Produktionsrei¬
hen weisen eindeutig kürzerfristige Zyklen auf, die vielleicht dem Typ der Kuznets-
Zyklen zuzuordnen sind, wahrscheinlich aber einen neuen Typus langer Wellen dar¬
stellen. Die mit Hilfe der Spektralanalyse diagnostizierten Zyklen-Typen erfahren al¬
lerdings bei der Darstellung in der historischen Zeit wesentliche Modifikationen.
Von Zyklus zu Zyklus ändert sich nicht nur die jeweilige Zyklenlänge, sondern auch
die Dauer der Auf- und Abschwungsphasen. Hinzu kommt, daß die Amplitudenaus¬
schläge deutliche Unterschiede zwischen vorindustrieller und industrieller Zeit auf¬
zeigen.
Vergleichsuntersuchungen mit deflationierten Preisreihen haben gezeigt, daß eine
schwankende Geldwertstabilität nicht Ursache dieser Zyklen sein kann, sondern nur
den Trend beeinflußte.
Die als Trend ausgefilterten nicht-periodischen Schwingungen zeigen keinen
gleichmäßig linearen, sondern einen wellenförmigen Verlauf. Ob es sich bei diesem
Phänomen um ein methodenbedingtes Ergebnis handelt muß vorerst offen bleiben.
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